# E-book "Didactical material of the MOOCs" for the project "MEDITERreg (101047919)

# CONTENTS

**REGIONAL STUDIES**

*(Compiler Olga Brusylovska)*

*E-book on didactics*

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# INTRODUCTION

Subject study of the discipline: Regional studies

Prerequisites and post-requisites (Place of the discipline in the educational program): Prerequisites – Political geography, Foreign policy of Ukraine, Foreign policy and diplomacy of the countries of Asia and Africa, Foreign policy of Latin American countries, US foreign policy, Foreign policy of Eastern European countries, Foreign policy of the countries of Western Europe. Post-requisites – Pre-diploma internship, Master's qualification thesis.

The purpose of the course is to explore the concept of regionalism as a phenomenon of International Relations.

The course objectives: studies of the origins and evolution of regional studies as an object and as a field of research; four main phases: early regionalism, old regionalism (both in Europe and developing countries), new regionalism and the current phase of regionalism, which is called comparative regionalism; the most important schools of scientific thought in the field in terms of theoretical and conceptual formulations, as well as empirical focus; theories that are most useful for the study of regional studies; comparison as a starting point for exploring and theorizing regionalism; Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and North America as examples of the combination of formal and informal actors and institutions in the regions; variety of types of regions and ways of organizing regional space; the multidimensional nature of modern regionalism, security regionalism, economic and development regionalism, environmental and social regionalism; the variety of complex relationships between civil society and political regions, as well as external forces and donor organizations; the connection between the internal consolidation of regions and the strengthening of external influence; the role of regions in global governance through comparisons in security, trade, health, culture and the environment.

Expected learning outcomes. By the end of the course the students will be able to: explain and analyse the nature, sources, and directions of the evolution of international relations, international politics, the foreign policy of states, and the state of theoretical studies of international relations and world politics; identify, assess and foresee political, diplomatic, security, social, and other risks in the field of international relations and global developments; participate in professional discussions in the field of international relations, foreign policy, public communications and regional studies, respect opponents and their points of view, convey information, ideas, problems, solutions and own experience on professional problems to specialists and the general public.

# LECTURE 1
## DEFINITION AND CATEGORIES OF REGIONAL STUDIES

*Definition of region*

According to one of the earliest definitions of the region by Joseph Nye, a region consists of "a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence" (Nye 1968: vii). Regionalism, Nye elaborates, results from "the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions." While many analysts agree that an element of geographic proximity remains essential for defining a region, most now regard Nye's definition as too narrow.

More recently, there has been a tendency to deemphasize the geographic elements of regions altogether, by focusing on the political and ideational character of regions instead. Thus, Frederik Söderbaum defines a region as a "body of ideas, values, and concrete objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security and wealth, peace, and development." (Söderbaum 2002: 5).

The European Parliament adopted in 1988 a "Regionalisation Charter" which defines the notion of "region" as follows (Article 1.1):

"A region is a territory which, from the geographical point of view, constitutes a political cohesion or a complex of territories constituted as a closed structure, whose population is defined by certain common features and which shows a will to continue to preserve and develop this cohesion by stimulating cultural, social and economic progress". At the same time, it follows from Paragraph 2 of Art. 1 that the "common features" denote language, culture, historical tradition and economic and transport interests.

### Concepts of "regionness" and "regionhood"

And what distinguishes a region from a "non-region"? Björn Hettne and Frederik Söderbaum have argued that a region can be identified on the basis of its distinctiveness as a relatively coherent territorial subsystem from the rest of the global system. According to them, "when different processes of regionalization in various fields and at various levels intensify and converge within the same geographical area the cohesiveness and thereby the distinctiveness of the region in the making increases." Regionness therefore describes a process "whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region" (Hettne & Söderbaum 2000: 361). As part of this process, regions gain different levels of regionness which can be increasing or decreasing over time.

The ultimate outcome of these processes of regionalization is "regionhood" – a concept that can be understood in analogy to the concept of "statehood". A region endowed with regionhood can therefore be described as a "non-sovereign governance system with (partial) statehood properties" (van Langenhove 2003). Others have argued that regionhood is only part of the equation and that "regionness" increases along with greater degrees of institutionalization or the redefinition of common norms and identities. More recently, it has been claimed that while these endogenous characteristics are essential they have to be combined with a number of exogenous characteristics in order to bestow regionness amongst a territorial entity. These exogenous characteristics include recognition by outside

actors and the ability to interact or influence other regions or the global governance level (de Lombaerde, et al 2010). A region therefore can be seen as distinguishing itself from other regions and non-regions, due to a combination of these various endogenous and exogenous characteristics.

***Regionalism as a natural principle of territorial organization. Regionalism as a problem of power distribution between the national and regional levels of power***

According to different understandings of the region, regionalism is also interpreted differently.

First, regionalism is a natural, organic principle of the territorial organisation of the social, political, economic and cultural aspects of human communities, the fact that areas with significant natural, economic, social and ethno-cultural differences exist in a country. In this context, regionalism is seen as regional differentiations within a state or supranational entity. Such regionalism aims to make practical use of those opportunities that arise from the natural territorial divisions of modern societies, and hence creates conditions for the rational distribution of power and productive resources among different population groups.

Second, regionalism in politics is the problem of power distribution between the national and regional levels of government. The importance of regionalism is particularly acute both in theory and in practice for those countries that are trying to create a balanced relationship of public administration between the centre and the periphery and to ensure democracy in conditions of decentralisation of power.

Regionalism in this context can be expressed in two ways.

On the one hand, it is the promotion of the region's interests in its relations with higher levels of government, most often with the state. This kind of regionalism is defined by a shared identity, culture, history and geography. Moreover, there are often deliberate and pro-active national and supranational institutions (such as the EU) in regulating regional development. This kind of regionalism reflects state (or supranational) interests in a particular territory (a movement "above").

On the other hand, regionalism can be seen as a generic name for different concepts and strategies to manage spatial disparities within countries and enhance the role of the region in the territorial division of labour, or to compensate for its disadvantages. Thus, regionalism is understood as an approach to addressing and solving economic, social, political and other problems from the perspective of the interests and needs of a particular region. In this context, regionalism is a strategy of regional elites to empower themselves (a movement "from below"). This process can be defined as the self-structuring of society and the mobilisation of regions in politics and economics. Regionalism is based on a regional division of society, and its main objectives are to exploit the natural territorial divisions of contemporary societies as a tool to achieve benefits and to reduce the essential differences between the centre and the regions (stabilisation). Unlike separatism, such regionalism is not destructive (regionalism in its extreme forms acquires negative features from the point of view of the state, whose interest – to preserve

the territorial integrity – collides with the interests of the region). Regionalism describes processes of state decentralisation, movements for ethnic rights and land tenure, transnational cooperation and territorial consolidation. Regionalism is Universalist, neutral in relation to problems of state unity and integration and assumes the existence of a redistributive strategy. Regionalism is a particular strategy, based on a consensus within the region, with the main objective to build stronger and more effective political and administrative political structures in the region in order to accelerate its development. In a broader and looser sense, regionalism can be defined as a sequence of operations between national and regional level elites. The general notion of regionalism can be formulated as a strategy of the political elites of the regions, the aim of which is to redistribute power from the centre to the regions.

Some authors see regionalism as a political movement, an ideology opposed to centralism: regionalism is a way of thinking and acting that prioritises regional interests over state interests; centralism, on the other hand, is based on ignoring regional interests.

### *Classifications/typologies of regionalism*

The various definitions and models that have been developed to analyze regionalism are to a large extent a reflection of the great variety and diversity of existing regional integration process that are complicating any attempt to draw up a definitive typology of regionalism.

I.      The Scope of Regional Integration

One of the most straightforward ways of differentiating regional projects is according to their scope. On the one hand, this concerns simply the number of countries and other actors involved in a process of regional integration. A small group of countries, like the Benelux, for example is likely to behave differently than a continental union, such as the African Union. On the other hand, the scope of a regional project also reveals something about its own raison d'être. While for most regional organizations the decisive membership criteria is a matter of geography, some are also founded on the basis of religion, like the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), linguistics and culture, like the Organisation internationale de la francophonie (OIF), or along mainly functional criteria, like the Council of Europe's focus on human rights and the rule of law. As a result, it seems plausible to differentiate between several broad categories of regions and regional organizations that can be grouped along the following lines:

1. Micro-Regions are most commonly defined as territorial units that are smaller than a state to which they belong, but larger than a municipality. Micro-regions are usually part of a state in the form of provinces or departments. While micro-regions therefore tend to be part of territorial nation states, at times they congregate in cross-border regions to make up larger regional governance structures.

2. Cross-Border Regions consist of several micro-regions forming a unit across state borders. Most of these cross-border regions tend to be of an economic or functional nature, addressing specific issues and problems common to these

regions. Many of them, like the Maputo Development Corridor, can be found in Sub-Saharan Africa, where they tend to address common development issues.

3. Sub-Regions consist of several states that are also part of larger macro-regional units. Examples include the Nordic countries, the Maghreb countries or the Andean countries. Sub-regional formations have often specific geographical or historical roots or might reflect linguistic or cultural similarities. At times they can represent poles of deeper political and economic integration within a macro-region, while at other times they are of a more formalistic or cultural nature.

4. Macro-Regions represent large territorial units comprising a number of different states. Similar to sub-regions, they are often bound by a common geography and history. Examples of these include Europe, South America or South-East Asia. Macro-regional organizations tend to be broad, multipurpose organizations addressing a wide range of political, economic and socio-cultural issues. Regions, of various sizes and shapes, have also developed an increasingly tight network of relations between each other, giving rise to the new phenomenon of interregionalism (Hänggi 2000). These developing relationships have taken several forms. Relations between different regional groupings have usually developed in forms of periodic summits held between the relevant organizations. Many of these group-to-group relationships have been driven by the EU, like the EU-ASEAN, EU-Mercosur and EU-African Union summits. But similar relations have also sprung up between other groupings, including the ASEAN-GCC meeting or the Mercosur-CER meetings. Another category of arrangements have been transregional in character, uniting groups of countries from different regions. These have included the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and several others. Finally, relations between regional groupings and single powers have also become increasingly common, including for example regular EU-Russia, EU-USA and ASEAN-Australia meetings.

II. The Depth of Regional Integration

One way of comparing the depth of different projects of regional integration is to draw on the concept of regionness as developed by Björn Hettne and Frederik Söderbaum (Hettne & Söderbaum 2000). This concept seeks to describe regionalization as a process that evolves through a number of different stages as a region progresses towards regionhood. They describe five general levels of regionness that define the depth of regional integration in a particular geographical space:

1. Regional Space: a primarily geographical unit delimited by more or less natural physical barriers and marked by ecological characteristics. In such a territory, people develop a kind of translocal relationship.

2. Regional Complex: emerges through increased social contacts and transactions between previously more isolated groups. The constituent units become dependent on each other as well as on the overall stability of the system.

3. Regional Society: the creation of a de jure or formal region, characterized by the appearance of a number of different actors apart from the state (markets,

transnational companies, civil society) that move towards transcendence of national space, making use of more rule-based patterns of relationships.

4. Regional Community: the emergence of a distinct regional collective identity with institutionalized or informal actor capabilities. This is also characterized by a mutually reinforcing relationship between the 'formal' and the 'real' region.

5. Regional State: the creation of a regional institutionalized polity resulting from the evolution of a group of formerly sovereign national communities into a new form of political entity that is based on a feeling of belonging to a region. Classifying regions according to their "levels of regionness" remains, however, only of limited use for the purpose of comparison. It allows us to distinguish between those regions that are at the stage of a regional community and might be moving towards a region state (such as Europe) and others that remain largely at the level of regional society (Asia, Latin America) or even a regional complex (Middle East).

However, this classification is mainly applicable to macro-regions and relies on relatively broad and unrefined categories. Moreover, while this approach allows for the fact that regions can gain as well as loose in their levels of regionness, this process is being described in quasi-teleological terms in the sense that one step is seen as building on another. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it ignores the multidimensional character of regionalism. To move beyond the broad categories that are implicit in the "levels of regionness" approach therefore requires an unbundling of the different dimensions of regionalism.

III. The Drivers of Regional Integration

Another defining characteristic that differentiates between various projects of regional integration are the drivers of integration. While it is possible that these drivers change over time as new issues come to the fore in order to replace the original rationale for cooperation as the process develops and deepens (for example through spill-over), the initial impetus for engaging in regional cooperation is likely to have a considerable impact on the shape and nature of regionalism.

Of course, these drivers might overlap, as it can be expected that frequently there exists more than one particular reason for states to engage in a common process of region-building. Regardless, it seems possible to differentiate between four plausible drivers of regional integration (Higgott 2006):

1. Rationalist-economic: A form of regionalism that is market-led and informal. The initial impetus for regionalism in this case is likely to be the integration of production chains on a regional level in a process that is driven by private businesses and other private actors. As companies trade regionally and production chains become more integrated there is likely to be a growing demand for common rules and regulations in order to ease transactions and trade flows. The form of regional cooperation that is likely to emerge, at least initially, is going to be flexible and intergovernmental. ASEAN could be considered a prime example of this kind of integration.

2. Legal-political: A form of regionalism that is state-led, formal and highly institutionalized. Rather than starting with private actors, the original impetus for

this kind of regional integration is likely to be a strong political consensus on the part of participating states. Based on a shared political vision, states engage in this kind of regionalism voluntarily to solve common problems and achieve common goals. In order to do so they subject themselves to legally-binding rules and build common institutions to ensure the enforcement of these rules. Once these rules are applied, spill-over into other areas is likely to take place. The EU is an example of this kind of regional integration, driven by a common political vision and strong legal rules.

3. Power-balancing: A form of regionalism that is state-led and informal. Unlike the previous form of regional cooperation, this form of regionalism is mainly driven by security interests and directed at a third party. Rather than pursuing a shared political vision or addressing common transnational problems, states bandy together in order to balance an outside actor or group of actors. In contrast to the legal-political variant, the main purpose of this kind of regional cooperation is to preserve the sovereignty and autonomy of participating states vis-à-vis an outside actor and not to transfer sovereignty to common institutions. NATO represents an example of this kind of regional integration during the Cold War, as do other regional security organizations.

4. Socio-cultural: A form of regionalism that is informal and can be both state- and society-led. A kind of cognitive regionalism that builds on shared cultural, linguistic, religious, historical or emotional affiliations in order to create a common transnational community. Institutionalization in this case is likely to be weak, although might result due to functional spill-over. The initial impetus might derive from a state, as was the case with Saudi Arabia and the Organization for the Islamic Conference (OIC). Alternatively, civil-society might play an important role as in the founding of the Council of Europe on the basis of the Pan-European movement.

### *Regionalism and regionalization*
The literature distinguishes between regionalism tout court and the process of regionalization. If in some publications the terms "regionalism" and "regionalisation" are used synonymously, they have a number of differences, which can be summarised as follows:

- Regionalism represents a certain strategy, an intention to establish regions as subjects of managerial decisions and redistribution of powers between the centre and the regions, taking into account and being aware of the national, economic and other characteristics inherent in the region; regionalism aims to secure the interests of the region.

- Regionalisation is the real process of redistributing power from the centre to the regions, taking into account all the peculiarities and needs of the region; it has the aim of accelerating socio-economic development and creating a balanced distribution of resources between the central and regional levels.

Ideas of regionalism come from below, from the regions, while regionalisation, in contrast, comes from above, from the national level, is the result of actions taken by the state or by individual central authorities.

Until the end of the twentieth century, the term "regionalization" appeared in the categorical conceptual apparatus of geography, regional studies and was used to systematize and identify features at the regional level. Currently, the concept of regionalization is actively used in studies by political scientists, specialists in international relations and geopolitics, economists, historians, sociologists and other researchers. Finally, this notion is used by such discipline as regional studies. It should also be noted that integration processes in scientific research in the studied area are only gaining momentum and as a result, the number of disciplines that address the category of regionalization will only increase. In this regard, the term has become interdisciplinary and has many definitions, covering the processes studied from different perspectives.

Regionalisation is a process aimed at creating an interrelated political and economic system that ensures the special status of regional entities in the political system of the state, the participation of regions in the exercise of state power, their relative economic and fiscal independence in a unitary state.

The underlying causes of regionalisation are

1) The regions' desire for self-governance, the sharing of responsibility for managerial decisions between central and regional authorities, and an increase in the coefficient of power;

2) An attempt to allow the regions to develop themselves;

3) The increasing complexity of economic, environmental and social problems, which require a new approach to the distribution of state powers;

4) Cultural and historical issues;

5) Integration.

Regionalisation is one of the stages of increasing the complexity of the structure of society within the development of socio-political systems. In this regard, the following types of regional development are distinguished:

a) integrative regionalisation (striving to create higher-level territorial units on the basis of national states and/or distinctive regions);

b) disintegrative regionalisation (emphasis on the priority of interests and needs of one's region).

This trend contributes to the development of separatist sentiments in society, autonomisation and sovereignty, an aggravation of regional identity, but it allows political, economic and social problems to be voiced. As part of this type of regional development, secessionist conflicts arise, the main feature of which is their intractability.

Regionalism and regionalisation are the antipodes of centralism, centralisation and unification, but neither can they be equated with separatism and disintegration.

The process of regionalisation is also seen as a successive change in the territorial division of society and its legislative fixation, with two forms of social division: 1) de-concentration as the distribution of power within the state; 2) decentralisation as the transfer of power from the state centre to the intermediate

and basic units of the territorial system, while establishing new governance within the respective territory.

Today regionalisation is seen as a naturally occurring process caused by a nation-state crisis – a top-down redistribution of power. In the broadest sense, regionalisation is the result of a crisis of the nation-state manifested in the diffusion of power.

Political institutions, acting in their own interests, are trying to manage regionalisation processes, which can be seen as vectors for managing these processes. Under different circumstances and at different times they are influenced by a different equilibrium, which, when detected, makes it possible to assess the direction and intensity of regionalisation processes in a particular country at a particular time. The process of regionalization can be called managed, for example, in conditions when the state initiates creation or reforming of its administrative-territorial units). Also, regionalisation processes can take place without anyone's influence, i.e. spontaneously, e.g. when territorial associations are created locally without state involvement.

Two forms of regionalisation are distinguished:

- passive – regionalisation is managed by the state: the state's territory is a mere object under the control of management decisions;

- active – the struggle of the regions for self-identity, their rights, the formation of separate territorial communities in the regions.

In the first case, regionalisation is passive on the part of the regions but active on the part of the state.

Particular attention should be paid to the result of the regionalisation process – the formation of a particular regional structure of the state, based on the following factors:

- External (global processes) – today the balance between the global and regional components of the system of international relations and world politics is shifting towards regional issues, depending on which are not only various aspects of international relations (formation of military-political alliances, integration processes), but also the fate of the world community as a whole;

- Geopolitical – geographical location (in particular the location of administrative borders, configuration of the state territory), natural and climatic conditions and localisation of resources, the history of formation of the region as an external and internal regulator of regional development;

- Socio-economic – the development of economic districts, the specialisation of regions, the cooperation of the region in the economic sphere with neighbouring regions of other countries enables a new level of relations not only on the regional but also on the national level, the factor of migration and changes in administrative boundaries determines the political culture of the region's population;

- Political – the political culture of the regions, the activity of regional political parties, their loyalty to the central government or, on the contrary, their opposition character, the political course taken have a noticeable impact on the development of the dialogue between the state and the region;

- Ethno-cultural – the ethnic map of the country: ethno-linguistic features (language families, dialects), confessional circles, ethnogenesis, presence of mono-ethnic habitats. The ethno-cultural factor has a significant impact on the processes of political regionalisation (the dependence of regional elites, political regimes and systems on local cultures).

### *Questions*
What is a region?
What is the difference between "regionness" and "regionhood"?
Why the region is the principle of territorial organization?
What is the problem of the distribution of power between national and regional levels of government?
Which typology of regionalism do you find most useful?
What is the difference between the concepts of regionalism and regionalization?

### *Literature*
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# LECTURE 2
# ORIGINS OF REGIONALISM

### *Origins of the theory of early regionalism: geoeconomic and geocultural approaches*
Theories of regionalism received their first impetus in P.-J. Proudhon's writings provided the initial theoretical basis for the regionalist ideas. He was the first to predict the future crisis of nation-states. He suggested the autonomy of the Old World, fixation of cultural differences and their legal protection.

Throughout the 19th century, however, ideas about the autonomisation of states remained on the margins of public consciousness. National ideas were based primarily on the obfuscation of state power and hence the apologia of an almost unconstrained centralism. Regionalism only gained a real shape at the end of the 19th century, when the ethnic rights movement began to be associated with it. At

the same time, in some European countries, antietatist political movements advocating the revision of the centre–periphery structure emerged.

The problem of understanding the regional development was made by economists only in the early 19th century and is associated with the formation of the so-called local direction in regional studies, which linked economic development with the rational placement of agrarian and later industry enterprises.

### *Local direction in local studies (German, Anglo-American schools)*

The strongest scientific school has developed in Germany, where traditionally increased attention was paid to the theories of location (J. Thünen, W. Launhardt, A. Weber, and A. Predel). Classical should include the study of regional growth (H. Siebert) and the regulation of territorial growth (W. Kristaller, A. Lesh), which were carried out during the 19 century and the first half of the 20 century, laying the fundamental concepts of regional development in a market environment. J. Thünen introduced the category of "local economy" into economic science at the beginning of the 19th century. Three main factors and their interrelation were mainly studied: distance from the enterprise to the markets, prices for different types of agricultural products and land rents. The main purpose of his research was to analyse the location of agricultural producers around cities, and he linked his research with categories of economic theory, mainly such as: economic rent, perfect competition, profit maximisation, etc. Thünen was one of the first who pays attention to the influence of the regional factor on costs and revenues, which made it possible to clarify its significance for the specialisation of enterprises. He actually for the first time introduced into the theory the placement of the general scientific concept about economic space, rent, and factors of productive forces placement.

A certain contribution to the theory of regional development was made by the representatives of the Anglo-American school. We should point out the concept of territorial development by M. Stopper and R. Walker, according to which there are four stages of such development: first – localization (placement of enterprises in new territories); second – capacity building (placed enterprises in the measure of strengthening their market positions); third – dispersion (promotion of producer firms to the periphery); the fourth stage – the transfer of production under the influence of factors of innovative nature.

Within the same school, theories of regional growth began to form, which were closely linked to the practical activities of the state and were based on an extensive base of statistical data. The subject analysis of this direction allows us to distinguish two groups of theories of regional growth.

First, neoclassical theories are based on the production function. A. Marshall, pointing to the explicitness of the special value of location, introduced the concept of "external economy" to explain the factors of production location.

But the most complete concept of regional growth has been proposed by Horst Siebert. It is also based on a production function in which the amount of potential production in the region is put in dependence on such costs as labour, capital, land and technical knowledge. In order to take into account the

geographical features of the region, Siebert adds the transport costs and the impact of the features of the social system to the model.

Second, the cumulative growth theories: R. Murdahl has proved how, with the help of specialisation and economies of scale, a small area advantage, can be multiplied over time. The advantage of certain locations (growth centres) ensures the acceleration of their development. This concept was further developed in the works of H. Richardson. The basis of this author's model is the localization component, which is based on location factors. Its necessity is justified by the lack of mobility of natural resources, presence of large cities and heterogeneity of the environment.

Since the late 50s of the 20th century, the category of "local economy" has gradually transformed. The American scientist W. Izard laid the foundation of modern theoretical approaches to the study of regional development processes and introduced a new concept and direction of research – space economy, thereby expanding the opportunities to study the international aspects of regional economic systems, adapting macroeconomic methods to study the regions and their international relations, offering the theory of industrial complex and justifying the feasibility of a comprehensive and systematic approach to Since the 1960s there has been a distinction between the two main areas of study in the local economy - there is a macro- and micro-level. The concept of "localization" is no longer understood as a synonym of the category "regionalization". More and more often they begin to use the concept of "regional economy", defining just the case of economic analysis, studying the territorial location of economic activity and differentiation of levels of economic activity of the regions.

Further development of the theory of regional development was aimed at developing econometric models that were often equivalent to our national ones. The desire to build specific models of regions was characteristic of countries with large areas, the regions of which differed significantly or nominally in the level of socio-economic development.

***Traditional, technological, socio-historical, and innovative theories***

The retrospective analysis of the theories of economists provides grounds for grouping these theoretical concepts of regional development in a market economy into three groups: traditional, technological and socio-historical.

Traditional concepts include regional interpretations of neoclassical and post-Keynesian theories, as well as unbalanced growth theories. The main message of neoclassical regional approaches is that a free unregulated market naturally leads to the elimination of inequalities between regions. Accordingly, regional policy should be about removing obstacles to the free movement of labour and capital between regions. Post-Keynesian theory allows for state regulation of inter-regional differences. Of the market-oriented instruments of regional policy, subsidies, credit and taxation levers are appropriate. It is these that now form the theoretical basis of most business-oriented instruments of market-oriented regional policy. The theory of unbalanced development is the exact opposite of the previous ones: the market without state regulation reinforces regional differences due to the

cyclical and self-organising nature of the market mechanism, which perpetuates the high development of some regions and the economic backwardness of others.

All traditional theories have two major shortcomings. Firstly, they are based on a large number of assumptions, usually far removed from reality. Secondly, they practically do not take into account average and long-term trends in social historical development.

Technological concepts of regional development include regional interpretations of product life-cycle theory, long-wave theory and regulatory theory. The product lifecycle theory considers the development of a particular product production as a series of stages (from innovation to decline stage), the placement of each stage being oriented towards regions of different countries. Accordingly, in order to support those or other regions, the state should not so much attract investment to them, as promote the creation of an innovation infrastructure that is capable of generating the emergence of new products and the timely release of obsolete productions. Long-wave theory explains the regional development of individual countries within 50-60 year technological cycles, which succeed each other.

Unfortunately, the technological theories are unable to provide clear guidelines for dealing with their own identification of regional problems.

The socio-historical regional theories have focused on the regional development in terms of social conflicts, and the contradictions between the centre and the periphery, pointing to the inability of the market to cope with regional problems. Within the framework of these theories, the distribution of resources and political power between the regions and the centre, social divisions and conflicts are explored first and foremost. Their practical recommendations are not so much concerned with solving regional problems as with the restructuring of society as a whole, which can with great convention be called constructive.

Over the last decades much attention in industrialised countries has been paid to the so-called endogenous development of regions, acting according to the principle: "development of regions at their own expense". According to this principle, the social and economic development of a region depends on the amount and use of intra-regional economic potential. A. Yagodka, M. Dyba, S. Kondratyuk note that "regional development should be based on the basis of self-development and the territory's own potential", with which it is difficult to disagree. Thus, the elimination of regional underdevelopment and reduction of inter-regional imbalances can be achieved not only through the exogenous growth impulse, but also through the activation of endogenous development potential. Intraregional potential activation should be achieved through exploiting specific regional skills and opportunities.

Modern economists have formulated the theory of uneven regional development for countries with developed economies, which is a synthesis of the theory of "growth poles" by F. Perroux and "long waves" by M. Kondratieff. The theory of growth poles and centres of growth is particularly popular in developed countries and occupies a central place among modern theories of regional development.

V. Leontiev's "output costs" matrix is often used, although it has certain drawbacks: the closeness of the system, a certain conditionality of exchange between the regions and a number of others, which leads to the need to improve this method, transform it towards greater flexibility, adaptation to regional conditions and the existing level of information system development.

The acceleration of scientific and technological progress and its ever-increasing impact on the sphere of economic activity have led to the widespread diffusion of innovation theory. This theory is nothing other than a scientific attempt to prove the inevitable power of the market economy of territorial disparities, the vitality of the principle "rich regions and countries will always remain rich, and the poor – poor". In spite of this, it can be a basis for clarifying the personality of the mechanism for diffusion and implementation of innovation. The concepts of dynamic and key areas are directly related to the theory of diffusion of innovation. All of them interact in a certain way and affect other sectors, the host regions.

### *Geocultural approaches to regionalism*

The problem of understanding the regional development was made by historians and anthropologists at the start of the 20th century. The 'father of modern anthropology', Bronislaw Malinowski, published his study of the islands of Melanesia, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, in 1922; it came to epitomize the ethnographic study of the beliefs, rituals, and social relations of faraway communities. Although future anthropologists would criticize or refine Malinowski's methods and interpretations, ethnographic practices would influence the general notions in sociology and political science that extensive field research was a necessary part of efforts to better understand foreign countries.

Whereas for geoeconomics the concepts of markets and commodity flows are fundamental, within geoculture the concepts of cultural landscapes, networks, anthropostructures and population movements take on special significance. Geo-cultural approaches create the basis for the formation of a new image of regions, their resource potential, territorial structure, taking into account geographical, linguistic, cultural, religious features and specific regional identity.

In the first half of the XX century the theory of space and its division was developed mainly by geographers in a geopolitical context. The search for a generalizing methodological category, capable of specifying the notion of space, was conducted in German (Alfred Hettner) geographical school. Hettner's name is associated with justification of the chorological concept, the central counterpoint of which was the notion of "territory" ("space"). The chorological method of studying socio-spatial phenomena advocated by Hettner emphasised territorial differentiation – the study of regularities of territorial differences, the connection of phenomena with place, territory and geographical space. Hettner justified the notion of "spatial science", the subject of study of which is "the nature of individual earth spaces and places". The scientist's proposed view of geography as a chorological discipline, studying spaces and spatial relationships, was a response

to the discord in geography concerning its place in the general system of world science and the integral object of geographical research. Far from flawless, this response opened up new ways of thinking about the vexed problem. According to Hettner, geography could be both earth science (natural science) and country science (human science) at the same time, but Hettner gave preference to country science. Rejecting Ritter's ideas, Hettner asserted an objective perception of space: the latter was synonymous with "territory" (country) and "place" (terrain).

In the interwar period, the notion of "regionalism" also appeared in the arsenal of economists and sociologists. Introduced into scientific usage in the late 1920s in the works of the school of regional sociology, created by H. Odom and R. Vance for the study of the American South, it was used in the broadest context - as a phenomenon of social life, as a problem of governance, as a phenomenon of regionalism. But the term did not have any noticeable, clearly defined content at that time.

Until the mid-twentieth century the concept of regionality did not attract much attention in either political or academic discourse. The pre-industrial and industrial stages of Western civilisation simply did not need a coherent concept of regional development of society, and ethnic groups and regional communities, with few exceptions, were not yet powerful enough to permanently undermine the foundations of national states or change their geopolitical configuration. It is only in the context of the "Third Wave" (Toffler's metaphor) that two groups of forces have emerged, attacking the foundations of the established world order. One of them, according to Alvin Toffler, attempted to transfer political power below nation states to subnational regions and groups. Other forces sought to shift power above, from nation states to transnational agencies and organisations. Both have adopted the slogan of regionalism. The term has gradually evolved from a broader (ideology and strategy aimed at exploiting the advantages of the region) to a narrower one (with an emphasis on the protection of language, cultural specificities, environment, etc.).

Early regionalism serves to draw attention to the deep roots of and diverse trajectories of regionalism 'beyond' the era of old regionalism. Among other things, early regionalism underlines the interaction rather than the competition between regionalist and statist ideas, and at least in some respects this resembles more recent debates about multilayered global governance. Early regionalism also draws attention to the various pan-regionalist movements that developed then, usually consisting of a mixture of geo-political, cultural and functional beliefs. Some of these pan-regionalist ideas continue to influence contemporary regionalist projects, especially in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and to some extent in Asia.

### Questions
What are geoeconomic and geocultural approaches?
What did the German and Anglo-American schools contribute to the development of local direction in local studies?

Which theories (traditional, technological, socio-historical or innovative) do you find most convincing?

What are the features of geocultural approaches to regionalism?

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# LECTURE 3
## IDEAS AND THEORIES OF OLD AND NEW REGIONALISM

### Old regionalism in the USA and Europe

It is only following World War II that area studies would grow into a core component of the discipline of political science, primarily within the subfield of comparative politics. This development was propelled by the sense that both the building of a stable post-war order and the containment of communism depended on deepening our understanding both of the Soviet bloc – and of the growing ranks of newly decolonized sovereign states.

In the United States, the growing demand for knowledge among government agencies, such as the State and Defence Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency, came to be met by new streams of federal funding, notably the Fulbright Program enacted in 1946 and the Title VI of the Higher Education Act – which grew out of the National Defence Education Act of 1958 – supported by programs set up by leading philanthropic organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. This set the stage for massive investments in learning foreign languages, deepening the understanding of previously less familiar societies, and developing frameworks for tracking economic, social, and political transformations in particular states. Two academic bodies founded in the aftermath of World War I – the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies – helped coordinate the activities and funding programs of universities, foundations, and government programs

(Szanton 2004).

Across Western Europe, the leading universities became a natural focus for concentrating resources that could be used by rapidly burgeoning communities of researchers devoted to building up stocks of knowledge across the humanities and social sciences, spanning language study, historical research, and cultural studies, as well as analysis of the politics, society, and economic development of specific countries and regions. The University of Oxford's School of Global and Area Studies developed graduate-level programs of study on entire continents (in the case of African Studies and Latin American Studies) alongside programs focused on either single countries (e.g. Japanese Studies) or sub-continental regions where one country clearly stood out (Modern South Asian Studies, and Soviet and East European Studies). In both the United States and Western Europe, national and international associations worked to promote research on various areas of the world, establish interdisciplinary area studies journals, and bring together scholars from different disciplines to area studies conferences each year.

On the other side of the iron curtain, the impetus came from a Soviet leadership eager to carefully monitor trends in the West while increasingly seeking engagement with post-colonial countries in search of new candidates that might join, or at least cooperate with, the communist bloc. The most prominent area studies think tanks were the institutes set up as part of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Zhuk 2017). The Cold War saw greater attention to the Americas, with the founding of the Institute of Latin American Studies in 1961 followed by the founding of the Institute of the USA and Canada in 1967. These institutes, as well as numerous other research centres and think tanks, accounted for thousands of re-searchers in the USSR (Gottemoeller and Langer 1983) and in other Eastern-bloc countries.

In the context of predominantly economically defensive vision of regionalism in the USA the primary conceptualisation of regional science took place in the mid-twentieth century. It is associated with the regional science department created by Walter Isard (1919-2010) in Pennsylvania. The Regional Science Association (Philadelphia) that sprang up on its basis in 1960 gained an international status and united around itself specialists of different fields – economists, geographers, architects, sociologists, psychologists. The view of the region proposed by her not so much as an object of state economic and social policy influence but rather as a subject of action opened up possibilities of creation and implementation of multipurpose regional development programmes which were based on the principles of long-term planning and complex management of natural and social resources of the region. American regionalists at the time did not delve into the realm of history or world politics.

The merit of introducing the concept of regionalism in the structure of analysis of the world-system dynamics is attributed to James Rosenau, who at the turn of 70-80s foresaw the onset of transnationalism as a process of the state borders blurring, intensification of commercial, cultural and informational exchange between non-state polities. The interest shown in the phenomena of

polycentricity, the interaction of integration and disintegration of subsystems at different levels soon led the researcher to the analysis of "cascading interdependencies" in the processes of globalization. He regarded the concept of international relations as obsolete, proposing a new term "post-international politics" with clear signs of turbulence and parametric changes. Suggesting in one of his works "understandable approaches to an incomprehensible world", Rosenau emphasised that traditional state-led hierarchical systems of governance are breaking down; hence the problems of horizontal global interaction at the non-state level become relevant. He saw the transition of some state competencies to a "multicentric" level as optimal. Rosenau's greatest contribution to updating theories of regionalism was his proposal of a new term "fragmegration", which organically combined the concepts of "integration" and "fragmentation". The sphere of competence that emerges from their intertwining is not unproblematic – the global can be resisted by the local. But it is the natural process of interaction between integration and diversification processes that allows us to speak of fragmentation as a phenomenon that goes beyond globalisation and is broader in content than the latter. On this basis, Rosenau built the theories of blurring the lines between foreign and domestic policies, introducing the terms "mutual intersection", "mutual penetration", and "complex interdependence".

The most relevant theories – which explained these developments in the European context – were federalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism, and intergovernmentalism. Federalism, which inspired the pioneers of European integration, was a political program; it was skeptical of the nation-state, although its project was in fact to create a new kind of 'state'. Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, both Italian anti-fascist communists, drafted the 'Ventotene Manifesto', which later lead to the European Federalist Movement. Spinelli continued to be one of the figures of European federalism until his death in 1986, but even so there was no obvious theorist associated with federalism. Functionalism was primarily a strategy (or a normative method) designed to build peace, constructed around the proposition that the provision of common needs and functions can unite people across state borders. This school of thought was strongly associated with the works of David Mitrany (1943). In the functionalist view, form was supposed to follow function, whereas for the federalists it was primarily form that mattered (especially a constitution). Functional cooperation should concentrate on technical and basic functional programs and projects within clearly defined sectors, led by functional international agencies. Usually, the nation-state should be bypassed, and international cooperation was preferred to regional cooperation. Mitrany criticized both federalism and neofunctionalism on the basis that both were primarily based on territory rather than function. He saw territoriality as part of the Westphalian logic, which was taken to imply conflict and war, although Mitrany considered the ECSC an acceptable organization. Neofunctionalism enjoyed a great standing during the 1960s. Its central figure was Ernst Haas, who challenged the functionalists and claimed a greater concern for centres of power (Haas 1958, 1964). Haas in fact theorized the 'community method' pioneered by Jean Monnet (a French diplomat, considered one of the chief architects of the EC).

Even if the outcome of this method could be a federation, it was not to be constructed through constitutional design. 'Regional integration' was crucial in neofunctional theorizing, and much of the debate on old regionalism in Europe was centred on this concept. It was famously defined by Haas (1958: 16) as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdictions over the pre-existing national states". Regional integration was seen as a path along which 'progress' could be measured (Haas 1961). Later, Haas (1970: 607-608, 610), re-defined it as "the study of regional integration which is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves". Neofunctionalists emphasized the deliberate design of regional institutions, which were seen as the most effective means for solving common problems. These institutions and supranational authorities were to be initiated by the states, but then the regional bureaucrats, interest groups and self-organized interests would become important actors in the process. The regional institutions were, in turn, instrumental to the creation of functional, political and cultivated spill-over, which would ultimately lead to a redefinition of group identity 'beyond the nation-state' and around the regional unit (Haas 1964; Hurrell 1995: 59). Karl Deutsch's 'security communities' approach was also very influential in the further development of so-called regional integration theory. Deutsch et al. (1957: 5) define the 'security community' as "a group of people which has become 'integrated'" and 'integration' is defined as "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population". Members of a security community believe "that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change' " (Deutsch et al. 1957: 6).

The early debate was always centred on Europe, and Europe was in some respects treated as a single case. Gradually the comparative element in the field grew stronger and some of the most respected (mainly neofunctionalist) theorists of their time also conducted comparisons. For instance, Ernst Haas, Philippe Schmitter and Sydney Dell studied regional integration (or the lack of it) in Latin America (Haas and Schmitter 1964; Haas 1967; Schmitter 1970; Dell 1966). Amitai Etzioni compared the United Arab Republic, the Federation of West Indies, the Nordic Association, and the European Economic Community (Etzioni 1965). Joseph Nye studied East Africa and conducted comparisons of the Arab League, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Nye 1970; 1971).

The macrostructural concept of Stein Rokkan and his school proposed in the 1970s was based on the distinction between monocephalic and polycephalic territorial structures and two types of periphery – horizontal (reference point:

remoteness) and vertical (reference point: dependence). The conceptual map of Europe created by S. Rokkan proved to be an "open model". All in all, the 1970s proved to be a milestone in the redefinition of the starting concept of region. At that time the region attracted the attention of European scholars not so much as a unit of territorial organization, but rather as a peculiar society and at the same time a new political actor.

The shift away from traditional Western presuppositions was closely linked to the dismantling of the East-West binary opposition initiated by Edward Said's book Orientalism (1978). In Said's vision Orientalism, even veiled, from the end of the XVIII century was a product of colonialism and turned into a Western style of domination, reshaping and domination over the East. This, in P. Burke's definition, "angry" book was perceived as a passionate appeal to foreigners to stop viewing Oriental cultures because of shores of hostility or superiority. It radically affect the tone of research related to the phenomenon of regionalism.

### *Old regionalism in developing countries: development and state formation*

The discussion about regionalism in the developing world was closely linked to colonialism/anti-colonialism and the quest to facilitate economic development in the newly independent nation-states. Many of the discussions about regionalism in the developing world were heavily influenced by the structuralist tradition of economic development, pioneered by Gunnar Myrdal, Arthur Lewis, and Raúl Prebisch. In sharp contrast to the European debate, which focused heavily on regional integration, the keywords here were development, state-promoted industrialization and nation-building, first and foremost through protectionism and import-substitution.

The Latin American structuralist discussion about underdevelopment reflected specific economic experiences in various countries, particularly in terms of trade problems. The depression of the 1930s also had severe impact on Latin American development, creating pressure for change. Encouraged by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and its dynamic Executive Secretary, Raúl Prebisch, the vision was to create an enlarged economic space in Latin America in order to enhance import substitution regionally when it became exhausted at the national level. Liberalized intra-regional trade in combination with regional protectionism seemed to offer large economies of scale and wider markets, which could serve as stimulus to industrialization, economic growth, and investment (Prebisch 1959). From this perspective, the rationale of regional cooperation and integration among less developed countries was not to be found in functional cooperation or marginal economic change within the existing structure, but rather, through the fostering of 'structural transformation' and the stimulation of productive capacities (industrialization), whereby investment and trading opportunities were being created. The structuralist school thus shifted its focus away from economic integration as means for peace and political unification, to one of regional economic cooperation/integration as means for economic development and state-formation. The dependent variable, as well as the

underlying conditions for regionalism, was so different that it called for a different theory, according to which Europe and the developing world were not comparable cases (Axline 1994: 180).

This type of regionalism resulted in the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in Montevideo in 1960. LAFTA was a comprehensive and continental project, and included all countries on the South American continent plus Mexico. However, the old regionalism in Latin America made little economic impact and was never implemented on a larger scale. The limited track-record of regional integration in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s was due to internal conflicts, a general failure among states to cooperate, and the whole structure of dependence. The member countries of the various partly overlapping regional schemes were politically and/or economically unstable and not willing to or capable of pursuing cooperation. The objective of a Latin American free trade area never materialized due to extremely unfruitful tariff reduction negotiations. Too many exceptions in combination with the continued protectionism against third countries only led to economic stagnation. Furthermore, the smaller member countries claimed that LAFTA mainly benefited the 'Big Three' (Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil), and opted for a more radical industrialization strategy. This was the basic foundation for the establishment of the Andean Pact in 1969, but the highly stated ambitions were never implemented. Military dictatorships were established throughout the continent during the 1970s, and these regimes were poor partners in regional cooperation schemes. The return to democracy in the mid-1980s subsequently provided a big boost for the new regionalism in Latin America starting in the late 1980s. External factors and external dependence were also important, especially the relationship with the USA. As long as the USA was a global superpower, there was little room for manoeuvre for Latin American states. On the other hand, there was very little positive interest for Latin America on the part of the USA. Radical development models were unacceptable as they were interpreted as advancement for 'the other side' in the Cold War. The only regionalism that was accepted was thus 'hegemonic regionalism' (which has some similarities with imperial and colonial regionalism). The OAS, for instance, has been perceived more as an instrument for US policies than a genuinely regional body (Frohmann 2000).

African debates about regionalism at the time were clearly influenced by the intellectual debates in Latin America, but to some extent also the ones in Europe – as seen in debates in the establishment of the OAU between the federalist Casablanca group (led by Kwame N'krumah) and the functionalist Monrovia group. The general ideological foundation of regional cooperation and integration in Africa is first and foremost formulated in the visions and series of treaties developed within the framework of what was then the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), such as the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991). Some had colonial origins (CFA, EAC, SACU), whereas other regional organizations were explicitly designed in order to work against dependence on colonial powers and the rest of the world.

The meaning of regionalism in Asia changed in relation to the question of

what sub-regions to include and exclude, what dimensions of regionalism to investigate (such as security, economics, politics, and culture), and which particular theoretical perspectives to employ. A considerable body of literature was concerned with the study of ASEAN, which was established in 1967. A major reason for this emphasis appears to be that ASEAN was one of the few sustainable regional organizations in the larger East/Southeast Asian region. ASEAN was understood as a joint attempt by a rather narrow but strong political elite to consolidate the nation-states and to enhance stability in recent but shaky state formations. Hence, as with most other regional debates in the then developing world, the primary aims were state-building and nation-building. Even if the treaties did not mention security explicitly, communism was the primary threat, irrespective of whether it was internal or external. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, there were many 'politically steered' policy declarations and attempts to create joint industrial ventures and to achieve preferential trading schemes. For the most part, the development impact of these attempts was low, and during this time the economic development in Southeast Asia can hardly be attributed to the policies of ASEAN as a regional organization. Subsequently, ASEAN has consolidated and to some extent, even flourished as a regional organization, a fact analysed during the new regionalism.

### New regionalism after the Cold War in the USA, the EU, Great Britain, and developing countries

The prospects of the fall of the Berlin Wall together with the 1985 White Paper on the internal market and the Single European Act resulted in a new dynamic process of European integration. This was also the start of what has often been referred to as 'new regionalism' on a global scale. The new regionalism referred to a number of new trends and developments, such as the spectacular increase in the number of regional trade agreements, an externally oriented and less protectionist type of regionalism, an anti-hegemonic type of regionalism which emerged from within the regions themselves instead of being controlled by the superpowers, the rise of a more multi-dimensional and pluralistic type of regionalism, which was not primarily centred around trading schemes or security cooperation and with a more varied institutional design, and the increasing importance of a range of business and civil society actors in regionalization (Bøås et al. 1999; de Melo/Panagaryia 1995; Fawcett/Hurrell 1995; Hettne et al. 1999; Mansfield/Milner 1997; Schulz et al. 2001). Even if an exogenous perspective also existed during the old debate (especially in realist thought and in the developing world), it was further developed under new regionalism. Many scholars emphasized the fact that the new wave of regionalism needed to be related to the multitude of often inter-related structural changes of and in the global system in the post-Cold War era, such as the end of bipolarity, the intensification of globalization, the recurrent fears over the stability of the multilateral trading order, the restructuring of the nation-state, and the critique of neoliberal economic development and political systems in developing as well as post-communist countries (Gamble/Payne 1996; Hettne et al. 1999).

The increasing multidimensionality of regionalism has resulted in an expanded research agenda and a proliferation of theories and perspectives, such as varieties of neorealist and neoliberal institutional theories, new trade theories and new institutionalist theories, multilevel governance approaches, a variety of constructivist and discursive approaches, security complex theory, and assorted critical and new regionalism approaches (Laursen 2003; Wiener/Diez 2003; Söderbaum/Shaw 2003).

The main characteristic of the field since the 1990s was the emergence of a multitude of constructivist and reflectivist approaches to regionalism that challenged core rationalist assumptions, such as the separation of subject and object, of fact and value, the state-centred ontology of most rationalist approaches as well as the role of norms and identities in the formation of informal and formal regions. Some constructivists first and foremost were engaged in a debate with the rationalists and mainstream discourses (Adler 1997; Katzenstein 1996; Acharya 2004), whereas others were engaged with more radical and critical approaches. In the former case, it can be somewhat difficult to draw a line between constructivism and reflectivism (Neumann 1994; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Paasi 2001; Söderbaum 2004). Reflectivist approaches had a particular concern for structural transformation as well as for whom, and for what purpose, regionalism is put into practice. Many critical scholars in the 1990s investigated whether the new regionalism represented the "return of the political" in the context of economic globalization. Some were sceptical and argued that regionalism primarily was a manifestation of economic globalization and prevailing forms of hegemony (Gamble and Payne 1996) whereas many others were more optimistic about the effects of regionalism (Hettne et al. 1999). Furthermore, whereas most (but not all) rationalist scholarship focused on pre-given regional delimitations and regional organizations, reflectivists and constructivists, in contrast, were more concerned with how regions are constituted and constructed (Murphy 1991; Neumann 1994; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000).

Contrary to the exaggerated focus during old regionalism on top-down and formal state-driven regionalist projects ('regional integration'), it was clear that also non-state actors played a vital role in new regionalism. Scholars pointed out that business interests and multinationals not only operated on the global sphere, but also created regionalized patterns of economic activity (Rugman 2005). Some scholars claimed that the private economic forces were reacting faster, or at least more effectively, than state actors to the new situation and the more liberalized political economy (Hettne et al. 1999). Within Europe there was an intense debate about the role of business actors and interests in the creation of the European common market, resulting in an intense discussion about whether market-based economic integration preceded or followed policy-led regionalism (Sandholtz and Stone-Sweet 1998). The role of US-based business interests in the creation of NAFTA is well-documented as well. Discussions about regionalism in East Asia emphasized that large Japanese keiretsu and TNCs, smaller ethnically or family-based networks and businesses developed sophisticated regional trading, investment, technology, and production strategies. In Southern Africa, for

instance, the South African firms have quite sophisticated regional strategies in such fields as food and beverage, trade and commerce, mining, banking and financial services, and the industrial sectors. The Nigerian, Senegalese, and Lebanese business, trading and smuggling networks operating all over West Africa, is a well-known feature of that particular region. In other developing regions, there was also great variety of private and ethnic businesses and networks, both big and small, which have well-developed regional strategies and often operated beyond the frameworks of state-led regionalist projects (Bach 1999; Perkman and Sum 2001; Söderbaum and Taylor 2008).

Civil society was hitherto largely neglected in the study of regionalism. New regionalism scholars pointed to an increasing relevance and strength of civil society regionalization around the world (Söderbaum 2007; also see Acharya 2004). Civil society regionalization emerged for a range of different reasons, such as functional problem-solving and service delivery, a 'need' to transcend the structures and boundaries of individual nation-states, sharing of information, and learning. The point was not that national civil societies were disappearing, but rather that they became intertwined on a regional basis and to some extent became integrated within an emerging global civil society.

With the Berlin Wall coming down in 1989, substantial investments were scaled back sharply, creating new challenges for maintaining support for language training and the building of area expertise.

In the United States, area specialists have faced mounting challenges in securing the resources needed for building language proficiency and carrying out sustained research in the field, as the government has steadily scaled back funding for area expertise except in the limited context of providing specific types of information deemed to be reliable and useful for the purposes of policymakers and media (Clowes and Bromberg 2015). Within political science, it is scholars in comparative politics who would be most affected by these cuts. For most areas, steady cutbacks in the Department of Education's Title VI funding since the 1990s made it progressively difficult to obtain federal support for language training and area expertise – except for select projects that are of high priority to US national security in a post-9/11 world (frequently focused on the Middle East and China). Additionally, in October 2013, the US State Department also eliminated its Title VIII program, which had been once a massive source of funding for language training and area expertise for scholars studying Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Despite the spirited effort to highlight the importance of area expertise by many political scientists (Fukuyama 2004; Hanson 2009; King 2015; Pepinsky 2015), area studies have remained under strain in the post-Cold War era. The strain has been magnified by a second trend: since the mid-1990s, leading political science departments in the United States have been placing less emphasis on the accumulation of area-focused knowledge in favour of methodological techniques consistent with the 'causal inference revolution'. Driving this shift is a basic epistemic notion, most famously championed by King et al. (1994), that there exists a universal set of methodological principles and logics of inference that define rigorous

scholarship in both quantitative and qualitative research. This idea is certainly not without its detractors, as evident in on-going debates as to whether there exist distinct 'cultures' of quantitative and qualitative scholarship with distinct understandings of evidence and causation (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Nevertheless, the growing attention to causal identification in the United States has reduced the space for stand-alone qualitative research, especially if focused on particular countries or areas. This is especially evident in flagship journals of the discipline (such as the American Political Science Review), which rarely publish papers focused on one country or region, not counting the United States. At the same time, area specialists in the United States have managed to survive and evolve. For one, within comparative politics, where political scientists with area expertise are generally housed, the majority of articles published in the subfield's leading journals are country- or area-focused, though increasingly incorporating at least some quantitative analysis or field experiments. Moreover, books published in comparative politics tend to be disproportionately focused on single countries or small-N studies confined to a single area (Köllner et al. 2018: 17). This has been buttressed by the growing awareness that cutbacks in area studies training and research are depleting much needed reservoirs of deep knowledge on areas where US policymakers have been confronting new conflicts and crises. The Maidan in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the steep downturn in US–Russia relations prompted Charles King (2015) to point out the danger of 'flying blind' in an era where Title VIII funding is no longer available to support advanced language training and deep knowledge of a critically important part of the world.

Across much of Europe there are indications of a continued commitment to area studies scholarship within the social sciences, with new strategies for continuing to develop area-focused training, research, and scholarship. As the EU itself became more responsive to the challenges of globalization in a post-Cold War era, pre-existing Europe-wide associations have been bolstered while new ones have been set up to pool resources and organize scholarly activities across different EU member countries. Examples of new associations include EASAS (the European Association for South Asian Studies) which began organizing Europe-wide conferences on South Asian Studies in the middle of the 1990s, and AEGIS (the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies) which was set up in 1991 to expand research on Africa's response to globalization and provide academic and policy-relevant knowledge to the Africanist institutions of the EU. In Germany, area studies scholarship appears to have not only survived the end of the Cold War but even progressed further, with expanded support for new graduate schools, research clusters, and collaborative networks devoted to various world regions. Since 2006, the German government has funded an on-going competition among state universities with the express aim of creating several 'universities of excellence'. Moreover, the German Council of Science and Humanities has also backed new programs to advance area studies, giving impetus to such initiatives as the 2009 effort by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research to enable a range of area studies centres, providing

research networks to expand their capacities to conduct research within and across various world regions. A related program has expanded the fellowship-based collaborative research centres focused on South Asia, Latin America, China, and sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the German government has teamed up with private foundations to promote new think tanks and funding lines for research on various key countries and world regions. Examples include the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) and the Volkswagen Foundation's funding initiative for research on Central Asia and the Caucasus.

In Britain, major schools set up long ago to study various regions of the world continue to draw distinguished scholars and support country- or area-focused research. In addition to the School of Global and Area Studies at Oxford, the School of Oriental and Asian Studies (SOAS) at the University of London remains a premier institution for the in-depth study of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, boasting the largest staff of area experts (over 300) of any university in the world. At University College London, the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) remains the leading institution in the world focused on teaching about Russia, the Baltics, and Central and Eastern Europe. There are also a host of British area studies associations for various countries and regions, many of which have joined the United Kingdom Council for Area Studies Associations, founded in 2003. In addition, a joint initiative by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), and the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) has provided funding for five new collaborative 'Centres for Excellence in language-based Area Studies' which are each housed at a lead institution and cover China, Russia, East Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Arabic-speaking world. This targeting of specific countries and regions may make it difficult in the future to devote resources for research on other regions, but overall, the commitment in British academia to area studies remains much more stable than is the case in the United States.

The developing world has also begun to catch up in terms of both overall investments in knowledge production and the generation of area and cross-area expertise. China has led the way and remains far ahead of the rest of the developing world or emerging economies, both in terms of the total amount invested in R&D (research and development) and the rise in percentage of GDP invested in R&D, which doubled between 2001 and 2016 according to the World Bank. India and Brazil spend far less on R&D, but have moved into the world's top ten in terms of total expenditures on R&D. This does not necessarily mean that research on different parts of the world is flourishing across the global south. But, certainly, there has been a growth in the scale of expert knowledge amassed in some developing countries at least about their own regional 'neighbourhood'. The Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, established in 1968 as the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), has greatly expanded its visibility, activities, and resources. Along similar lines, the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), first established in 1960, was restructured and expanded in 2001 and now purports to produce some of the finest research on contemporary African Affairs

by having its dedicated and highly qualified researchers conduct field research every year throughout the African continent. AISA has been rated among the top fifty best-managed global think tanks. In addition, while the economic trends that gave rise to the term 'BRICs' in 2001 are no longer evident (given the lower growth rates in Brazil and Russia), research on BRICS (now including South Africa) has become a cottage industry in each of the member countries. Most notable among these is the BRICS Policy Centre in Brazil (attached to the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro), which has made it to the list of the top-ten best university-affiliated think tanks. There is also now a BRICS Think Tank Council (BTTC) that was established in 2013 to boost cooperation on BRICS-focused research being done at major institutes or centres in each of the countries. On the whole, while research on faraway regions remains substantially under-developed and underfunded across the developing world, the growing scope for intensive research focused on the 'regional neighbourhoods' of particular emerging economies or rising powers have helped to greatly expand the production of area-based knowledge worldwide.

### *Questions*
What is the difference in the development of old regionalism in the USA and Europe?

What did the old regionalism mean for developing countries?

What are the specifics of the development of new regionalism after the Cold War in the USA, EU, UK and developing countries?

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# LECTURE 4
# COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM

### The term 'comparative regionalism'

The term 'comparative regionalism' is a phenomenon of XXI century. The authors who use it refer to the emergence of new approaches in the study of modern regional processes that take into account an inclusive, comprehensive study of them.

The new term has been widely used in the academic literature, but there is still no consensus on what is meant by 'comparative regionalism'. Some authors mean a comparative analysis of theoretical perspectives, others mean a comparative analysis of regions, others mean a comparative analysis of types of regional projects, etc. One of the first who coined the term was Finn Laursen in his edited monograph "Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives" (2003).

Luk Van Langenhove concluded that a comparative analysis of regional dynamics using the social sciences, for example, should be applied, taking into account and comparing different countries and cultures in the analysis of regional construction. Here, two sociological approaches should be involved, namely the study of cross-national processes (collecting empirical data across regions) and the idiographic approach (implying a detailed study of each individual case and highlighting particularities). Thus, by 'comparative' regionalism author means a bias towards social constructivism in the study of regions (2011).

Amitav Acharya, who studies mainly integration processes in Asia, questions the use of the experience of the European Union as a model for the evolutionary construction of the region. By 'comparative' regionalism he understands the theory of 'regionalism' in a broader sense, which also takes into account the historical heritage. For him 'comparative regionalism' is an approach which implies, first of all, rejection of Eurocentricity as a classical example of region building, allowing other variants of regional construction as model projects. Acharya believes that regional integration can follow different paths depending on historical, cultural and linguistic traditions. This is a kind of 'extra-European' type of regionalism, the study of which requires a serious theoretical rethinking of such issues as the principles of regional formation, criteria for the effectiveness of regionalism, the role of institutions in the process of region-building, etc.

Comparative regionalism is a kind of shorthand that includes different types and kinds of regional construction. Let us formulate some distinguishing features (markers) of comparative regionalism.

First, a characteristic of comparative regionalism is that regional construction is a project or a politically motivated action. The creation of a region can be driven by the need to solve specific problems (from below); it can also be the result of an integration policy of a regional and/or world power. From A.

Acharya's point of view, the world of regions today is structured within the US hegemonic policy. B. Buzan in his work "Regions and Power" also writes about the role of great and regional powers in the formation of regional security complexes. Collective actors, such as "Asian powers" within ASEAN, can also structure regional space.

Second, in the theories of comparative regionalism, geographical and territorial factors continue to play an important role. A region is a grouping of two or more states sharing borders and close intra-regional relations.

Third, a distinctive feature of the regional approach is that researchers study already existing institutions and organizations or foresee the emergence of new institutions. Regional institutions are traditional objects of study. However, it cannot be argued that regional organisation is the end product of effective regional policy. For researchers, on the one hand, there is no direct correlation between the process of building a region and the creation of a regional organization, on the other hand, the emergence or existence of a regional integration organization can be a sign of one of the stages of regionalism.

Fourth, the process of building a region is almost always linked to the solution of practical problems. These can be economic integration objectives (ASEAN), economic and security issues (SCO), conflict resolution objectives (Kimberley Process Certification Scheme) and multifunctional objectives (MERCOSUR, EU). Regionalisation as a process of building regional cohesion appears mainly when there is a need to address practical challenges.

Fifth, regional approaches have a strong focus on the normative and ideational foundations of regionalisation. F. Soderbaum and B. Hettne introduce the term 'regional cohesion' (regionness). It is a process of the formation of a region, similar to the process of the formation of a state or a nation. According to Hettne, there are no 'natural' regions, the regions can be created and can be created again in the process of global change. A. Acharya and a number of experts analysing ASEAN write about the identity of ASEAN as a special normative culture within the organization. A set of certain norms and the acceptance of these norms by regional actors can form a regional identity. Ideas are becoming paramount in contemporary regional processes, often ahead of economic and political opportunities.

Sixth, the relationship between region-building processes (regionalism) and region-forming processes (regionalization) is important in theories of comparative regionalism. Regionalization is seen as the motivation of the various actors in a region to form greater integration, shared values and a regional identity. If region-building practices (regionalism) are accompanied by processes of regionalization, the politics of regionalism become more successful and effective. One can also hypothesize that if the regional project is attractive to the region's stakeholders, internal regionalization processes can intensify.

Seventh, regionalism can be open (soft) and closed (hard). Open regionalism enables project participants to be in other integration projects, without infringing on their rights. Open regionalism can be with asymmetric participation of partners, i.e. it involves not only states, but also regions, non-state actors. Its participants can

interact on an equal footing, with no hegemonic or regional leader. On the contrary, closed regionalism implies participation only in a given regional project. As a rule, it is a symmetric project with a hegemon.

Thus, regionalism as a project can have different institutional forms and different types of regional consolidation, and can position itself differently at the international level. The European Union as a regional project has gone through several stages of regional construction, from economic community to regional economic and political union. Other regional groupings have different levels of integration and regional cohesion.

### *Importance of regional studies in XXI century*

One important difference between the new and the most recent phase of regionalism is that during the 1980s and 1990s both the prevalence and the relevance of regionalism were sometimes questioned. By contrast, today it is difficult to dispute the increasing salience of regions and regionalism. Indeed, regionalism has become a structural component of today's global politics. Some observers even claim that today's world order is a regional world order. Peter Katzenstein (2005: i), for instance, rejects the "purportedly stubborn persistence of the nation-state or the inevitable march of globalization", arguing instead that we are approaching a 'world of regions'. Similarly, Amitav Acharya emphasizes the "emerging regional architecture of world politics" (2007) and the construction of "regional worlds" (2014). Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver (2003: 20) speak about a "global order of strong regions" (see also Van Langenhove 2011). The fundamental point is not that regionalism necessarily dominates global politics in all respects, but rather that "regions are now everywhere across the globe and are increasingly fundamental to the functioning of all aspects of world affairs from trade to conflict management, and can even be said to now constitute world order" (Fawn 2009: 5).

The fact that something has happened with regionalism since the mid-2000s, as well as signs of its increasing diversity, is evidenced by the rich set of new (partly overlapping, partly competing) concepts and labels, such as "post-hegemonic regionalism" (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012; Telò 2013), "post-neoliberal regionalism" (Riggirozzi 2012), "heterodox regionalism" (Vivares 2013), "differentiated integration" (Leuffen et al. 2013), "porous regional orders" (Katzenstein 2005), "regional worlds" (Acharya 2014), "converging regions" (Lenze and Schriwer 2014), "networking region" (Baldersheim 2011), "beyond regionalism" (Harders and Legrenzi 2008), and "persistent permeability" (Salloukh and Brynen 2004). These and similar concepts and labels are all signs of the increasing diversity and complexity of regionalism. Even if the new regionalism did emphasize multi-dimensionality, there are many new ideas about the changing nature of regionalism that take us 'beyond' it.

One of the original intentions of distinguishing between old and new regionalism was to draw attention to the different world order context shaping regionalism in the late 1980s and 1990s, in order to pinpoint the 'new' features of regionalism in contradistinction to the 'old' characteristics (Hettne 1994, 1999). For the same reasons, one relevant strategy to understand the difference between

new regionalism and the most recent phase is therefore to understand the changing world order context of regionalism. It is evident that today's world order context is markedly different from the one of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when new regionalism emerged. In contrast to a world order dominated by the recent fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, neoliberalism and economic globalization, current regionalism is shaped by a world order characterized by many diverse and also contradictory trends and processes, such as the war on terror, the responsibility to intervene and protect, a multi-layered or "multiplex" world order, recurrent financial crises across the world, the persistent pattern of overlapping and criss-crossing regional and interregional projects and processes in most parts of the world, and not least the rise of the BRICS and other emerging powers (Acharya 2014; Shaw et al. 2011; Fioramonti 2012, 2014; Van Langenhove 2011).

One of the core issues focused upon during the new regionalism was the relationship between globalization and regionalism. Even if this issue has certainly not disappeared, the global-regional nexus has changed its meaning over the last decade. While new regionalism focused on the relationship between globalization and regionalism, often in the form of whether the two processes reinforced or competed against each other, current debates about regionalism are focusing on the rising complexity of regionalism and by multifold interactions between state and non-state actors, institutions and processes at a variety of interacting levels, ranging from the bilateral to the regional, interregional, and multilateral/global (Baert et al. 2014; Shaw et al. 2011). This also means that current regionalism has moved beyond intense and often dichotomous debates about whether regionalism is formal or informal and driven by state or non-state actors. Scholars still disagree about the relative importance of state and non-state actors in specific cases, but it is no longer possible to question the multiplicities of state and non-state agencies within a variety of modes of regional governance, regional networks, and institutional forms interacting in complex ways with global governance (Armstrong et al. 2011; Fioramonti 2014; Shaw et al. 2011).

### *Methodological framework of comparative regionalism*
Theoretical and methodological dialogue is another emerging feature of the most recent phase in the study of regionalism. Whereas the new regionalism was characterized by fragmentation and a series of methodological and paradigmatic rivalries, regionalism is being consolidated as a field of study. During new regionalism there was a general lack of dialogue between academic disciplines and regional specializations (European integration, Latin American, Asian, and African regionalism) as well as between theoretical traditions (rationalism, institutionalism, constructivism, critical and postmodern approaches). There was also thematic fragmentation in the sense that various forms of regionalism, such as economic, security, and environmental regionalism, were only rarely related to one another. Such fragmentation undermined the further generation of cumulative knowledge as well as theoretical and methodological innovation and consolidation. It also lead to unproductive contestation, among both scholars and

policy makers, about the meaning of regionalism, its causes and effects, how it should be studied, what to compare and how, and not least, what the costs and benefits of regionalism and regional integration were. Today's regionalism is characterized by a changing intellectual landscape of regionalism, with increased dialogue between theoretical approaches but also the increasing acceptance that a multitude of scientific standpoints and perspectives are necessary and plausible (Söderbaum 2009; De Lombaerde and Söderbaum 2013). A considerable amount of the confusion and trench-war surrounding the study of new regionalism in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s has been abandoned or solved.

From a methodological point of view, it can be argued that the consolidation of comparative regionalism constitutes one of the core characteristics of the current phase of regionalism (De Lombaerde and Söderbaum 2013; Warleigh-Lack and Van Langenhove 2011). According to Acharya (2012), comparative regionalism is indeed "a field whose time has come". A great deal of research during the new regionalism was based on case studies. Even if attention certainly was given to comparison, too many comparisons were either parallel case studies, or too rigid quantitative studies that usually failed to take the historical and regional context into consideration. We are now witnessing an increasing creativity in the way regions are compared across time and space. The increasing cross-fertilization and interaction between students of European integration and regionalism elsewhere is particularly important, not least because this promises to lead to less Euro-centrism in the field. A range of previously compared regions and regional frameworks now are being subjected to fresh and intriguing new comparisons. Acharya is correct in that the "global heritage" of regionalism needs to be acknowledged: "ideas and literature that constitute comparative regionalism come from and have been enriched by contributions from many regions, including Latin America, Asia, North America, the Middle East, Africa and of course Europe" (2012: 12). It must also be recognized that our understanding of regions and regionalism has changed during recent decades, which is good news for comparative regionalism as well as for attempts to move away from narrow and conventional understandings of European integration. "While the contemporary interest in comparing regions and regionalisms may not be completely new, it is different from older approaches. Our understanding of what makes regions has changed with social constructivist and critical theoretical approaches that have led to less behavioural and more nuanced, complex, contested and fluid understandings of regions" (Acharya 2012: 3). Still, all is not well with the study of regionalism and it remains necessary to deepen the comparative element of regionalism without becoming trapped in either parochialism or a false universalism (usually Eurocentrism).

The preferred version of comparative regionalism is eclectic and inclusive. Such eclectic perspective should enable area studies, comparative politics and international studies to engage in a more fruitful dialogue, and through that process overcome the fragmentation in the field of regionalism that still remain. It should also enable continued cross-fertilization between different regional debates and specializations (African, American, Asian, Caribbean, and European forms of

regionalism). Such eclectic perspective will also enhance a dialogue about the fundamentals of comparative analysis, for example, what constitute comparable cases, and the many different forms, methods, and design of comparative analysis.

The eclectic approach offered here underlines the richness of comparison. Regions can and should be compared in time as well as within and across different spaces and forms of organization. It is possible to compare the comprehensive and multidimensional regions at various scales (Europe, Africa/Southern Africa, East and Southeast Asia) but also to compare more distinct types of regions and regionalism, such as trade blocs, security regions, cognitive regions, river basins, and so forth. Using the EU as an example, as an object of research it can, for instance, be studied in different ways and its comparability depends on the questions asked and its conceptualization. As all other aspects of the social realm, the EU has at the same time both specific features and general characteristics that it shares with other regions and regional political communities. The great divide between EU studies and other regions has been bridged, even if the EU (just like other regions) also has certain unique properties (De Lombaerde et al. 2010; Van Langenhove 2011). For the same reasons, the eclectic perspective offered here does neither reject comparisons between the EU and other federations or even nation-states, nor necessarily between EU and older empires (even if that comparison may be somewhat more complicated). In other words, conceptual pluralism does not equal anarchy. The fundamental point is to be clear about the research question and case selection, while at the same maintaining conceptual clarity.

The process of building regional integration is now taking on a new form. New projects such as BRICS, the Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TFTA) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are emerging, i.e. new types of regionalism, which can be conventionally called 'alternative'. The emergence of new types of regionalism has been followed by a reflection on their theoretical implications, namely from the study of a geographically linked region to more complex projects involving not only countries but also whole regional groupings. There are different models of regional construction and new forms of regional projects that are not linked to borders and institutions are emerging. Regionalism is becoming a project activity of two or more states, can have a hegemonic or collective nature, and is also a project with an explicit ideological or value-forming orientation.

Regional studies are developing more and more actively, approaches and principles to the study of modern regions are changing. The number of scientific works devoted to different variants of regionalism is huge; nevertheless, try to find answers to the raised questions and to identify theoretical trends in modern studies of regions.

Conceptually, the proponents of comparative regionalism agree that 'region' is a multi-valued concept ('container-concept') and its definition depends on the specific research problem (De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, Van Langenhove, Baert 2010). If within the framework of early regionalism the region was considered mainly as a space located between the national and local levels within a single state

(micro-regions), then in modern studies we are talking about the region's entry into the macro-regional level. Moreover, representatives of neofunctionalism, institutionalism and especially transnationalism point out that regions are no longer exclusively state-centric, non-state actors and interest groups are now actively involved in regional cooperation (Acharya 2003; Söderbaum 2007; De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, Van Langenhove, Baert 2010).

As a result, within the framework of comparative regionalism, due to its pluralistic nature, two main approaches to the definition of 'region' have been established: most studies are still focused on understanding 'region' as an interstate form of cooperation (Fawcett 2005), but the trend in recent years is the transition to the so-called 'soft', or informal, regionalism, involving non-state actors (business and civil society) in regional cooperation (Acharya 2003; Söderbaum 2007).

Regional studies include representatives of the various theoretical schools: from classical approaches of functionalism and neorealism to cognitivist and poststructuralist approaches. It should be noted that positivist approaches are important in regional studies. The emergence of regional institutions cannot be analysed without reference to neofunctionalist theories, nor can one ignore neorealist theories explaining the role of regional powers or rising powers and their impact on regional dynamics. It is difficult to argue with J. Mearsheimer that institutions largely reflect the distribution of power in the world (Mearsheimer 1994). However, the increasingly complex, multiplex world (Acharya 2014) requires a more pointed approach to regional studies. Social constructivism, neo-Marxism, postcolonial and other cognitive approaches allow us to consider the internal dynamics and problems of the formation of the region, the perception of the region itself, as well as in the context of relations with other regions. There is an emerging tendency to apply constructivist approaches to institutions, neo-Marxism (Vivares and Dolcetti-Marcolini 2016), etc. Regional institutions are seen as autonomous actors in international relations, with their own values and norms, on the basis of which they build relationships both with other institutions and in global governance.

Louise Fawcett proposes three options for building regionalism, drawing on the EU experience. The first option, the orthodox one, suggests building regional and interregional relations based on the flagship experience of the EU. The second option is revisionist, which questions the EU experience and emphasises the role of other actors and models of region-building. The third option, post-revisionist, is a synthesis of the previous two options, namely recognising the role of the EU as an integration model, its influence and role in shaping regions outside Europe, and recognising that the EU is one of many options for regionalism (Fawcett 2016). Today all three research options are relevant, as different regions use different options for building regionalism: from building regionalism through learning, using EU practices, to revisionist regionalism.

### *Towards further development?*
First of all contemporary regions are complex fields where several regional institutions interact simultaneously. In some cases, such as in post-Soviet Eurasia,

there is a multiplication of regional institutions, which has been called the overlapping effect (Adler and Greve 2009; Panke and Stapel 2018). So-called 'overlapping regionalism' is now found not only in Eurasia, but also in Africa and Asia. It is also common in North and South America and Europe. In addition, more than 60 currently operating regional organisations have overlaps with each other, both in terms of membership and fields of activity. It is therefore important to explore how contemporary regional institutions can interact and deal with conflicts of interest.

Second new field ties with studies of the emergence, nature and basic processes of inter-organizational relations in global processes.

The third direction suggests the emergence of such initiatives as One Belt, One Road (China's initiative), and Uniting Europe and Asia. Classical integration theories do not yet allow us to explore the emerging inter- and trans-regional ties within the framework of these initiatives. Moreover, the phenomenon of 'initiatives' itself does not fit into the research field of classical theories. The emergence of the practice of trans-regional and interregional relations (Hanggi, Roloff, and Ruland 2006; Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2006; De Lombaerde and Schultz 2009) and development of theoretical studies in this field require comparative studies of modern interregional relations.

Fourth, the study of the features of modern interregional relations: 1) the emergence of 'competing', rival regionalism, the emergence of regional blocs in which interregional cooperation has been used as a tool to dominate the region in a foreign regional group; 2) formation of the complex interregionalism, with the emergence of interregional 'concerts' of powers within Europe, East Asia and North America; 3) regional powers, rising powers, have become more active among regional actors and are using their toolkit for regional construction, conflicting forms of interaction between regional powers and their neighbours in the region and with other regions; 4) institutional overstretch in contemporary global governance because of the number of regional blocs, institutions and arrangements at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Such new phenomena as BRICS, MICA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia), One Belt, One Road, Greater Eurasian Space, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership are difficult to explore within the classical integration theories and the region concept.

Fifth, one of the important theoretical directions of modern regional studies can be the study of the relationship between regionalism (macro-level) and regionalization (micro-level). Simultaneously with the formation of mega-processes, the construction of macro-regions, fragmentation and regionalization within each region takes place. Sub-national regions (micro-regions) and supranational regions (macro-regions) hardly overlap in research fields; they are studied by different academic communities. Micro-regionalism is usually analysed in the context of issues of federalism, separatism and trans-regional cooperation. The links between micro-regionalism and macro-regionalism are not simply underestimated from an 'empirical' perspective. The coexistence of micro-regionalism and macro-regionalism, and above all their complex relationship, is poorly explained by traditional theories that dominate contemporary international

relations (Söderbaum 2005; De Lombaerde 2010). The growing number of micro-regions emerging in various forms, such as sub-national and/or cross-border, formal or informal, economic, political, administrative, cultural, etc. regions, is becoming evident and requires a distinct research field.

### *Questions*
What is "comparative regionalism"?
Why has the importance of regional studies grown in the 21st century?
What are the methodological foundations of comparative regionalism?
Where is the discipline heading in its further development?

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# LECTURE 5
## DEBATES ABOUT FORMAL AND INFORMAL REGIONALISM

***Basic scientific approaches to the typology of regions and ways of organizing regional space***

Many scholars in the study of regionalism have concentrated on determining what types of regions are the most functional, instrumental and efficient to 'rule' or govern.

Often, especially in mainstream (rationalist and 'problem-solving') political science and economics, both macro-regions and micro-regions have been taken as pre-given, defined in advance of research, and have often been seen as particular inter-state or policy-driven frameworks. Integral to this reasoning is that regions are believed to exist 'out there' – identifiable through material structures and formal regional organisations. This preference is evidenced by the fact that the majority of studies in the field of regionalism are heavily state-centric or geared in favour of (formal) intergovernmental regional organisations.

Even if classical theories of regional integration and cooperation, such as functionalism and neofunctionalism, appreciated liberal-pluralist assumptions, as well as cordial relations between states and non-state actors for the promotion of commerce, these early perspectives were subordinated to the analysis of what 'states' did in the pursuit of their so-called 'interests', as well as the consequences of state-society relations for supranational and intergovernmental regional organisations.

Neofunctionalism builds on the functionalist method, but challenges the functionalist assumption of separability of politics from economics. It claims to contain a greater concern for the centres of power (Haas, 1958; 1964). Neofunctionalists emphasise the deliberate design of institutions, which are seen as the most effective means for solving common problems. These are, in turn, instrumental for the creation of functional as well as political spillover, and ultimately lead to a redefinition of group identity around the regional unit (Hurrell, 1995: 59).

Institutionalism, in its various versions, has become the contemporary form of functionalism and neofunctionalism. One of the dominating approaches of new institutionalist theories – neoliberal institutionalism – is based on a number of core arguments (Keohane, 1984; Mansfield and Milner, 1997). In common with their neorealist comrades, neoliberal institutionalists share the idea of an anarchical system in which states are largely rational and unitary actors, but 'institutions matter' because of the benefits that they provide (especially in the procurement of public goods or the avoidance of negative externalities from interdependence), meaning that state behaviour is constrained and affected by variations in the degree of institutionalisation across different issue areas of international and regional politics.

Probably the most promising comparative study on institutional design is Acharya and Johnston's (2007), who studied how institutions actually work, and the effect of institutional design. Their analysis is extended beyond the rationalist (and neofunctionalist) approach to institutional design in order to engage constructivist and other approaches (including looser and 'informal' variables). Acharya and Johnston ask why different forms of institutionalisation develop in different regions, and whether variation in institutional design leads to variation in the nature of cooperation; hence institutional design is analysed both as dependent and independent variable (Acharya and Johnston 2007: 2, 15). Acharya and Johnston's study contains a rather broad understanding of institutional design, including both formal and informal rules, and identity as well as norms (which is seen as the formal as well as informal ideology of the institution). In this way, their approach is able to account for the so-called 'Asian Way', which is based on informality, flexibility, consensus and non-confrontation (Acharya and Johnston, 2007: 245). With regard to Asian institutions they point out that: One of the main lines of difference is between the 'formal' informality of Asian institutions and the 'formal' formality of those in other regions. That is, the ASEAN states have deliberately and carefully designed their institutions to be informal. And in other regions the formality of the institutions has been a cover for the informality or the

weakly legalised way in which they have functioned (Acharya and Johnston, 2007: 246).

Neorealism analyses the formation of regions from the outside-in. The structural features of the anarchical system make the states – which are looked upon as unitary and rational egoists – predisposed towards competition and conflict. Regions and regionalism may occur under certain circumstances, for instance, when the distribution of power is opening up for cooperation, either through geopolitical reasons, or through the politics of alliance formation (especially in order to counter the power of another state or group of states, within or outside the region) (Gilpin, 1987). A central neorealist proposition is that a hegemon or 'stabiliser' can stimulate the emergence of regional cooperation and regional institutions in a variety of ways (Hurrell, 1995: 51-53).

Barry Buzan challenged conventional neorealism, and argued that power theorists underplayed the importance of the regional level in international relations. Buzan's well-known invention of a 'regional security complex' – originally defined as "a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan 1983) – had a profound and positive impact on the research field in the1980s and 1990s. Buzan's early perspective had state-centric origins. For instance, security complexes were seen as 'miniature anarchies', and in a rather orthodox manner the states were taken more-or-less as 'given', and as the units in the international system. Buzan also shared the conventional neorealist conviction that strong states make strong and 'mature' regions (cooperative 'anarchies'), whereas weak states, in their quest for power and security, tend to create (regional) conflicts and 'immature' regions, or are considered so weak that they do not form a region at all. Not surprisingly, Western Europe (and the EU in particular) is an example of the former, whereas weak states in Africa, for example, create weak regions. In collaboration with Ole Weaver, Buzan has subsequently revised the regional security complex theory in order to take account of his switch to the constructivist method, and to move away from state-centric assumptions. The new definition of a regional security complex is "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed apart from one another" (Buzan and Weaver 2003: 44). Buzan argues that the constructivist approach is necessary if one is to keep the concept of security coherent, while adding 'new security sectors' – economic, environmental and societal – beyond the traditional military and political ones. The new formulation allows for a deeper analysis of non-state actors and informality and also that regions are even less 'given'.

The view that regions must not be taken for granted, nor be analysed as regional organisations, is particularly emphasised in constructivist and post-structuralist scholarship. As Jessop (2003: 183) points out, "rather than seek an elusive objective …criterion for defining a region, one should treat regions as emergent, socially constituted phenomena." From such a perspective, all regions are socially constructed, and hence politically contested. The emphasis is placed on

how political actors (state as well as non-state) perceive and interpret the idea of a region, and notions of 'regionness' (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Hettne 2005). It is clear that such (inter)subjective understandings of regions transcend more narrow interpretations of formal regionalism, which in turn, of course, pose certain challenges for systematic comparison. The key point in this is that from such a constructivist and reflectivist perspective, the puzzle is to understand and explain the process through which regions are coming into existence, and are being consolidated – their 'becoming', so to speak – rather than a particular set of activities and flows within a pre-given region or (formal) regional framework. In this kind of analysis, regional inter-state organisations are seen as a second order phenomenon, compared to the processes that underlie regionalisation in a particular geographical space. As a consequence, for constructivists and reflectivists, regions are not taken for granted; they are not seen as 'natural', organic, essential or material objects, but rather as dynamic settings for social interaction, with a particular focus on the process through which they are 'becoming', and the way they are constructed/reconstructed by reflective actors. Because there are no 'natural' regions or given 'interests', the regions are, at least potentially, heterogeneous, with unclear spatial delimitations. Hence, this kind of scholarship is more concerned with the relationship between formal and informal regionalisation than regional institution building and institutional design per se.

In this context it must be noted that, in recent years, social constructivism has also gained a more prominent place in the study of European integration (Christiansen et al 2001). This line of thinking has entered the discussion on European integration mainly as a spillover from the discipline of international relations, and as a means of transcending the rather introverted debates between the conventional and rationalist theories of European integration referred to previously. The social constructivist approach in the European debate emphasises the mutual constitutiveness of structure and agency, and pays particular attention to the role of ideas, values, norms and identities in the social construction of Europe, which in turn draws attention away from the formality and particularities of the EU (Christiansen et al 2001). As Checkel points out, the differences between Europe and the rest of the world are overstated (even if some differences remain). According to Checkel, "If not yet completely gone, then the days of sui generis arguments about Europe are numbered, which is very good news indeed" (Checkel 2007: 243). This review shows that there is a rich variety of market and society actors that have begun to operate within, as well as beyond, state-led institutional frameworks, illustrating a complex relationship between formal and informal regionalism. Hence, the discourse on formal-informal regionalism is both expanding and vibrant.

But new definitions of formality-informality compete with old definitions, resulting in a large number of alternative, and often competing, conceptualisations. Even if individual researchers often apply coherent definitions, the literature as a whole is incoherent, leading to a lack of cumulative knowledge. Hence, a large number of partly overlapping and partly competing labels have been used in the debate, in order to capture similar (but not always identical) phenomena, such as:

top-down vs. bottom-up regionalism; de jure vs. de facto regionalisation; state-led regionalism vs. market- and society-induced regionalisation; hard vs. soft regionalism; and official vs. unofficial/informal regionalism.

It is not possible to provide a solution to this conceptual pluralism. It is possible, however, to draw attention to some pitfalls. First of all, the many varieties of formal and informal regionalism referred to above have a tendency to be rather metaphorical, without properly defining formality and informality in a strict sense. The formal regionalism often refers to official policies and codified interactions, which are often backed by written texts, legal treaties or constitutions. Informal regionalism processes are non-codified series of events based upon mutual understandings, accommodations and tacit agreements.

Another pitfall is that, unless handled with care, conceptualisations can prevent scholars from understanding the links between the two processes. It may lead to putting realities into boxes instead of revealing nuances, or understanding/explaining the logic of regionalism. In fact, there is a particularly strong tendency to dichotomise state and non-state actors. Frequently, regionalism is defined as a state-led project, and regionalisation as a (non-state) societal process (Gamble and Payne 1996; 2003), which has led several scholars to describe the regional phenomenon in terms of regionalism versus regionalisation (state versus non-state actors). This conceptualisation is inconsistent, however, since it excludes non-state actors of political agency. As Bøås, Marchand and Shaw (2003) pointed out, "regionalism is clearly a political project, but it is obviously not necessarily state-led, as states are not the only political actor around … we clearly believe that, within each regional project (official or not), several competing regionalizing actors with different regional visions and ideas coexist." This is by no means equivalent to rejecting the state.

States and inter-governmental organisations are often crucial actors and objects of analysis in contemporary regionalism, although some analysts and approaches certainly privilege them more than others. Clearly, so-called new regionalists are often wrongly accused of ignoring non-state actors. Indeed, it is important to continue to study 'states' and 'countries', however defined, even for those scholars. It is therefore more consistent to define 'regionalism' as the policy and project, whereby state and/or non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a particular region or as a type of world order.

Regionalism is usually associated with a formal programme, and often leads to institution building. 'Regionalisation' refers to the process of cooperation, integration, cohesion and identity creating a regional space (issue-specific or general), and involves state as well as non-state actors. "At its most basic it means no more than a concentration of activity – of trade, peoples, ideas, even conflict – at the regional level. This interaction may give rise to the formation of regions, and in turn, to the emergence of regional actors, networks, and organisations" (Fawcett 2005: 25).

*Formal and informal regionalism in East Asia*

There exists no overall consensus for a definition of the Asian region. The meaning of regionalism has changed in relation to the question of what sub-regions should be included and excluded, what dimensions of regionalism should be investigated (such as security, economics, politics and identity), and over the particular theoretical perspectives employed.

Conventionally, Asia has been divided into the regions Central Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, with a blurred border towards the Middle East. Most literature in relation to regionalism has focused on East Asia, that is, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. This diversity reveals the difficulty in taking the region as 'given' and also the limitations of focusing on one particular regional organisation.

Still, a considerable body of literature on regionalism in East Asia is concerned with the study of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Acharya 2001).A major reason for this emphasis, at least historically, appears to be that ASEAN has been one of the few sustainable regional organisations in the larger East Asian region – at least partly reflecting the preference for studying state-led regional organisations instead of broader processes of regionalisation and region-formation. During the Cold War the core of ASEAN cooperation was in its joint effort to consolidate the member nation states and to enhance stability. These goals were driven by narrow political elite in what were, at that time, relatively fledgling and fragile state formations. Communism was the primary internal and external threat. The raison d'être of ASEAN – bulwarking against communist expansion – is of course long absent; the focus has shifted to achieving increased economic development and to ensuring security in a new context.

During recent decades an important part of the debate about regionalism in East Asia has focused on collective identity formation and informal, or 'soft', regionalism (Acharya 2001; Katzenstein 2002). This scholarship seeks to account for the non-legalistic style of decision-making in this region, and the fact that there is no transfer of national sovereignty to a supranational authority. Nevertheless, there exists a dense network of informal gatherings, working groups and advisory groups, particularly within ASEAN, but also in the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and more recently the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea). This informal style of decision-making incorporates its own innate code of conduct that is often referred to as the 'ASEAN Way' (or 'soft institutionalism'), which, in contrast with European-style (and North American) formal bureaucratic structures and legalistic decision-making procedures, is built around discreetness, informality, pragmatism, consensus-building, and non-confrontational bargaining styles (Acharya 1997: 329). Further, the ASEAN Way reflects, to some extent, the illiberal underpinnings of the 'Asian values' construct, which stresses a communitarian ethic ('society over the self') in explaining the region's economic dynamism (Acharya 2002: 27-8). This means that there is a considerable emphasis on cultural factors in explaining the Asian Way and its differences from Europe. There exists a vigorous debate about the impact and efficiency of the informal and non-legalistic approach of Asian regional

organisations (Acharya and Johnston 2007). The 1997/98 Asian financial crisis not underlined only the interdependence of Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, but it also, according to Higgott (2002: 2), "exposed the weakness of existing regional institutional economic arrangements". To some observers, the crisis has undermined confidence in the soft institutionalism of the ASEAN Way, and underscored the need for deeper institutionalisation and stronger commitments from countries in the region. Following the region's recovery from the1997/98 financial crisis, the East Asian countries moved to institutionalise annual leaders' summits and ministerial dialogues through the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) framework. The most concrete project is the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which was adopted in May 2000 in order to provide emergency foreign currency liquidity support in the event of a future financial crisis. But broader cooperation also exists across a range of areas, such as small- and medium-scale industry development, human resource development, agriculture, tourism, and information technology (Nesudurai 2005: 167).

The question arises whether the strong informal nature of East Asian regionalism is having an impact on broader comparative discussion on regionalism. As indicated earlier, the comparative discussion is premature and there are fairly few systematic or organised comparisons of the main regions in the world. There are many studies which explicitly or implicitly compare Asian regionalism with European integration, and a large portion of these characterise East Asian regionalism as looser and more informal, sometimes even as "underdeveloped" (Choi and Caporaso 2002: 485). It is problematic, however, to regard EU-style institutionalisation as an ideal model for regionalism. A particularly effective remedy for such misplaced comparison with European integration is the edited collection by Bertrand Fort and Douglas Webber (2006), Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe: Convergence or Divergence?

Amitav Acharya (2006: 312-313) points out that rather than elevating the European model over the Asian experience as a preferred model of regionalism, it is more productive to recognise that regional cooperation is a difficult and contested process that will throw up different, equally legitimate, outcomes. Indeed, as Acharya and Johnston point out in their more recent volume, "more formally institutionalised regional groups do not necessarily produce more effective cooperation … More informal groups such as ASEAN have had a discernible impact in changing the preferences and norms of their members" (Acharya and Johnston 2007: 268-269). Acharya and Johnston's important conclusion is that "greater formality [e.g. a shift from consensus to majority voting] may actually affect cooperation negatively" (Acharya and Johnston, 2007: 270).

### Formal and informal regionalism in Africa

The ideological foundation of regional cooperation and integration in Africa is evidenced in the pan-African visions and series of treaties developed within the framework of the OAU and, more recently, the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Asante 1997; Murithi 2005;

Taylor 2005). While earlier strategies, from the 1960s through to the 1980s, were built around state-led industrialisation, import substitution and collective self-reliance, the dominant view since the early and late 1990s is that Africa 'must unite' in order to avoid its marginalisation in the global economy, and it should instead exploit the opportunities provided by economic globalisation. Indeed, an overarching market-orientation in combination with EU-style institutionalisation is the official strategy adopted by most of Africa's main regional cooperation and integration schemes, such as AU/NEPAD, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA).

The academic debate about regionalism in Africa often focuses on state-led regional integration frameworks. Two partly overlapping schools of thought dominate the debate. Both are state-centric, and biased in favour of formal regional organisations, while largely neglecting underlying societal logic. The first line of thinking is mainly associated with institutionalist and liberal lines of thought, concentrating on formal inter-state frameworks and/or official trade and investment flows, commonly with reference to the EC/EU as a comparative marker or model (Foroutan 1993; Holden 2001; Jenkins and Thomas 2001). What distinguishes the second, 'pan-African', school of thought is synoptic overviews of African regional organisations and political economic relationships, which are then coupled with demands for the strengthening of pan-African regional organisations and the so-called regional economic communities (RECs) of the envisioned African Economic Community (AEC) (Asante 1997; Muchie 2003). It is noteworthy that the pan-African line of thought often takes the EC/EU experience as inspiration, and as a justification for the development of pan-African regionalism. Indeed, despite their foundational differences, the two strands of thought make implicit or explicit comparisons with the EU, and also come to a similar conclusion, to the effect that, notwithstanding the 'failure' of regionalism in Africa hitherto, there is still great potential to build successful regionalism in the future.

A third and smaller group of scholars – sometimes referred to as the new regionalism/regionalisms approach – is more sceptical about whether the restructured regional organisations will be able to attain their goals of highly developed institutional frameworks (nearly always modelled on the EC/EU), with attendant economic and political integration. The scepticism of this group has generated a radically different interpretation of regionalism in Africa, associated with various approaches centring on critical political economy and new regionalism (Bach 1999; Bøås et al 2005; Grant and Söderbaum 2003; Hentz and Bøås 2003; Söderbaum 2004). These approaches obviate the artificial separation, in the African context, of state and non-state actors, and of formal-informal.

The particular importance of informal regionalism in the African context relates both to the informal economy and to the informal nature of politics. It is undisputed that many parts of Africa are characterised by myriad of informal and non-institutional interactions and activities between a mosaic of informal workers and self-employed agents, families, business networks, petty traders, migrant

labour, refugees, and so forth. In fact, the size of the informal economy in Africa, relative to the formal economy, is the highest in the world. Furthermore, in many parts of Africa informal employment represents up to around 75 per cent of non-agricultural employment and around half or more of total GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa.

By the same token, political power in Africa is often 'informalised'. State power within Africa is less about administration over the state and its attendant geographic area, with all the implications this might have regarding the provision of services to the populace, and more about the running of a relatively limited (in geographic terms and economic embeddedness) set of resources that are the sources of revenue and the foundations for entrenching power through patronage. Indeed, the informalisation of politics on the continent inevitably impacts upon the types and varieties of regionalism in Africa.

Shadow regionalism – or what Bach refers to as "trans-state regionalization" (Bach 1999; 2005) – is an important ingredient of regionalism portrayed by the so called new regionalists. Shadow regionalism suggests that regime actors use their power positions within the state apparatus in order to erect a complex mode of regionalism, characterised by informality and driven by rent-seeking and personal self-interest. Control of the state serves the twin purposes of lubricating the patronage network and satisfying the selfish desire of elites to enrich themselves – in many cases, in spectacular fashion. Taking the example of the Great Lakes region, Taylor and Williams argue that, for well-placed elites and business people, the war in this region potentially offers substantial resources for those able to exploit them. Foreign involvement is not only about preserving national security and defeating enemies, but also about securing access to resource-rich areas, and establishing privatised accumulation networks that can emerge and prosper under conditions of war and anarchy (Taylor and Williams 2001: 273).

A number of African regional organisations are involved in different types of peace operations on the continent. The personalisation of politics and relationships between heads of state in Africa – based either on empathy or animosity – are also recurrent in these regional peace operations (Hentz, Söderbaum and Tavares 2009). For instance, it would be difficult to understand Angola's and Zimbabwe's military deployment in the DRC if we did not account for the personal bond between Eduardo dos Santos and Robert Mugabe. The same holds for the ties between President Babangida of Nigeria and Samuel Doe of Liberia; between Liberia's Charles Taylor and Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and Blaise Campaore's Burkina Faso; or President Diouf of Senegal and Joao Vieira of Guinea Bissau. This type of personalisation is hardly ideal for peacekeeping. Yet, at least in the Liberian conflict, it was contingencies and personal relations between ECOWAS leaders and Liberian warlords – rather than any structured plans – that led to the end of the war in Liberia. Personal relationships may of course also hinder successful outcomes. As Meyer (2009:171) points out, the instrumentalization of the region and interplay of particular interests among political elites make regionalization in

Central Africa considerably vulnerable to deadlocks, as it easily leads to discordance among states.

These observations show that regionalism is more complex (and sometimes also more detrimental) than simply being an instrument to enhance an ambiguous 'national interest' (realism) or the procurement of the 'public good', or of 'trade' (liberalism). Potentially, state actors create regionalisation in order to achieve private goals and promote particular (vested) interests rather than broader societal interests (neopatrimonialism). Bach claims, for instance, that regional organisations constitute a means for 'resource capture' and international patronage (Bach 2005). This results inregionalisation without (the implementation of) formal regional integration. The informal and the formal stand in a symbiotic relationship.

The type of 'shadow regionalism' referred to here may be a goal in itself, but it may also be closely related to more formal and symbolic 'regime boosting' regionalism (Söderbaum 2004). The latter refers to the practice adopted by many ruling regimes and political leaders in Africa of engaging in symbolic and discursive activities – praising the goals of regionalism and regional organisations, signing cooperation treaties and agreements, and taking part in 'summitry regionalism' – while remaining uncommitted to, or unwilling to implement, jointly agreed policies. Regionalism is thus used as a discursive and image-boosting exercise: leaders demonstrate support and loyalty towards one another in order to raise the status, image and formal sovereignty of their often authoritarian regimes, both domestically and internationally (Bøås 2003; Clapham 1996). As Herbst (2009: 144) correctly points out, "African leaders are extremely enthusiastic about particular types of regional cooperation, especially those that highlight sovereignty, help secure national leaders, and ask little in return". The point is thus that African political elites continue to participate in regional organisations that have long records of failure. Those who believe that regional institutions exist in order to solve regional and collective problems cannot understand this tendency. But it is nonetheless understandable from a domestic perspective: "Regional institutions in Africa usually work when they help African leaders with their domestic problems" (Herbst 2009: 129).

The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) reveals a different pattern of the formal informal nexus in Africa (Söderbaum 2006). The Maputo corridor has been a largely informal cross-border micro-region for more than a century, constructed by millions of migrants, extensive informal trading as well as dense socio-ethnic interactions. Since the mid-1990s there is a formal project in the making, officially known as the MDC, which is seen as a key component of the economic development policy in this part of Africa, built as it is around large-scale private investment in infrastructure and industry. What makes the case of the MDC interesting is the fact that whereas there is an intense debate on how the MDC impacts on the formal economy, there is a silence concerning the linkages and effects on the informal economy. The negligence of the informal economy – which constitutes between half and two-thirds of the total economy in Mozambique – can be seen in the gigantic financial resources devoted to large investment and infrastructure projects with only a small fraction devoted to local development and

community participation, and hardly anything that targets the informal economy in itself. In fact, the informal economy is seen as a problem rather than a resource, and therefore the formal policy is "Blocking Human Potential" (Söderbaum 2006). The negative attitude towards the informal sector is made explicit in the statement by the Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI) (a membership organisation, composed of private infrastructure investors and service providers, as well as some public actors in South Africa): The MCLI is not against informal trading per se, only the black market part of it, but it needs to be better organized: "The Lebombo border post looked like a pig sty because of the vendors. People lived there and traded there. Vendors were in danger, any moment they could get hit by a truck. Vendors need to be capacitated about rules and regulations connected to trading etc., there are bodies for that. From a logistical point of view, the squatters/vendors living at the border-post had to be evacuated".

In order to properly understand the intricate relationship between formal and informal regionalism on the African continent properly, we need to go beyond a particular reading of European integration and the associated exaggerated emphasis on formal and policy-led regionalism/regional integration. For similar reasons, we need to go beyond the related, but false, assumption that there necessarily is a conflict between sovereignty and regionalism. Regionalism in Africa is often used in order to boost national sovereignty.

### *Questions*
What scientific approaches to the typology of regions and methods of organizing regional space are the most famous?

What are the features of formal and informal regionalism in East Asia?

What distinguishes formal and informal regionalism in Africa?

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**LECTURE 6**
**MULTIDIMENSIONAL REGIONALISM:**

# SECURITY, SOCIO-ECONOMIC SPHERE AND DEVELOPMENT

***Security regionalism. The theory of the regional security complex (RSCT) by B. Buzan. On dreams of security in the "Third World" by M. Ayub***

In the context of globalization, the term "security regionalism" has become increasingly used. The aim of regional peace-making is to prevent the spread of local conflicts. Conflict management, therefore, becomes internationalized, whether at the global or regional level. The peculiarity of the development of interstate relations since the early 1990s was the process of transformation of former groups, associations of states into new regional and sub-regional groupings. At the same time, such transformation takes place in the conditions of "descent" of a number of common political and economic "responsibilities" from the global to the regional level in the process of global regionalization of the geopolitical space, ultimately aimed at the formation of a new, territorially smaller political region within certain limits.

Regionalism, as a set of various forms of interstate group cooperation and integration, in theory and in practice is inseparably linked to the idea of international order, security and lasting peace. Conceptually it is based on the classical European integration theories, inspired by the idea of a gradual unification of sovereign states, fragmented by conflicts, into a single community, able to develop without serious internal conflicts and military confrontations. In practice, international conflicts stimulated not only theoretical research, but also organizational efforts to create regional unions. The first of these, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was born as a means to prevent new military conflicts in Europe, and its establishment in 1951 hastened the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950-1953. Conflicts or the threat of conflicts served as important impulses to regional progress in other parts of the world as well. The creation of Asia's first and oldest regional grouping today – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – was directly linked to communist threat, the desire of member states to ensure their survival in the face of imminent social change and to counter any possible dangers from outside.

While regionalism is understood to have increased globally since World War II, different regions of the world differ sharply in their levels of institutionalisation: high in Europe, low in South Asia for example. However, most regions, with few exceptions, have seen sustained institutional growth. In addition, though many regional institutions were established with a distinctly economic orientation (see further below), many regional institutions have further developed a distinctive security component, a product of functional expansion, but also reflecting regional needs and global priorities.

The security dimension of regional institutions may be understood in two different, related ways. First, it can be broadly interpreted as the attempt to promote peaceful and predictable relations among its members, to build security and community through cooperation. This loose understanding of security could be said to apply to any regional organization. Second, and more narrowly, a regional security institution can be understood as an organization whose charter contains an

explicit reference to security provision to meet a security threat, whether through the coordination of defence or foreign policy at some level. The focus here will be principally on the more measurable forms of security provision, less on security understood as community-building, though the two are often linked (Fawcett 2009).

The enthusiasm that accompanied the first regional cooperative experiments in different parts of the world was based on the assumption that closer relations could help unify the values and rules of behaviour of the parties involved, strengthening their mutual understanding, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict situations and the use of force in resolving them. Despite the lack of spectacular successes in building a non-conflict world during the Cold War, the number of regional associations continued to grow steadily. Moreover, they gradually came to be perceived as effective partners of the UN in its efforts to promote and consolidate peace in conflict zones. These perceptions were based on a number of rather simple logical arguments. Regional organizations and institutions, according to them, are capable of playing a significant role in ensuring regional security because of their special interest in preserving peace in 'their' regions and their greater awareness of the causes, circumstances, opportunities and ways of resolving local conflicts. The regionalization of security does not exclude the possibility that many or at least certain security problems are also global and thus best dealt with by multilateral institutions like the UN. However it also recognises that the regional sources of insecurity can be met with regional security provision, that the UN cannot act as a global security provider and that regional security provision may be better matched to a given's regions needs and interests.

Some well-established regional organizations have registered important advances in the area of peace enforcement or rebuilding war-torn states: whether in Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America or Europe. There have been many reverses however, and the record of others – in the Middle East, South or Central Asia – for example, remains quite limited. There is no regular or easily identifiable pattern or process to the development of security regionalism. For example, Latin American, South Pacific, Southeast Asian and most recently African countries have successfully established and maintained a nuclear free zone throughout their regions. In South Asia, in contrast, the two major regional powers, India and Pakistan, have gone nuclear, while the commitment of the League of Arab States to remove all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the Middle East has failed, with Israel's nuclear capacity already well-established and Iran moving ever closer to becoming a nuclear power.

New threats raise questions about the importance of the role of the state as a major actor in security issues. In some cases, states are no longer capable of dealing with any threats. Maximizing the interests of the state is much more important for them. Accordingly, it is increasingly not in their interests to take full responsibility against global security threats. They prefer to share the costs, and where the costs exceed the possible profits, they become even more indifferent to this issue. There is reason to believe that global problems in general require a global response. Nevertheless, it is clear that these responses are not always easily

achievable. The regional level of security can provide opportunities to address new security threats.

But the specifics of interaction within the limits of a concrete regional space are caused by features of foreign political strategies of the countries of the region. Thus, relations within the region can be represented as an integral derivative of the foreign policy activities of two (whose relations have a military strategic character with a clear idea of the region's security) or several states, which belong to this space. Relations between the states of the region are both situational and systemic, aimed at establishing cooperation in clearly marked areas and accompanied by an exchange of information in order to form an idea of the future development of the region and to identify ways to overcome real and potential threats to the implementation of regional projects in the political, economic, energetic, military and humanitarian spheres, as well as to improve the peaceful situation in the region. External political strategy of the countries of the region can be coordinated in order to improve the efficiency of reaction to possible changes in the existing system of interaction, which took place as a result of destructive actions of one of the players in the region, and pose a threat to almost all countries of the regional space. The actors' presence in a distinctly marked regional environment is reflected in their foreign policy actions. Thus, actors rationally comprehend the characteristics of the environment, which are transformed, and respond to them. However, it is worth emphasizing that actors' orientations and attitudes are not constant and change under the influence of institutions, simultaneously changing the institutions themselves.

Humans' basic instinct is survival, just as the most fundamental task of the state is its survival and the maximization of its interests. States try to protect themselves from any threat, to ensure their security. Each state has different ideas about threats, as well as different perceptions of the concept of security, so different states form their own security policies.

Thus, talking about security regionalism it reflects the ability of states in the region to repel aggression and ensure the stability of the system of regional relations. According to Barry Buzan, the main criterion for identifying specific international regions is the high level of interdependence in the field of security, which is recognized by neighbouring states (Buzan 2003). In the Copenhagen School's Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) Buzan defined such the basic parameters of regional security complex: 1) borders that separate one region from another; 2) an anarchic structure, meaning that the region must consist of two or more autonomous units (states); 3) polarity, which characterizes the spread of power between the main actors in the region; 4) the social component, which determines states' perception of neighbours within the region on a 'friend-enemy' scale. Buzan (2003) distinguishes a typology of regional security complexes. The first type is standard, for which the polarity is determined by regional states (powers). The second type is central, which is divided into three main forms, but a fourth is possible. The first two forms of this group are characterized by unipolarity, but the difference between them lies in the possession of primacy in the region by a superpower or regional power. Superpower is a state-leader not

only at the regional level, but also at the global level, so the other subjects of the regional grouping are not able to create a pole of power counterweight to superpower. The third type is a world state. This is a bipolar or multipolar centre of power in the region. The fourth type is super-complex. This is a strong interregional level of security that grows dynamically and in which weak states can enlist the help of a superpower or a world state against the core state of the region. RSCT focuses on the existence of more than two actors in the region, the polarity between them and the friendship-hostility dialogue. Polarity between regional states varies from unipolarity to multipolarity and from friendship to hostility. Such variations undergo a definite evolution from conflictuality through a security regime to a security community (Buzan 2003). The international system is one of the most important determinants of threat and security for a state. To this end, it is important to understand the international system and to determine its impact on a state's security policy. It is necessary to learn how a nation's understanding of security can influence its policies regarding the creation of a regional security complex. According to Buzan regional security organizations can be divided into the following two types: first - standard cooperation organizations, which consist entirely of regional forces. The standard organization maintains a balance of power, the leader can stand out and nevertheless, and all participants are regional and are not global in nature. The second type is the centre-oriented regional security organizations. This is a type of organization, the members of which, in addition to regional powers, are one or more world powers. This type of organization is created so that through the participation of world powers, the organization has the greatest influence. In this case, the strongest world power becomes the centre of this regional security organization, and the understanding of the organization's security moves from the regional level to the global level. This kind of security cooperation is likely to be more stable, as the central power establishes an "open hegemony" over other states in the region. The weaker states of the organization transfer some of their rights to the hegemon, allowing it to participate in conflicts and problems in the region, in order to ensure their stability and security (Buzan 2003). The effectiveness of the application of the theory of Buzan is justified by the example of the South Asian region, where the security factor is decisive. The interdependence of South Asian states at the domestic, regional, interregional and global levels is confirmed by the current political situation and allows us to classify the region as a super-complex. For example, the SAARC initiative (The South Asian Association for *Regional* Cooperation) is sometimes associated with an attempt by the small states of South Asia to form a regional security system in which the influence of India would be limited to the structural influence of the rest of the states. Due to the exclusion of bilateral and controversial issues from the SAARC mandate, this interest of small states has not been realized. At the same time, the multilateral format of the SAARC and the declarative principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity remain conditional security guarantees for South Asian states. The next level of security in South Asia is interregional cooperation, which in practice takes place within the framework of overcoming the conflict potential in Afghanistan with the involvement, primarily,

of Pakistan. New Delhi also pursues an Afghan policy vector, as opposed to Islamabad. Moreover, it is the India-Pakistan-China triangle of interests that embodies the 'polarity' behind Buzan in the 'deterrence' format of regional actors – India-Pakistan and PRC-Pakistan. This fact allows us to call South Asia a super-complex.

To analyse this phenomenon, along with Buzan's theory of regional security complex, a constructivist approach intersecting with postcolonial theories of regionalism within the boundaries of the concept of 'identity' can be applied.

For instance, Muhammad Ayoob identifies these foundations of security in the "Third World": the illegitimacy of state borders, institutions and regimes; the social disintegration of the population; the lack of consensus in society about fundamental problems. Ayoob summarizes these basic notions: 1) domestic and world orders are interconnected especially in the sphere of conflicts; 2) domestic order in the state should be considered in the first place, as it is the source of conflicts; 3) conflicts within and between states are interconnected and have a direct impact on the regional environment. Thus, M. Ayoob concludes, without stability within the state and a certain identity it is impossible to speak adequately and objectively about the system of regional security and a cohesive region. The scholar argues that domestic conflicts, in particular in post-colonial states, are responsible for regional instability. The uncertainty of state identity leads to ethnically-based rebellions and separatist movements that cross borders and destabilize the situation in neighbouring countries. The existence of an internal identity and the image of the 'enemy' (threatening country) for the state will not only help to establish stability within the country, but also to form a relatively safe climate in the region in the absence of chaotic conflicts (Ayoob 1995).

### *Regionalism of economy and development. Social regionalism*

Any state consists and functions primarily thanks to people and population. The importance of demographic potential is emphasized by its connection with the social and economic potential of countries. The quantity and quality of the demographic potential directly affects the quality of labour resources that affect production and, ultimately, the economy. In addition, the population is important from the point of view of settling and economic development of the territories of the country, which also affects its economy, because the territories ennobled by people can benefit the economy. In countries where people are wealthy, healthy, have access to education, have high rates of duration, level and quality of life, the social sphere functions more successfully.

For ex., Croatia is among the 10 oldest nations in the world and the demographic picture of Croatia shows features that are not typical for most EU countries. Negative processes in Croatia began from the moment of the economic crisis of 2008, which affected not only the Croatian economy, but also the demographic component. At this time, Croatia faced problems such as natural population decline (i.e. more deaths than births), a negative migration balance and a decline in population. Every year the population decline continued to grow. It is especially tragic the fact of the emigration of young people and educated people.

The tendency of young people leaving rural areas and moving to larger cities leads to depopulation of the countryside, the disappearance of villages and centralization, which also negatively affects economic growth. A new wave of emigration in Croatia began in 2013, after the accession to the European Union. This was due to the possibility of free movement around the countries of the European Union, due to the poor economic situation within the country (consequences of the crisis of 2008), the inability of the state to create new jobs and the search for a better life.  Another negative aspect of the decrease in the number of young population is the fact that they stop paying taxes, which are later used in the social sphere – in the construction of schools, the development of health care, paying pensions. Due to cuts in tax payments and a small number of newborns, there may be a problem associated with the disappearance of professions and the loss of work: for ex., due to lack of payments and a small number of students, many schools can close, and teachers can simply be left without work. The Croatian government is trying to deal with the demographic crisis at the state level:  in 1995, several programs that encouraged fertility were adopted, but they were not fully implemented. The same program, but more effective, was created in 2007 – financial support for the 3rd and 4th child. In addition, a number of laws have been adopted – an increase in the amount of exemption from income tax, which increases in proportion to the number of children, the Law on Subsidized Housing Loans, the Law on Maternity and Parental Assistance etc. These efforts were not effective because economic crisis began, which stalled the further implementation of the proposed assistance. Also there is a problem, connected with the lack of work with society, which would make the image of a large family positive and popular among the population. For today, the population of Croatia is about 4 million people, the birth rate is about 100 children per day, and the death rate is about 140 people.

The main problem in Croatia is the active aging of the nation and a decrease in the number of young people. In order to encourage youth and the entire working-age population, Croatia focuses on the younger generation, supporting youth in employment, creating decent living conditions in all corners of the country. To encourage the younger generation to go to work, the government provided them with conditions in the form of the possibility of continuing education at the workplace. In addition to the youth itself, the Croatian government also encourages employers to hire young professionals.

### Ecological regionalism

Nowadays a large number of international organizations, transnational corporations, development banks, social movements and even individuals are actively promoting the idea of sustainable development, which will help humanity resist climate change. Indeed, rapid climate changes since the beginning of the 21$^{st}$ century, global warming, melting glaciers, as well as massive environmental pollution and the fight against it have become the most important trends of our time, along with new economic initiatives, human rights and technological progress. In order to overcome or at least reduce the negative effects of climate

change, many organizations have been created and many international treaties have been signed, among which the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015) obviously stand out.

However, not a single global effort has been able to achieve significant success to this date – while some countries actively adhere to new environmental principles, others, mainly the highly industrially developed actors, ignore these postulates in every possible way or express their commitment to climate change fight conditionally. This situation has led to the formation of regions in the world that clearly demonstrate the most successful actors of the climate change fight; within the most advanced regions each individual state makes a significant contribution to eliminating the problem, which allows scientists to talk about their common regional policy. At the same time, a group of states and several regions with the worst environmental performance have emerged; they require a fundamental rethinking of their green policies or international support in order to successfully finance their efforts to combat the effects of climate change (Yadav 2008:128). Thus, the concept of environmental regionalism arises – the study of the climate policy of countries, based on their belonging to a group of advanced or lagging climate actors.

Studies on international coordination via regional rather than global involvement have developed in the literature while there is continuous debate over the viability of negotiations and implementation for global environmental accords. Regional environmental agreements, which account for 60 per cent of international environmental accords, might give useful information for creating regional climate initiatives, but further study is required. Many regional environmental accords, such as the Alpine Convention's Action Plan on Climate Change in the Alps (2009), include climate change provisions (Balsiger 2012; Church 2010). So, here is the list of some regions and their characteristics according to their climate-related performance.

One of the founders of the movement for green economy and biggest supporters of the transition to the use of eco-friendly materials are the developed countries of old Europe. The forwards of this process are undoubtedly Scandinavia, the Benelux and the Baltic countries, regional division of which is a vivid example of regionalism. These states are often considered in such a regional context, when their outstanding contribution to the fight against global climate change is mentioned.

Firstly, despite the fact that the first Regional Seas Convention – The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) – was established here in 1974 and the region has a long history of cooperation and environmental preservation, this area surprisingly contains some of the world's most polluted waterways. Ecological borders and cross-sectorial integration are investigated as part of the existing environmental governance setups. The growth of environmental governance and current environmental laws in the area show how the ecosystem approach to management is both a tool and a vision for the comprehensive management of natural resources. The ecosystem approach is currently the primary guiding concept in European maritime governance, as shown by the fact that key

European Union's directives and HELCOM policies both encourage it (Söderström 2017: 26).

However, there are several ways in which governance systems might hinder implementation. The many environmental issues in the region need distinct forms of government, preventing a comprehensive solution. Because of the interconnected nature of environmental issues, addressing them will need extensive cross-sectorial and cross-border collaboration, which is now the most significant impediment to their implementation. To make the ecosystem approach a practical approach rather than just a policy principle, current trends that combine solid regionalization through the EU and HELCOM with increased Europeanization and macro-regionalization through various EU initiatives are promising. However, cross-sectorial impediments must be resolved.

Next, the European Union offers a variety of initiatives for its member states connected with climate change and fighting its consequences. A European Union-wide $CO_2$ tax has been attempted and failed for many years. Only a minimum level of energy tariffs may be specified for the EU as a whole at this point. Other transnational climate policy projects tend to focus on a few specific technologies, unlike this one. The Climate Technology Initiative, the Methane to Markets Initiative, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, and the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy are all available to each country of the region (European Commission's website).

For almost a decade, the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) has been developed in close cooperation between the EU Commission and member state governments, the European Parliament, and business groups. From a highly decentralized to centralized structure, it has gone through three stages. Initially encompassing approximately 2 Gt of yearly $CO_2$ emissions and 12,000 installations owned by over 4,000 enterprises, the EU ETS is still the world's biggest emission trading scheme (Agrawala and Klasen 2014: 1111). Since 2000, the EU has shifted its position on climate policy from a sceptic of market mechanisms to a backer of a large-scale carbon trading scheme. A carbon tax would need unanimity in the EU, but under EU rules, trading may be agreed upon by a qualified majority. The Kyoto Protocol has raised the profile of climate policy. Windfall earnings realized by incorporating permits into energy and other goods that are not subject to worldwide competition attracted industry to the program.

The strictness with which allowances are allocated has largely defined the EU Emission Trading System's environmental performance. Researchers have criticized the first implementation of a decentralized allocation system for leading to a 'race to the bottom' among member states. Analysts were surprised to see permission prices soar to approximately 30 EUR in 2008, which spurred emission reductions of up to 170 $MtCO_2$ in the 2005-2007 test periods (Agrawala and Klasen 2014: 1112). In part, this large range is due to the difficulties in determining emission levels at the start of an analysis. Member states' allocation plans for 2008–2012 were lowered by 10% as a result of an EU Commission clampdown (European Commission's website).

The EU ETS's institutional feasibility was accomplished by a fundamentally liberal allocation, which raises questions about its environmental performance. Over time, the distribution of resources became more centralized, reducing the authority of individual national governments. In the second phase of the EU ETS, a number of variables have led to lower carbon pricing. As a result, the European policymakers' target has been met, but carbon prices remain low. Efforts have been made to stabilize the carbon price through back loading or an ambitious emission target for 2030 (Blatter 2000); however, at the time of this writing, it has proved politically difficult to reach agreement on these issues. A quantified emissions goal or a significant carbon price will be necessary in any future EU ETS reforms.

In addition, regional cooperation in the energy industry may be especially relevant given the importance of the energy sector in mitigating climate change. There are several ways in which regional and interregional agreements on economic, policy, and legislative cooperation may lead to collaboration in renewable energy sources and energy efficiency (Altmann 2002). Cross-border activities such as energy resource sharing and cross-border infrastructure are also a factor. Many factors influence the kind of regional energy cooperation that may be implemented, including the level of political unity in the area, energy resources available, economies linked to each other, institutional and technical ability in each country, and the available financial resources. Obviously, the Scandinavian countries show the best results in this process (Morales and Sariego-Kluge 2021).

It must be noted that the use the regional approach in the study of international politics allows making the most objective selection of states according to certain criteria. In the case of environmentalism, scientists have the opportunity to analyse the practical efforts of individual groups of states based on their real-life performance in combating climate change. Also, this approach makes it possible to adequately classify countries and divide them into the more advanced in terms of regionalism and those who, for various reasons, demonstrate modest results in ecology. This allows further use of various theoretical ideas for regions and countries with different potentials. In terms of green regionalism, it is necessary to single out several groups of states that form regions or sub-regions showing the most successful results in the fight against environmental pollution and the transition to alternative energy sources. These are, first of all, the countries of Western Europe, Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea. Further, it is necessary to note the huge efforts of the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, probably with the exception of China. Their incredible commitment to sustainable development combined with creative innovation makes this region one of the most successful while speaking of green regionalism. There are also serious efforts to prevent the consequences of global warming in Latin America, but these countries still need to do a lot to compete with Europe and Asia.

*Questions*
Why has security regionalism become the most discussed topic since the collapse of the bipolar system?

What is the theory behind the regional security complex?

What are the main provisions of M. Ayub's monograph?

What does regionalism of economy and development mean?

Why are social regionalism and ecological regionalism considered separate from economy and development regionalism?

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# LECTURE 7
## REGIONS IN INTERREGIONALISM:
## THE CASE OF MEDITERRANEAN

### *The concept and features of interregionalism*

Many scientists have devoted their research to the study of issues of interregional cooperation. The sources of the idea of interregional cooperation as a whole were laid down by the classics of economic thought: E. Heckscher, A. Smith, A. Lesh, D. Ricardo and others.

In modern conditions, interregionalism refers to regular forms of cooperation between regions or subjects of different regions and is the result of parallel phenomena of globalization and regionalism. Interregional relations are rapidly developing around the world and form a new level of global governance. Today, developing regions are more active and visible participants in interregional cooperation.

According to Heiner Hänggi (2006: 3), interregionalism is defined as "institutionalized relations between world regions". Put it simply, interregionalism means region-to-region relations. Interregional relations involve regional organizations and civil society in the process. In addition, interregional relations

are usually asymmetric, since they tend to involve regions with different degrees of development. Moreover, interregional relations tend to put the main focus on economic or social issues rather than security or military matters (Malamud and Gardini 2015: 3). The latter comes out of an assumption that regionalism is a multidimensional concept which includes a political, an economic and an identity dimension (Panebianco 2010: 156).

The typology of interregional relations offered by Hänggi (2000) includes three types of interregional relations:
- pure interregionalism, that is relations between regional groupings (such as EU-ASEAN or EU-Mercosur)
- transregionalism, that is arrangements where states participate in an individual capacity, as in APEC, the Trans-Pacific Partnership or EU-Latin America and the Caribbean before the establishment of CELAC
- hybrid interregionalism, that is relations between regional groupings and single powers (such as the so-called strategic partnerships of the EU with several regional powers).

In addition, Hanggi distinguishes between the 'old' interregionalism, characteristic of the EEC during the Cold War, and the 'new' interregionalism that emerged after the end of the bipolar confrontation. Hanggi believes that the fundamental difference between the old and new interregionalism is that the first was focused on the problem of actors, while the second was focused on problems of the system level. The relations of a regional organization with a regional group and of a regional group with a regional group (less formal than cooperation between regional organizations), in his opinion, are inherent in the main new interregionalism.  They were the most developed in the post-bipolar period (Hanggi 2005:  39).

The capacity building form of interregionalism is largely directed towards the strengthening over time of a weaker interregional partner (Doidge 2007: 238-242).

Two elements are intrinsic to this. The first is the building of intraregional institutions within the weaker regional grouping as a function of the need for greater intraregional cooperation in order to more fully engage with a more integrated partner. The second is the formation of regional identities, whereby the process of interaction with a more coherent regional 'other' at the interregional levels leads to a reinforcement of identities at the regional level.

In contrast to this internally focused variety, the globally active interregionalism is concerned with expression of the interregional partnership on the global stage. It is focused on the pursuit of agreed goals and interests in the international system and in multilateral fora. Again, this involves a variety of processes. First, drawing on realist conceptions of actor competition and notions of 'balance of power', interregionalism is seen to contribute to the maintenance of equilibrium in the international system, particularly within the triad of regional economic powers of North America, Europe and Asia. Second, the globally active interregionalism envisages such partnerships facilitating cooperation in global multilateral fora, allowing regional groupings to agree agendas for pursuit in global

fora, or acting as clearing houses for such fora, allowing issues of global importance to be considered at a remove from the complexities of truly global multilateral negotiations.

In general, the principles of the functioning of interregionalism through regional institutions and departments include the following:

1) respect for state sovereignty within the regions, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of states that are part of these regions;

2) taking into account, when concluding agreements on interregional cooperation, the powers of subjects and the rights of participants in such cooperation (regional institutions and departments);

3) coordinated removal of political, economic, legal, administrative and other obstacles to mutual cooperation.

However, this list of principles is much wider. Such principles can be combined into two groups: general and specific.

The general principles are based on the fact that the development of interregional cooperation should be carried out taking into account the preservation of the specifics of the identity and individuality of each of the parties, i.e. preserve the versatility of the regions while countering each individual attempt at unification. Development must also take into account all currently known social, economic, foreign policy points of view.

General principles include:

1) the functioning of interregional cooperation through regional institutions and departments on the basis of mutual assistance and partnership;

2) the functioning of interregional cooperation through regional institutions and departments based on enhanced regional awareness;

3) contributing to the strengthening of regional and public identification (self-awareness) of the population.

Specific principles are based on the principles of partnership, equality, equivalence of the parties. The principle of partnership has two elements:

1) vertical partnership, that is, with the appropriate participation of the international, central, regional and local levels on each side, complementing existing structures, but without elements of competition;

2) horizontal partnership, i.e. partners of the region, namely regional institutions and departments.

This type of partnership is based on the parity of the parties, regardless of the size of the territory in the spatial, economic or demographic dimension; to develop this type of partnership, it is necessary to overcome a number of obstacles arising from differences in administration, competencies and funding sources;

Another specific principle is the principle of assistance (subsidiarity), which is understood as the assistance of international, state and regional institutions and organizations in achieving the realizable goals of interregional cooperation, which is implemented by regional institutions and departments; aid also means strengthening the regional and local levels through the delegation of authority to the lowest level of administration;

An important principle is also the principle of existence of the concept of

the strategy of interregional development; the implementation of this principle is mandatory for the creation of strategic boundaries and prospects for long-term cooperation; this strategy should be consistent with the development program of the regions and regional institutions, and determine the needs and future goals of inter-regional cooperation to overcome isolated development on one side only and develop an appropriate common perspective for interregional development.

Therefore, the most important principles of interregional cooperation through regional institutions and departments include the following: legality, independence, territorial integrity, voluntariness, equality of participants, independence, subjectivity, spatial optimality, compromise, target sense, hierarchy, complexity, systemic nature.

The proposed principles can be conditionally divided into two groups, one of which combines the principles associated with organizational and legal aspects, the second – organizational and economic.

The emphasis on the organizational component is not accidental, since it is on it that the cooperation of heterogeneous in interests, practical contributions, and initiative of regional institutions and departments is built, which on both sides carry out interregional cooperation.

Legality is the formation of legal and institutional support as a necessary condition for interregional cooperation at the international, national, local and regional levels. The above is based on mutual respect for the domestic legislation of neighbouring countries, as well as international norms and standards, local documents of regional institutions and departments.

All those who are participants in inter-regional cooperation on the basis of their own desire and interests resolve issues of participation in cooperation with territorial communities, branches of government of the regions through regional institutions and departments. This shows the voluntariness of their actions.

The principle of equality of participants provides equal opportunities for different regions and regional institutions to cooperate with territorial communities or branches of state power in the framework of interregional cooperation. The essence of this principle lies in the implementation in practice of uniform rules, procedures and the provision of the same status and opportunities to all participants in such cooperation in projects.

The principle of independence ensures the solution of issues of territorial development creates effective mechanisms for participation in interregional cooperation with the assistance of local governments and executive authorities within the limits determined by law.

The principle of subjectivity most reflects the essence and specifics of interregional cooperation. It provides for the implementation of such cooperation within the powers and functions of not only local governments, territorial communities or authorities, but also regional institutions participating in cooperation in accordance with their competence defined by national or international legislation.

The principle of spatial optimality involves ensuring the effectiveness of interregional cooperation projects, which depends on the correct choice of

boundaries and the scale of the regions, which makes it possible to ensure not only legal, but also actual equality of subjects and participants in cooperation.

Cooperation agreements were aimed at the establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area (MEFTA) that should eventually result in a Euro-Mediterranean FTA (EU-MEFTA). If we assume that regionalism is a multidimensional concept which takes into account political and security, economic, but also social and cultural aspects, each of these dimensions can be imagined as a continuum and can be combined in a triangle. The triangle indicates that regionalism can have different forms, since it moves along three continuums which reflect the political dimension (shifting from the extreme of war and conflict to political integration), the economic dimension (which moves from the absence of economic interactions – or eventually sanctions – to market integration), and the identity dimension (which ranges from the supposed clash of civilization to the sharing of a regional identity) (Panebianco 2010: 158).

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was originally organized into three categories, or pillars, focusing on political stability, economic prosperity, and social cooperation for the states on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. In 2005, a fourth focus area – migration – was also added. The fourth basket was meant to address concerns on the part of some EU member that immigration originating from the MENA region is threatening the security of EU member states. The first pillar of the Barcelona Process, "Political & security partnership: Establishing a common area of peace and stability," focuses on the development of political stability and security with an emphasis on "good governance" practices, the development of democratic regimes, and the protection of human rights (Council of the European Union 1995). The second pillar, "Economic & financial partnership: Creating an area of shared prosperity," emphasizes the purported importance of "sustainable and balanced economic development of the countries of the Mediterranean region" (Council of the European Union 1995), noting three interconnected objectives: the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, EU support for economic transition and to help the partners meet the challenges posed by economic liberalization, and the increase of investment flows to the Mediterranean partners which will result from a tree trade and economic liberalization (European Commission 2000). This pillar expresses a primary interest in mitigating poverty and lower life expectancy in non-European Mediterranean states, such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, through an emphasis on development and the creation of a Mediterranean free trade zone (Council of the European Union 1995; Philippart 2003: 210). With the adoption of the EMP, a large number of free trade agreements were signed bilaterally between states, although the project of a "region-wide" free-trade area has largely failed (Handoussa and Reiffers 2001). The third pillar outlines the goals for the EMP with regards to the social and culture objectives. The main objective of this basket is to promote intercultural dialogue, particularly through an emphasis on shared culture between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Although, the regional polarisation caused by the recrudescence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, together with the war in Iraq and its aftermath, has also serious

repercussions on Euro-Mediterranean individual relations. Xenophobia, Islamophobia and increasing intolerance inevitably hinder mutual trust and the fostering of a shared identity (Panebianco 2010: 16). One reality of the EU's relationship with its MENA neighbours is that the focus on economic issues has largely been on a state-to-state level. In addition to the perceived failure to foresee the Arab Spring, there is also a question of how genuine and effective the EU's response to the Arab Spring was, or whether it was too little, too late (Etzioni 2011). In the years since the Arab Spring uprisings, many Arab populations across the region are still under dire political and economic constraints. Thus, many of the attempts to create multilateral talks stalled, which left the European Union created bilateral agreements with individual countries in the south (Vasconcelos and Joffé 2004: 4).

### *Multidimensional regionalism in the Mediterranean: integration processes, regional identity, macro-regional initiatives*

South-south trade integration has been put forward by the implementation of regional free trade agreements among the southern Mediterranean countries themselves. The Arab League announced the possible extension of the Agadir Agreement to 22 Arab countries by 2015, with the ultimate goal of signing a comprehensive Arab Free Trade Agreement.

Land Transport: Countries of the Arab Maghreb Union are working on two major communication routes: the Maghreb unity motorway (which connects the five capitals of the region's countries, from Nouakchott in Mauritania to Tripoli in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) and the trans-Maghreb railway, which already connects Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The "high-speed railway of the sands",connecting Casablanca and Cairo.

Energy: Energy has brought countries in the southern Mediterranean region closer together. The EU receives 18 per cent of its natural gas imports from Algeria, Libya and Egypt. Ensuring energy supply is of primary importance to the EU, and various pipeline projects have been put forward with the aim of safeguarding the transmission of natural gas:

- MEG pipeline, transmitting Algerian natural gas to Spain and Portugal via Morocco
- Medgaz, a natural gas transmission pipeline under construction between Algeria and Spain
- Transmed, an underwater natural gas pipeline connecting Algeria, through Tunisia, with Italy and Slovenia
- Green Stream, a pipeline between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Italy, operating since October 2004
- Galsi pipeline, an underwater natural gas pipeline to connect Algeria with Northern Italy through Sardinia

In 1975 the first attempt to put the Mediterranean on the international agenda. The inclusion of a Mediterranean Chapter in the Helsinki Final Act draws on the assumption that without security in the Mediterranean, there can be no security in Europe; and vice versa. Initiatives in the 1980s aimed to foster both

political and economic cooperation. In 1983, French President François Mitterrand launched a security initiative with the goal of creating a Forum to bring together five members of the Arab Maghreb Union and their northern neighbours. This led to the establishment in 1990 of the Western Mediterranean Dialogue. The purpose of this initiative was to improve economic cooperation and increase regional interdependence.

In 1995, the foreign ministers' meeting of the 15 EU and 12 Mediterranean countries was held in Spain. The meeting resulted in the Barcelona Declaration. In the Barcelona Declaration, the Euro-Mediterranean partners established the three main objectives of the Partnership: Definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue (Political and Security Basket). Construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area (Economic and Financial Basket).

Today the Mediterranean region does not have an agreed regional identity. Launched by the European Union in November 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) relies on a region-building approach in its attempts to stabilize the southern Mediterranean. It entails the promotion of common values, interests and a shared identification among the participating parties.

The member states of the European Union dominate more than half of the foreign trade of the southeast Mediterranean countries. There are glaring economic inequalities between the north and the south, and it would be very difficult to talk of a homogenous entity of Mediterranean countries. Trade and the elimination of customs barriers may be beneficial for the members with regard to rapprochement, but they can also have a negative impact when the partners involved have different levels of growth and development. In a context in which globalisation has become the economic, political and media watchword, observers are drawn to the strategic and economic stakes in the Mediterranean basin.

In 2010, just one year after the launch of the EU's first macro-regional strategy in the Baltic Sea, the European Parliament identified the Mediterranean as a future EU macro-region alongside the Danube and Alpine regions, an idea developed further in its June 2012 report on the evolution of EU macro-regional strategies.

The EESC's 2013 opinion, emphasised that a macro-regional strategy would help regions address the causes of uncertainty that dominate the area, and put forward a governance structure based on a multilevel approach involving regional, national and EU institutions.

The Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (AII) was established at the Summit on Development and Security on the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, held in Ancona (Italy) on 19th/20th May 2000 and attended by the Heads of States and Governments of Italy, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece and Slovenia. At the end of the Conference, the Foreign Ministers of the participating Countries signed the "Ancona Declaration" in the presence of the President of the European Commission. As the Declaration states, strengthening regional cooperation helps to promote political and economic stability, thus creating a solid base for the process

of European integration. From the very moment of its institution the goal of facilitating the enlargement of the EU in the Western Balkans was clear. Today, the AII counts nine Members: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. Given the increased interdependence among States connected to the globalization processes and the need to provide common solution to common problems affecting the Adriatic region ask for concerted cooperation not only among regional Countries but also among regional initiatives. Cooperation has therefore gradually assumed different forms, including the establishment of partnerships involving Adriatic Ionian networks and Fora such as the Forum of the Adriatic Ionian Chambers of Commerce, the Adriatic Ionian Forum of Cities and Towns and UniAdrion (the Adriatic Ionian network of Universities). The AII was originally founded with the aim of providing common and concerted solutions to shared problems, from fighting against organized criminality to the need to protect the natural environment of the Adriatic-Ionian Sea. Following the recent EU approach to support multilateral sub-regional cooperation and the successful example of the adoption of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea, the AII has worked, since the beginning of 2010, on the idea of a Macro-Region for the Adriatic Ionian Region. Considering the common historical and cultural heritage, the use of the common sea, the need to protect the marine environment from pollution, the opportunity of sustainable development and growth and the common goal to make this basin an internal sea of the European Union when the integration process is concluded in the Western Balkan countries, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the 8 countries of the Adriatic Ionian Initiative approved, under Italian Chairmanship, a "Declaration on the Support of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Basin" (5th May 2010, Ancona). Since then the AII participating States, the coastal regional authorities, the thematic networks and the AII initiated a joint action aimed at raising awareness on the necessity of establishing a Macro-Region for the Adriatic Ionian basin. This initiative raised support from all Adriatic Ionian actors at all levels of government and society. As a consequence of AII full commitment, the European Council gave mandate to the EU Commission to present a new "Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region" (EUSAIR) that was endorsed by the Council on the 24 October 2014. So, carried forward by significant political momentum, the macro-regional strategy for the Adriatic Ionian was officially launched, marking the completion of the first of the three Mediterranean macro-regional strategies.

And the last integration initiative, Western Balkans Fund (WBF), is an international organization established by the governments of the WB6 Contracting Parties: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The Agreement for the creation of WBF was signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of WB6, on November 2015. The Fund has become operational on October 1, 2017, after the conclusion of the ratification procedures by all the parliaments of its constitutive members. The Fund's main objective is to boost cooperation between its members, to strengthen relations and regional cohesion and to advance integration into the European Union.

In 2017 Council conclusions on the implementation of macro-regional strategies clearly stated that the Council was open to examine any commonly agreed and mature initiative of Member States facing the same challenges aimed at setting up a new macro-regional strategy, a stance reiterated in June 2019 and in December 2020, Council has yet to make any direct reference to the establishment of a Mediterranean macro-regional strategy. As one of the leading advocates of macro-regionalisation in the region, the CPMR's Inter-Mediterranean Commission has also continued to promote the idea of a macro-regional strategy for the region, with its 2020-2021 action plan advocating, among other things, the possible extension of the WestMED Maritime Initiative to the entire basin. This could represent a first step towards a macro-region in this area, potentially complementing the EUSAIR strategy and possible future strategies. More recently, the CPMR General Assembly's July 2021 declaration emphasised that a global macro-regional strategy linking in with other Mediterranean macro-regions and initiatives such as the Adriatic-Ionian MRS and WestMED would strengthen cohesion, with the development of a Mediterranean macro-regional governance framework, covering the various levels of government, providing an excellent opportunity for recovery from the pandemic.

World's Geopolitical Centre, Mediterranean region has a unique global position with some most remarkable geostrategic corners (for ex., the Suez Canal and Strait of Gibraltar). Open access to the Black Sea enables continental states easily enter global markets. On the other hand, the Euro-Mediterranean region represents a religious, cultural and academic bridge between the Arab world, North African states and the European Union.

### Questions
What is the phenomenon and concept of interregionalism?
What are the main features of interregionalism?
What features of interregionalism in the Mediterranean are priorities?
What is regional identity?
Are macro-regional initiatives the norm during the development of interregionalism?

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# LECTURE 8
# REGIONS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

### The concept of global governance

In a globalized world, global governance is a key concept for understanding the mechanisms that perform policy-making and monitoring functions at the global level. Making global governance work is the defining challenge of our time, given that too often international leaders cannot agree, let alone act in concert, to address pressing transnational issues at the intersection of peace, security and justice. Since World War II, organizations and alliances have been created to maximize global governance and intervention to prevent imbalances among states. Not only should one country have a say in world issues, but decisions should be made together and internationally, which is a basic characteristic of global governance.

With the emergence of a multipolar world order, global governance structures are facing a number of important challenges. These challenges relate to the difficulties of adapting existing global governance structures to the emergence of a number of new global players, each eager to have a bigger say in international affairs. Most commonly, it is assumed that these developments will contribute to a weakening of multilateral institutions and lead to the development of new global governance structures. This section seeks to investigate this claim by attempting to under- stand the impact of multipolarity on the multilateral institutions and the potential contribution of regionalism to global governance under the condition of multipolarity. In its final part it will consider the emerging role of the EU as a promoter of regionalism in the multipolar order.

The rapid increase and growing complexity of regional arrangements spurred a continuing academic debate about the role and nature of regionalism and its relevance and impact on world politics and global governance. This has resulted in a growing demand for multilateral institutions that can help states and societies deal with these new issues.

Arie M. Kacowicz (2018) suggests that "governance refers to the different ways that organizations, institutions, businesses, and governments manage their

affairs. Governance is the act of governing and thus involves the application of rules and regulations but also of customs and practices, and ethical standards and norms, and it is characterized by the fragmentation of political authority. A framework of governance allows us to theorize beyond the state, including a multiplicity of different kinds of actors and different and nonhierarchical modes of steering and policymaking. Thus, governance includes the various institutionalized modes of social coordination aiming at the creation and implementation of collectively binding rules and regulations, to provide collective goods in specific issue areas."

There are many ways in which various authors have used governance. It is important to start with a survey of different ways the term governance being defined. Richards and Smith (2002) suggest that governance is a descriptive label that is used to highlight the changing nature of the policy process in recent decades. In particular, it "sensitises us to the ever-increasing variety of terrains and actors involved in the making of public policy. Thus, it demands that we consider all the actors and locations beyond the 'core executive' involved in the policy-making process". Governance refers to a 'new process of governing'. Richards and Smith (2002) propose that, in the British case, governance "refers to self-organising, inter-organisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state". Richards and Smith (2002) concentrated on the relationship between government and society. They suggest that the governance of modern societies is a blend of all kinds of governing levels, modes, and orders. Also they argues that social-political governance implies "arrangements in which public as well as private actors aim at solving problems or create societal opportunities, and aim at the care for the societal institutions within which these governing activities take place" (Richards and Smith 2002)

Rosenau (1992) focuses on what he refers to as global governance, and adopts a perspective that allows for governance occurring apart from what governments do. He argues "governance is conceived as systems of rules, as the purposive activities of any collectivity that sustain mechanisms designed to insure its safety, prosperity, coherence, stability, and continuance". For the international organisations, the focus seems different. Most of their definitions reflect their interest on strengthening domestic institutions for policy development and implementation. The World Bank explicitly defines the term as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's social and economic resources for development (Rosenau1992).

While the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has linked governance to capacity building and defines that "it encompasses the functioning and capability of the public sector, as well as the rules and institutions that create the framework for the conduct of both public and private business, including accountability for economic and financial performance, and regulatory frameworks relating to companies, corporations, and partnerships".

Both of them seem to be different from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) who links governance to sustainable human development and

defined it as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a nation's affairs at all levels. It comprises the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. It can be observed that the use is vast and ranges from narrow problems of institutional development to broad questions relating to the manner in which power is exercised within society. From this review of various definitions used, we could observe that the central themes of governance involve not only the improvement of public sector capacity, but also a transformation in the role, compass, power, and the activities of state in economy and society. It identifies government's optimal role in public life and allows society to be involved more in public sphere. At the same time, governance promotes the role of non-state actors in the society and the public activities. It widens the roles, responsibilities and burdens of social actors outside the state terrain. It means that the state's responsibility and function for the provision of those services needs to be redefined. The state's responsibility is not necessarily to render those services on its own, but to foster conditions and mechanisms that are conducive to enabling to the institutions of society to meet the specific needs of their communities.

Arie M. Kacowicz (2018) defines global governance as the possible regulation of the global sphere and the multiplicity of spheres of authority and nature of actors, both public and private, involved in the regulative process and the production of public global goods, in an effort to resolve pressing shared problems that defy solutions by any single national government. Examples of global governance include the so-called global international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the Group of 8 (G8) and nowadays the Group of 20 (G-20), as an amalgam of both wealthy and emerging economic powers dealing with global economic issues (Kacowicz 2018).

Globalization creates opportunities but also vulnerabilities. The future of the world economy decisively depends on how global challenges such as cyber risks, climate change, epidemics, and geopolitical conflicts are managed. No country can master these challenges alone. The globalized world economy needs global governance, and actors must play an active role in shaping it.

Global governance is a continuous process of balancing different interests and initiating cooperative action. The basis for this is the coordination of national policies and identification of shared norms and rules. Examples include financial market regulation through the Bank for International Settlements and the guidelines for multinational enterprises set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Even more, global governance must also initiate joint action and bring resources together, as is the case in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group.

Global governance manifests itself in various forms: International agreements (such as the trade rules of the GATT and GATS) comprise one aspect of global governance, and international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund comprise

another. Furthermore, loose groupings (G7 and G20) and informal discussion forums also contribute to effective global governance.

The actors of global governance are as diverse as the forms and formats. Besides governments and international institutions, relevant actors also include civil society and businesses. Their participation ranges from simple consultation in the OECD to decision-making powers in Internet governance.

Global governance – understood as a combination of security providers, policies and underlying norms – is directly affected by the simultaneous evolution of threats and shifting centres of power. On the one hand, the world remains characterised by instability, conflict and human suffering, as well as by high levels of strategic uncertainty. On the other, institutions like the United Nations, the African Union or the European Union itself – as well as non-governmental organisations – have developed a wide range of tools to tackle evolving dangers.

The goal of global governance is to provide global public goods, particularly peace and security, justice and mediation systems for conflict, functioning markets and unified standards for trade and industry (Hewson and Sinclair 1999). Some well-known intergovernmental organizations are UN and NATO.

Interdependence is the mutual reliance between states and other actors in international relations. Global governance is the tour given to the systems and institutions that both support and set limits on this interdependence. Many of the systems and institutions in global governors are non-binding states are still free to make their supreme decisions on this matter. So what encourage this to participate in this global interdependence?

The liberal theory of international relations emphasizes the interconnected nature of global politics and a stronger world when states cooperate.

### *Regional governance and the role of regions in global governance*

The seemingly unstoppable growth of regional organizations, since the end of the Cold War, has been one of the defining characteristics of the current international system. Throughout this period, regionalism has taken many forms and shapes, varying from small associations that include a few actors and focus on a single issue, to huge continental-unions that address a multitude of common problems from territorial defence to food security. Far from being solely state-led undertakings, regional organizations have also come to include a variety of actors from civil society and NGOs to private businesses and interest groups. Together, these actors engage in common problem solving that has become an indispensable part of the current international system. Due to the Timo Behr and Juha Jokela (2018) "regionalism, in other words, has become a mainstay of global governance, contributing in a myriad of different ways to the solving of emerging transnational issues."

The rapid increase and growing complexity of regional arrangements spurned a continuing academic debate about the role and nature of regionalism and its relevance and impact on world politics and global governance.

Regionalism, in one form or another, has been a constant feature of the international system. However, the more formal regional organizations and

institutions that today represent an enduring element of the global governance system only began to spread following the end of the World War II.

The term 'regional governance' is used to analyse new forms of political coordination on the regional state-level adequately. On the other hand, hidden behind the term 'regional governance' lie also scientific and political demands as to how regional policy can be effectively and efficiently shaped. Regional governance is even understood to be a kind of healer of various fundamental challenges to political steering in a modern state. Even if there is no lack of normative claims calling for regional governance, analyses of its implementation are still rare. Similarly to other policy fields in which political coordination problems arise, an increased use of the term 'governance' has, in the past few years, also come to be observed within regional policy. The term 'regional governance' thereby signifies a set of different characteristics, which, together, constitute a new form of regional policy which seems to be able to support sustainable regional development (Krahmann 2003).

Analogous to other fields of politics, this increased use of the term goes hand in hand with the realisation that earlier political coordination procedures are no longer able to solve regional problem situations adequately due to altered general conditions. Fukuda-Parr gives globalisation, the rise of the neo-liberal paradigm, the state's financial crisis and the increasing meticulous organisation of society combined with the corresponding fragmentation of societal coordination as examples of such altered general conditions.

Regional governance is first and foremost a definition for a modern form of regional policy which stands out due to the following factors:
-   Increase of the importance of the region as political coordination level
-   Replacement of the territorial principle by the functional principle
-   Intersectoral cooperation through weakly institutionalised regional networks and partnerships
-   Hierarchical steering of incentives through various instruments and forms

Regional duties should also be fulfilled outside of traditional democratic institutions on the local and regional level through the cooperation of all relevant public and private actors in a region. The persons and groups which are linked by regional political networks should ideally stand out through a horizontal cooperation aimed at dealing with factual issues and which does not contain any form of distinctive hierarchy. Partnerships, trust and consent as well as a common vision or goal for fundamental regional political aims between participants ensure the necessary motivation in order to be able to be involved in solving regional problems. Cooperation between politics, economics, social actors and science is required during the complex restructuring processes in the regions. Regional networks only demonstrate their full potential if the members fully trust each other, see each other as partners and orient their problem solving processes towards learning. Cooperation and networks in particular demonstrate the potential for regional governance.

Bhagwati (1999) concentrated that "the growth of regionalism is generally seen as being part of this larger trend. Here, one of the central issues of the debate

has been whether regionalism is a stepping-stone or a stumbling block for multilateral economic interdependence. While some regard regionalism as a reaction against globalization that encourages protectionism and undermines global multilateralism".

Although regionalism has often been portrayed as a force that is opposed to the development to globalization, both processes are intrinsically linked with global developments. Moreover, during the 'third phase' of regionalism from 1985-mid 2000s due to the Timo Behr and Juha Jokela (2018) globalization itself can be seen as one of the main driver of regionalism and regionalization. In the emerging interpolar world order, regional cooperation and integration are likely to continue to play a major role. Within the context of the current transformation of the world order, however, regional developments have attained rather limited public and scholarly attention. This is peculiar as regional cooperation continues to be high on the agenda of states and other actors. Dissatisfaction with the performance of global governance institutions has led to a joint response at the regional level after the end of the Cold War and is likely to do so again.

Regionalism has increasingly become a global phenomenon. Growth of regionalism is a sign of political globalization and the attempts to regulate its effects. Some well-known regional organizations are NAFTA and the EU.

Arie M. Kacowicz (2018) expresses that "regionalism and governance potentially share a common vocabulary. Not only is there a strong indication that regions should be looked at as an appropriate level of analysis for the organization of governance (i.e., regional governance), but the variation in governance structures also raises the question of how parallel but unequal regional transformations might affect global governance in specific issue areas" (Kacowicz 2018).

The term 'regional governance' is currently a buzz word in the discussion on regional policy and how to initiate processes auf sustainable regional development. The transfer of responsibility, decentralisation and self-coordination seem to be promising attempts for successful regional planning, which have by now been reflected in the concepts of important support programmes. It seems to be a problem that regional governance is often used in a normative way, formulating certain claims for regional policy with no consideration of their practical implementation. One also notices that, with a strongly normative use of the term fundamental problems – such as the possible lack of democratic legitimacy of the postulated weakly institutionalised networks or the different power potentials of actors within – receive too little attention. There is therefore still a high need for research on the effects of regional governance in practice (Krahmann 2003).

Behr and Jokela (2011) suggest that the simultaneous expansion of multipolarity and interdependency have further underlined the importance of regional cooperation and regionalism. Regional governance is closer to the source of the problems to be tackled, be they security threats, energy security, economic instability and crises or environmental challenges such as climate change. Moreover, regional cooperation provides one global public good that is in high demand in the evolving international environment and especially for the always

jittery financial markets – certainty. Regionalism serves as an insurance policy against instability and – in case of a monetary union – reduced transaction costs, thereby increasing certainty and allowing smoother interactions and exchanges. Also recent failure to address transnational issues within a global governance framework has shifted the attention of stakeholder towards potential regional solutions.

Interesting function of the EU's approach to global governance is beginning to shift away from its former emphasis on the promotion of regional integration and inter-regional dialogue in its external relations with the emergence of a more multipolar world order. There seem to be several reasons encouraging this development. It is engaging in inter-regional dialogues and other forms of inter-regionalism have been an essential part of the EU's external policies.

The EU has for long been a staunch supporter of regional cooperation and integration as a key element of global governance. Börzel and Risse (2007) said that EU has also sought to actively promote regional cooperation elsewhere as an essential part of its external policies. It has done so as a functional way of exporting stability and security and to encourage economic development and integration in the global economy.

As much as being a functional and pragmatic strategy, the promotion of regional integration has therefore also been "an EU foreign policy objective that stems directly from its own internal identity" (Waltz 1998).

Together, the EU's policies of fostering regionalism in third countries and exporting its own model of regional governance to others have been understood to be part of an EU-specific approach to global governance. The essence of this approach is seen to be the promotion of a global order in which regional entities are the structuring units of international relations (Smith 2003).

This contribution has shown that this concept is in any case suitable for analysing the principles of political funding programmes – here it can be shown that regional governance plays an important role in relationship to programmes supporting strategies for sustainable regional development.

D. Nolte (2016) argues that regional governance seems then to be more than a normative claim, if it is supported by political funding programmes which steer through hierarchical incentives. In such a case, regional governance is supported by funding programmes and can support processes of sustainable regional development.

Regional governance is both necessary and complementary to global governance structures. Regional cooperation in an interpolar world, the nature of regionalism becomes a highly topical question that should be put under closer analytical scrutiny. Strong regional and global governance institutions through which common problems are identified, joint interests realized and effective action facilitated.

Contrary to the profusion of explanations and meanings of the term governance, the previous definitions have demonstrated that governance at the national, regional, and global levels displays many common characteristics.

The new regionalism can provide a firm basis for global order rather than a threatening source of institutional fragmentation. The investment of great powers in regional organizations and the increasing scale of regional actors and economies will award regional governance a larger place in the international landscape. Consensual strategies of integration and coordination will insure that its benefits, which can be considerable, will outweigh the risks that it presents for the multilateral institutions that anchor global governance.. In particular, a common understanding of governance encourages the comparison between governance arrangements at the national, regional, and global levels as well as helps to determine the suitability of specific governance mechanisms across sectors and levels. Furthermore, it raises the question of whether governance failures encountered at one level might come to affect others. Indeed, a common definition of governance might help identify solutions to these problems by suggesting research into the applicability of particular compensation mechanisms across levels of analysis.

### *Questions*
What is the concept of global governance?
What is the role of regions in global governance?
What are the features of regional governance in the Mediterranean?

### *Literature*
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# THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICY TOWARDS MEDITERRANEAN REGION

*(Compiler Iryna Maksymenko)*

*E-book on didactics*

**ODESA**
**ONU**
**2024**

# INTRODUCTION

***Subject study of the discipline***
EU policy towards the Mediterranean region.
***Prerequisites and post-requisites (Place of the discipline in the educational program):***
Prerequisites – The EU in the International Security System of the XXI century, Regional politics and security in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, Migration process in the Mediterranean.

Post-requisites – Pre-diploma internship, Master's qualification thesis.
***The purpose of the course is*** to develop concepts about the main stages of formation, institutional foundations and peculiarities of the policy of the European Union in the Mediterranean region.

***The tasks of the discipline*** include the study of: the theoretical and methodological foundations of the research of the EU policy regarding the Mediterranean region; periodization and characteristics of the main stages of development of the European strategy regarding the Mediterranean region; regulatory and institutional foundations for the implementation of the EU's Mediterranean policy at various stages; multilateral institutional arrangements and initiatives, including the Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Union; the role of regional factors and external actors, in particular, the USA, China, Russia.

***Expected learning outcomes.***
***By the end of the course the students will be able to:***
*explain and analyse* the nature, sources, and directions of the evolution of international relations, international politics, the foreign policy of states, and the state of theoretical studies of international relations and world politics;

*identify, assess* and *foresee* political, diplomatic, security, social, and other risks in the field of international relations and global developments;

*evaluate* and *analyse* international and foreign policy problems, propose approaches to solving such problems.


# LECTURE 1
## INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE: ORIGINS OF EU POLICY TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

***The Mediterranean region as a geopolitical concept***
The Mediterranean can be conceptualized as a "region" – a rather homogeneous area with distinct characteristics that contrast it with surrounding areas with certain regular patterns of relations and interactions between the countries making up that area – with sub-regions. These subregions encompass southern Europe, North Africa or the Maghreb and the Levant or the Mashriq. On

the other hand, the Mediterranean region can be also described as an interface or bridge between coherent regions (for example, between Europe and the Middle East and North Africa, MENA). In the case of the former, the Mediterranean is said to embody at least parts of Turkey, southern European Union member states – Italy, Spain, France, Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal to an extent and Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia as well as Egypt, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. However, these classifications are highly debatable.

Moreover, the Mediterranean has not referred to a political unity except during the Roman and Ottoman periods. It is referred to as "a concept, a centre, a limit, or an edge". Yet, it is more than all of these conceptualizations, and it is definitely more than just a sea. It is a broad maritime space where interaction, communication and movement of people, goods and other assets have always taken place. The Mediterranean has been central to the development of humanity since known history began, and while it ceased to be a primary junction of global convergence after the late Middle Ages, it remained a focal point of international affairs, whether as a subject or as an object. A measure of such continuity is the extent to which terms coined in our times could easily have been applied to the region centuries ago. Here began, and persisted, the North-South divide, as did Europe's imperialism. Here too was played out more than one East-West contest. From imperial collapse to postcolonial transitions and legacies and now post-postcolonial ones, to concerns over Islamist militancy, to mass movement of people, so many world developments and phenomena featured, if not originated, here and in many cases they remain rampant today. The Mediterranean is more than just a list of problems, but depth of civilization, the olive and the vine, and holidays in the sun are only one side of a very crowded coin.

The idea of the Mediterranean as a space with common qualities like culture, climate, architecture, etc. has existed in the minds of early observers such as poets, novel writers, historians, geographers or political scientists since ancient times. Similarly, early navigators of the Mediterranean such as sailors, merchants, slave traders or pirates would also have tended to see the sea as a common space in its totality or sub-regions like the Aegean, eastern Mediterranean, Adriatic and the shores of West North Africa, etc. over which they undertook their business. The actors of the Mediterranean found a climate/environment suited to the development of civilizations. Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam were the dominant religions and denominations. The Roman Empire, Carthage, and the Ottoman Empire were the states/empires that determined the agenda over and around this space for hundreds of years. Referring to the rising tourism industry during the last half of the XXth century, some researchers claimed that the Mediterranean transformed into a leisure-oriented space. Many researchers stress that the Mediterranean hosts both unity and diversity. While there is physical and cultural unity in the region, there are ethnic, linguistic, religious, and political diversities. That is why the Mediterranean is often referred to as both a bridge and a barrier.

Nowadays the Mediterranean Sea represents a common ground for Asian, European and African countries. This is not a negligible fact, since the Euro-

Mediterranean region was the world's center for many centuries. The Mediterranean Sea is a gateway for East Asian countries and a sea window to the world oceans for Russia and Ukraine. The Euro-Mediterranean's most important geostrategic point is for sure the Suez Canal (along with three natural straits: Gibraltar, Bosporus, and Dardanelles). It represents the shortest seaway from East Asia and the Middle East to Europe as well as for some African states to Europe.

In sum, the Mediterranean has been a political space over which many different actors played different games, made calculations and taken actions. According to Edward W. Soja (1971, p. 1), political organization of space is characterized with the ways in which space and human interaction are structured to fulfil political functions.

And in this case the Mediterranean is very complicated region due to the different factors and as a geopolitical concept includes:

1. Historically the Mediterranean has been a crossroads of civilizations for millennia. Ancient empires, such as the Roman and Byzantine, emerged around its shores. The region has witnessed the rise and fall of great powers, influencing global politics.

2. Geographically Mediterranean region consists of the following countries:

•EU members: Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, partially Portugal

•Non-EU members:

a. Europe: Gibraltar, Monaco, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Montenegro,

b. Middle East and North Africa: Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine (officially it's mentioning that "*this designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue*"), Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. And Jordan in wider understanding of the region.

3. Therefore, the Mediterranean region is characterized by a mosaic of cultures, languages, and religions, including Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. This diversity contributes to both cooperation and tensions, influencing political dynamics. Ongoing cultural exchanges, migration patterns, and historical legacies create a complex geopolitical landscape with various identities and allegiances.

4. As a system, it consists of variety of actors: states internal and external, international organization (EU, OSCE, NATO, UN etc.), regional organization (the Western Mediterranean Forum (WMF), the Agadir Agreement, the Union for Mediterranean, the Arab Maghreb Union, the Arab League, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), etc.), sub-regional unities (Maghreb and the Mashreq), territories, terrorist organization, NGO etc. All of them play roles in shaping the geopolitical landscape, promoting cooperation, and addressing challenges in the region. Moreover, multiple nations and entities vie for influence and control in the Mediterranean region. European nations, particularly those in the European Union, seek stability and cooperation in the Mediterranean region. The EU's involvement in issues like migration, security, and economic development reflects its geopolitical interests. Meanwhile, Russia's presence in the

Eastern Mediterranean and its involvement in conflicts like the Syrian Civil War contribute to the geopolitical complexities.

5. The Mediterranean Sea has multiple decisive meanings in international geostrategic planning. It is one of Europe's inland seas, linking the continent with the rest of Eurasia, and most immediately with the Middle East and Africa. As such, it has two characteristics. First, its strategic relevance to outside powers (such as the United States) depends on whether they deem European political dynamics of vital interest. If continental Europe (and to a lesser degree the Middle East) loses geopolitical appeal, then the Mediterranean is of little significance. Second, the stability of the Mediterranean can be guaranteed only when one power (or friendly powers) controls access to it as well as its circumference; when its shores are under the sway of rival powers, it becomes an unstable frontier sea. This geopolitical unity of the Mediterranean is now breaking because of the political instability on its southern and eastern shores, Russia's re-entry, and Chinese influence over the politics and economics of South-Eastern Europe. Therefore, we can assume that the importance of the Mediterranean Sea is conditional and its nature favours continental control; it is a sea of passage and a sea of land powers.

The tendency to stretch the definition of the Mediterranean is not unusual among the scholars who study it. As mentioned already, the countries that are conjured up in our minds when thinking about the Mediterranean often depend on where one is located. For example, if one is located in northern Europe the Mediterranean can stretch as far as Greece, Italy, France, Malta and Cyprus, perhaps Portugal. We want to make the point that such interpretations of the Mediterranean, and the endless debates about whether to stick strictly to the coastal states surrounding the Mediterranean Sea or whether to include certain hinterlands, may lead observers to imagine a fractured space. Our point is that breaking down the region into sub-regions serves certain (political, economic) purposes. But the Mediterranean is much more than the sum of its parts.

Consequently, different interests, conflict of interests only enhance regional contradictions and tensions. According to Jakub Grygiel from Hoover Institution, for South European countries (Italy, Greece, and Spain) the stability of the Mediterranean determines their security and prosperity. However, for other powers, mostly outside the region (Great Britain in the past, the US, Russia and China nowadays), the Mediterranean is important for strategic purposes that go beyond the confines of the immediate basin. This sea is a means of influence or connection, and it matters only insofar that the target to be influenced (or connected) is relevant. Or by other words, the Mediterranean per se offers an entry point into Europe to powers that are outside of its continental core. As Elisabeth Monroe states, the Mediterranean is "a string which, when pulled, has revealed that its other end was in India, Vladivostok, the Middle Danube, or Mosul." Connecting the Orient and the West, the North and the South, the Mediterranean becomes the place where European powers clash among themselves and with non-European potentates. The rationale for these clashes is rarely the Mediterranean per se but the Mediterranean as a way of extending greater influence over Europe. The prize is not the sea, but the continent.

The second characteristic of the Mediterranean is that its unity and stability depend on the ability of one power or a group of friendly powers to control its shores and access points. The necessity of geopolitical unity arises from the fact that the security on one Mediterranean shoreline resides on the opposite shores. That is, the security of southern Europe is not on the Sicilian beaches but on Libyan shores. What happens on – and who controls – the North African seafront has a direct impact on the European states on the other side of the sea. Therefore, whoever controls the Mediterranean coastlines controls the sea. This gives land powers a considerable advantage because naval superiority is not sufficient to dominate the basin, and in fact, by itself, it is useless. As a consequence, the Mediterranean puts a premium on the ability to exercise political and economic control over the shores over mere naval prowess. Land powers here can be maritime powers with often minimal or inferior naval capabilities. This is why China's current advances in the Mediterranean basin are worrisome: they aim to influence the political dynamics of states located on the shores of this sea and, by doing so, they can deny a more powerful naval power the ability to exercise control.

For the EU, the Mediterranean Sea represents its integral part although not Mare Nostrum (Our Sea). The EU officially recognizes in 2004: "Relations between EU and the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East reflect the complexity and diversity of our partners and their situations". The discourse that "the Mediterranean is a diverse space" has always been part of the European Community (EC)/EU discourse and the diversity in the Mediterranean is almost always represented by the EU-Europeans as a trait which diminishes the chances of integration/cooperation in the region. For example, former High Representative Federica Mogherini and other officials contended that the Mediterranean was "the less integrated" region in the world.

Indeed, there are many things in the region which are not well integrated [other than culturally and linguistically], at least we can name Turkey - it is still formally a candidate country] or Israel which is completely separate, completely different from others. We have the Maghreb with its own history and special relationships with certain EU Member States. The region is not a very well integrated economically; the trade between countries of the region is only 5-6 per cent. It is not well integrated politically, either.

Another argument is related to the demographic composition of the region. The population of the 24 countries bordering the Mediterranean is more than 530 million: approximately 205 million live on the northern shore and more than 320 on the southern and eastern shore.

Therefore, we can say that the EU mapped the Mediterranean as a vastly diverse, divided space with various geopolitical subgroups such as those which had the prospect of membership (i.e., the European Mediterranean countries which became EU members in the 1980s), non-European Mediterranean countries, and Yugoslavia as well as the subgroups in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean – the Maghreb and the Middle East. Many EU-European politicians, officials and researchers define the Mediterranean as a diverse space,

which is composed of several sub-regions that are not only limited to the coast of the Mediterranean, because such depictions sometimes involve the Sahel as well as the Gulf countries.

In summary, the Mediterranean region as a geopolitical concept is multifaceted, encompassing historical legacies, cultural diversity, economic interests, security concerns, and the strategic calculations of various global and regional actors. The Mediterranean region is a European construct essentially, not a natural construct. Nevertheless it is worth to stress that this construct appeared as a result of the EC/EU policy towards the region that has been launched much before the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of Union for Mediterranean (UfM).

### The framework of the EU cooperation with the Mediterranean countries: a historical background.

The EU has had a bumpy relationship with the Mediterranean countries.

From one hand, countries located on the Southern and Eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea belong to the EU's immediate geographical, historical and cultural neighbourhood, similarly to its Eastern neighbours (despite the fact that they are not technically located in Europe). Going back to the ancient times of the Greek and Phoenician colonization and then the Roman and Byzantine empires, Arab and Ottoman expansions and, more recently, the colonial era, cross-Mediterranean political and economic relations have been always of crucial importance for all sides of the Mediterranean basin. For example, three current and one ex-EU member states France, Italy, Spain and the UK have colonial experience in this region. The colonial era and then the decolonization process (sometimes involving violent conflicts) have had serious and lasting consequences both for the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMC) and their former colonial powers. This concern, for example, is large migration flows from the former colonies to the EU as well as terrorism.

Due to their strategic geographical location, historic links to Europe, and natural resources, the SEMC play a very important role for EU countries in terms of geopolitical stability and regional security, direct trade and investment relations, safe transit routes to Asia and Africa, energy supply, tourism, and as a source of labour migration (legal and irregular).

But from another side, the economic and social backwardness of this region and its numerous unresolved conflicts (between Israel and its Arab neighbours, between Algeria and Morocco, internal conflicts in Lebanon, Syria and Libya, and others) make it a source of increasing political and security troubles for the external world. Therefore, it rises the EU engagement in the region but simultaneously impedes it from taking advantage of all potential opportunities of economic cooperation with the EU.

### Periodization of the EU policy towards the Mediterranean.

As the world grew broader and more and more of it entered die scope of Eurocentric history, the Mediterranean, while no longer 'the sea in the middle of the Earth' held on to its role of a microcosm of world affairs. With Europe still

paramount in the world, and in control of large swathes of its Mediterranean semi-periphery, there was no shortage of developments of world import occurring there. Big Power brinkmanship in Bosnia, Morocco, Albania and Serbia during the early years of the twentieth century set the stage for the First World War, until the Powers, having bickered over the Balkan lands for a couple of centuries, tripped and stumbled over events in that most tragic of cities, Sarajevo. Just as the war left in its wake great changes in the European map, so also it brought about messy changes in the Middle East that gave birth to one of the most intractable of conflicts in our time. The interwar years saw the consolidation of European imperialism in the Mediterranean, even as the principles of self-determination and democracy were proclaimed as the hallmark of future peace and prosperity in Europe.

After the Second World War, the Mediterranean experienced at first hand, and earlier than most other parts of the world, the two great phenomena that defined world affairs for the rest of the twentieth century, namely the Cold war and the end of European empires. It was right here in the Mediterranean that these east-west and North-South axes intersected. First in 1944 when Churchill and Stalin in Moscow were already dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence; second in 1947 with Harry Truman's doctrine proclamation and the beginning of Cold war. Soon the Mediterranean was roped into the grand strategy of the Western alliance, NATO, through the membership of Italy (1949), Greece and Turkey (1952). The Mediterranean Sea became NATO's southern flank, the front where the Western alliance felt particularly vulnerable and hence resolved to secure. Through the eastern Mediterranean the alliance linked on to other alliance sets in Asia - the Baghdad Pact and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) – to extend the chain of Soviet containment all the way to the Far East.

In parallel with all the above, the non-European Mediterranean joined the rest of the world to experience the wide-ranging phenomenon of decolonization. Featuring so centrally in these two world-changing phenomena of Cold war and decolonization, it is not surprising that the Mediterranean became a part of the World Nonaligned Movement. During these years it was difficult to get anyone to recognize the Mediterranean as a single interconnected unit. To be sure the superpowers clearly treated the sea as one geostrategic area, but while each saw it as directly relevant to their own strategic and defence interests neither of them took kindly to discussing, much less addressing, its problems. The most telling instance was the respective allies' hostility to a proposal by Malta to include the Mediterranean in the scope of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), when it met in Helsinki in 1975; and if the final document ended up including a so-called 'Mediterranean Chapter', it was only thanks to the use of the veto by the proposer.

More benignly, the European Community (EC), being less hyperopic and more concerned about the problems and opportunities in its immediate neighbourhood, did take an early a sustained interest in the Mediterranean as a whole.

Analyzing and allocating different points of view the following periodization

of the EU policy toward the Mediterranean region can be suggested:
I.    1957-1970s – "special relations" and Association Agreements
II.   1980s – Southern enlargement
III.  1990-1995 – launch of "Renovated Mediterranean Policy" of the EU
IV.   1995-2005 – Barcelona Process
V.    2007-2011 – launch of the Union for Mediterranean
VI.   2016-2020 – Global Strategy of the EU
VII.  2021-… – "New Mediterranean Agenda"

Here only three stages are discovered as the others are the topics of the next lectures.

I. Despite the strategic location of the Mediterranean countries, the EU was not originally interested in these states, especially at the time of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. For them, cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean countries was not an alluring idea, yet events such as the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO, and the Suez crisis of 1956, forced the ECSC to consider the idea of cooperation. Therefore, the Treaty of Rome on the establishment of the European Community, which notes the possibility of association with overseas countries and territories for the purpose of increasing trade and joint assistance for economic and social development. In fact, it was about the interests and "special relations" that Italy and France had in the Mediterranean region. Special attention was paid to Libya, Algeria and Mauritania, in particular in Art. 227 of the Treaty of Rome, "Declaration of Intentions" and Annex 4 to the Treaty of Rome stated the need to liberalize the service sector and introduce the regime of free movement of goods, establish competition rules and promote development in the social sphere.

The turning point was in 1962, when Algeria gained independence from France and the latter lost a very strategic area that had enabled France to control its Southern sea border. Moreover, the fierce rivalry between the West and the USSR, which arose as consequence of the Cold War at the time, also urged the ECSC to race to set up cooperation agreements in the region. In 1961, the European Economic Community (EEC) negotiated some trade agreements with Greece, with the aspiration to build stronger economic bonds in preparation for a future customs union. Similar negotiations extended to Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, and Israel.

The Arab-Israeli war in 1967 further called for urgent intervention due to a need arose to ease the tension and instability between the two blocs by means of diplomacy and cooperation in various fields. Therefore, in 1969 a series of negotiations were held with Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco as well as with Malta (1970), Cyprus (1972), and Israel (1975) in order to establish a Preferential Trade Area, but most of these agreements were reached bilaterally. Interesting fact that it also includes the custom union although the customs union with Malta was never established, with Cyprus it was partially created, and only with Turkey this project was made a reality.

Preferential trade agreements were signed with Spain in 1970, with Israel in 1964 and 1970, with Lebanon in 1965 and 1972, and with Egypt in 1972. These agreements were based on the principle of reciprocity, but in fact provided

asymmetrical approach in favour of less developed partners.

However, geopolitically and territorially, this group of countries included, in addition to the North African countries, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, and Israel. Israel, like Spain, "dropped out" of it for many reasons, but because of its geographical position and its links with the Community in the framework of the Arab-Israeli dialogue, it was an important part of the Southern Mediterranean. Malta and Cyprus, former British colonies, have always had close relations with Europe, and Turkey became the first Mediterranean country in which the EEC began to work out its new model of relations through association agreements, which during this period meant not only free trade, but also the creation of the customs union in the future. In the case of Spain, preferential agreements became the basis for the future expansion of the EEC at the expense of southern European countries. Formally, until the beginning of the 80s, it was one of the countries to which the Mediterranean community policy was extended, but at the same time, it stood apart in comparison with Turkey, Malta and Cyprus.

To note, at the beginning of the 1970s, several factors made the EC countries aware of the need to develop new initiatives towards the Mediterranean that were aimed at stabilizing this region and at strengthening the European role. Europe's southern neighbours descended further and further into turmoil in the years following their independence: Algeria and Morocco had clashed in the 1963 Sand War, Israel and its Arab neighbours had fought three wars over Palestine by 1973, Spain's withdrawal from Western Sahara in 1975 led to the still ongoing dispute over sovereignty, and governments were ousted in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria by military coups. Terrorism, in the region as well as in Europe, targeted governments as much as it was funded by some; and, in 1975, Lebanon's 15-year long civil war broke out. Meanwhile, in 1970 the EU launched the European Political Cooperation format: albeit modest in scope - and formally not part of the treaty - the framework nevertheless delivered several important milestones for relations between the EC and its southern neighbours. Almost all of these were in direct relation to on-going crises and conflicts. Therefore, the Mediterranean reached the top of the European agenda and in two years, from 1972 to 1974, the EC developed two initiatives that were directed to this region: the "Global Mediterranean Policy", formally launched at the Paris Summit of 1972, which for the first time addressed the Mediterranean countries from Spain to Turkey as a region within a single policy framework, and the Euro-Arab Dialogue, launched after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which involved the members of the Arab League and was developed in the newly established framework of European Political Cooperation.

At the European end, the dialogue was to be managed by the Presidency of the Council. The dialogue in itself was a novelty and came to include the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), until then shunned by other international actors. However, it soon became a hostage of international politics: as Egypt signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979, it was expelled from the League of Arab States which in turn also requested the suspension of the Euro-Arab dialogue. Attempts to revive the format in 1989, after Egypt returned to the ranks of the Arab League, were hampered by the Gulf crisis of 1990. As long as Arab states

remained divided, the format of two multilateral entities engaging in dialogue remained stuck.

II. The second stage is the 1980s, when almost the entire Northern Mediterranean was integrated into the EU: Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1985. Due to significant geopolitical changes in the shape of the EU, a new block of countries was created, which had significant interests in the Mediterranean region. Moreover, they were rather active trying to influence the EU approaches towards the Mediterranean issues. But in general, the EU enlargement was double hand. From one side, the southern expansion of the EEC in the 1980s was generally positive both for the Community and for Greece, Spain and Portugal. But in fact it led to the "separation" of the Mediterranean countries into privileged countries that joined the European Community, and countries that were not members of the Community, having only preferential agreements and association agreements with the EEC that do not provide for membership in the EU in the future. Therefore, for most of the Southern Mediterranean states, this expansion of the EEC had negative consequences first due to Spain and Portugal became the main deliverers of agricultural products. The situation was also affected by the global energy crisis that increased negative trends of the southern countries' development and the security issues. All in all the EU members concerned about the insecurity in the region and asked for review of the EU policy in the region.

III. The third stage, which spans the 1990s, can be described as the "new Mediterranean policy of the EU". There were several objective reasons for the introduction of a new foreign policy course:
1) the collapse of the USSR and the need to fill the power vacuum,
2) the EU's attempt to compete with the US through an increase in foreign trade turnover,
3) political realities when the development of the EU and its institutions required the creation of new unions,
4) the civil war in Lebanon, the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as the unification of North and South Yemen gave way to hope that the wider region might at long last stabilise.

In contrast to previous predominantly reactive approaches, the EU was now moving towards proactive engagement with its southern neighbours. It did this first with the Renovated Mediterranean Policy and, later, the so-called Barcelona Process.

Commission Report to the Community's Mediterranean Policy (1975-1988) and also European Parliament declared the failure of Mediterranean policies. The paper presented to the Council by the Commission, stressed that the period should be redirected to the Community's policy towards the Mediterranean and determined the general framework Renovated Mediterranean Policy notice.

The negative dynamic of previous period especially worried the leaders of the Mediterranean states of the EU, in particular France, Spain and Italy, who were looking for opportunities to intensify activities in the region, in particular, because

the parallel processes in Central and Eastern Europe turned the attention and resources of the bodies of the united Europe to the east. It is worth noting the increasing activity of these three countries not only within the Community structures, but also outside their borders, especially in cases where the capabilities of the community structures were limited. For example, in 1990 they initiated the 5+5 format of cooperation in the Western Mediterranean, and Spain and Italy promoted the idea of creating a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, a kind of analogue of the CSCE in the region. Already in 1994, NATO initiated the Mediterranean Dialogue, and France and Egypt launched the Mediterranean Forum - an informal association of 11 states. Even within the framework of the OSCE in 1995, the status of Mediterranean partners for cooperation was created. In fact, there was a struggle for the positions of Mediterranean topics on the agenda of European politics.

Therefore, in December 1990, 12 members of the Community submitted a draft of Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) aimed at tripling investment in the region. It included the creation of special financial funds and increased development assistance to strengthen horizontal cooperation and regional integration, the effectiveness of existing preferential agreements, including the expansion of trade preferences and an increase in quotas for textile and agricultural products.

Therefore, the new cooperation instruments proposed by the European Commission, in addition to existing agreements, were mainly of a financial nature. The EEC also promised to provide technical assistance, maintain balance of payments and increase the flow of investment into Mediterranean countries.

However, the new policy placed the main emphasis on the socio-economic development of this region, as an important condition for political stability and security for the countries of the Community. Thus, horizontal financial cooperation, trade, the protection of human rights and the environment were decided as main five major issues for RMP. The second important point of the RMP was its focus on accelerating regional cooperation between Mediterranean countries.

The main focuses of RMP were explained as follows:
- Promotion of economic reforms and reinforced the economic dialogue,
- The promotion of private investment and investment,
- Keeping open the Community market for manufactured goods,
- Community development process with the Mediterranean coun-tries.

However, at the Lisbon meeting in June 1992, the new policy moved away from a global approach to the Mediterranean countries and identified the main partners of the Community as the Maghreb countries, that is, it concentrated its attention on a few countries rather than on the region as a whole.

Back in April 1992, the European Commission made proposals for the gradual improvement of the Mediterranean regional policy, focused mainly on cooperation with the Maghreb countries and the creation of a free Mediterranean trade zone of the EEC with 3 Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). But already in 1993, the frame of EU cooperation with the Mediterranean was

expanded due to a new initiative of the European Commission - a creation of a "Middle East Economic Zone". This idea was aimed at providing the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour between Mediterranean countries. New proposals for regional integration in the Mediterranean region coincided with the creation of a single internal market in the EEC, in the likeness of which the Community was going to create a new Middle Eastern economic zone. However, this ambitious project turned out to be unrealistic and unfeasible.

It was only after 1994 that there was a renewed trend towards expanding cooperation with all countries of the Mediterranean region. Despite the intensification of these ties, the results of the EU's activities and its initiatives were not very successful. Financial funds were formed mainly at the expense of the European Investment Bank (EIB), they were insufficient for such a large region, and investment growth was constrained by existing financial and political risks. Due to protectionist tendencies in EU trade policy, Mediterranean countries have consistently had trade deficits with the Community. Their connections were asymmetrical. In the early 1990s, more than 50% of the Southern Mediterranean's exports went to the European Union, while less than 8% of European trade was with the region and only 2.3% with the Maghreb, its top priority partners. Development assistance was insufficient to address the social and economic problems of these countries and was distributed unevenly, widening the gap in levels of economic development.

At the EU Lisbon Summit in June 1992, the European Council proposed new instruments for Mediterranean policy - a horizontal expansion of cooperation with these countries, including accelerating their regional integration, strengthening cultural ties, and new investment programs. The main outlines of the EU's Mediterranean policy were formulated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, and its priority direction was the policy of "association" in the southern direction. Already in December 1994, the European Council declared the Mediterranean area a region of "strategic and priority importance", and in 1995 it proposed a new concept for its policy in the southern Mediterranean countries, aimed at the subsequent creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA), political dialogue between the two regions and increasing financial support from the EU. The final stage in the transition of the European Union from the Mediterranean policy, limited mainly by trade and economic frameworks, to the new policy of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was the holding of the Barcelona Conference in November 1995, at which the main provisions of this partnership were adopted.

***The political, security and economic dimensions of the European Union cooperation with the Mediterranean.***

In the Euro-Mediterranean region, the EU is the largest and strongest economic power. The Near East is the second largest and North Africa the third. For the EU, the Euro-Mediterranean region with a strong European-Arab economic and political partnership is very important neighbourhood due to plenty of natural richness, among them: natural gas, crude oil, excellent solar position, perfect

agricultural conditions and high touristic potential. However the EU and Mediterranean can best use and exploit them only in cooperation all together. Numbers and statistics are significant:

1. Natural gas is considered as a clean source of energy, which is important not only for the EU but also to the MENA states. In the beginning of XXI century the energy links between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean were very strong and growing stronger every year. The EU depended on Mediterranean producers for 36% of its natural gas imports and 20% of its oil imports. Historically, the EU has received natural gas supplies from Mediterranean countries via pipelines. For example, Algeria is a major natural gas supplier to Europe through pipelines, particularly via the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline (Tunisia-Italy) and the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (Algeria-Spain). In addition to pipeline supplies, the EU imports liquefied natural gas (LNG) from various sources, including Mediterranean countries. LNG terminals in countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece receive LNG shipments from Mediterranean exporters like Algeria and Egypt.

Israel's offshore gas reserves, notably the Leviathan and Tamar fields, have the potential to become significant sources of natural gas for export. While Israel has primarily focused on regional markets and domestic consumption, there have been discussions about exporting Israeli gas to Europe via pipeline or LNG.

In fact, that Turkey plays a significant role in the transit of natural gas from the Mediterranean to Europe. Turkish pipelines, such as the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), serve as key transit routes for natural gas from Azerbaijan and potentially other sources in the future.

2. North Africa has also been a significant supplier of crude oil to the European Union. Countries like Libya and Algeria have been major exporters of oil to the EU. Libya, in particular, has significant oil reserves and has traditionally been one of the largest oil exporters to Europe. However, political instability and conflicts in the region, particularly after the Arab Spring in 2011, have disrupted oil production and exports from Libya. Algeria is another significant oil exporter to the EU. It has sizable oil reserves and has maintained relatively stable production levels compared to Libya.

3. Natural solar endowment is an enormous energy potential has became one of the top priority of the the Barcelona Process and after UfM. The initial plans was about the Euro-Mediterranean region should produce 20 GW by the year 2020 and thus meet demographic and energy consumption challenges in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Moreover, it is supposed that the Euro-Mediterranean region could provide in the future enough solar power to feed northern Europe as well.

4. The EU shares cultural, historical, and linguistic ties with many of its southern neighbors, particularly countries in the Mediterranean region. Strengthening cultural and people-to-people exchanges fosters mutual understanding, dialogue, and cooperation, contributing to stability and prosperity in the region. Tourism development ia also among the priorities of the EU Mediterranean policy. In 2022 tourism in Southern Mediterranean Europe had

265.7 million visitors; North Africa 19.1 and Middle East 67.8 %. Together, it is 36.7 % of total world market share in tourism in 2022.

6. The Mediterranean Sea offers another strategic advantage: the so-called Mediterranean highways – an opportunity to ensure fast, safe and cost-effective transportation in the Mediterranean Sea. According to Solana and Saz-Carranza, in 2010 "the container traffic between the Far East and Europe totals 18 million TEUs (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units) per year, compared to 20 million TEUs of annual Trans-Pacific traffic and just 4.4 million TEUs of Trans-Atlantic flows between Europe and America". Along with the Mediterranean seaways, the additional value have the north Adriatic system of ports that are small, but together with the Mediterranean ports, they can become a serious strategic partner.

### *Questions*
What is the Mediterranean region?
What is the main characteristics of the Mediterranean region?
Why the EU – Mediterranean relations can be described as "bumpy"?
What are the key factors that defined the EEC policy towards the Mediterranean region?

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# LECTURE 2
## THE HISTORY OF THE EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

*A brief history of the enlargement of the European Union: main ideas, rationale and consequences.*

EU enlargement is a natural process associated with the growth and strengthening of the Community, deepening integration, and the emergence of new needs in the Community. History shows that expansion usually occurs at the expense of adjacent territories and states. If in the past such a process led to the creation of empires, then in modern conditions it leads to the formation of communities or unions of formally equal states.

From its inception in the early 1950s, the EU has been tightly linked to the question of enlargement. Seen in historical perspective, the successive enlargement of the EU to include the vast majority of European countries is a natural solution to the unnatural division of Europe caused by the Cold War. But the unification of was not always perceived as an obvious end-goal; nor was the choice of the form of integration that came to characterize the EU clear from the outset. "Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community' With such concise wording in the Rome Treaty (1957), the founding fathers imagined the enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) leaving it up to European and national officials in the early 1960s to organize the legal basis, content, and conduct of the accession negotiation when the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway first applied to join. Later, the Single European Act of 1986 added to the original requirement of **consensus among the** member states in the Council, the assent of the European Parliament to the enlargement of the EC. At the time, no further consideration of potential new members' democratic credentials or socio-economic model was thought necessary, given the prevailing geopolitical situation (the continuing Cold War) precluded large-scale enlargement. The existing member states shared the same democratic values and norms and their economic and social systems were built on similar models; differences between them were of degree rather than of principle.

In view of possible enlargement following the end of the Cold War, however, the member states agreed to the conditions of accession in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The new provision clarified the fundamental principles of the Union – namely, those of "liberty democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of l a w" – w h i c h  a n y  n e w  e n t r a n t would first have to fulfil. Other new measures to ensure the application of these principles were added in the Amsterdam Treaty (**1997**), such as the possibility to suspend the rights of a member state found to be in serious and persistent breach of these principles. The Lisbon **Tr**eaty (2009) elaborated even further the fundamental values of the Union by stating that it is "founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities" and by specifying that **"these values are common to the member** states in a society in which pluralism, no-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality

between women and men prevail". It also made the possibility of suspension more workable by adding a preliminary stage to establish the risk of a serious breach and hold hearings with the member state in question before the European Council, acting by a qualified majority vote, could proceed to suspend the rights of that state. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty introduced another novelty by providing for the possibility of a member state withdrawing from the EU.

Since its inception, the EU has undergone several waves of enlargement, each with its own set of motivations, consequences, and underlying principles.

First Enlargement of 1973 was about inclusion of three new member states: Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. This enlargement was primarily motivated by economic interests, as the EEC sought to expand its common market and strengthen its position in international trade.

The next stage or so called Southern Enlargement took place in 1980s, when the EU admitted several Mediterranean countries: Greece (1981), Spain, and Portugal in 1986. This phase of enlargement aimed to consolidate democracy and stability in Southern Europe and enhance economic cooperation across the region.

The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 along with the so called "Big Bang" or Eastern Enlargement (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU in 2004 and in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania followed suit) these waves were driven by the following factors:

- End of Cold War and the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe created opportunities for democratization and integration into Western institutions like the EU.

- Desire for stability and security through integration with the EU expressed by many Central and Eastern European, particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

- Economic development as a benefit from the accession to the EU, including access to the single market and financial assistance for development projects.

Hence, the EU has been engaged in the process of integrating the Western Balkan countries and Croatia. Croatia became the EU's 28th member state in 2013 became the most recent member state to join the EU. Its accession was seen as a milestone in the stabilization and integration of the Western Balkans. The accession process for countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia is ongoing, aiming to promote stability, reconciliation, and economic development in the region. The Western Balkans, including countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia, have been on the path toward EU accession. Enlargement in this region aims to foster reconciliation, stability, and economic development after years of conflict and instability.

The EU continues to consider further enlargement, with countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia expressing varying degrees of interest in joining the EU. However, the process of enlargement has become more challenging, with concerns over the EU's absorption capacity, geopolitical

implications, and domestic reforms in candidate countries. For instance, after Crimean annexation by Russia in 2014 Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia signed and ratified the Association Agreement with the EU and aftermath of Russia's full scale invasion on Ukraine, the European Council took the decision to grant Ukraine the status of candidate country to EU membership on 23 June 2022. In December 2023 the EU leaders approved opening the EU membership talks with Ukraine and Moldova and to grant candidate status to Georgia.

Thus, 50 years of enlargement, so different countries and very different geopolitical environment. Thinking over all the stages of the EU enlargement the following rationale for the expansion can be pointed out:

1) Peace and stability as enlargement is always viewed as a means to promote peace, stability, and reconciliation in Europe by fostering closer economic and political ties among member states.

2) Economic prosperity due to the possibility for the new member states to access to the single market, which can stimulate economic growth, attract foreign investment, and promote trade.

3) Moreover, the EU expansion is also seen through the lens of sharing of the democratic values. The recent stages of the EU enlargement have been accompanied by requirements for candidate countries to adhere to democratic principles, respect human rights, and strengthen the rule of law.

4) Regional integration and cooperation across Europe, which is strongly supported by the EU, is among the positive outcomes of the enlargement process.

However, here is also important to have a look at the consequences of EU enlargement that became more and more complicated. The EU enlargement has expanded the cultural, linguistic, and socioeconomic diversity of the EU, presenting both opportunities and challenges for integration. It also has strained EU institutions and decision-making processes, as they adapt to accommodate the interests and preferences of a larger and more diverse membership. More, the expansion of the EU has highlighted economic disparities among member states, with newer and less developed countries often requiring financial assistance and structural reforms to converge with wealthier counterparts. Aiming to unite Europe after the Cold War the enlargement has reshaped Europe's geopolitical landscape, extending the EU's influence and promoting stability in neighbouring regions. Overall, EU enlargement reflects the organization's commitment to promoting peace, democracy, and prosperity across Europe, while also posing challenges related to integration, governance, and socioeconomic convergence, which the EU must address to ensure the success and sustainability of the union.

### *The Dilemma of Deepening vs. Broadening.*
The European Union has faced a longstanding dilemma between deepening integration and broadening its membership. This strategic choice involves a balance between deepening cooperation among existing member states and expanding the EU by admitting new members. The tension between deepening and broadening reflects the complex challenges and opportunities facing the EU as it navigates its evolution.

To note, "deepening" and "broadening" of European integration are two relatively separate, but closely related processes that determine the dynamics of the development of the European Union. The "deepening-broadening" dilemma is that the leading principle is deepening, i.e. the process of economic integration as such. It creates and, as it develops, strengthens the gravitational field. However, expansion, in turn, increases the overall potential of the regional grouping and, thereby, the force of its attraction. While generally agreeing with this approach, we note that "deepening" should be understood, in our opinion, not only economic, but also political (and military-political) integration. In addition, it must be taken into account that expansion to some extent slows down deepening: the more countries there are, the more heterogeneous they are, and "newcomers", as a rule, are not able to immediately join such advanced forms of integration as Eurozone or the Schengen area. On the other hand, enlargement usually requires some kind of transformation of the institutional structure of the European Union, i.e. indirectly contributes to deepening integration.

The hardest discussions on the issue took place at the end of XX century preparing to the Eastern Enlargement. At the moment some countries (in particular, France and Germany, which from the very beginning occupied a central place in the European integration field) may prefer deepening, while others (for example, Great Britain, which always had its own opinion and wanted to participate in integration "in your own way") – extension.

Usually there are several fundamental approaches to the relationship between the processes of expansion and deepening. Some consider EU enlargement a priority, which should contribute to economic and political stabilization in Central and Eastern Europe. The fact that constant enlargement makes it difficult or even impossible to create a federal European Union suits them just fine. This position is shared, for example, by many politicians in Great Britain and Denmark. Others proclaim the priority of deepening integration, which turns the EU into a truly strong economic and political Union. At the same time, expansion should take place slowly and gradually. This position has been repeatedly taken by the leaders of France, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Still others see deepening as a means of expansion. They believe that, on the one hand, the success of integration should not be allowed to "erode", and, on the other hand, expansion should be quite effective. This opinion was periodically voiced by politicians in Germany, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. However, since 2004 the majority of the EU member states express solidarity and prefer to "take a break", proposing to go through a certain "consolidation phase".

Going deeper in the discussions on advantages and disadvantages of "deepening" some experts emphasize that "deepening" enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of EU institutions by streamlining decision-making processes and strengthening cooperation among member states; promotes greater economic integration, market harmonization, and convergence of social and fiscal policies, which can stimulate economic growth and stability; as well as increases the EU's capacity to address common challenges such as climate change, migration, and

security threats through closer coordination and joint action. Meanwhile, "broadening", according to them, can strain the EU institutions and decision-making processes, making it more difficult to reach consensus and implement reforms, particularly as the EU grows larger and more diverse. Among other challenges also can be pointed out a risk of enlargement fatigue among existing member states and public skepticism toward further expansion, especially if concerns about immigration, economic competition, or cultural identity arise.

Contrary to that the pro-enlargement experts highlight that "deepening" may exacerbate disparities between member states, particularly in terms of economic performance and social welfare standards, leading to tensions and divisions within the EU. It also requires member states to relinquish some degree of national sovereignty, which can be politically sensitive and lead to resistance from member states and their citizens. Therefore, there is a risk of creating a "two-speed" or "multi-speed" Europe, where some member states integrate more closely than others, potentially undermining the cohesion and solidarity of the EU. While "broadening" can potentially extend the benefits of EU membership, such as access to the single market, economic assistance, and political stability, to new countries, promoting peace, prosperity, and democracy in Europe; strengthens the EU's geopolitical influence and fosters stability in neighbouring regions by offering a path to membership for countries aspiring to join the EU, thereby encouraging democratic reforms and regional cooperation as well as reflects the EU's commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law by providing a framework for countries to align with EU norms and standards.

The dynamic released by the debate on the widening and deepening of the EU has pus integration forward, sometimes with unexpected outcomes. It is probably true to say that more than any other factor, enlargement has had a major impact on the political dynamics, institutional structure, and policy-mix of the Union. Every round 0f enlargement has brought into the EU the special characteristics of the acceding countries, resulting in a readjustment of the existing pattern of cooperation and integration. Officially, however, the EU's doctrine on enlargement is clear: membership entails a total acceptance of the Union's acquis, composed of the treaties, secondary legislation, political commitments, and policy doctrine (such as in the area of extern relations). The discrepancy between the official technical aspect of enlargement and the non-official political dimension has complicated every round of accession, tossing the problems and ruffling political sensitivities, but also producing quick solutions once the political 'settlement' of enlargement, among new and old members has been struck.

Therefore, looking for a balance, the EU has often adopted a "variable geometry" approach, allowing different member states to participate in specific policy areas at different levels. This flexibility accommodates diverse interests and levels of integration. The EU has also used conditionality in its enlargement process, requiring candidate countries to meet specific criteria before accession. This approach is intended to ensure that new members adhere to EU values and standards.

Ultimately, finding the right balance between deepening and broadening the EU is a complex and ongoing challenge for EU policymakers. While deepening integration can enhance the EU's effectiveness and resilience, broadening membership can promote stability and prosperity in Europe and beyond. Effectively managing this dilemma requires careful consideration of the EU's strategic priorities, as well as active engagement with member states, candidate countries, and civil society stakeholders.

### *External and internal factors of enlargement from 1973 to the present.*

This balance became a result of the enlargement of the European Union since 1973 to the present, which has been influenced by a combination of external and internal factors. These factors have shaped the EU's decisions regarding which countries to admit, the conditions for accession, and the timing of enlargement. Among the external factors first and foremost the following ones are significant:

*Geopolitical consideration*: the Cold War context heavily influenced European politics during this period. The expansion of the EC was seen as a means to consolidate Western Europe against the Soviet bloc. The EC enlargement served as a way to strengthen the economic and political ties among Western European countries, bolstering their collective security in the face of the Soviet threat. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union created a new geopolitical landscape in Europe. The EU saw enlargement as a way to promote stability, democracy, and economic development in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Western Balkans.

*Economic integration and market access*: the aftermath of World War II led to a concerted effort towards economic recovery and stability in Europe. The EEC enlargement was part of this broader effort to promote economic integration and cooperation among European nations. Membership in the EEC provided countries with access to a large and prosperous market. For countries seeking to join, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, membership offered the prospect of economic development and modernization through increased trade and investment opportunities. Similarly, for existing members, enlarging the community meant expanding the common market and fostering economic growth. The 1970s and 1980s saw increasing globalization and the rise of multinational corporations. Joining the EC provided countries with access to a larger market and enhanced their competitiveness in the global economy. Enlarging the community facilitated greater economic interdependence and cooperation among member states, enabling them to collectively navigate the challenges of globalization. For countries in Central and Eastern Europe, joining the EU offered a path to modernization and integration into the global economy.

*Democratic transitions*: in the 1970s and 1980s, several Southern European countries, including Greece, Spain, and Portugal, underwent transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic systems. Seeking integration into the EC was not only a means to promote economic development but also a way to consolidate democratic institutions and align with Western European values and norms. The same can be observed for the Central and Eastern European countries, which

consider the EU accession a tool for promoting stability and reconciliation in regions with a history of conflict, such as the Western Balkans. Thus, by offering the prospect of EU membership, the EU has incentivized political and economic reforms in these countries.

With this *Security concerns* are also among the most important factors. Enlargement has been influenced by security considerations, particularly in the context of the post-Cold War era. The EU has sought to extend its zone of stability and security by integrating countries that were previously on the periphery of European security structures.

The post-Cold War period is additionally effected with *European identity and solidarity concerns*. The expansion of the EU reflected a broader aspiration towards European integration and the construction of a common European identity. Enlarging the community was perceived as a step towards strengthening solidarity among European nations and fostering a sense of unity and shared purpose.

The internal factors driving the enlargement of the EC/EU were primarily centered around institutional dynamics, economic interests, and political considerations within the existing member states. Some key internal factors can be describe as follows:

*Institutional capacity and cohesion*: The EC had evolved from its inception as the European Coal and Steel Community into a more comprehensive economic community by the 1970s. The existing institutional framework provided a basis for further expansion. However, internal reforms and adjustments were necessary to accommodate new members and ensure the smooth functioning of the community. Indeed, the enlargement has posed challenges to the EU's institutional capacity, particularly in terms of decision-making processes, budgetary allocations, and administrative capacity. The EU has had to adapt its institutions and policies to accommodate the needs and preferences of new member states.

Here there is a matter of the EU *capacity for enlargement*: the EU had developed mechanisms and procedures to facilitate enlargement while maintaining the coherence of the community. These included frameworks for accession negotiations, criteria for membership, and mechanisms for integration into the existing institutional structure. The internal capacity of the EU to absorb new members played a crucial role in driving the enlargement process.

To manage this issue the EU leaders uses the principle of *conditionality and reform* as a lever to promote political, economic, and institutional reforms in candidate countries. Accession negotiations have been accompanied by conditions related to democracy, rule of law, human rights, and economic convergence.

*Economic benefits of enlargement* could be achieved for both existing and prospective member states. For existing members, expansion meant access to new markets and increased opportunities for trade and investment. For countries seeking to join, membership offered the prospect of economic development and modernization through integration into the larger European market. At the same time economic disparities between existing member states and candidate countries have influenced enlargement dynamics. Concerns about the absorption capacity of

the EU budget, regional development funds, and cohesion policies have shaped debates about the costs and benefits of enlargement.

*Public opinion and political dynamics* within existing member states have influenced attitudes toward enlargement. Concerns about immigration, competition for jobs, and cultural identity have sometimes fuelled skepticism about enlargement. Political leaders' commitments to enlargement have varied over time, affecting the pace and direction of the process.

Moreover, here it's important to stress the value of strategic considerations of some member states. For example, France supported the accession of Mediterranean countries like Greece as part of its broader geopolitical strategy to counterbalance German influence within the EC. Similarly, Germany saw enlargement as a means to strengthen its ties with neighbouring Eastern European countries and consolidate its position as a leading economic power in Europe.

Finally, normative and ideological factors, including the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, play crucial role in the EU expansion. By enlarging the community, European nations sought to spread these values and norms to new member states and promote a shared sense of European identity and solidarity. At the end of XXth century the enlargement has raised questions about the EU's identity and values, particularly regarding the boundaries of "Europe" and the criteria for membership. Debates over enlargement have reflected broader discussions about the EU's role in the world and its commitment to a leader of the democratic world.

*Questions*
What are core ideas for the EU enlargement?
What is the essence of the EU deepening vs. broadening dilemma?
Can we conclude that broadening approach won? Please explain your point.

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# LECTURE 3
## SOUTHERN DIMENSION OF THE EU ENLARGEMENT POLICY

***The southern dimension of EU enlargement.***

Speaking about the enlargement of the EEC in 1980s it's exactly about South Mediterranean dimension of the Community expansion. To note, that in the middle of 1970s democratic regimes had been restored in Portugal, Greece and Spain. And after that they immediately applied for the EEC membership.

To note that for *Greece* it was the second application as the first one was made in 1959 aiming to join the integrational process, common market of agricultural products as well as to get financial assistance and stabilize internal political situation. The Association Agreement was signed in July 1961 but did not implemented due to military coup in Greece.

A new democratic government under rule of Karamanlis applied again in 1975 that was not in time – from the EEC standpoint. First Brussels just finished very complicated negotiations with Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark. Second Europe's economics had been recovered from 1973 energy crisis that affected economic development globally. For its part, the Greek Government was eager to consolidate its new-found legitimacy on the domestic and international stages and played the political card, quoting support for democracy, to insist on as full and as rapid an accession as possible.

Therefore, understanding that the EEC could not say "no" to Greece, a member of NATO, though, still unstable and with weak democratic processes, Brussels suggested to establish certain transition period to resolve existing problems with the help of the EEC before the start of accession negotiations.

The Commission identified three main problems:

1. The unresolved Cyprus conflict and the general state of Greek-Turkish relations. The Commission insisted that all disputes between Greece and Turkey should be resolved before accession, so that the EEC would not be drawn into these disputes. In addition, it is necessary to find mechanisms that will allow the EEC to maintain its Association Agreement with Turkey and balanced relations with the EEC.

2. The state of the Greek economy. The Commission considered that, in its current state, it required serious structural changes in order to meet the requirements of the EEC. The main concerns were the large and weak agricultural sector and the underdeveloped Greek industry. Their modernization and restructuring will require the allocation of significant amounts from the Community budget. The Nine also feared an influx from Greece of cheap labour seeking a way to escape the chronic unemployment levels at home. There were also shipping lobbies in Europe that feared competition from the Greek merchant fleet that would, however, make the European fleet the largest in the world.

3. The impact of Greece's accession on the process of functioning and decision-making in the Community itself. The Commission clearly confirmed the fact that any expansion of the EEC leads to a change in the existing order of

functioning of the Community and requires the adoption of new measures aimed at deepening the integration process. Otherwise, the Community may become inoperative. Therefore, the Commission unequivocally stated that before Greece joins the EEC, it is necessary to complete the processes of deepening integration through the creation of a European Monetary Union and holding direct elections to the European Parliament.

Negotiations on Greece's accession to the EEC were opened in July 1977 and in two years an agreement on Greece's accession to the EEC from January 1, 1981 was signed. The procedure for ratifying the agreement in all EEC countries and Greece passed without any particular difficulties. Only in France, when voting in the National Assembly, supporters of the expansion of the EEC received a majority with a difference of 60 votes only.

Greece's entry into the EEC posed a certain challenge to the Community. For the first time, the Community had to join an economically underdeveloped state that had just liberated itself from the authoritarian junta of the "black colonels" and lacked well-established democratic principles. Therefore, the question for the EEC was primarily political - can the European Community contribute to the weak and undeveloped states joining it acquire economic prosperity and well-established democratic governance institutions?

The accession of Greece changed the face of the Community by strengthening its Mediterranean character whilst adding a Balkan element. Community Europe's centre of gravity, which until then had tended towards the North, now shifted southwards with the addition of the Iberian Peninsula. But Greece's backward economy and its geographical isolation – it had not a single common border with a Member State of the European Community – exacerbated regional disparities within the Community of Ten.

In case of *Spain* let's start with a fact that after World War II, European states pursued a policy of ostracizing Spain for its support of Germany during the war as well as Franco's dictatorial regime. Thus, Spain found itself in a kind of international political isolation. As a result, when the European Communities were created, Spain remained outside the European integration process.

However, in 1962 the Spanish government formally requested the opening of negotiations with the EU to explore the possibility of creating an Association with the Communities. Yet, France and Germany decided not to rush and start with the Preferential Trade Agreement between Spain and the EEC. Negotiations took place with some periodicity, as they were sometimes suspended when the Communities applied sanctions against Franco "for totalitarianism" and "voluntarism". In 1970, the efforts of the Spanish government culminated in the signing of the Preferential Trade Agreement. With Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland joining the EEC, negotiations on Spain's membership were suspended.

On November 20, 1975, Franco died, which meant the disappearance of the political obstacle to Spain's accession to the EU. Negotiations about the Kingdom's "European" prospects started between the EU and the new Spanish government in 1976-1977. Spain's application for membership in the European Communities has been approved. Therefore, Madrid applied for the EEC membership in July 1977

and negotiations started in February 1979. Nevertheless, Great Britain, France and Italy reacted with restraint to the accession of Spain: London had the Gibraltar issue in Anglo-Spanish relations; Rome and Paris - due to fears of competition in the agriculture field.

The French position changed after the Socialists came to power in France (1981) and Spain (1982). French President F. Mitterrand said that Spain's accession to the EEC could help improve the functioning of this community. One of the reasons for France's agreement was its desire for leadership among the countries of Southern Europe - members of the EEC.

In 1985, negotiations on Spain's entry into the EU were completed and the necessary documents were signed. On May 8, 1985, the European Parliament adopted a special Resolution approving the signing of the "Treaty on Spain's accession to the EU." Finally, on June 12, 1985, the Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal to the EEC and Euratom was signed.

Bearing in mind that in 1985 the Spanish share of the total GDP of all member states was only 6.5%, and the average representation in EU structures of 11% that can be considered a significant diplomatic victory. The Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal and its annexes came into force on January 1, 1986. However, the process of Spain's adaptation to EU membership took place in a transitional period until 1993.

About *Portugal*, it is worth to note that Lisbon was in favour to join the EEC for economic reason but from another hand, it was rather concerned of ideological concept on common European identity. The matter of fact that a lot of Portuguese people believed that a state as small as Portugal, a country whose economic development was far from the level of developed European countries, would then face the real prospect of merging with its more powerful neighbours. The historically established imperial consciousness of the Portuguese could not allow such a loss of identity. National interests had to be preserved at any degree of integration they demanded.

Also to keep in mind that Portugal was a state-founder of the European Free Trade Association in 1960 and enjoyed a free-trade agreement with the EEC since 1973. Nevertheless, the deepening economic crisis persuaded the political circles to apply and join the EEC.

To sum, despite of institutional complications due to the first enlargement Brussels' choice was clearly in favour of Mediterranean expansion considering the ideological but mostly economic and political reasons.

*Turkish case* can be viewed through this statement. As you know, the Treaty of Rome clearly stated that any European country can apply to become a member. However, Turkey being not pure European country played a significant role in Europe during the Cold war. At the end of 1940s – beginning of 1950s Turkey joined Organization for economic cooperation and development, Council of Europe, NATO etc.. So, when Ankara applied for Association Agreement in late July 1959 it was supported by positively accepted. The decision of Turkey was inspired by Greece application and anxiety that if Athens became a member of the EEC it would conduct anti-Turkey policy in the Communities. And in 1963,

despite France and Italy concerns on competition with Turkish agricultural goods and intention to sign a limited trade agreement, the Ankara Agreement on association and Custom Union between the EEC and Turkey was signed. To note Germany backed this agreement strongly due to the Soviet Union activities in the region.

The Agreement aimed to promote continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the parties with the goal of eventually creating a customs union, of which Turkey officially became a part in 1995. As a result, Turkey became part of an economic zone in which trade barriers are absent or reduced, while common external tariffs are established for goods entering the EU member countries. The Ankara agreement was a reflection of the strategic attitudes of both sides towards mutual rapprochement. The purpose of the agreement was "promoting the permanent and sustainable strengthening of trade and economic relations, taking into account ensuring the accelerated pace of development of the Turkish economy, increasing the level of employment of the population and improving the living conditions of the Turkish people" (Article 2.1). The conclusion of the agreement with the EEC allowed for the free movement of labour (Article 12). Thus, the economic objective was to create a strengthened relationship between the people of Turkey and the peoples united in the EEC, and to eliminate the gap that exists between the Turkish economy and the economies of the member countries of the Community. The political goal was defined as the joint defence of the principles laid down in the Treaty on the establishment of the EU, determination to protect and strengthen peace and freedom.

However, the Ankara agreement did not consider the integration of Turkey with the EEC in the medium term. Yet the Ankara Agreement contained only a cautiously formulated prospect of accession: "As soon as the implementation of this Agreement confirms Turkey's full acceptance of the obligations arising from the EEC Treaty, the contracting parties will consider the possibility of Turkey's accession to the Community".

At the late 1970s the relation between the EEC and Turkey turned to become conflict due to economic decline in Turley and its dissatisfaction of the level of economic assistance from Europe and trade relations. Soon the military coup took place that accompanied by new government's recognition of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus froze any cooperation and negotiations.

Only in mid 1980s the parties renewed cooperation and in 1987 Turkey officially applied for full membership into the EEC. This application was de facto ignored by the EEC institutions but the decision to strengthen the relation with Turkey. Ozal's government realized impossibility of positive reaction on the application but it was perceived exactly as a shock therapy for improvement of the interaction with the EEC. As a result in 1990 the Cooperation Program was launched with Custom Union to be established in 1995. So, only at the Helsinki Summit in 2000 Turkey was granted a candidate status. In October 2004, the European Commission decided that Turkey met the Copenhagen political criteria, as it had significantly reformed its constitution and legislation after 2002. These reforms included granting freedom to all ethnic minorities,

abolishing the death penalty, reducing the role of the military in the government, and strengthening punishments for the use of torture. On December 17, 2004, at a meeting in Brussels, EU heads of state and government decided to start negotiations for Turkey's EU accession. Official negotiations began on October 3, 2005. After analyzing Turkish legislation for compliance with EU law, 35 chapters or areas were identified in June 2006 for direct negotiations, which were significantly slowed down by Cyprus case, Arab spring, refugee issue and a constitutional referendum, transforming Turkey from a parliamentary system to a presidential republic without a system of checks and balances. The political developments and human rights concerns in Turkey have raised questions and led to delays in fulfilling certain aspects of the EU-Turkey deal, including the EU accession negotiation process with Turkey.

### *EU policy priorities and the role of Mediterranean EU member states. Importance of southern neighbours for the EU.*

The trend of EU expansion to the south is a logical continuation of the Community's Mediterranean policy. A number of EU member states (France, Italy, Spain) view the EU's southern expansion as a counterbalance to the Community's advance in CEE, where they fear Germany will play a dominant role.

The foundations of *Malta*'s relationship with the European Union were laid officially upon signing an Association Agreement in December 1970. This agreement called for the creation of a customs union based on free trade between Malta and the EEC. The Association Agreement, which came into force in 1971, provided for a customs union between the EU and Malta, which was never fully implemented.

Nevertheless, in 1990, Malta submitted a request to join the EU and met understanding on this issue. In 1993, the EU Commission put forward as a condition the reform of legislation in the field of economics, Malta's abandonment of the policy of neutrality and non-alignment, bringing foreign policy into conformity with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and others. The 1995 session of the European Council called for the commencement of negotiations with Malta six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference. However, the application was temporarily halted in 1996, when a change in government resulted in a change of political direction. The Labor Party leadership had not formally withdrawn its request for Malta to join the EU. Malta's position, judging by the statements of officials, was to ensure a "special relationship" with the EU, "a new type of relationship based on an association agreement", in support of the idea of creating a free trade area. Only in September 1998, after the Nationalist Party won the elections, Malta informed the Council of its wish to reactivate Malta's application for EU membership.

Formal accession negotiations started in 2000 and were completed by the end of 2002. A referendum was held in March 2003 with the 54% positive result to EU membership. Following the signature of the Treaty of Accession in April 2003, Malta joined the EU a year later, on 1st May, 2004, together with Cyprus and 10 CEE countries.

Cyprus signed an Association Agreement with the EC in 1973, and in 1987 it signed a protocol on a customs union, participation in which facilitated trade with EU countries. At the same time, the country'ss government began to take various measures in the sphere of economics and social life that would allow Cyprus to meet the criteria for applicants for EU membership. A reform program was developed, consisting of 12 sections, which included changes in the field of transport, environmental protection, finance, intellectual property and entrepreneurship, competition, consumer protection, transport, justice and internal order, health, employment and social protection, statistics and industrial policy. The implementation of this program led to the fact that, within the framework of the development plan for Cypriot agriculture for 1994-1998 it has come closer to EU requirements in this area. The financial system was liberalized and a corresponding law on banks was adopted.

As a result, the application to join the EU, submitted by Cyprus back in 1990, after a detailed study by experts, had a chance to become the subject of official consideration. The application for membership submitted on 4 July 1990 by the Republic of Cyprus applies to the whole island. As stated in Agenda 2000, membership should benefit the whole island and representatives of the northern population should be involved in the membership negotiations.

On 30 June 1993, the Commission delivered a favourable opinion on Cyprus' eligibility and scheduled a reconsideration of the application for membership and re-evaluation of the situation for 1 January 1995.

The Commission's decision was supported by the Council of Ministers and then by the Corfu and Essen summits in 1994. In July 1997, the Commission, supported by the European Parliament, recommended opening negotiations with Cyprus on accession to the EU.

That same year, in December, the European Council announced the adoption of a strategy for the admission of Cyprus to the EU, which was reflected in the inclusion of Cyprus in the first group of candidate countries for accession. In Agenda 2000, presented on 15 July 1997, the Commission confirmed the opening of negotiations with Cyprus six months after the end of the IGC. "Agreement on a political settlement would permit a faster conclusion to the negotiations. If progress towards a settlement is not made before the negotiations are due to begin, they should be opened with the government of the Republic of Cyprus, as the only authority recognised by international law".

In April 1998, direct EU negotiations with Cyprus began. For a long time, the prevailing view among EU member states was that Cyprus should be admitted into the Community only after the problem of relations between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus had been resolved. However, the session of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, speaking in favor of intensifying negotiations between them, stated that henceforth this condition would not be considered a priority for the admission of Cyprus to the EU, and the Council would proceed from an assessment of "relevant factors". Thus, Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004.

### *The interests of the Mediterranean countries towards the EU.*

The accession of Cyprus and Malta in the EU has had an internal as well as an external dimension from the EU's stand point. Externally, their accession further extended the EU's borders southwards in the region. Internally, the Mediterranean group within the EU - at that moment composed of five member states, namely Spain and Portugal (even if the latter has only an Atlantic coastline), France, Italy and Greece increased to seven.

The Cyprus and Malta joining to the EU, strengthened the sensitivity of the Union towards the Mediterranean region. The cause of this increased sensitivity derives from two main aspects: the small size of the two prospective member states and the fact that they are only two wholly Mediterranean states with little other competing interests apart from the Mediterranean region. By virtue of their small size and limited resources, their attention and contribution in the decision-making institutions of the Union has to be more focused. This 'Mediterranean orientation' is best brought out by this comparison: while the larger European Mediterranean states have multiple foreign policy interests, apart from what is happening in the Mediterranean region (e.g. the larger EU member states are all in one way or the other involved simultaneously in developments in the Balkans, Central and eastern Europe and trans-Atlantic relations to mention a few) and which divide their attention in international relations, the main concerns of Cyprus and Malta and which flow mainly from their smallness and vulnerability, are more focused on the matters of immediate relevance to them, which begin in the Mediterranean region, if not the sub-region of the Mediterranean to which they belong. Their small size and their sense of insularity, makes them more sensitive to whatever happens in the region than most other states.

In addition, it must be emphasised that Cyprus and Malta are not only island states but also the only ones with no physical link with any of the larger continents (Europe, Africa or Asia) surrounding the Mediterranean.

Hence their 'Mediterranean orientation' tends to be stronger (although they are not totally focused in this direction only). The attitude of the Mediterranean states could perhaps be illustrated by reference to Malta's first policy statement when it joined the Council of Europe in 1965. Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly in 1965, Malta's Prime Minister expressed it this way: "Membership of the Council of Europe has been to my country like returning home after a long absence…Whilst a European country sharing a common culture, history and way of life, we naturally gravitate towards Europe, our geographical position makes us aware of the importance of North Africa, which shares, with six members of the Council, a common sea and which has much to contribute to the welfare of the area. We therefore would think of this aspect of European foreign policy could be given some more thought" (Pace 2002). From that point onwards, Malta's foreign policy emphasis has varied from more to less intense preoccupation with the Mediterranean region.

Being small states, both Cyprus and Malta have a different approach to their Mediterranean agenda than the larger countries. The independence and

identity of small states is probably more at risk in an anarchical international or regional states system, and particularly in times of war, than in a "rule-based" one. That is why, small states such as Cyprus and Malta are more inclined than larger states to support and uphold international organisations and to act through them in concert with others. Indeed, both countries have placed special importance on international organisations and multilateral negotiations where they have initiated their most note-worthy foreign policy actions since their independence. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is a rule-based international regime that suits these two countries' aims and methods in the region to near perfection: the partnership facilitates the achievement of more open trade, eventually a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, it strengthens the links of interdependence among the region's states, it gives both Cyprus and Malta a freer access to the North African and Near Eastern markets, it provides a political forum for the discussion of some key regional political issues, strengthens confidence-building measures and multiplies the horizontal and vertical links of co-operation across the region and keeps both sides of the Mediterranean Basin positively engaged in search of common solutions. In the last analysis the partnership is a factor of stability for which there is no alternative substitute in sight. Furthermore, while the larger EU states can contemplate a national approach to the region in parallel with the EU's unified policy, Cyprus and Malta can only act effectively if they do so through a larger and more effective policy such as the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Policy. As a result the importance that the two small states attach to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership may always tend to be different from that attached by the larger EU member states.

It is also likely that the importance and international standing of both Cyprus and Malta can increase in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership by virtue of their EU membership alone, and particularly by the fact that they become direct participants in the formulation and execution of the EU policies.

### *Questions*
What is the specifics of the EEC southern enlargement?
What are the key issues of the EEC relations with Turkey?
What effect had the joining of Spain, Portugal and Greece on the Mediterranean policy of the European Community?

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# LECTURE 4
## LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

***Trade agreements and the Customs Union as tools for closer cooperation with the Mediterranean countries. From Global Mediterranean Policy to Association Agreements: Normative and Practical Dimensions***

The existing traditional trade, economic and cultural ties, favorable geographical location, and the availability of necessary energy resources and raw materials in the Mediterranean countries contributed to the active development of relations between the European Union and them. After the signing of the Treaty of Rome on the creation of the EEC, the former colonies of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands were associated with the community on special terms. In the early 1960s, special trade benefits were granted to Morocco, Turkey, Israel, Malta, Cyprus, and Spain. Greece was associated with the Community under special conditions back in 1962, and Turkey in 1964. Similar association agreements, the purpose of which was to create customs unions, were signed by the EEC with Malta in 1970 and Cyprus in 1972. But the customs union with Malta was never established, with Cyprus it was partially created, and only with Turkey this project was translated into reality.

Preferential trade agreements were signed with Spain in 1970, with Israel in 1964 and 1970, with Lebanon in 1965 and 1972, and with Egypt in 1972. These agreements were based on the principle of reciprocity, but in fact provided reduction of duties asymmetrical to the product structure, mainly on industrial goods, in favor of less developed partners. Liberalization also applied to a number of agricultural goods and did not cover the service sector. These agreements represented the first preparatory level of integration, and the period from 1958 to 1972 can be considered the first stage in the development of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Geopolitically and territorially, this group of countries included, in addition to North African countries, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, and Israel. Israel "fell out" of

the group for many reasons, but due to its geographical location and its links with the Community in the Arab-Israeli dialogue it was an important part of the Southern Mediterranean. Malta and Cyprus, former British colonies, have always had close relations with Europe, and Turkey became the first Mediterranean country, where the EEC began to work out its new model of relations through association agreements with prospects for the creation of the customs union in the future. In the case of Spain, preferential agreements became the basis for the future expansion of the EEC to include southern European countries. Formally, until the early 1980s, it was one of the countries covered by the Community's Mediterranean policy, but at the same time, it stood apart compared to Turkey, Malta and Cyprus.

The first stage of relations between the two regions was characterized by a fragmented, "mosaic" approach of the EEC, which used two types of agreements to form relations with the southern Mediterranean countries - preferential agreements and association agreements providing for economic and financial cooperation. They laid the foundations for the EEC policy to integrate the region with the European community. During this period, "association" was used for relations with states that were not comparable in level of development to the EEC countries. Moreover, Spain, with which an association agreement was never concluded, became a member of the Community before Malta and Cyprus, with which similar agreements were concluded.

The Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) launched in 1972 was the new stage in the development of Euro-Mediterranean relations. It was aimed at overcoming the shortcomings of bilateral agreements and smoothing out the consequences of the first enlargement of the Community in 1973, which took place without serious negative changes for the Mediterranean countries. The new policy provided for the introduction within 5 years of a free customs regime, asymmetrical for the Mediterranean countries. Preferential regime was applied to 80% of agricultural exports from Mediterranean countries, they were provided with financial assistance and were covered by a single agreement on labor migration.

Despite the intensification and expansion of ties with developed countries in general, the main course was taken to develop relations with Africa and the Mediterranean. Moreover, relations with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East expanded most intensively in the 1970s, which was associated with the oil crisis of 1973. French economist F. Perroux in mid-1955 put forward the concept of an "African-Arab-European" union, aimed at the gradual integration of these countries with Western Europe, in which there was a clear desire of the community to extract economic benefits from cooperation with these countries, especially oil and gas producing countries, and use them as suppliers of raw materials and markets European industrial products. During this period, two visions of the EEC's Mediterranean policy continued to coexist - the existing bilateral agreements with the countries of this region, taking into account the characteristics of each country, and the gradual transition to a global approach in relation to the Mediterranean countries, which later led to the revision of the EEC agreements with Israel and the Maghreb countries.

In 1975, the EEC concluded an association agreement with Israel, and in 1976, trade and cooperation agreements with Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, which were essentially association agreements. They provided for more liberal rules for the entry into the EEC countries of migrant workers from the Maghreb countries, since Europe needed cheap labor to boost its economy in the post-crisis period. The import of industrial goods from these countries was duty-free and was exempt from quantitative restrictions, with the exception of certain types, such as petroleum products, cork, and textiles. And for agricultural products, a special system of differentiated customs discounts was introduced, which was associated with subsidies for agricultural products in the EEC countries and high purchasing prices within the Community. Similar agreements were signed in 1977 with the Mashriq countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria).

Thus, in the 1960-1970s, a special zone of Mediterranean countries gradually formed around the European Community, which were subject to a relatively free customs regime. Thus, in the 1970s, the EEC's Global Mediterranean Policy, carried out in the format of an association and a customs union, was aimed at countries with which preferential agreements had been concluded. These agreements represented the lowest level of economic integration. They provided only for the exemption of industrial goods from customs duties and preferential access for basic agricultural products from Mediterranean countries to a united Europe. But at this stage of Euro-Mediterranean policy, cooperation in the social sphere was already present (problems of immigration in the EEC, improving the standard of living of migrants, family reunification and equal social rights for immigrants and residents of European countries).

In the 1980s, the EEC placed its main emphasis not on the development of trade and economic relations with the Mediterranean region as a whole, but on increasing the level of economic development of the new southern members of the Community - Spain, Portugal and Greece - including the redistribution of funds for less developed regions newcomer countries. That is, the increase in costs for accession and integration of 3 new members of the EEC objectively entailed a decrease in assistance to the countries of the eastern and western Mediterranean and affected their economic stability, which led to an increase in the gap in the levels of their economic development. To mitigate the consequences of southern expansion, guaranteeing the continuation of traditional development assistance and the volume of supplies of agricultural products, the EEC signed a series of protocols with the southern Mediterranean countries. Thus, the southern expansion of the EEC had a negative impact on the general Mediterranean policy and showed its main contradiction - a selective approach to the countries of the Mediterranean basin, both included and not included in the association, thereby dividing this region into main and secondary countries for the Community, which reduced the achievements of the Mediterranean policy of the 1970s.

The EEC policy towards the Mediterranean changed in the 1990s. In December 1990, a draft Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) aimed at tripling investment in the region was submitted. It provided for the creation of financial funds and an increase in development assistance to strengthen horizontal

cooperation and regional integration, the effectiveness of existing preferential agreements, including the expansion of trade preferences and an increase in quotas for textile and agricultural products by 5% per year.

The new cooperation instruments proposed by the European Commission, in addition to existing agreements, were mainly of a financial nature. The EEC also promised to provide technical assistance, maintain balance of payments and increase the flow of investment into Mediterranean countries.

The new policy placed the main emphasis on the socio-economic development of this region, as an important condition for political stability and security for the countries of the Community. The second important point of the RMP was its focus on accelerating regional cooperation between Mediterranean countries. However, at the Lisbon meeting in June 1992, the new policy moved away from a global approach to the Mediterranean countries and identified the main partners of the Community as the Maghreb countries, that is, it concentrated its attention on a few countries rather than on the region as a whole.

Also in April 1992, the European Commission made proposals for the gradual improvement and improvement of the Mediterranean regional policy, focused mainly on cooperation with the Maghreb countries and the creation free Mediterranean trade zone of the EEC with 3 Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). But already in 1993, the scope of EU cooperation with the Mediterranean was expanded due to a new initiative of the European Commission - a plan to create a "Middle East Economic Zone", providing for the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor between Mediterranean countries. New proposals for regional integration in the Mediterranean region coincided with the creation of a single internal market in the EEC, in the likeness of which the Community was going to create a new Middle Eastern economic zone. However, this ambitious project turned out to be unrealistic and unfeasible.

It was only after 1994 that there was a renewed trend towards expanding cooperation with all countries of the Mediterranean region. Despite the intensification of these ties, the results of the EU's activities and its initiatives were not very successful. Financial funds were formed mainly at the expense of the European Investment Bank (EIB), they were insufficient for such a large region, and investment growth was constrained by existing financial and political risks. Due to protectionist tendencies in EU trade policy, Mediterranean countries have consistently had trade deficits with the Community. Their connections were asymmetrical. In the early 1990s, more than 50% of the Southern Mediterranean's exports went to the European Union, while less than 8% of European trade was with the region and just 2.3% with the Maghreb, its top priority partners. Development assistance was insufficient to address the social and economic problems of these countries and was distributed unevenly, widening the gap in levels of economic development.

At the EU Lisbon Summit in June 1992, the European Council proposed new instruments for Mediterranean policy - a horizontal expansion of cooperation with these countries, including accelerating their regional integration, strengthening cultural ties, and new investment programs. The main outlines of the

EU's Mediterranean policy were formulated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, and its priority direction was the policy of "association" in the southern direction. Already in December 1994, the European Council declared the Mediterranean area a region of "strategic and priority importance", and in 1995 it proposed a new concept for its policy in the southern Mediterranean countries, aimed at the subsequent creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA), political dialogue two regions and increased financial support from the EU. The final stage in the transition of the European Union from the Mediterranean policy, limited mainly by trade and economic frameworks, to the new policy of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was the holding of the Barcelona Conference in November 1995, at which the main provisions of this partnership were adopted.

Thus, during 1960-1995 the Mediterranean policy of the European Union was characterized by a gradual transition from a fragmented "mosaic" approach to a more constructive global concept towards the Mediterranean countries, based on trade and, later, financial instruments. During this period, bilateral agreements between the Community and individual countries, providing for an asymmetrical free trade regime, were important, and the Mediterranean policy was aimed at countries with which there were Preferential agreements and association agreements have been concluded, primarily for the Maghreb countries. These treaties represented the lowest level of integration of the Mediterranean region and were limited mainly to trade, gradually covering socio-cultural aspects and migration issues. Later, new financial and economic instruments appeared in the EU's relations with this region. A clearer concept with a unified approach to the region, based on the idea of regional integration, of which the European Union was the "exporter," began to take shape already in the 1990s. It was formalized in the form of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership strategy at the Barcelona Conference in 1995.

### Questions

What was the objectives of the Trade Agreements and Association Agreements between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries?

What were the drivers for the European Community to change its general approach to the Mediterranean during 1970s – 1980s?

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# LECTURE 5
## BARCELONA PROCESS AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

### *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

The crises Europe experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the Yugoslav crisis, the Gulf War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, prompted the member states of the European Economic Community to re-evaluate their objectives, cooperation methods, and international activities. The dissolution of the bipolar international system compelled Europeans to adapt swiftly to new developments and broaden their interests, which included a focus on the Mediterranean region. In the era of globalization, this realization led to the need for more extensive economic and political expansion. The Mediterranean region held significant strategic importance for Western European nations, particularly France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. However, it was gradually falling under the influence of the United States. Recognizing their expanding role in Europe and globally, the European Economic Community was determined not to be overshadowed by American dominance. European leaders were thus challenged with the mission of identifying fresh approaches to enhance their security and safeguard national interests in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries.

Steps towards this objective were initiated in 1990 with the official launch of the "5+5 Dialogue." The idea was for informal discussions between France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Malta on one side, and Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia on the other, to address contemporary political matters. However, these plans did not materialize, and it was not until 2001 that this forum began its functioning. The development of a common Euro-Mediterranean policy by European leaders was significantly influenced by the civil war in Algeria. In 1991, the Islamist political party, the Islamic Salvation Front, emerged victorious in the first round of local parliamentary elections. To prevent the Islamists from taking power, the Algerian military canceled the second round of elections, compelled President Chadli Benjedid to resign, and banned the Front. In response, the Islamists initiated a series of terrorist attacks against both the population and government officials, leading to a full-blown civil conflict. This situation posed an Islamist threat in close proximity to the borders of France and other European countries.

On February 7, 1992, the member states of the European Economic Community signed the Treaty establishing the European Union in Maastricht. Following this development, the countries of the European Union were confronted

with the challenge of formulating a new common foreign policy stance on several issues and reevaluating existing joint initiatives. An important step at this stage in the development of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue was the proclamation of the New Mediterranean Strategy by the Maastricht Treaty. This policy encompassed significant financial aid, with a portion of it overseen by the European Investment Bank.

The implementation of the New Mediterranean Policy was based on three main aspects of the partnership: political and security aspect, aimed at ensuring peace and stability; economic and financial aspect, which consisted of building a common prosperous area. The Euro-Mediterranean agreements were aimed at creating a free trade area; the social, cultural, and human aspect involved promoting the development of civil societies in all countries. The execution of this aspect of the strategy involved establishing various working groups tasked with carrying out specific projects. The organizations targeted for funding included higher education institutions (Med-Campus), mass media (Med-Media), local communities (Med-Urbs), and small and medium-sized enterprises (Med-Invest).

The principal objectives of the New Mediterranean Policy were as follows: supporting structural reforms in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to minimize their effects on the population; promoting the establishment and growth of small and medium-sized enterprises; advocating for environmental protection; providing funding for regional-level activities to enhance horizontal cooperation; emphasizing the significance of human rights protection, with the European Parliament deciding to suspend funding in cases of documented human rights violations. In essence, the New Mediterranean Strategy aimed to invigorate Euro-Mediterranean relations and promote structural economic reforms.

Subsequently, Mediterranean countries began to express concerns, primarily driven by the official applications for EU membership from Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, including Cyprus and Malta, between 1994 and 1996. They feared that the EU's expansion to the North and East would lead to a reconsideration of key priorities in regional policy, potentially resulting in reduced financial and economic support for the southern EU regions. France took a firm stance on this matter, insisting on the implementation of the recently adopted New Mediterranean Strategy. However, Germany's proactive approach towards EU expansion to the East raised the prospect of straining Franco-German cooperation, which historically had been a driving force behind European integration.

A compromise was achieved during a meeting of EU leaders in Greece in June 1994. France and other southern EU countries consented to the EU's expansion towards the East, while Germany acknowledged the viability of the New Community Mediterranean Policy. The final declaration of the summit instructed the European Commission and the European Council to assess possible initiatives aimed at strengthening the EU's policy in the Mediterranean region in the short and medium term, taking into account the possibility of convening a conference with the participation of the EU and its Mediterranean partners.

Subsequent meetings in Essen (December 1994) and Cannes (July 1995) helped establish the fundamental directions for the development of relations between the EU-15 and the countries along the southern Mediterranean coast. During these meetings, the European Council decided that the EU's financial aid to the countries of the southern Mediterranean coast, under the MEDA program (the primary EU financial instrument for Euro-Mediterranean partnership implementation) for the period of 1995-2000, would total 4.6 billion Euros. This decision aimed to allay the concerns of southern EU members about a potential reduction in funding for the South due to the Eastern enlargement process.

One of the crucial decisions was to convene a significant Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona in the autumn of 1995. Therefore, by the mid-1990s, the Unified Europe was progressively shifting from a disjointed approach to a more constructive global concept in its dealings with its Mediterranean neighbours.

### Conference in Barcelona

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, was created in 1995 as a result of the Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Barcelona on 27 and 28 November under the Spanish presidency of the EU.

The Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona in 1995 was attended by all the EU members (15) as well as by 12 Southern and Eastern Mediterranean was represented by the following countries: Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta. The question of Libya's participation remained open in view of both the sanctions imposed on the state by the UN, due to them it could not fully participate in international cooperation. As well as the position of its leader M. Gaddafi, who deliberately rejected the format of interaction proposed by the EU, considering it neocolonial and insisting on the development of relations on an interregional basis: Euro-Arab or Euro-African.

Answering the question why the EU were looking for a new format of cooperation, the following incentives and motivations can be pointed out:

The first reason can be described as it stated in the Barcelona Declaration itself: "The EU is launching the Euro-Med partnership partly out of dissatisfaction with the results so far achieved by its Mediterranean policy". These dissatisfactory results came out of the EU's previous initiatives, the GMP and the Renovated Mediterranean Policy launched in the beginning of 1990s – as we described it earlier "step back", and so the EU wanted to reorder and correct the asymmetry and imbalance created by them, and to strengthen those agreements into a more coherent and holistic approach.

The second incentives was that the best tool for avoiding problems is considered to be regional cooperation—for instance, building economic ties, good neighbourly relationships, and working on policy coordination and knowledge transfer. Such regional cooperation would be beneficial for both sides: economically, the Southern Mediterranean countries represent a huge market for

the EU's products, and this materialistic motive appears in the commission documents. The Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries offer a market of 420 million consumers. A flourishing of economic cooperation would lead to increased employment in the Partner Countries, and would cut off increasing labour migration to the EU.

The third motivation for the Process, according to Etel Solingen, should be considered a tool for strengthening the division between the North and the South, in order to control security between the two blocs—for example, to hinder and curb illegal immigration, Islamic fundamentalism and transnational crimes as well as the proliferation of weapons, and also to regulate the dependency of the European countries on gas and oil from the Southern Mediterranean states. Very interesting are the view of Joffe, who did believed that: "The Barcelona Process is not an act of generosity by Europe, as some believe. Even though the Declaration refers to creating a zone of shared peace and prosperity, it is actually a statement about European Security. Even though people in the south might take a generous attitude towards the European vision and argue that the process really was an attempt to avoid creating a "Fortress Europe" I shall argue that it was designed to do precisely that".

The forth reason was that the EU viewed cooperation with the Southern countries as a window, which would enable it to intervene in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), one of its objectives being to act as a counterweight to US power in the region, and to promote political reform.

### Three main dimensions of the Barcelona Process

Therefore, the partnership was divided into three baskets of cooperation.

1. The first form of cooperation concerned political and security-related issues. Its main goal was to preserve stability and peace in the region. In this regard, European countries focused on cooperation with Mediterranean states in combating terrorism and organised crime. The principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was stressed, and the parties committed to adopting conventions on disarmament in order to gradually reduce armaments in the region. The basket further included declarations on actions towards ensuring the respect of fundamental freedoms and human rights.

2. The second area of cooperation concerned economic issues, the ones most important to MENA countries. This form of cooperation provided for the implementation of an economic and financial partnership. The aim of this basket was the establishment of a Mediterranean area of prosperity on the basis of bilateral relations.

3. The last basket concerned cooperation in the area of culture and social issues. Apart from the typical goals related to scientific exchange, promotion of culture and student visits, the basket also provided for cooperation in migration-related issues. European countries were putting special emphasis on the development of cooperation in countering illegal immigration. It needs to stressed here as well that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership did not in any way include liberalisation in the area of free movement of workers.

In 2005 Chapter 4 was added to the Barcelona Declaration (2005), which emphasized the importance of issues of migration, justice, social integration, etc. In the 2005, a fourth basket was been added: Migration, social integration, justice and security which supports legal immigration on one hand and fighting against illegal immigration in the other hand.

Therefore, priority was given to building an area of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean, minimizing the gap in the level of development between the parties, bringing the degree of economic integration of the region to the level of a free trade zone in the Mediterranean no later than 2010.

At the same time, one can notice that the Barcelona Process has two complementary dimensions:

1. The bilateral dimension: the EU carries out substantial cooperation activities bilaterally with each country, the most important being the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. Starting with Israel (1995), this format was signed by all interested states of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, with the exception of Libya and Syria.

2. Regional co-operation covering the political, economic and cultural areas.

To ensure the functioning of the baskets, institutions were established and framed by the Barcelona Declaration. The main institution was annual summits of the representatives of all partners.

In the political and security policy basket

• **Euro Mediterranean Summit**: this composed of the heads of states of the Partner Countries and the European countries. It convenes every five years in order to decide on policy priorities, referred to as "the work plan", for the following five years. The work plan aims to stress citizen participation, to increase freedom of expression and cooperation, and to implement a code of conduct on combating terrorism. The most recent of these summits was held in Slovenia in 2006, where the Partner Countries expressed the need to combat poverty and to provide support for young people

• **Euro Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers**: this is composed of the Foreign Ministers of the Partner Countries, who meet regularly in order to "monitor the implementation of the Barcelona Declaration, the five years' work program, and to define the necessary actions for the fulfilment of partnerships objectives".

• **The Forum/EMPA**: This is an international and transnational parliament created in 2004 to replace its predecessor, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum (EMPF) which is the heart of the EMP institutions. The EMPA consist of members of the European Parliament, as well as members of the parliaments of both the EU nations, and of the Partner Countries. The functions of this institution are to provide "further cooperation, [to] implement association agreements and [to] propose recommendation to European Mediterranean Ministerial meetings".

• **The Euro-Med Committee** is formed of senior officials from the EU Troika (officials and ministers), and one delegate from each partner state. The role of this institution is to assess the achievements of the work program, and to

prepare the meetings of Foreign Ministers.

### *Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. EU regional programs in the Mediterranean*

The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements or the earlier Cooperation Agreements constituted the bilateral track of the EMP. Between 1995 and 2004, nine Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements were established with Tunisia, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Additionally, the Agreement signed in 1995 between the European Union and Turkey, establishing a customs union, can be included in this list. These Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements superseded the initial generation of agreements, known as Cooperation Agreements, which had been negotiated in the 1970s. The countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean had high expectations regarding the financial assistance provided by the EU. However, following the Barcelona Declaration, funds were not simply distributed to partner countries but were contingent on specific conditions. This meant that countries that implemented structural economic, institutional, and administrative reforms received the majority of the funds.

The multilateral or regional track covered the three baskets of the Barcelona Declaration.

The reason behind the creation of the political and security basket was that "Europe wishes to see its Southern group of countries that *will not* be at war with each other, destabilized by socio-political conflicts, export terrorism or drugs to Europe, threaten Europe's social stability by continued or even sharply increased flows of illegal immigration". Before 9/11, however, this basket was not the EU's main concern, and there were no actual dialogues related to political reform. The EU did not exert any pressure on the Partner Countries for far-reaching political reforms. After 9/11, the EU realized that there was an urgent need to reform the political structure. The EU has made some changes in the balance between *soft* and *hard* security by emphasizing the hard security components. In response to this, at the 2002 ministerial meeting in Valencia, a new Justice and Home Affairs pillar was added to this basket in order to curb illegal immigration, as was a new clause of antiterrorist strategies. The EU has also begun to consider a range of international issues, such as terrorism, international crime, trafficking, and immigration.

In the economic-financial basket the aim was set to establish a Euro**Mediterranean Free Trade Area by the year 2010.** Among the main financial instruments, two MEDA programs were launched **(1996–1999, 2000–2006) to finance bilateral and regional cooperation programs.** The volume of MEDA I in 1995-1999 amounted to about 3.5 billion euros (more than three times the EU financing of programs in the region in the previous period 1991-1995). MEDA II program allocated 5.35 billion euros in 2000-2006. The European Investment Bank, within the special instrument FEMIP (Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership) was created in 2002, also carried out the support of projects in the region. **It is worth to be stressed that** in article 3 of

the MEDA financial regulations, it states that the MEDA is dependent on "the respect of democratic principles and the rule of law and also human rights and the fundamental freedom". It means that the EU grants financial aid on the basis of positive conditionality: greater aid to those countries that show the most progress. If a country fails to show progress and continues to violate human rights and to restrict freedom, then EU will adopt negative measures: either to impose sanctions – for instance, MEDA aid will be cut off – or to postpone trade negotiations and cooperation agreements.

**In the cultural basket consists of** a number of programs in the field of education, heritage protection, youth exchanges. **In** April 2005 the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue of Civilizations was launched, the first permanent institution of the partnership to be located in the south **and a project that aimed at bringing peoples of the EMP countries closer to each other through a dialogue conducted through the networks of NGOs. Through this, institutionalisation of the cooperation of the EU's southern partnership has become complete.**

It is obvious that, by launching such a comprehensive format with far-reaching tasks and significant financial support, the EU counted on an accelerated deepening of the integration processes in the Mediterranean, but the results turned out to be quite modest.

In political and security field there was a lack of achievement, since the EU has not shown any real effort to promote political reform in the region.

In economic field: despite the doubling of the exports of the Mediterranean partners to the EU in 1995-2004 to more than 65.0 billion euros, a significant asymmetry in trade in favor of the EU remained, and the process of signing and entering into force association agreements and reform structures took place unevenly and stretched until the mid-2000s (the association agreement with Algeria entered into force only in 2005, and the initialed agreement with Syria was never signed).

Therefore, a space of stability, peace and prosperity did not appear in the region either in the 1990s or in the 2000s, and the free trade zone did not become operational until 2010. The differentiation between motivations for both sides only grew up that has led to an expectation gap, and the failure of the EMP's political incentives and political will within the partner countries. Therefore, the X Summit in Barcelona (2005), which was ignored by the leaders of the Arab countries and Israel, was a vivid conclusion of the EMP.

Despite the fact that in 2000 the European Council adopted the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region, which called on for reactivation of EMP and outlined the main tasks of the EU's Mediterranean policy, the implementation of this program turned out to be a difficult task.

Among the main obstacles to the realization of the objectives of the Barcelona Process in general, we can single out the following:

-        the weakness of most of the economies of the EU's Mediterranean partners, which were not ready for rapid trade liberalization, as well as

- a lack of interest of the authoritarian regimes in the region in implementing the norms of free competition in general and the development of democratic freedoms in the humanitarian sphere, in particular.

- failure of the Middle East settlement and normalization of Israel's relations with the Arab countries,

On November 27-28, 2005, Barcelona hosted the anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit, during which the leaders of partner countries aimed to assess the outcomes of a decade of the Barcelona Partnership. Notably, a significant number of Arab leaders did not attend the summit. This included the president of Egypt, the kings of Morocco and Jordan, the presidents of Syria and Lebanon, and the president of Algeria, who were represented by their heads of government or foreign ministers. The adopted Work Program reaffirmed the commitment of the partner countries to establish a free trade area in the region by 2010. The summit also highlighted that migration and counterterrorism remained key focal points of the Euromed policy. An important accomplishment of the summit was the approval of the Code of Conduct on Terrorism proposed by Spain. Furthermore, it was decided to double the EU's financial assistance to the Arab countries in the Mediterranean region.

However, already on the eve of the Barcelona Summit in 2005, it was clear that the Euromed partnership faced serious obstacles in all areas of cooperation. The zone of stability and development in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean was not created: The Arab-Israeli conflict continues, and confrontational relations between the Euromed member states also persist: Turkey-Greece, Israel-Palestine. Economic development and reforms in these countries have been slow, leading to an increase in the already existing disparities between the Mediterranean South and North.

### *Common Strategy of the EU towards Mediterranean.*

The Common Strategy was adopted to help with implementation of the Barcelona process objectives. It was initially adopted for four years (expiring on 23 July 2004) but was extended by the European Council on 5 November 2004 until 23 January 2006.

In short the Strategy stated the following. In view of the Mediterranean region's strategic importance for the European Union and the challenges it faces, the EU considers the two sides must work together as partners with a common vision and mutual respect. The principle of partnership implies active support by both sides to develop good neighbourly relations, improve prosperity, eliminate poverty, promote and protect fundamental freedoms, encourage cultural and religious tolerance, and develop cooperation with civil society including NGOs. The European Union will do so by supporting the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and contributing to the consolidation of peace in the Middle East.

The European Union's goal is to help secure peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Its objectives also include promotion of core values such as human rights, democracy, good governance, transparency and the rule of law. Social, cultural and human affairs also play a role in promoting mutual understanding.

Free trade, closer cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, greater security through cooperation to promote peace and dialogue to combat intolerance, racism and xenophobia are further objectives.

Efforts will also be undertaken to enhance coordination, coherent and complementarity between the EU and its Member States and between its Mediterranean policy and policies for other partners.

The main areas of action and implementation of the Common Strategy objectives were defined as political and security dialogue, justice and home affairs, economic and financial assistance, and social issues.

On the political and security front, the Union will strengthen dialogue at all levels through cooperation and exchange of information in order to establish a common area of peace and stability. Conflict prevention and other issues such as anti-personnel mines are other central issues of concern. The EU also attaches great importance to the signature and ratification of non-proliferation instruments and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass-destruction and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

On democracy, human rights and the rule of law, it is essential to strengthen democratic institutions and to promote good governance and accession to international human rights instruments. In more concrete terms the Union would like to see the death penalty abolished in the region.

In the field of the justice and home affairs area migration issue is one of high concern. The EU intends to simplify visa issue procedures, combat illegal migration networks, ensure more effective border control, reduce the causes of migration and help ensure the integration into society of all persons residing legally in the Community and prevent their double taxation. There must be a review of the legal systems, and in particular civil law problems relating to the laws of succession and family law, including divorce, to make them more transparent and predictable. Refugees and measures to combat crime are two other European concerns in this area. Compliance with the Geneva Convention and accession to the United Nations Convention are also desirable.

In the economic and financial field implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements to promote the progressive liberalisation of trade is the principal objective in strengthening the private sector and making the region more attractive to investors. Appropriate trade policies, accession by partners to the World Trade Organisation on the right terms, support for subregional cooperation and greater South-South trade are also goals. The Union will not neglect the need for interconnection of infrastructure, improved water management strategies and the creation of a market economy with a social dimension. Environmental concerns will also be taken into account to ensure sustainable economic development.

The impact of financial cooperation will be maximised through coordination of national and Community strategies, enhanced economic dialogue and coherent use of all the resources available.

The core social issues are participation by civil society and NGOs in the partnership, cooperation to promote equal opportunities for men and women and

dialogue. On the cultural side, the aim is to improve education and vocational training particularly for young people and women.

### Questions
Which factors did induce the EU to review its approach to the Mediterranean in the early 1990s?

What is Barcelona process?

What were the objectives of the EU Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region?

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## LECTURE 6
## EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

*European Neighbourhood Policy and Mediterranean. Europeanization without Europe. From Action Plans to Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements.*

In 2004, there was a big enlargement of the EU involving the accession of countries from CEE as well as Malta and Cyprus. The new EU borders brought both benefits and risks to the Member States, which decided to regulate their

institutional relations with the EU's new neighbours. As a result of the steps taken in 2004, a new EU initiative was launched, called the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The new undertaking was addressed to six eastern neighbours of the EU and 10 Mediterranean countries (Algeria, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia).

The disillusionment and dissatisfaction of the southern Mediterranean partners due to several reasons: on the one hand, the southern/eastern Mediterranean partners complained of Europe's marginalisation of development issues and its emphasis on security, while, on the other, they noted that the EU made aid to its partners conditional on domestic reform, which they saw as the EU dictating. The introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy further strengthened such grievances, while at the same time blurring the picture and presenting challengers – the eastern partnership countries – to the southern/eastern Mediterranean partners. The EU's efforts to link the development of relations with partners in various fields turned out to be a hindrance to progress. Especially in terms of their cooperation with other financial centers that did not put forward political conditions like the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Or, as another example, the Greater Middle East Initiative and the free trade agreements proposed by the United States must also be taken into account. Many fear that if the southern partners have to choose, they will opt for the US and that could wreck the Euromed partnership. Among other regional initiatives let's mention the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) of Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya formally established in 1989, in February 2004 the Agadir Agreement for the Establishment of a Free Trade Zone between the Arab Mediterranean Nations was signed among Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, as a possible first step towards the Euro–Mediterranean Free Trade Area. It was followed by the launching of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area in January 2005 by the Arab League. Together with the US-initiated Greater Middle East Initiative and the African Union, in both of which the southern Mediterranean states are partners, we can see that there are several overlapping initiatives, most of which aim at not only economic, but also cultural and to some extent political and even military cooperation.

Therefore, the reasons for launching a new format are rooted in the acknowledgment of the deficiencies and shortcomings, which have impeded the EMP from accomplishing its objectives, and the EU intention to complement and reinvigorate the EMP. A secondary reason for this new approach to the EMP was the largest EU enlargement to date, in 2004 that extended the EU member states with two pure Mediterranean countries.

At the same time, the growing activity of the EU on the eastern flank and the development of the ENP for the "new neighbours" in Eastern Europe caused fears in the Mediterranean states of the EU that the new policy would attract resources at the expense of the southern dimension. This time, the activities of France, Spain and Italy led to the Mediterranean was covered by the concept of a "wider Europe", becoming a component of the "ring of friends" of the EU together with Eastern Europe and the countries of the Caucasus. The combination of different regions already took place in the conceptual document of the Commission "**Wider**

**Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours**" 2003 and was confirmed in the 2004 ENP Strategic Document.

The Commission paper stated that "over the coming decade, the EU should therefore aim to work in partnership to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood, a "ring of friends", with which the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations. It suggests that, in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political economic and institutional reform, all the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU's internal market. This should be accomplished by further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capitals (four freedoms)".

To implement the objectives, the ENP strategy is based as what is known as *Action Plans,* bilateral instruments which are negotiated and signed between the Partner Countries and the EU. The aims of the Action Plans are to solidify the Partners' commitments to specific actions, to bring their foreign and security policies closer to the EU's, and give them the impetus to adopt standards, which bring them closer to the EU in the following fields: economic, political, justice and home affairs, market and regulatory structures, infrastructure network, and people-to-people contact.

Many diplomats feared that the ENP would override or overlap with the EMP policies, since the ENP policies carry the same core as the EMP initiatives. But as a matter of fact, the ENP reflects different policies, and stresses certain aspects more – specifically the opportunity to access the European internal market. The Commission's communication stressed that the *acquis* of the EMP is the cornerstone of all regional and sub-regional cooperation in the Mediterranean region. The ENP is thus a tool to enhance the core of the Association Agreements and to implement them.

Moreover, institutionally, the ENP did not change the Barcelona Process or the EU's policy in the region, because both the mechanisms of cooperation through the action plans of the association agreements and the financial instruments remained unchanged until 2006.

However, focus on a bilateral format of relations immediately caused the division of spheres of activity, not only immediately shifted the emphasis of cooperation with Mediterranean partners to a bilateral format, but also relegated the Euro-Mediterranean partnership to the second plan, transferring the most successful forms of cooperation to the competence of the ENP. This became especially noticeable after the expiration of the MEDA II program, which was replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007. Although the ENPI plan in 2007-2013 allocated 8.7 billion euros to the Mediterranean partners, and 3.7 billion to the Eastern partners, it was a step back for EU policy in the Mediterranean as a whole.

In practical terms, the transfer of the focus of the Mediterranean policy to a bilateral format within the ENP with its differentiated approach to partners allowed each country to deepen relations with the EU individually without being tied to

others. This had a positive effect, in particular, for Israel and the Maghreb countries, which worked relatively more successfully than the rest on individual FTA formats, without waiting for the launch of a regional platform, which was postponed for an indefinite future.

At the same time, the factors that inhibited the Barcelona process also slowed down the implementation of plans within the ENP, namely, the principle of conditionality and protectionism in the sensitive area (agricultural products). Soon, the growing mutual contradictions in maintaining political dialogue among all parties involved as well as acknowledgement that there is an overlap between the initiatives taking place in the Mediterranean, especially between the EMP and the ENP proved that all EU efforts failed to bring desirable results.

### *Limits and achievements of the ENP in the Mediterranean.*

The focus on a bilateral format of relations immediately caused the division of spheres of activity, not only immediately shifted the emphasis of cooperation with Mediterranean partners to a bilateral format, but also relegated the Euro-Mediterranean partnership to the second plan, transferring the most successful forms of cooperation to the competence of the ENP. This became especially noticeable after the expiration of the MEDA II program, which was replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007. Although the ENPI plan in 2007-2013 allocated 8.7 billion euros to the Mediterranean partners, and 3.7 billion to the Eastern partners, it was a step back for EU policy in the Mediterranean as a whole.

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To stimulate progress, the EU offered full access to its markets if MENA neighbours enacted reforms with its support and assistance. Accordingly, the EU developed Action Plans based on existing Association Agreements with six partner states, detailing which reforms were to be undertaken and how. Not all states were included though: neither Algeria nor Syria concluded one. The plans contributed to further dialogue, advanced access to Europe's market, and achieved some limited regional economic integration. For reform projects in line with the Action Plan, the EU provided financial assistance (€8.7 billion for the period 2007-2013).

It was also during this period that the EU launched electoral observation missions in the South as a contributing element in the democratisation process. Aimed at creating trust in the electoral process, such missions have been repeatedly deployed to Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Palestine, and Tunisia since 2005.

Regional instability has at times worked for and at times against the goals set out in the various Action Plans. Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 certainly

opened a window for reform as much as the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya originally did in 2011. But changes in politics often entailed further economic and political instability that have ultimately worked against democratisation and prosperity. While the EU was quick to welcome the 'Arab Spring' events of 2011, it has struggled with political quagmires - such as the electoral victory of Hamas in Palestine in 2006 or the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi by the Egyptian military in 2013 - which presented it with tricky dilemmas and difficult choices. An initial recalibration on the ENP, in the wake of the Arab Spring (May 2011), tried to highlight the need for a more responsive approach to the region taking into account each country's respective needs and deeds, but had limited impact on the events. Moreover, the interplay between regional instability and conflict, Islamist radicalisation and irregular migration to Europe - spanning from Tunisia to Syria via Libya - has prompted a reconsideration of policy priorities and instruments, which culminated with the ENP review.

At the same time, the factors that inhibited the Barcelona process also slowed down the implementation of plans within the ENP, namely, the principle of conditionality and protectionism in the sensitive area (agricultural products).

Soon, the growing mutual contradictions in maintaining political dialogue among all parties involved as well as acknowledgment that there is an overlap between the initiatives taking place in the Mediterranean, especially between the EMP and the ENP proved that all EU efforts failed to bring desirable results. While the EU constantly reviews its framework of engagement with its neighbours, the guiding principles are nevertheless not being fundamentally questioned. In spite of criticism of the framework - too uniform and too 'softly-softly', as the European Court of Auditors described it - EU policies towards the South remain anchored on reform and dialogue, with the long-term objective of creating prosperity and stability. Questions about whether the EU could achieve more by proposing 'more for more' to states that are willing to engage in reform, is a tactical rather than strategic change within an existing policy, while the call for more responsive and realistic approaches is shifting the emphasis towards more tailored plans and types of partnership.

**In 2015, the European Commission (EC) launched a review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to address the consequences of the Arab Spring. The ENP's main priority in its Southern dimension continued to be promoting economic growth and institutional modernization in partner countries, but collective security and the prevention of irregular migration also emerged as major issues. The progressive construction of a European Security and Defence Policy found in the complicated Mediterranean scenario an area demanding increasing attention. It also included the emergence of new and enormous challenges, such as climate change, the environmental emergency and the necessary energy transition, or the digital transition imposed by technological change. The imperative has been to adapt to the accelerating process of globalization. All of this led to the publication in February 2021 of the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,**

**"Renewed partnership with the southern Neighbourhood: A New Agenda for the Mediterranean."** To demonstrate its intended effectiveness, the Communication was accompanied by an Economic and Investment Plan.

*Questions*

What were the reasons to include the Mediterranean region into the European Neighbourhood Policy?

How does it correlate with the existing Euro-Mediterranean initiatives?

What factors did affect the potential of the ENP?

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# LECTURE 7
## UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AS A NEW FRAMEWORK

*The French initiative for the Mediterranean.*

The EMP has faced many setbacks and failures for many reasons, among them are the asymmetries between the two regions, the unequal representation of the EU and the Partner Countries, the lack of commitment between the two sides,

the difficulty in maintaining political dialogue as well as an overlap between the initiatives taking place in the Mediterranean, especially between the EMP and the ENP, which this hinders the efficiency of the programmatic and institutional management.

As a reaction to these failures, in Toulon on July 2, 2007, when Nicolas Sarkozy was running for the French presidential campaign, he initiated the idea of creating a Mediterranean Union, by declaring that "it is about time for the Mediterranean and Europe to realise that their destinies are tied together".

The basic idea behind the project was based on three diagnoses made by Sarkozy: the weakness of EU policy in the region, the erosion of the French role as a powerful geopolitical player in the region, and the marginalisation of the Mediterranean economy.

Yet Sarkozy was too ambitious. In Toulon in 2007, he declared his vision to establish something in the Mediterranean similar to the council of Europe (Conseil de la Méditerranée) by founding a central bank modelled on the European Investment Bank, a nuclear energy agency in which France would play the key role, an institution to monitor water issues, and a common audio-visual space and cultural exchange program for universities. Moreover, during his visit to Morocco he announced how he framed the nature of the project: as a "Union of Projects".

The project to create this Mediterranean Union - in the meantime the project had been re-baptised 'Union for the Mediterranean' - caused heavy discussions amongst the EU member states, notably between France and Germany, since the intention was not to include all EU members as had been the case with the EMP before, but only Mediterranean coastal states – which means only five of the member states: France, Spain, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, and Portugal, along with five of the Southern countries.

The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, accused Sarkozy of attempting to "side-line the existing EU policies and to hijack European funds to support French foreign policy initiatives". She also added that the creation of an exclusive institution would lead to "a corrosion of the EU in its core and [would] unleash explosive forces in the EU that I would not like to see". She also commented on Sarkozy's intention of excluding non-Mediterranean European countries "one thing has to be clear... Northern Europeans also share responsibility for the Mediterranean, just as the future of the borders with Russia and Ukraine is an issue that concerns those living on the Mediterranean. Even Spain implicitly had some reservations about the project, as it didn't want to jeopardise its relation with the EU. Furthermore, Britain and Sweden showed the same reaction, as they believed that the project would just increase the expenditure of the EU budget in the Mediterranean, but without giving them any say in it.

Moreover, Turkey saw it as a direct attack on its plans for accession to the EU, as it was convinced that this project was a substitute for full membership. Furthermore, after Sarkozy's statement that accepting Turkey into the EU, "would deal a fatal blow to very notion of European" and that "The ambitious project which I will propose to Turkey would be its being the backbone of a new alliance, the Mediterranean countries union", Turkey's feeling of distrust towards Sarkozy's

intention to create a Mediterranean Union only increased. After negotiations and consultations with the EU, a common position that "this project is not directed against Turkey's EU accession talks" resulted.

On the other hand, Sarkozy's project attracted a great deal of attention in the Southern Mediterranean, as it offered so much potential for the Partner Countries.

As the project was given more detail over time through speeches made by Nicolas Sarkozy and after the concerns of other EU members were listened to, a compromise was found: the new policy should be based on the EMP and therefore complement rather than replace it. Also, all EU members would take part in the new policy and the provisional name, introduced by the Council in its summit in March 2008, 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean', reflects the difficult process of negotiation. Sarkozy also gave up on creating a central bank, but instead a Council and a Secretariat were to be established.

As a result, the European Council approved the project on the March 14, 2008, and asked the commission to present a detailed outline, in order to avoid confusion between the EMP and the ENP on one hand, and the UfM on the other hand. Consequently, the European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso stated, "Today we recognised the need to upgrade the Barcelona Process.... When the Barcelona Process was launched, it was a quite a different time ... but now things have changed, we need to adapt".

On May 20, 2008, the Commission prepared a communication in which it reached the following main conclusion: "this new initiative will give a new impulse to the Barcelona process in at least three important ways: by upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners; by providing more co-ownership to our multilateral relations, and by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region."

Due to stagnation in the EU's relations with its southern neighbours, a new form of cooperation was established on the initiative of France in 2008, namely the Union for the Mediterranean, with a total of 44 participants: the countries that participated in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as well as Turkey, Monaco, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, and Mauretania, and also the League of Arab States. Libya was also invited to the cooperation, but Muammar al-Gaddafi, who governed the country at that time, rejected the offer and accused the EU of pursuing a new neo-colonial policy in the region.

The assumption behind the UfM was to continue the implementation of the Barcelona Declaration, but its main goal was to strengthen cooperation in the region through the execution of multilateral projects. The UfM was to supposed be financed from the instrument of the ENP. As the decision about the establishment of this initiative was made under the EU Financial Framework for 2007-2015, the EU members were unable to find more funds to finance this undertaking. What made the UfM project even more important was the decision to establish institutional structures linking the members of the EU with the Mediterranean countries and headed by a joint presidency. It was a symbol of equal partnership between the countries of the north and of the south of the region.

The establishment of the UfM meant that the EU acknowledged the failure of the ENP. The most important change in the EU's approach to Mediterranean countries was that the countries of the region were separated from the EU's eastern neighbours. It seemed that the EU would be successful in developing this new system of economic, political and social ties in the region.

### *From strategies to projects.*

On July 13, 2008, a turning point occurred for the initiative, as thirty-four heads of states, foreign ministers, and leaders of both EU institutions and regional organisations (especially the Arab League), convened to outline and approve an upgrade in their relations which would develop and strengthen the Barcelona Process.

At the summit, they agreed to establish a new structure which composed of three core institutions, apart from the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. The co-ownership of these institutions between the member countries has been emphasised.

The Paris summit allowed the participation of regional cooperation: the Arab League was granted observer status, albeit without the right to vote. Israel was granted its first position as Deputy-General in the organisation.

Additionally, the Paris Summit put forward six cooperation projects: maritime and land highways, depollution of the Mediterranean, civil protection, alternative energies (the Mediterranean Solar Plan), higher education and research, the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, and the Mediterranean University. This kind of project cooperation proves that the EU wants to engage the population of the Partner Countries, and make the process more visible to them, something which the EMP failed to do. Further project cooperation was left to the meeting of foreign ministers in Marseille.

Even though the incentive behind the project is pushing the partnership further, Sarkozy stressed that the Middle East Peace Process is inevitable, and he hopes that these programs will bring peace as he comments that, "Arab states made a gesture of peace by attending the founding summit of the Union for the Mediterranean, and pledged that Europe would build peace in the Mediterranean, just as yesterday we built peace in Europe". Moreover, there has been so much progress on political ground, including, for example, the first time following six years of boycott of Israel that the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad actually sat at the same table as Israeli President Ehud Olmert. Assad stated that he was ready to have normal relations with Israel, that the two countries have been formally at war since 1948, but that direct talks would have to await a new American president. He also reopened diplomatic ties with Lebanon, which had been cut off since the assassination of Hariri.

Sarkozy was so excited about this whole project that he stated a few months after the Summit, in justification of its creation, that "we have to learn to make peace, to work together on projects like the ones Jean Monnet did in his time".

In short, the UfM does offer creative tools to revitalise the BP by offering programmes, which are connected with the daily life of the people, and also by

offering the Partner Countries the chance to influence the decision-making mechanism.

At the opening of the session in Marseille, the foreign ministers stressed the outcomes of the Paris Summit, especially concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, and reaffirmed their continuous support of the MEPP by all means. They encouraged the two sides to engage in continuous negotiation in order to reach a peace agreement based on the Annapolis Process, and they also welcomed the on-going negotiations between Syria and Lebanon.

On the basis of the success of the Paris summit, the ministers approved of the six areas of cooperation and called for an assessment of the cooperation. The project's title was changed from "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" to simply "Union for the Mediterranean".

In conclusion, the Paris summit and the Marseille Declaration stressed that the UfM is complimentary to the EMP, and that there is a need to apply the *acquis* of Euro-Mediterranean policy. But at the same time it would be a mistake to believe that the UfM and the EMP together are simply a combination of the two frameworks, because firstly, at the Paris Summit, the Council decided to shift to the UfM as the EU's pivotal policy towards the Mediterranean. Secondly, they called for adjustments to be made to the EMP within the UfM framework. So now the chief EU policy towards the Mediterranean is the UfM, and despite the fact that the EMP *acquis* and its programs survive, they will be implemented within the UfM institutions. Furthermore, the Commission's communication emphasised that the work program (the fourth chapter of the cooperation on "Migration, Social Integration, Justice, and Security), which had been adopted by the 2005 Euro-Med Anniversary Conference, will remain and be implemented though integrating it with the UfM.

*"Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" and the implications for the EU policy in the Mediterranean. Basic principles and tasks of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).*

After all contradicting projects were abandoned, the aim set for the UfM was to preserve and continue the process of cooperation between the EU and its Southern neighborhood and therefore preserve all the previously implemented Barcelona *acquis*. An idea about what the 'Barcelona *acquis* actually is, is given in the Paris summit declaration, which denominates the Barcelona Declaration with its three chapters of cooperation, the Five- Year Work Programme of 2005 with the fourth chapter of cooperation as well as all conclusions of Euro-Med ministerial meetings to be included. Furthermore, all the old aims' already proclaimed earlier within the EMP such as the vision "to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding" remain valid for the future. However, new aims of the UfM are to give a new impulse to the Barcelona process, first, by upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners; second, by providing more co-ownership to our multilateral relations; and finally by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the

citizens of the region.

In light of these aims, the deep political meaning of the UFM, but also its main challenge, is the attempt to share decision-making and management between the regions north and south of the Mediterranean Sea.

Such approach - co-ownership - is the most important of the principles that are inherent in the UfM. The principle finds its expression on all levels of interaction, beginning with the Co-presidency of the organisation: one EU member state (in accordance with the Treaty provisions) and one partner from the Southern states - Egypt from 2008 until 2010 - will preside over the organization together, and also jointly chair at the level of "Ministerial meetings, Senior Officials meetings, the Joint Permanent Committee and, when possible, experts/ad hoc meetings". The upgrading of relations between all partners involved finds expression in the institution of biennial meetings at the level of Heads of State or Government, where the EU Commission will also be represented as an additional party of the agreement. These meetings, alternating location between the EU and the states of the Southern partners, shall set up regional projects and affirm broader two-year Working Programmes for the UfM.

There was a strong belief among the Partner Countries that common political joint action would be a catalyst for more fruitful political dialogue. As Aliboni pointed out, "the central tenet of the new policy is co-decision and co-management .... A shift from EU tutorship to co-ownership". Although this co-ownership is a huge step in the Euro-Mediterranean process, and one which will strengthen political dialogue and cooperation, the basic agenda on which the UfM is based is more development and business-oriented than focused on high politics.

The political setbacks which plagued the EMP caused the Union to change the focus of its cooperation to what Sarkozy called the "Union of Projects", which has made the UfM's activities and projects more tangible to people, and allows them to "tackle their daily life".

Moreover; while the Barcelona Process used to bring ambassadors and experts to meetings, the UfM brings the heads of states and governments together.

On security issues, the EMP proved unable to deal with hard military security issues, such as sufficient defence and non-proliferation. These difficult issues have been explicitly dropped from the UfM's framework. At the same time, security has not been neglected totally, but has been included in a lower form, under the rubric of civil protection. The heads of state in the Paris Declaration launched a program called "Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters" (PPRD), which will contribute to a stronger response in civil protection capabilities. It also aims to bring this program together with the European Civil Protection Mechanism, in order to render it more effective.

Economically, although the EMP improved the economic performance of the Partner Countries, some deficits remained. They are on the whole less significant than the political problems. The significance of the UfM is its total focus on implementing regional projects.

*Questions*

What were the drivers for the French President F. Sarkozy to launch a new initiative on the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation?

What are the main objectives of the Union for the Mediterranean?

What are the differences from the Barcelona Process?

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# LECTURE 8
## INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

*Institutional structure of the Union for the Mediterranean. The role of the Secretariat of the UfM. Ministerial meetings of the UfM and their tasks. Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM. Meetings of officials as a basis for closer cooperation with the EU. The role of the Regional Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean.*

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is an intergovernmental organisation that brings together 43 countries to strengthen regional cooperation and dialogue through specific projects and initiatives that address inclusive and

sustainable development, stability and integration in the Euro-Mediterranean area. As a direct continuation of the Barcelona Process, the launch of the UfM in 2008 was the reflection of its member states' shared political commitment to enhance the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The governance of the UfM is based on co-decision and shared responsibility between the two shores of the Mediterranean and is structured around a working methodology that promotes dynamic interactions among Member States.

Co-Presidency

The governance of the Union for the Mediterranean is established through a process designed to ensure co-ownership of the decisions and shared responsibility by the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries. The UfM is chaired by a co-presidency shared between the two shores. Since 2012, it is assumed by the European Union on the Northern side, ensuring a close link with the European Neighbourhood Policy, and by Jordan on the Southern side, allowing its full appropriation by the Southern countries. The co-presidency applies to all levels: summits, ministerial meetings, and officials' level meetings.

Senior officials' Meeting (SOM)

The members of the Union for the Mediterranean meet on a regular basis at the level of Senior Officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the 43 UfM countries, EU institutions and the League of Arab States. The Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) provide the framework to discuss the current political context and coordinate the work of the UfM Secretariat. They approve the budget and work programme of the Secretariat and set the basis to prepare the Ministerial Meetings. They also discuss the project proposals submitted for approval and endorsement. The Senior Officials take decisions by consensus.

Secretariat

Based in Barcelona, the UfM Secretariat is the platform to operationalise decisions taken by Member States, through the preparation of Ministerial meetings, the facilitation of regional dialogue platforms and the development of strategic regional projects. The UfM Secretariat operates under the direction of the Secretary General, supported by six Deputy Secretary Generals (DSGs), each in charge of a sectorial division: Economic Development and Employment, Social & Civil Affairs, Higher Education & Research, Water, Environment & Blue Economy, Transport & Urban Development and Energy & Climate Action.

The Secretary General and the DSGs are appointed by the Member States for a three-years term, renewable once. Three DSGs are nominated by EU countries and three by Southern and Eastern countries.

The UfM Secretariat team consists of more than 60 international staff members from over 20 countries, including diplomatic and technical personnel seconded by Member States and partner institutions such as the European Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and France's Caisse des Dépôts.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean (PA - UfM), formerly Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, consists of 280

members: 132 EU members (83 members from the 28 EU national parliaments – three from each Parliament except for the UK that has two members – and 49 members from the European Parliament), 8 members from parliaments of the European Mediterranean partner countries (two for each delegation from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monaco and Montenegro), 130 members from the ten founding countries on the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey), and 10 members from the Parliament of Mauritania.

The PA - UfM advances the:

1.     Visibility and transparency of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
2.     Alignment of the UfM's work with public interest and expectation.
3.     Democratic legitimacy of cooperation within the Mediterranean region.
4.     Dialogue between Israel, Palestine and other Arab elected officials.

The Assembly has five parliamentary committees which are responsible for monitoring the following aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership:

-     Committee on Political Affairs, Security, and Human Right,
-     Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs, Social Affairs and Education,
-     Committee on Improving Quality of Life, Exchanges between Civil Societies and Culture,
-     Committee on Women's Rights in Euro-Mediterranean countries,
-     Committee on Energy, Environment, and Water.

The Assembly may set up working groups whose membership and powers will be determined by the Bureau.

The PA - UfM is a consultative institution. It acts through resolutions or recommendations on all aspects of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. These can concern the executive organs of the UfM, the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the national governments of partner countries. These recommendations and resolutions are not legally binding.

Recommendations and resolutions require approval by consensus when more than the half of the delegations of each of the two components – European and non-European – of the Assembly are present. If this is not possible, a qualified majority of two thirds can approve decisions. At present, the PA-UfM is the main parliamentary dimension of the Union for the Mediterranean. It absorbed the Barcelona Process and was officially launched at the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of 43 countries held in Paris on 13 July 2008. The PA-UfM

The UfM has consolidated an action-driven methodology that creates effective links between policies and tangible projects and initiatives to adequately address the region's challenges and its key interrelated priorities.

This methodology is composed of three things: policy frameworks, dialogue platforms and regional projects – the "3 Ps".

Political Framework

UfM's political dimension is structured around Ministerial and governmental representatives' meetings, that define the priorities of UfM work through the adoption of common agendas in key strategic areas.

Through declarations adopted by consensus of the 43 UfM Ministers, the Ministerial Meetings address strategic priorities in the region (employment, women empowerment, water, urban development, etc…), and define the scope and objectives of a common Mediterranean agenda.

Regional Dialogue Platforms

UfM's Policy dimension is structured around regional dialogue platforms involving not only representatives from governmental institutions and experts, but also regional and international organisations, local authorities, civil society, private sector and financial institutions.

This close interaction between national experts and stakeholders is a fundamental tool to exchange on the ministerial mandates, better understand the needs, share experiences, identify best practices and promote concrete projects of cooperation.

Regional Projects

The UfM Secretariat acts as a catalyst of projects, accompanying promoters throughout the project lifecycle and enhancing regional dialogue to create synergies for partnerships. It provides continuous support towards ensuring the implementation of the projects through technical expertise, networking opportunities and visibility, and takes stock of particularly innovative ideas in view of up-scaling them to a more regional level.

The UfM attributes its Label to these regional cooperation proje cts by the unanimous endorsement of the 43 UfM countries that meet on a regular basis through their country representatives, or senior officials. This UfM label allows project promoters to mobilise governments and stakeholders, raise awareness and visibility and gain access to a strong network of donors and financial institutions. The UfM also supports or joins initiatives with partner institutions with bilateral or multilateral agreements or Memorandums of Understanding (MoU).

*Questions*

What is the General Secretary's role?
What is the role of Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM?
What is the core methodology of the UfM?

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# LECTURE 9
## TOOLS AND MECHANISMS OF EU COOPERATION WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

*The basic mechanisms of cooperation between the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean. The financial dimension of cooperation. MEDA II and its regional programs. ENISP and the Mediterranean.*

The Mediterranean region, characterized by its rich cultural diversity and complex geopolitical landscape, has been a focus of international development efforts, including the European Union's MEDA program.

MEDA Programme has been launched by the EU to implement the cooperation measures designed to help Mediterranean non-member countries reform their economic and social structures and mitigate the social and environmental consequences of economic development.

The MEDA Regulation is the principal instrument of economic and financial cooperation under the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. It was launched in 1996 (MEDA I) and amended in 2000 (MEDA II). It enables the European Union (EU) to provide financial and technical assistance to the countries in the southern Mediterranean: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The MEDA programme takes the place of the various bilateral financial protocols that exist with the countries in the Mediterranean basin. It is inspired by the Phare and TACIS programmes, especially as regards transparency and information. A budget heading is established for financing the programme.

Actions under the MEDA programme aim to fulfil the objectives of the three sectors of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership:
- reinforcing political stability and democracy;
- creating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area and the development of economic and social cooperation;
- taking due account of the human and cultural dimension.

Measures supported

3. The MEDA programme supports the economic transition of Mediterranean non-member countries (MNCs) and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by promoting economic and social reforms for the modernisation of enterprises and the development of the private sector, paying particular attention to:
- support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and job creation;
- the opening-up of markets;
- promotion of private investment, industrial cooperation and trade between the various partners;
- upgrading of economic infrastructure, including the financial and taxation systems;

- consolidation of the major financial balances and creation of an economic environment favourable to accelerated growth (support for structural adjustment).

4. The MEDA programme also supports sustainable socio-economic development, in particular through:
- the participation of civil society and populations in the planning and implementation of development measures;
- the improvement of social services (education, health, housing, water, etc.);
- harmonious and integrated rural development, including agricultural development;
- the strengthening of democracy, human rights and the rule of law;
- the protection and improvement of the environment;
- the upgrading of economic infrastructure, especially in the sectors of transport, energy and the information society;
- the promotion of youth exchanges and cultural cooperation;
- the development of human resources (vocational training, improvement of scientific and technological research).

5. In addition, MEDA supports regional, sub-regional and cross-border cooperation, in particular through:
- the establishment and development of structures for regional cooperation between Mediterranean partners and between them and the EU and its Member States;
- the establishment of the infrastructure necessary for regional trade in the areas of transport, communications and energy;
- exchanges between civil society in the Community and the Mediterranean partners within the framework of decentralised cooperation through the networking of civil society actors (universities, local communities, associations, trade unions, the media, private business, non-governmental organisations, etc.).

MEDA II was a second iteration of the original MEDA program established by the European Union, specifically the European Commission, in 1995 with an intent of leading the potential of cooperation within the broad Mediterranean region to fruition through financing projects, which intended to fulfil the aims engrained in the three pillars of Barcelona process.

Reforms in the external assistance managed by Commission, including programming assistance and the devolution of management tasks to delegations, marked a turning point in 2000, prompting the program's evolution. This has led to MEDA branching off into its successor program. In its time, both parts of the program represented a significant investment specific to the countries of South Mediterranean, aiming to foster economic and social development in their region through various means. It should also be noted that researcher Brach, when comparing the two stages of the program in her 2006 article, called MEDA II "more program oriented than its predecessor".

MEDA II came to its end in 2006 with its merger together with other regional programs of assistance like TACIS or Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, the INSC better known as the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and the Cross-Border Cooperation instrument, which turned all of them into a single umbrella entity of ENPI – European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument.

However, it should be mentioned that the ENPI did not completely rid itself of regional separation, allowing for different regional programs to be developed based on the specific needs and priorities of different regions, with each of these regional programs having its focus areas and allocation of funds. In addition to regional programs, each country, including those in the Mediterranean region, had its own National Indicative Program or NIPs that outlined specific priorities and projects for that country.

The MEDA II regulation, serving as the main financing instrument for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, had a combined budget of €5.3 billion for its support. It was directed towards the non-EU member states of the region, or as they are called in EU documentation – Mediterranean Partner Countries, in short MPCs. Additionally, the European Investment Bank extended €6.5 billion in loans to foster private sector and infrastructure development in MPC.

These MPCs included Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel, eligible only for regional cooperation and a separate group of countries that later on detached from MEDA II due to them progressing along the European integration route and becoming eligible for the dedicated instrument of pre-accession assistance – namely Turkey, Malta and Cyprus.

According to a comprehensive 2009 report on MEDA II by the European Commission, that also focused on the general fund allocation within the program, geographically these resources were distributed as follows:

The regional program (17.7%), Morocco (18.4%), the West Bank & Gaza Strip (15.1%), Egypt (11.3%), Turkey (10.9%), Tunisia (9.1%), Jordan (6.3%), Algeria (5.7%), Syria (2.9%), and Lebanon (2.6%). The economy was the top priority, receiving 40% of total commitments, while social sectors and infrastructure each garnered 20%.

The remaining 20% was allocated across other sectors. Traditional Technical Assistance programs remained the most used financial modality at 54.4%, while budget support accounted for 35.5% of total commitments. Funds allocated to the EIB and Twinning represented 9.2% and 0.9%, respectively.

The Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership, which has been in operation since 2002, brought together different financial mechanisms managed by the European Investment Bank. Its main purpose was to support the economic and financial cooperation outlined in the Barcelona process. The FEMIP, primarily financed by the EIB, was authorized to utilize these resources for MEDA II projects in the Mediterranean countries under the direction of EU Member States. Four financial mechanisms of the FEMIP have also been a part of the MEDA II program: the Technical Assistance Support Fund, interest subsidies, the

Risk Capital Facility, and the FEMIP Trust Fund. It's worth noting that the European Commission's contribution to the FEMIP Trust Fund was relatively small in terms of overall percentage.

The distribution of commitments per sector of intervention is quasi similar at bilateral and regional level except that at regional level social sectors received minor support to the benefit of other intervention sectors such as energy, telecommunications, environment, and culture and information. The span of MEDA II covered a wide range of areas, from economic development to infrastructure and social programs. The prioritization of areas by country allowed for greater degree of individuality in respective strategies of cooperation.

In addition, two critical planning documents come to the forefront: the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and the National Indicative Program (NIP). The CSP serves as a strategic compass, outlining the European Commission's priorities and approaches for collaboration with a specific partner country over a multi-year horizon. It is crafted through a consultative process involving the partner country and relevant stakeholders. Within the CSP, the NIP takes shape as a concrete translation of strategic objectives into actionable projects and programs. It specifies the sectors in which financial resources will be invested, articulates expected outcomes, and defines relevant performance indicators. Together, these documents provide the framework for efficient resource allocation, strategic alignment, and the pursuit of development objectives, all crucial components of the European Union's external assistance programs.

However, over the span of its operation, several historical and economic challenges have significantly influenced the implementation of MEDA II projects. Politically, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, with the failure of the Camp David negotiations in 2000 followed by the eruption of the second intifada, the electoral victory of the Hamas in 2006, and the military conflict between Israel and Lebanon, and regional tensions related to issues like the Western Sahara negatively affected the relationships between Mediterranean Partner countries. The conflicts made it difficult to bring all MPCs together for cooperation. This trend has been exacerbated furthermore by the events of September 11, 2001, and the occupation of Iraq in 2003. The rise of moderate and reformist Islamic movements, along with political extremism, added pressure on political regimes and hampered progress toward openness and pluralism.

Moreover, Rak (2016) noted that "Analysing the percentage of financial expenditure for particular purposes the very low level of financial support for projects aimed at building civil society and political dialogue is conspicuous. This was most probably due to the fact that EU member countries did not want to be on a collision course with the regimes in power and rather opted for the policy of avoiding direct confrontation with them.", coming to the general conclusion that "democratic values and hopes of building civil society had been sacrificed at the altar of a more pragmatic approach where good relations with the regimes, trade and civil sector reforms turned out to be more important."

Brach (2006) notes that, economically, these challenges also had a substantial impact. The economic activity in the region suffered due to political

conflicts, resulting in infrastructure destruction, border closures, and a discouraging environment for foreign investment. Economic integration among South Mediterranean countries was low, reflecting limited economic complementarity, differences in economic regimes, and a wide range of GDP per capita levels. Governance issues, weak institutions, and corruption further hampered business environments, competitiveness, and foreign investment.

The European Commission adapted its cooperation with the region, recognizing that each country would progress in cooperation with the EU at its own pace. Regional integration was challenged by the absence of operational regional institutions, and the Commission worked with sub-regional initiatives, with a particular interest in the Agadir Agreement involving Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.

In terms of managing aid, multi-annual programming was used to set budgets and objectives for each priority sector. The Inter-service Quality Support Group, or iQSG, closely monitored the quality and consistency of programming, focusing on policy and strategy issues. The devolution of the external assistance management system separated tasks and responsibilities between Delegations and Headquarters, leading to de-concentration of policies.

Governance and local ownership also has played a pivotal role in shaping outcomes. Projects that engaged local communities and empowered them to take ownership demonstrated higher sustainability. In the current context, the term "ownership" is used by the EU institutions to constitute the degree to which the policies, strategies, and programs are not only aligned with the priorities and needs of the partner countries but are also led and directed by the partner countries themselves.

As for concrete projects, the most extensive data could be obtained from the 2009 European Council review. Under the MEDA II Regulation, eight specific programs aimed at supporting Association Agreements – SAAP in short – were implemented, with a substantial total budget of €122 million. These programs were allocated to individual countries, including Algeria (€10 million), Egypt (€25 million), Jordan (€35 million), Lebanon (€12 million), Morocco (€20 million), and Tunisia (€20 million). The primary goal of these programs was to facilitate the adaptation and modernization of legal and regulatory frameworks and enhance the institutional capacity of state administrations. Notably, they were instrumental in advancing trade liberalization efforts within these regions.

The second pillar of the Barcelona process, focused on economic prosperity and preparations for the Free Trade Agreement, received significant attention within the MEDA II budget line, absorbing 39% of the total Commission support for regional projects. This support was particularly aimed at fostering economic reforms, promoting private sector development, and facilitating trade, constituting approximately 30% of total commitments in most countries, with the exception of Algeria. Moreover, the social sectors, specifically education and health, accounted for 19% of the total MEDA II commitments, emerging as a top priority in certain countries such as Algeria and Syria.

In addition, extensive bilateral justice programs were implemented to support countries engaged in reform efforts. However, such initiatives often encountered challenges during dialogue, especially concerning matters perceived as sovereign, such as judiciary system reforms, as well as politically sensitive issues like gender, civil society, and human rights.

Specifics of cooperation with the West Bank & Gaza Strip was such that it was dominated by humanitarian and crisis concerns that did not allow a strategic approach to the Barcelona objectives.

The Commission also increasingly relied on budget support as a financing modality in four Mediterranean Partner countries – Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, where it accounted for over 50% of the total support provided. This approach aimed to bolster macroeconomic and sectoral reforms that aligned with the partner countries' key priorities. Through the preparation and execution of budgetary supports initiatives, the Commission not only expanded its political dialogue within the framework of Association Agreements but also engaged in a constructive policy dialogue centered on pressing reforms that were deemed mutually beneficial. These dialogues facilitated a shared understanding of reform direction and content, enhancing the effectiveness of the partnership.

It can be observed that budgetary support accompanied policies that introduced important changes in regulatory frameworks, macroeconomic policies, and governance modes. However, there exist shortcomings of such a format of support, exacerbated by procedural complexities of MEDA II. In countries not eligible for budget support, the obligation to concentrate on a limited number of focal sectors has given rise to very large TA programmes that proved extremely difficult to manage. One reason is their excessive scope, especially as they attempt to influence the direction of whole sector policies.

*Questions*
What is MEDA Programme?
What are MEDA objectives?
What are the main obstacles in the implementing MEDA Programme?

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# LECTURE 10
# PERSPECTIVES OF THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EU POLICIES: THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL AND GLOBAL FACTORS

***The EU Global Strategy and New Challenges for the EU-Mediterranean Partnership.***

The renewal of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy in 2017 and the prior approval of the EU's new Global Strategy in 2016 have provided key moments for reflection on the European approach to the complicated Mediterranean area.

The Global Strategy 2016 states that "in a world caught between global pressures and local pushback, regional dynamics come to the fore. Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs. This is a fundamental rationale for the EU's own peace and development in the XXIst century, and this is why we will support cooperative regional orders worldwide. In different regions – in Europe; in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa; across the Atlantic, both north and south; in Asia; and in the Arctic – the EU will be driven by specific goals".

Therefore, the EU is going to further support the neighbouring countries both to the east and to the south that wish to build closer relations with the Union. The EU's enduring power of attraction can spur transformation and is not aimed against any country. Within this group are currently countries such as Tunisia or Georgia, whose success as prosperous, peaceful and stable democracies would reverberate across their respective regions. The ENP has recommitted to Eastern Partnership and southern Mediterranean countries wishing to develop stronger relations with the EU. "We will support these countries in implementing association agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). We will also think creatively about deepening tailor-made partnerships further" with the possible creation of an economic area with countries implementing DCFTAs, the extension of Trans-European Networks and the Energy Community, as well as building physical and digital connections, the document declares. Societal links will also be strengthened through enhanced mobility, cultural and educational exchanges, research cooperation and civil society platforms.

It is also stated that resilience is a strategic priority across the EU's east and south both in countries that want stronger ties with the EU and in those – within and beyond the ENP – that have no wish to do so. The EU will support different

paths to resilience to its east and south, focusing on the most acute dimensions of fragility and targeting those where we can make a meaningful difference.

When it comes to the **Mediterranean, Middle East and** sub-Saharan Africa, the EU considers solving conflicts and promoting development and human rights in the south is essential to addressing the threat of terrorism, the challenges of demography, migration and climate change, and to seizing the opportunity of shared prosperity. The EU will intensify its support for and cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa and the Middle East, as well as functional cooperative formats in the region. By mobilising bilateral and multilateral policies and frameworks as well as by partnering with civil societies in the region the EU is going to act flexibly to help bridge divides and support regional players in delivering concrete results. The five lines of action are mentioned in the Global Strategy.

First, according to the Strategy, in the Maghreb and the Middle East, the EU will support functional multilateral cooperation on border security, trafficking, counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, water and food security, energy and climate, infrastructure and disaster management. Also, the EU will foster dialogue and negotiation over regional conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya. On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the EU will work closely with the Quartet, the Arab League and all key stakeholders to preserve the prospect of a viable two-state solution based on 1967 lines with equivalent land swaps, and to recreate the conditions for meaningful negotiations.

Second, the EU will deepen sectoral cooperation with Turkey, while striving to anchor Turkish democracy in line with its accession criteria, including the normalisation of relations with Cyprus. The EU will therefore pursue the accession process – sticking to strict and fair accession conditionality – while coherently engaging in dialogue on counter-terrorism, regional security and refugees. We will also work on a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, and cooperate further with Turkey in the fields of education, energy and transport.

Third, the EU will pursue balanced engagement in the Gulf. It will continue to cooperate with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and individual Gulf countries. Despite of the failure of the Iran nuclear deal, the EU plans to find the ways of cooperation with Iran on areas such as trade, research, environment, energy, anti-trafficking, migration and societal exchanges. It will deepen dialogue with Iran and GCC countries on regional conflicts, human rights and counter-terrorism, seeking to prevent contagion of existing crises and foster the space for cooperation and diplomacy.

Fourth, in light of the growing interconnections between North and subSaharan Africa, as well as between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the EU will support cooperation across these sub-regions. This includes fostering triangular relationships across the Red Sea between Europe, the Horn and the Gulf to face shared security challenges and economic opportunities. It means systematically addressing cross-border dynamics in North and West Africa, the

Sahel and Lake Chad regions through closerlinks with the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel.

Finally, we will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity. We will intensify cooperation with and support for the African Union, as well as ECOWAS, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in eastern Africa, and the East African Community, among others. The Economic Partnership Agreements and European investment can support sustainable development and spur African integration and mobility, and encourage Africa's full and equitable participation in global value chains. The EU will build stronger
links between our trade, development and security policies in Africa, and blend development efforts with work on migration, health, education, energy and climate, science and technology, notably to improve food security as well as to continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa, and assist African organisations'work on conflict prevention, counterterrorism and organised crime, migration and border management, states the Global Strategy.

As some experts note, the conclusions of the Global Strategy have not been revolutionary, but they have been substantial, albeit insufficiently applied. From the point of view of cooperation and the application of the association treaties, there have been no radical changes, but some relevant criteria have been introduced, in particular, a greater degree of realism in allowing positive or negative discrimination in cooperation with partner countries. This is based on their level of commitment to the values and reforms that underlie the entire Euro-Mediterranean project, as well as their alignment with EU interests, such as respect for human rights and democracy, but also in areas like migration control or participation in peace efforts. There has been an increase, although insufficient, in the resources available for the neighbourhood policy. A clear distinction is made between the different policies applied by the partner countries, but not enough and lacking the decisive support that countries at a key moment of their transition, in association with Europe, should be receiving, as is the case with Morocco, and especially Tunisia.

Nevertheless, as Federica Mogherini herself pointed out that "the EU is today
the point of reference for all those that are investing in peace, multilateralism, free and fair trade, sustainable development, the fight against climate change, human rights and democracy, social economy – in a rules-based global order". And Europe
faces a demanding task ahead for many years to come: to build and protect an area of peace and shared progress around the Mediterranean – a Euro-Mediterranean Area of Economic Integration – including furthermore the rest of the African continent as privileged partners in a greater area of Euro-African Association.

And the regional and global consequences of Russia's war on Ukraine is one of such threats that is challenging both the EU and the Mediterranean. According to the different meeting between the EU and Southern Neighbourhood, the both side parties are going to to increase mutual engagement to close the existing gaps

along the two shores of the Mediterranean, to further foster regional cooperation and to work together to face the negative impact of the Russian war against Ukraine.

As High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Josep Borrell said concluding the 7th Regional Forum of the Union for Mediterranean: "We are not just neighbours, we are a community. We need to strengthen our regional integration. We need much better connectivity, both on the infrastructure side and the regulatory side. We must further reinforce our strong and strategic partnership to successfully address the multiple crises that we are facing today. The EU remains committed to work with its Southern partners, notably in addressing specific challenges encountered by them as a consequence of the Russian war against Ukraine."

"The way to tackle this is by strengthening our regional integration. We should do it by focusing on these key areas: stepping up efforts to close the existing gaps; offer particularly the young people a common vision on mobility; to drive innovation and growth. We need to enhance people-to-people engagements, fight climate change, develop energy partnerships and advance regional stability and integration." Borrell added.

The main objective of the EU-Southern Neighbourhood Ministerial Meeting was to discuss the consequences of the Russian aggression on Ukraine, in particular food and energy security, in addition to the need for a green transition. The latter is even more relevant considering that the Mediterranean is one of the main climate change hotspots.

*The role of regional and global actors (NATO, OSCE, USA, Russia and China) and their interaction in the Mediterranean. The impact of political processes and initiatives in the Mediterranean region: MENA, the Middle East peace process, NATO's Mediterranean dialogue, etc.*

The Mediterranean space holds an enormous amount of challenges for NATO. Ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the war in Syria, the collapse of Libya, the risk of further state-breakings in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel due to economic, social and political inequality, and climate change are among the factors that have contributed to a situation of durable chaos, which will be difficult for the alliance to keep at arm's length. Under these conditions, NATO faces a set of diverse, interlinked challenges. Some are familiar, others new; some are from within the region, others from beyond its borders; and still others are looming on the horizon.

Together with the EU, another supranational organization started to put the accent on a dialogue dimension with the Mediterranean region – NATO. In 1994 the North Atlantic Council decided to establish a specific partnership project for the region aimed at linking NATO/European security with the security of the southern shores. As an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, the dialogue reflected and still reflects the Alliance's vision that security in Europe was closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. The initiative initially involved seven non-NATO countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

The dialogue was modelled in regard to some general principles, which rendered the NATO initiative successful. These principles were:

- flexibility, allowing to involve new partners (Jordan and Algeria for instance) as well as to extend the issues dealt with and so the content of the dialogue itself;

- the possibility to organize meetings using a double model: multilateral or bilateral, all on the regular basis;

- the principles of equality and non-discrimination, both of them considered essential features of the dialogue as a key to its successful establishment and subsequent development.

- to complement the dialogue with other partnerships, whose object and objectives are related to the Mediterranean region. This would entail an enhanced cooperation with other supranational activities such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Mediterranean Initiative (Partnership for the Mediterranean).

All these principles allowed the dialogue to develop towards different action lines and actively contributed to realizing a mutual confidence.

In June 2004 NATO elevated the Mediterranean dialogue to a genuine partnership. The process, known as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, aimed at "promoting essentially practical cooperation on a bilateral basis with interested countries in the region, which subscribe to the aim and content of this initiative including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Each interested party would be considered by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis and on its own merit". The Initiative did not want to replace the dialogue but enhance it through the promotion of the bilateral cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Countries on a wide range of issues such as defence, military-to-military cooperation, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit trafficking and maritime cooperation.

The enhancement of the MD's political dimension included increased consultations at working and Ambassadorial levels in multilateral (NATO+7) and bilateral (NATO+1) format, and the organisation of ad-hoc meetings at Ministerial level or even for Heads of State and Government. For example: three meetings of NATO and MD countries' Foreign Ministers, took place in 2004, 2007 and 2008 in Brussels, two meetings of NATO and MD Defence Ministers took place in 2006 in Taormina and in 2007 in Seville. Nine meetings of the NATO and MD countries' Chiefs of Defence have also take place since the 2004 Istanbul Summit. Also, in the context of strengthening the political dimension, the former Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer conducted official visits to all MD countries and the current NATO Secretary General Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen has not only started to conduct official bilateral visits to the countries of the region, but has also stated from his first day in office that he intends to position the further enhancement of the MD among his three top priorities during his mandate as NATO Secretary General.

At the Istanbul Summit NATO leaders also decided to significantly enhance the practical dimension of the MD by promoting military-to-military

cooperation to achieve interoperability. The conclusions outlined the following priority areas: active participation in selected military exercises to improve the ability of Mediterranean partners' forces to operate with those of the Alliance in contributing to NATO-led operations consistent with the UN Charter, which could include non-Article 5 crisis response operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian relief, search and rescue and peace support operations; combating terrorism, for example through effective intelligence sharing and maritime cooperation, as is the case for the framework of Operation Active Endeavour, the Alliance's maritime mission to detect, deter and disrupt terrorist activity in the Mediterranean; promoting democratic control of armed forces and facilitating transparency in national defence planning and defence budgeting in support of defence reform; contributing to the work of the Alliance on threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery; and enhancing cooperation in the area of civil emergency planning, including the possibility for Mediterranean partners to request assistance from the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

A further enhancement of the practical dimension included: the possibility of using NATO Trust Funds; agreeing together with MD partners on action plans covering a wide range of practical, issue-specific cooperative activities; individual cooperation programmes allowing for self-differentiation; the use of existing PfP activities and tools to improve the ability of Alliance and Mediterranean partners' forces to operate together in future NATO-led operations; enhanced participation in appropriate PfP exercises; and enhanced cooperation in scientific and environmental fields.

In addition, NATO also offered to establish appropriate liaison arrangements at NATO HQ in Brussels and at the Military Cooperation Division at NATO's Strategic Command in Mons, in order to enhance coordination of activities among the countries involved, especially in the military field.

Another intergovernmental organisation facing the Mediterranean dialogue is the Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), which with the 1975 Helsinki Accords declared its interest in cooperation with the Mediterranean region states in particular: "to promote the development of good-neighbourly relations with the nonparticipating Mediterranean States [...]; to increase mutual confidence, so as to promote security and stability in the Mediterranean area as a whole' [...]; to intensify their efforts and their co-operation on a bilateral and multilateral basis [...] directed towards the improvement of the environment of the Mediterranean…".

These lines were reasserted in the 1990 Charter of Paris, in which the participating states maintained that they "will continue efforts to strengthen security and co-operation in the Mediterranean as an important factor for stability in Europe", anticipating the ideas and the main concepts expressed later by NATO. However no meaningful progress has been made by OCSE in the dialogue and a renewed line of activity was launched in December 2003 when, during the OCSE Mediterranean Seminar held in Aqaba, the Organisation decided to involve new regional partners in the Mediterranean cooperation group.

Besides the number of potential participants, the Aqaba conference established the intensification of the dialogue aimed at translating the security in the Mediterranean region "into more concrete measures [...] through a comprehensive process of enhanced dialogue, economic co-operation and intercultural exchanges". This was because "the need to address the new type of threats - originating from terrorism, organized crime, the existence of civic conflicts, xenophobia, racism, discrimination, illicit trafficking of human beings, of arms and drugs - unites the OSCE participating states and their partners from the Mediterranean". Other seminars followed the Aqaba partnership which, in the long run, could entail a Mediterranean free- exchange area, but also a socio-cultural partnership addressed at enhancing the intercultural dialogue and common values.

This was a part of a broader strategy aimed at granting security and stability, in an era in which Europe was facing important territorial changes, with the first steps of an enlargement towards the north (Baltic States) and to the east, getting beyond the Iron Curtain. It was thus necessary to reach a new geopolitical equilibrium, and so the decision was taken to go south, to the heart of the Mediterranean.

These processes and strategies were embedded in the so-called "Barcelona Process", launched in November 1995 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the then 15 EU members and 14 Mediterranean partners, as the framework to manage both bilateral and regional relations. On these premises a real dialogue with the two shores put on the same level was at last envisaged. Through the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership wanted to link into the unique organisation of the whole Mediterranean region. According to the Declaration, this new strategy should represent the main tool for the Euro-Mediterranean relations, a strong instrument for promoting an "area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity".

The development and the establishment (or the strengthening) of political, economic and social institutions were the main instruments chosen by the EU to foster a stable evolution of the area, and thus a real regional cohesion as was emerging in the 1950s. The EU tried to ensure a gradual convergence of the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea, around institutions capable of undertaking dialogue with each other, and able to manage the issues of public finance, a strong autonomy of the central banks, and a rigid monetary management. Once established or strengthened, the southern Mediterranean would have been able to implement some (Western driven and/or inspired) structural reforms.

These were all tools promoting and facilitating the establishment of a free trade area, the free movement of capital, but not of human beings. Even if from a theoretical point of view and according to the manifest policy of the Union, these instruments had created a convergence, which would have lead to an homogenisation of the unbalanced standards of living existing between the two shores, from a pragmatic point of view, it became clear that these instruments were fully to the advantage of the EU. In fact they wanted to create a market representing a fundamental support for EU goods. Furthermore, the one, all characterised by the attempt to adapt the response to the multiple aspects of the

threat. The instruments established during the 2008 Amman Seminar included the implementation of the international and trans-regional cooperation in fighting terrorism, through a multidisciplinary approach, which also entails the involvement of civil society, looking to a public-private partnership in order to enhance collaboration between state institutions and civil society, but also with the international organisations, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Arab League, providing more than just a mere military approach.

The Mediterranean Conference held in Montenegro in October 2011 was an attempt to update the OSCE strategy to the new socio-political reality which started to characterise the southern Mediterranean since December 2010, with the so-called "Arab spring" or "Arab revolutions". In recognising the "structural lack of the desire for freedom" in the Arab world, OSCE states that it "cannot simply ignore what is happening in its neighbourhood [because] this would be foolish". There has been an immediate positive response, mostly voiced by the Chairmanship, the PA, the ODIHR, and the Secretary General declaring in principle the Organization's willingness to support transition in OSCE's Mediterranean Partners. There have also been visits and direct contacts with the authorities of Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, intended to gauge interest and declare the commitment of the Organization to assist countries during their transition period to build and consolidate democracy and specifically in the realms of electoral support, development of the independent media, drafting legislation, police reform, border management, travel document security and migration management.

However, while the leadership of the Organization has found the right words to indicate willingness and interest of the Organization to provide assistance to its Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, in particular to Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, there seems to also be preference among the participating States to move slowly and along established parameters on this matter. The existing decision-making and financial procedures and operational limitations on engaging on the ground in those countries would not allow for quick and decisive response. In the mid-term, much will depend on whether the Partner States can formulate realistic requests from the OSCE, as organisational change tends to be driven by actual demands.

Over the years, the OSCE has been able to share its experience with the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation on a number of topics, adapting its agenda to the evolving security context. Initiatives and projects tailored to the needs of the Partners for Co-operation have been developed in a growing number of fields, including:

- the environment-security nexus
- women economic empowerment
- youth engagement and participation
- the fight against terrorism
- the fight against human trafficking
- the fight against cultural property
- cooperation in cyber security

- migration and integration policies

Through ongoing dialogue and joint activities with the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, the OSCE shares its expertise and provides insight into current developments, offering a unique regional platform for countries from across the OSCE and Mediterranean regions.

In general, the development of the Mediterranean dialogue largely depends on several factors. The first one will be whether the OSCE will be able to spread the word on its profile, experience and the assistance it could provide not only to the delegations of Partner States in Vienna but also to other players, governmental and non-governmental. The second one will be whether participating States will be able to find consensus on activities in support of democratization and transition processes in North Africa taking place in Partner States (rather than in one of the participating States, as is the case of "Arab spring"). The third one is whether Partner States will be open to working with international and regional organisations in general and the OSCE in particular on democratization and transition processes at all. There appears to be a certain amount of hesitation, for domestic reasons. The fourth factor is how far other, larger and richer players, such as EU will be interested and motivated to co-operate with the OSCE in North Africa. And finally, the way forward will also depend on whether the various stake-holders are able to develop more visionary approaches to security in the region.

The Mediterranean region, always rich in resources, special geographical location, cultural diversity and valuable historical heritage, for centuries has been an arena for the competing interests of several parties. It was a place of war, a place of power and the collapse of several empires. In a sense, it remains such a place today. An internally stable region seems to attract external actors to become involved.

However, The United States has seen the Mediterranean neither as a coherent geographic entity nor as a priority of its foreign policy. In the past, US attention has been divided between Europe on one hand and the Middle East on the other, with North Africa seen largely as a European area of responsibility. Currently, the United States is focused on Russia and the eastern flank in Europe, and on Iran, the Gulf, and the conflicts in the Middle East. Yet, the security dynamics between the regions are deeply intertwined, and can only be addressed through a comprehensive vision that bridges the northern, southern, and eastern Mediterranean.

The Obama administration preferred to use the principle that Europe should promote stability in their own region. Washington meanwhile can maintain significant leverage with key regional powers such as Turkey and Egypt, and it can shape the circumstances in which those regimes make decisions. It also has close military ties with regional militaries and with states that can project power there, such as the UK, France, and the Gulf states. The United States should be more active in NATO to build consensus on the Alliance's political and military role, to find a way forward with Turkey, and to facilitate NATO-EU cooperation on resilience, migration, cyber threats, and terrorism.

Alongside enabling its allies, the visible presence of the United States in the Mediterranean, both physically and diplomatically, will go a long way toward stabilizing the region. The United States could help allies build their own relationships by launching a US-Mediterranean dialogue forum for littoral states, similar in design and intent to the US-Nordic Security Dialogue. The United States should leverage its considerable diplomatic standing to organize a periodic region-wide discussion to focus on illicit trade, counter-terrorism, maritime and human security, sustainable development, and energy issues. Such a forum would enable the United States to bring its key European allies to the table alongside other Mediterranean states such as Turkey, a critical interlocutor for relations with Russia, China, and states in the Caucasus region.

The United States can help partners keep a strategic focus, as stability in the basin also depends on what happens in neighboring regions. Finally, the United States possesses a hard power capacity that no other country has. As the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has argued, stationing an aircraft carrier group in the Mediterranean would send a strategic message to allies, partners, and rivals alike.

As the Mediterranean has a huge north-south prosperity gap, the United States should pay more attention to development, supporting European development initiatives for partnerships in the region as laid out in the European Global Strategy. The United States and Europe can work with key global investors and donors, coordinate development dollars, and tie aid to legitimate governance and resilience actions.

Considering the role of Russia in the Mediterranean, some researchers turn to the times of Russian empire and its ambitions to control the Black and Mediterranean seas. Recalling history, Moscow saw the wars for Crimea and the Black Sea starting from the 17th century as a part of a "great plan" to project its power and influence on the Mediterranean both militarily and geo-economically. Attempts to take possession of Malta during Napoleon wars or to establish control over the Black Sea Straits during the First and Second World Wars resulted in no success.

The Soviet authorities made another effort believing that since the USSR was a Black Sea power, it was a Mediterranean power as well; therefore, the presence of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean would be a guarantor of the regional security. During the Cold War, the Kremlin used every opportunity to increase its military presence: either through the Arab-Israeli wars and the Cyprus conflict or by deepening contacts with individual countries in the region (Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Yugoslavia).

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow had to withdraw its ships and submarines from the Mediterranean. Only when Putin came to the power this region returned to the agenda of Russia's foreign policy. The 2001 Maritime Strategy identified the Mediterranean as an important area where the presence of the Russian Navy needs to be increased. The Kremlin's narrative about NATO's intention to encircle Russia transformed this task into a cornerstone of

Russian strategy and diplomacy, which subsequently led to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and a significant strengthening of Russia's position in Syria since 2015.

Analysts emphasize that Russia's intervention in the war in Syria became the first major operation of the Kremlin's new projection of power in the Mediterranean implemented in gaining a permanent military presence at the Mediterranean: at the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim airbase. Therefore, the military involvement of the Kremlin in the war in Syria brought Russia to the strategic aim – to obtain the right to a permanent presence in the region. What are the objectives of Moscow in a gradual but persistent strengthening of its naval presence in the Mediterranean?

First, there is the general goal to assert the status of a great power able to determine political and geo-economic trends in the regions of the Kremlin's special importance. Secondly, this significance consists mainly in the implementation of strategic tasks to increase the combat capabilities of the Russian Navy and to ensure national security and national interests of Russia, including the maintenance of strategic stability and strategic deterrence of adversaries in the region. Among other goals, it is worth mentioning the following: the collection of data and information about NATO forces in the region as well as the assistance of the political forces of several countries in the wider region that can be used for further extension of the Kremlin's presence, or destabilization and provoking of conflict potential in the Mediterranean.

Also, this marks a significant achievement for Russia in its ongoing rivalry with NATO, wherein Turkey plays a potentially decisive role in the broader context of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean. Russia has carefully managed its relations with Turkey, aiming to create a division between Ankara and the rest of NATO. By deploying its forces in Syria, Moscow has gained leverage over Turkey, both militarily and by using the prospect of pushing more refugees into Turkey as a means of pressure. Notably, Russia supported President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the aftermath of the attempted coup in 2016, while the United States and European nations were more hesitant in their response. This subsequently, in my opinion, influenced the further dynamics of relations between the heads of Turkey and the Russian Federation, and determined the further role of Turkey and Erdogan personally in a full-scale war in Ukraine from 2022.

An interesting point of view is that the strengthening of Russia's influence on the Mediterranean region began with Ukraine's establishment of intentions for rapprochement with the EU and NATO, and entry into these unions. Indeed, even after the collapse of the USSR, according to the agreement signed by Russia and Ukraine in 1997, the Black Sea fleet was divided and stationed in Sevastopol. Ukraine's entry into NATO and the expansion of the alliance called into question not only the prospects for Russia's presence in the Mediterranean Sea, but even in the Black Sea. Added to this is the position of Georgia, which, also becoming independent, expressed an increasing desire to reliably ensure its security within the framework of NATO membership. That commitment that held out the possibility that Russia would lose access to Sevastopol, leaving it with only one

major port in Novorossiysk and presenting Moscow with the prospect of the Black Sea becoming a NATO lake with grave consequences for its security pushed it then to start the war against Georgia in 2008, annex Crimea and start aggression in eastern Ukraine. From Russia's perspectivewith this actions they prevented the penetration of a hostile alliance, NATO, in this critical region, the shrinking of its presence in the Black Sea with ensuing new challenges for its access from the Mediterranean, and a significant deterioration of the correlation of forces on Europe's southern flank and consequently the entire European theater.

Moreover, the war with Ukraine, in the eyes of the Russians, allowed them to return an invaluable resource, the Crimean Peninsula. The most important element in Russia's awareness of itself as an empire. However, the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts could not compensate for the challenge that geography and European geopolitics have posed to Russia for centuries. Its warships still have to transit the straits controlled by Turkey or sail around Europe, as they did in the days of Catherine the Great, past the shores of NATO allies and partners from the Gulf of Finland to the strait of Gibraltar. Russian warplanes must fly through unfriendly airspace if they are to reach the Mediterranean (Rumer, Sokolsky, 2021). Feeling this imbalance and having a complex of being deceived by the West, the Putin regime in 2015 resumes its attempts to strengthen its influence, now in the Mediterranean.

Russia considering the Mediterranean as an area of NATO's dominance sees the region as an important coercive element in its escalation strategy, an additional leverage of influence to deter potential challenges to Russia's territorial possessions in the Black Sea. Analysts have already stressed that the military bases in Syria will help Russia to partially evade the Montreux Convention limitations on the regime of the Straits, thus establishing a direct line to maintain the permanent presence of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Russia's efforts to create the A2/AD area will further strengthen the position and influence of the Kremlin in the region. Accordingly, the provision of the 2022 Maritime Doctrine about the "unconditional right" to deploy and use the Russian Navy forces should be perceived as a strategy to intimidate strategic rivals with escalation, which includes, first of all, the USA and the Allies. Meanwhile, the naval potential, which significantly exceeds the Russian one, is considered a reason for increasing the number of bases of the Russian Navy outside its borders. At the same time, Russia's strategy in the Black and Mediterranean regions consists of militarization but also of deliberately cultivating feelings of enmity and fear, constantly stressing that a great military confrontation is likely, almost inevitable because of the United States and Europe solely.

It should be noted that in recent years, in the context of the activities of the Russian Federation in the region, the energy factor has played a significant role, namely the strengthening of its energy policy as an instrument of geopolitical influence. Everyone knows that the extraction and export of energy resources has been the basis and engine of the Russian economy for many years. This, as well as the desire to reduce dependence on Ukraine for gas supplies to Western Europe and preventing the European Union from implementing an energy diversification

strategy, has pushed and is pushing Russia towards strengthening its energy policy in the region. Part of Russia's strategy in the Mediterranean is to gain a foothold in countries where the development of new energy sources has begun (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, Algeria, Libya). In addition, a special place is occupied by energy cooperation with Turkey, which is highly dependent on energy resources and their import. That has lead Turkey to the partnership with Russia in constructing its first nuclear power plant, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, in the southern province of Mersin. Also, Turkey as well has several ongoing natural gas projects, including the TurkStream pipeline, which brings gas from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea to the countries of southeastern Europe. By the way, Russia's gas exports, despite a significant decrease, were not completely suspended even with the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine and a number of attempts by sanctions groups to establish gas embargoes against the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia's energy policy will most likely remain the most important component of the country's presence on the world stage, especially in the Mediterranean region.

For decades, China has attached great importance to developing friendly relations with Mediterranean states. Despite huge differences between China and the Arab world in terms of historic background, culture, lifestyle, religious beliefs, political systems, and development paths, both sides had no historical entanglement and no conflict of fundamental interests. Similar historical experiences in the past and common aspirations for development in the future have laid a solid foundation for both to forge friendly and cooperative relations.

China's most important concern in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region is the maintenance of peace and stability as preconditions for regional development, world peace, and Chinese interests in the region. China has a number of very important interests, the highest ranking of which is energy security. Since 1993, China has become a net oil importer and the oil imported from the Middle East has increased annually ever since. At present, oil from the Middle East accounts for more than half of China's total oil imports from abroad. Thus, alongside its rapid economic growth, China has become more and more dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Secondly, China has developing economic interests in the region. Since 2012, China has increased its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, as it views the region as an area of strategic economic opportunity through its Belt and Road Initiative. Its infrastructure investments in the region serve as a gateway for Chinese investments in Europe, the western Balkans, and the Middle East.

Southern Mediterranean nations like Italy, Portugal, Romania, and Greece have become integral components of China's extensive networking endeavors. Greece is a pillar of China's Eastern Mediterranean strategy, and Beijing has invested more than $10 billion in Greece, largely in infrastructure projects and utilities. The Greek port of Piraeus stands as the crown jewel within the Belt and Road Initiative's Mediterranean presence. This deep-water harbor, equipped with state-of-the-art technologies, cranes, and logistics infrastructure, arguably serves as China's maritime gateway into mainland Europe. China's investments in Portugal,

exceeding $10 billion, and, to a lesser extent, in Italy, play a significant role in facilitating China's access to European markets. Nonetheless, this relationship has evolved into a mutual interdependence, exemplified by Italy, an industrialized Mediterranean nation highly valuing its connection to China's profitable markets.

Egypt, being the host of the Suez Canal, which serves as a vital entry point for Asia into Europe, holds significant strategic importance for China, not only in the Arab Mediterranean but across the entire Arab region. This strategic significance has resulted in the formation of a high-level "intergovernmental cooperation committee" aimed at fostering collaboration and expediting the implementation of BRI-linked projects in Egypt. China's expanding presence within the Suez Canal Economic Zone not only contributes to the enhancement of this crucial European access route but also leads to the assisted development of various industries along Egypt's Red Sea coastline. These industries are intended to cater to markets in neighboring states and regions, with China playing a key role in their growth.

Cyprus is seeking Chinese investment. In 2015, Cyprus's president pledged his country's cooperation in implementing the Belt and Road Initiative and encouraged Chinese investment in Cypriot infrastructure. The other objects of Chinese economic interest with growing investment flows are Lebanon (primarily out of interest in Syrian reconstruction), Turkey (the telecommunications and banking sectors, building new railways in Turkey, helping to connect trade from the Middle East to Europe), Israel (economic and high-tech investment, including sea ports, cybersecurity, Internet business, and medical devices).

Turkey is actively collaborating with China to integrate the Belt and Road Initiative networks in West and Central Asia with its Middle Corridor. This integration positions Turkey as a key hub and transit point within Eurasian connectivity initiatives.

The third area of concern is security interests: friendly relations with the region could help China fight what it calls the "three ugly forces," that is terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The abovementioned Arab Policy Paper, it highlights the substantial role of defense and security collaborations, especially in the southern Mediterranean. Notably, in the contexts of Algeria and Egypt, China seeks to gain a larger market presence, particularly in comparison to Russia. Russia's capacity to supply military equipment to long-standing clients like Algeria is facing growing uncertainties. China has also actively worked to reestablish ties with Syria, an ally of Russia, while maintaining at least a commitment to the spirit of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Concerning the former, China's involvement is driven by its interest in participating in Syria's reconstruction and by its support for Russia's closest Arab ally. Syria's formal participation in the Belt and Road Initiative in January 2022 has provided both sides with additional incentives to foster closer relations Cannot forget about China's commitment to fostering strong relationships with Arab nations and the broader Arab region as a counterweight to the West. China is actively committed to advancing connectivity between China and the Arab world through its land and maritime Silk Roads. In the context of the southern

Mediterranean states, the policy outlines specific areas of cooperation, which effectively define China's engagement strategy. These areas are categorized into five distinct baskets: political cooperation, trade and investment cooperation, social development, people-to-people exchanges, and, finally, cooperation in the fields of peace and security. Each of these baskets, arguably, articulates China's policies toward the southern Mediterranean.

Moreover, the concept of "South-South" cooperation is a recurring theme in China-Arab summits and serves as a clear distinction between China's engagement with the southern Mediterranean region and its interactions with the southern European nations. This South-South partnership has a reassuring effect on the southern Mediterranean states, which are keen on diversifying their trade partners and forging connections with influential nations beyond Europe. Additionally, they seek diplomatic support to counter Western pressures. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that nearly every North African country has developed a preference for Chinese investments and a desire to expand trade links. Egypt and Algeria, the prominent southern Mediterranean nations, have both entered into comprehensive strategic partnerships with China, cementing China's dominance in their trade dynamics as their primary source of imports.

China is actively committed to advancing connectivity between China and the Arab world through its land and maritime Silk Roads. In the context of the southern Mediterranean states, the policy outlines specific areas of cooperation, which effectively define China's engagement strategy. These areas are categorized into five distinct baskets: political cooperation, trade and investment cooperation, social development, people-to-people exchanges, and, finally, cooperation in the fields of peace and security. Each of these baskets, arguably, articulates China's policies toward the southern Mediterranean.

China conveniently divides the Arab region into three distinct zones. The Persian Gulf nations play a pivotal role in meeting China's energy demands while also offering expansive markets in countries like the UAE, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. This subregion is of critical importance along the western edge of the Asian segment within the Belt and Road Initiative. The other two significant Arab zones are situated in the Mediterranean region, encompassing North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. Notably, North Africa is home to some of the largest Arab countries, which are big markets for China. As previously mentioned, China's focus on Egypt is pretty clear, but its ties with Algeria and Morocco also hold considerable significance. These countries are instrumental in facilitating China's efforts to enhance connectivity between Europe and Africa.

For instance, Morocco's TangerMed port, arguably the largest of its kind in the Mediterranean, is being developed as a key conduit for exports to France and broader European markets. Additionally, China is actively pursuing an infrastructure project to establish an overland transport route connecting sub-Saharan Africa with the Mediterranean through Algeria. Moreover, China maintains a continuous interest in the phosphate deposits found in these regions, as well as Algeria's abundant hydrocarbon potential.

*Questions*

What are the main tasks for the EU towards the Mediterranean according to the EU Global Strategy 2016?

What is the role of NATO in the region?

How can you describe the role of the OSCE in the Mediterranean?

Compare the interests of the state actors in the Mediterranean area. What is common and what is different in the US, Russia and China approaches?

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# REGIONAL POLITICS AND SECURITY IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

*(Compiler Alla Zakharchenko)*

*E-book on didactics*

**ODESA**
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# INTRODUCTION

Subject study of the discipline: Regional Politics and Security in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.

Prerequisites and post-requisites (Place of the discipline in the educational program): Prerequisites – Political geography, Foreign policy of Ukraine, Foreign policy and diplomacy of the countries of Asia and Africa, Foreign policy of Latin American countries, US foreign policy, Foreign policy of Eastern European countries, Foreign policy of the countries of Western Europe. Post-requisites – Pre-diploma internship, Master's qualification thesis.

The purpose of the course is to explore the politics and security of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (the SEMED) and its role in the world system from a local, regional and global perspective.

The course objectives: to represent the new geopolitics of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, its main actors, key trends and drivers; to focus on the political, economic and social dimension of the Arab spring in the region; to represent a variety of uprisings and political transformations in Arab countries in order to discern their similarities and differences; to examine the reasons that contribute to the evolution of problems of regional security after the Arab spring; to analyse internal and external aspects of civil wars in Syria and Libya; to trace the new dynamic of the Arab-Israeli conflict; to evaluate the rise of non-state actors (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIL) in regional affairs, their strategies and tactics; to examine current balance of powers and regional alliances in the SEMED; to trace the shifting political influence of the USA, the EU, and China in regional processes.

Expected learning outcomes. By the end of the course the students will be able to: demonstrate a high level of awareness of the complexities of the SEMED and profound changes that are taking place in the area; know the social, economic, religious and political causes and consequences of the Arab spring; demonstrate in-depth understanding of regime transitions in the region, by looking both at the wider comparative picture and at specific cases; differentiate between variant types of regional crises, conflicts and sources of instability; differentiate between the diverse involvement of the regional and global powers in the area; master the theoretical skills and empirical evidence necessary to evaluate and develop their own arguments about contemporary politics in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.

# LECTURE 1
# THE ARAB SPRING IN THE SEMED: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS

*The roots and stages of the Arab uprisings*

During last decade conflict and political unrest remain an on-going feature in the region of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (the SEMED), which includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The deep transformations that swept through the region have risen new challenges that overlap with old crises. State fragility, conflicts, security threats and socio-economic inequalities have turned the area into one of the world's most volatile regions, whose geo-strategic importance goes far beyond its geographical borders. Growing competition among external and regional powers, who seek to strengthen their influence, adds further instability to the region.

The Arab spring is the wave of pro-democracy protests that took place in the SEMED and broader Arab world beginning in 2010 and 2011. The term evokes historical analogy with the "Spring of nations" in Europe in 1848, the "Prague spring" of 1968, and spring of 1989 in Europe with the fall of communism.

The roots of the uprising in the region could be divided into the several categories.

1. Political: authoritarian one-party regimes, poor governance, corruption, bureaucracy, and lack of freedoms.

2. Economic: unemployment (especially youth unemployment), shadow economies, income inequality, and social inequality.

3. Ideological (religious), ethnic and tribal.

The transformations caused by the Arab spring went through several stages:

1. 2010-2011: the active stage of mass uprisings all over the SEMED; resignation of Ben Ali in Tunisia, H. Mubarak in Egypt and defeat of the regime of M. Gaddafi in Libya. A more informal civil society has emerged, which is still a force for change in the region.

2. "The Arab winter": the euphoria of the uprisings gave way to a certain disillusion. Islamist parties gained power in Tunisia and Egypt (although only temporarily in the latter); Libya and Syria spiralled into protracted civil wars.

3. 2013-2018: setbacks across the region in many respects. Journalists, human rights activists, and critics face violations of their freedom of expression. Security services have once again taken centre stage in the political governance of a number of countries in the region. The often divided and weak civil institutions have failed to impose any effective democratic control over the sector.

4. "2nd Arab spring": second wave of uprisings broke out in 2019 in Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon caused by demands for the better democratic governance. These events have led to the resignation of Algerian President A. Bouteflika. These actions show that the deep discontent behind the 2011-2012 uprisings is still alive and that the process they triggered is not yet complete.

5. The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the region's democratic transformation in two ways. On the one hand, it strengthens authoritarian and repressive tendencies because regimes use health measures to impose additional restrictions on fundamental rights. On the other hand, the health emergency reveals the inadequacy of the authorities' response and gives a new role and impetus to

civil society. The pandemic also intensified the socio-economic hardships in the SEMED countries (Mneimneh 2017; Khedher 2021).

### *The consequences of the Arab spring*

The uprisings produced modest political, social, and economic gains for the region's inhabitants. Youth unemployment in the region remains the highest in the world and has worsened in several countries. Poverty rates are high, especially in rural areas. In no country has the standard of living significantly improved since the revolutions, and it has even declined in conflict-ravaged areas. Corruption among political elites persists and is worsening regionwide. It is particularly daunting in the countries driven by civil war. Press freedom in the region is worse today than in the years before the revolts. Many governments have moved aggressively to suppress any criticism in the media. The uprising sparked lasting violence in Syria and Libya. Post-uprising civil wars have caused mass displacement. Syria's conflict alone has created more than five million registered refugees and over six million internally displaced people (Brun 2019; Rivlin 2021).

The scenarios of revolutionary events and their results in particular country in the region differs significantly: riots suppressed (Bahrain); constitutional reforms (Morocco, Jordan, Algeria); minor riots in 2011 (Lebanon, Iraq) with the second wave in 2019; revolutions transformed into the civil wars (Syria, Libya, Yemen); restoration of authoritarianism (Egypt); democracy (Tunisia till 2021).

The Arab spring brought some sort of democracy only to one country – Tunisia. There are several reasons for this:

1. No leadership. The Arab spring produced not a single leader who could rise above narrow partisan or sectarian affiliations to think about the interests of the nation as a whole, let alone establish a vision to transform it.

2. No institutions. Minus Tunisia, in other countries affected by the Arab spring credible institutions rooted in the will and authority of the people (empowered parliaments, respected judiciaries, a free press, and a robust civil society) either don't exist or have been suppressed or co-opted by the state.

3. No cohesion. Religious and ethnic tensions have risen in the region since 2011, which plays into the hands of ruling regimes who benefit from social divisions. Such tensions reduce trust among citizens and make it harder to bring different communities together through mass mobilization or public action.

4. Socio-economic factor. In 2011, protesters made a clear link between political change and addressing socio-economic issues, believing that once authoritarian regimes were brought down, such problems would vanish. As a result of the Arab spring, not only have socio-economic problems not gone away but in many cases they have worsened.

5. Public opinion in Arab countries appears to be extremely inconsistent. As events unfolded, those who supported order and stability clashed with supporters of democratic transformations. For instance, Egyptian society elected President Morsi in June 2012 (52% of the vote), then in May 2014 – A.F. al-Sisi, advocating the restoration of an autocratic regime (96% of votes) (Pollock 2021; Frisch 2021).

*Post-Arab spring regional order*

Mixed results of the Arab spring sparked the debate around the nature of regional order in post-revolutionary SEMED, with the tree alternative visions.

1. A new order. According to this approach, the Arab spring has already given birth to a new order comprising alternative forms of governance, and new dynamics of inter-state relations. Many countries will have to resign themselves to limited sovereignty, reflected in the emergence of chaotic, contested, and ungoverned zones on their frontiers, or in the need to share sovereignty with other actors. A different regional balance of power (the rise of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran) as well as new configuration of great power involvement (disengagement of the USA and more active role of China and Russia) has taken root in the region.

2. A continuing upheaval. The collapse of the pre-2011 order has not (yet) produced a new one in the SEMED, and the region will remain in a protracted period of transition. The region's fundamental economic deficiencies have not been resolved. Violence continues in Syria and Libya, where full political sovereignty remains elusive. The region might well undergo additional shockwaves in the coming years that could bring about additional, unexpected changes.

3. An old order. The SEMED has, despite the upheaval, retained the predominant characteristics of its pre-2011 order. The demands of protestors in 2011 for individual rights and social justice did not translate into a new political culture in the region. Countries of the region continue to be characterized by authoritarian rulers, close links between wealth and power, deep involvement by the military and state security system in politics and the economy, and a central role for religion in public and private life. Fundamental problems may persist, but the region's leaders are more aware than before of the potential threat, and now they know how to deal with it (Brun 2019).

*Questions*
What are the roots and stages of the Arab uprisings?
What are the consequences of the Arab spring?
Why democratic transformations in most Arab countries have failed?

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# LECTURE 2
# POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT

***"Jasmine revolution" in Tunisia***

Tunisia's revolution in 2011 against Ben Ali's authoritarian regime was a surprising event in a country, which did not have a record of political or social upheavals. Those who demonstrated against dictatorship in 2010 and 2011 had multiple goals:

1. The chief slogans were about better jobs and more equality. Young Tunisians, educated or relatively educated, could not find the right jobs and the expected salaries.

2. The movement was also concerned with police brutality and state corruption, hence the calls for dignity.

3. There were among them smaller groups of democrats and human rights activists who had campaigned for decades for dismantling the police state.

The first democratic election in the country's history took place on 23 October 2011. It was the election of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), tasked with drafting a new constitution and guarantee the sustainability of democracy. In a development that would become the regional trend, Tunisia's formerly banned Islamist movement, Ennahda ("Renaissance"), emerged in a dominant position, capturing 41% of the popular vote and obtaining a plurality of seats in the transitional parliament (Feuer 2017).

Since then, Tunisians have been called to the polls seven times: two legislative elections (2014 and 2019), two presidential elections with two rounds (2014 and 2018) and municipal elections. A new constitution of 2014 was progressive even by Western standards. It enshrines freedoms of speech, association, and press; gender equality between men and women; and checks and balances between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Tunisia has passed progressive laws countering violence against women and racial discrimination. It also initiated a national reconciliation process, which exposed

human rights violations and other abuses of the former regimes. These achievements, unprecedented in other Arab countries, have prompted observers to label the country the only "democratic success" of the Arab spring (Aliriza 2018).

Four structural factors explain why democracy has taken root in Tunisia while failing in other Arab spring countries:

1. Tunisia enjoys an ethnically and religiously homogenous population - 98% Sunni Muslim - avoiding the sectarian or tribal divisions that contributed to civil war in Libya or Syria.
2. Tunisia's military had long been marginalized politically.
3. Tunisia features a strong civil society and a relatively well-educated citizenry.
4. Tunisia enjoyed a relative balance of power between secular and Islamist forces (Driss 2018).

### *Disillusionment with democracy: economic and political factors*

But eight years into democracy, Tunisians have become frustrated with its failure to deliver economically. The 2011 revolution demanded not just freedom, but also economic improvements and social justice. Unfortunately, the economic situation has barely improved, if at all. The unemployment rate, which had remained at a steady 12% through the late 2000s, jumped to 18% after the 2011 revolution. The rate of inflation, 4% prior to the revolution, has doubled to 7.4%. Receipts from international tourism, the third-largest sector of the Tunisian economy, totaled $3.9 billion in 2009 and have dropped to just $1.7 billion in 2019.

Alongside failing to improve the economy, democracy seems only to produce political instability and infighting. The 2014 electoral campaign was very tense and extremely polarized between the Islamists from Ennahdha, and the modernists from Nidaa Tounes (in contrast to Islamism). In 2014 Islamists lost quite clearly (38% for Nidaa against 28% for Ennahdha), and the two parties decided to govern together.

On one hand, the aftermath of the 2014 elections was a major step forward for democracy in Tunisia. The Islamist party accepted its defeat to the secularist majority. It has shown a political culture that is able to manage disagreement and reach consensus despite sharp divergences in viewpoint. On the other hand, a grand coalition government between the secular President Essebsi (the leader of Nidaa Tounes) and Ennahda has produced four years of compromise solutions that have frustrated supporters of each party. It was difficult for Tunisians to identify who was truly in power. Public unsatisfaction with political parties intensified, with many Tunisians accusing parties of failing to address the economic crisis, inequalities, and corruption (Islamists Parties in North Africa: a Comparative Analysis of Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt 2018).

### *The collapse of democracy in Tunisia*

On 25 July 2021, after months of economic and public-health hardship induced by Covid-19, major protests erupted against the Tunisian government. The Islamists have been blamed for the country's setbacks, because Ennahdha was the only party that has governed or participated in all the governments of this decade. In response to the protests and threats on his power, President Saied temporarily suspended the normal functioning of political institutions. Kais Saied, a law professor, was elected in 2019. In his election campaign he stated that his only programme was to implement what the people and the youth would decide. Saied wished to build a form of direct, grassroots democracy, where the people always have the power to dismiss elected officials. These populist slogans allowed him to win the second round of elections with 72.7% of the votes (Krichen 2021).

The de facto dissolution of parliament, the abandonment of the constitution, and the arrests of political opponents and journalists are clear signs that Tunisia is no longer a democracy. The President's populist message, blaming the country's woes on his opponents and foreign conspiracies, keeps him above the political confusion, making him increasingly intolerant of any form of criticism and ultimately consolidating his powers. Over time, he risks becoming a classic authoritarian ruler. At the international level, recent developments in Tunisia have raised some red flags in both the United States and Europe, traditionally committed to the country's institutional and economic stability.

Public opinion rejected the return of the current Parliament in any shape or form and expressed eagerness for a shift towards a presidential system. On 25 July 2022, the new constitution was approved at national referendum by 94% of voted. It turned Tunisia's semi-presidential system into a presidential one, giving the president sweeping powers while largely limiting the role of the Tunisian parliament. The turnout of the referendum was low at only 30.5%, according to official figures released by Tunisia's elections committee. The referendum was boycotted by Tunisia's largest political parties, including Ennahda.

The gap between the opposition and the public, who continue to support the President Saied might escalate into violence, especially considering the most severe economic crisis in recent years, aggravated by the rise in food and energy prices.

### *Revolution in Egypt. Islamists in power*

In January 2011, inspired by the revolution in Tunisia, Egypt witnessed mass protests against President Mubarak and his regime for their social, political, and economic failures. Dozens of civilians were killed by the security forces during the demonstrations. After Mubarak's resignation, governance shifted to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. In March 2011 a "constitutional declaration" was issued, which included a timetable for shifting power from the Supreme Council to an elected parliament and president.

It seemed as if Egypt was beginning a process of democratization that would lead to the establishment of a stable democratic regime. The transition included a process of writing a new constitution, the holding of parliamentary elections at the end of 2011, and a presidential election in 2012. In January 2012, the three rounds

of voting for the lower house of the Egyptian parliament ended with the bloc of Islamic political parties winning about three-quarters of the seats: The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party won 237 of the 498 seats and the Salafist party al-Nur secured 120 (Sawaed 2019).

At the end of spring 2012, there were two rounds of the presidential election, which Mohamed Morsi, the Freedom and Justice party candidate, won with a majority of 51.7%. As a result, many Egyptians began to express growing concern about Egypt's identity shifting toward Islamization, religious law, and of being a state of the Muslim Brothers. The debate over the character of the new constitution was a key factor that contributed to Egypt's instability and lack of citizenship agreement. The predominance of Islamists on the Constitutional Committee resulted in a draft that was more Islamic than before. The new document reduced freedom of religion and limited the activities of civil organizations and the press, giving credence to worries that the new Morsi-led regime would work to Islamize the state.

Referendum over the draft constitution was held during December 15–22, 2012. While a majority of 63.8% approved the new constitution, only 33% of the public had participated in the referendum. The low voter turnout indicated that the public was sceptical over the process of approving the constitution and that there was no broad consensus over it. Morsi appointed the individuals identified with political Islam to the most senior positions in the government, the local administration, and the media. His plans to save the economy from the grave crisis and to restore internal security failed to bear fruit, and the economic distress grew worse (Islamists Parties in North Africa: a Comparative Analysis of Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt 2018).

Various opposition parties and movements contended that Morsi failed in his handling of domestic problems because his policy sought to serve the interests of the Muslim Brothers. Moreover, Morsi strengthened Egypt's ties with the Shiite Muslim regime in Iran, the Turkish regime, whose ideology is close to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Qatar, whose leaders have supported Hamas, which identifies ideologically with the Muslim Brotherhood. The army's leadership and security elite perceived these ties as being harmful to Egypt's economy and security as well as to its relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia. The growing polarization between the supporters of Morsi and his opponents and the public's dissatisfaction with the lack of real progress in realizing the goals of the revolution - especially social justice and better socioeconomic conditions - returned people to the streets (Melcangi 2021).

### *Egypt under the rule of A.F. al-Sisi*

The struggle between the supporters of Morsi and his opponents escalated and turned violent. Many protestors were killed or wounded during the rounds of violence that continued through most of 2013. The army exploited a popular civil protest staged against the Muslim Brotherhood, and Morsi was removed in a military coup after only one year into his term.

Once again, Egypt came under authoritarian rule, this time led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who was commander of the armed forces during Morsi's term in office and who had led the revolt against the new president.

In May 2014, after another presidential election, al-Sisi became Egypt's official ruler and, in March 2018, he was elected to the second term in office. Both elections were far from being democratic. The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed and its Egyptian infrastructure was dismantled. 40,000 members of the movement were imprisoned (Sherif 2018).

Along with the trials of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, which culminated with the death sentence given to Morsi in May 2015, al-Sisi imposed severe restrictions on public gatherings, used tough measures against demonstrators, and arrested thousands of political activists – some of whom were liberals, who were put on trial and sentenced to long prison terms. In 2014 new constitution granted the armed forces an unprecedented degree of autonomy and shielded them from civilian control. In February 2019 a referendum was held that allowed President al-Sisi to retain his position until 2030.

Internally, Egypt faces challenges of domestic security, a profound economic crisis, social rifts, the failure to transition to a democracy, and the return to a dictatorship, as well as a crisis of legitimacy of the new authoritarian regime, lending further cause for internal destabilization. Nearly a third of Egypt's population, which stands at over 100 million, live below the poverty line, the direct consequence of years of cuts in state subsidies and the general worsening of economic conditions due to the health emergency.

Another serious problem the government faces is the high rate of unemployment (risen to 9.8% in 2021), further aggravated by the negative economic impact of Covid-19. Egypt's economy suffers from rising prices, and decline in the value of the Egyptian lira compared to the dollar (from 6 Egyptian liras to the US dollar at the end of Morsi's term to 18 Egyptian liras in June 2018). The tourism sector was badly hit, whose 2020 revenue plummeted to US$ 4.4 billion from 13 billion the previous year, with growth prospects and a return to normalcy predicted only for 2024 (Zoubir, Abderrahmane 2021). Egypt's domestic weakness has damaged its regional standing as well. It lost its status as the leader of the Arab world, a position now occupied by Saudi Arabia.

### Questions

What were the causes of mass protests in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011?

What was the reason for success of Islamists parties at the initial stage of revolutions?

Why the transformations in Egypt ended with the restoration of authoritarianism?

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# LECTURE 3
# THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE SEMED.
# TRANSFORMATION OF REGION ALLIANCES

***The evolution of regional balance of powers***

The region of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, which includes Arab and non-Arab states, is an important component of international relations and the world economy. This area is traditionally characterized by a high level of conflict potential. There are no completely isolated, purely national problems here: if they

arise in one corner of the region, they often, in a more acute form, are reproduced in other places.

After the World War 2 four systems of counterbalances dominated here:

1. Rivalry between the USA and the USSR for the influence in the region;

2. Competition between Arab countries that adhered to the ideology of pan-Arabism (such as Egypt, Syria) and Arab conservative regimes, mainly, monarchies (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and others).

3. Rivalry between Arab states and Iran (after Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979);

4. Confrontation between Israel and Arab countries (in a framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict).

After the collapse of the USSR and bipolar world order the regional balance of powers was transformed dramatically and for the next 25 years it became American-centric. The United States has become the most influential superpower here and regional political elites were forced to adapt to this new geopolitical reality.

The formation of the current balance of powers in the SEMED was launched by the Arab spring in 2011. The revolutionary events have led to the destabilization of a number of Arab countries, including Syria and Libya, with the further devastating civil wars. "Power vacuum" resulted in activation of radical Islamist movements and non-state actors, which play significant role in the formation of regional alliances. New centres of power of non-Arab origin have also emerged here: Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Nowadays, at least six countries – Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, and Egypt – view each other as adversaries, friends, or potential allies in the regional balance of power. Competition between these states prevents any of them from becoming a regional hegemon (Kausch 2020). Finally, the gradual distance of Washington from the SEMED along with the growing influence of Russia and China here has led to greater autonomy of regional actors.

### The phenomenon of "flexible alliances"

Under the influence of these regional and global transformations, traditional power structure in the SEMED has given the way to new types of interaction and various forms of ad-hoc collaboration. So-called "flexible alliances" arose here, which do not fall under the classic definition of an alliance. According to E.C. Lecha (2017) "flexible" or "liquid" alliances are an informal blocks of states (and non-state actors) with common security interests. They respond sensitively to changes in the environment and adapt to the new political landscape. The rivalry between them also becomes flexible. Traditionally hostile actors can temporarily unite around a specific threat without recognizing each other as allies.

The current balance of power in the SEMED is based on two axes of confrontation: the Sunni-Shia, which is traditional for the region, and the intra-Sunni, which is a relatively new phenomenon.

The first axis, the Sunni-Shia, is the 40-year struggle of Sunni states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, etc.) against the so-called "axis of

resistance" led by Iran. This confrontation can be viewed both through a religious prism and through the prism of the balance of powers. The religious factor is used by these powers as a tool for the implementation of political tasks, such as the mobilization of the population around their regimes and regional dominance. The confrontation between Shiite and Sunni blocs has intensified significantly since the Arab spring (Fathollah-Nejad 2017).

Another axis of regional confrontation is the split within the Sunni camp itself, which was caused by the events of 2011. Since then, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand, and Qatar and Turkey on the other, have started a struggle for regional dominance, supporting local proxies throughout the Sunni world.

On this basis three alternative alliances were formed: Shia, pragmatic Sunni and radical Sunni. The interaction between these blocs in the form of diplomatic struggle, open confrontation or balancing explains all major political and strategic processes in the region.

### The current alliances in the SEMED

The first alliance, the so-called "Shia axis", includes Iran, the Assad regime in Syria, and Iranian proxies in the region: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Islamic Jihad in Gaza Strip, Yemeni Houthis and Shiite proxies in Iraq. In the case of Sunni Islamic Jihad strategic considerations play major role for Iran, not religious one. This alliance consists of only two countries, and the rest of the participants are non-state actors. Despite this, the Shia bloc is the most organized and cohesive among the three (Krasna, Meladze 2021).

The second regional alliance is a bloc of Sunni pragmatic countries. It includes Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab monarchies, excluding Qatar. Israel has joined this group in 2020. They are interested in the containment of Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood (including Hamas) and their sponsors – Turkey and Qatar. This alliance, given the diversity of its members, is the most controversial and unstable one.

The third one is the radical Sunni alliance, represented by Turkey, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. The members of this alliance support Muslim Brotherhood's Islamist ideology and maintain relations with Iran. This fundamentally distinguishes this block from pragmatic Sunni camp, which sees both the Brotherhood and Teheran as a threat to their stability and regional security. The boycott of Qatar has deepened the split in the Sunni block and strengthened the alliance between Doha and Ankara (Guzansky, Lindenstrauss 2020).

In 2022 there were clear signs of changes in 10-year old post-Arab regional order. First, Turkey had lunched a number of diplomatic initiatives toward normalization with its neighbours – the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt (reconciliation between the Sunni camps). Second, Tehran re-established full diplomatic ties with Kuwait and the UAE. Third, the most recent development is a resumption of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023 with China as the mediating power. This event did not come as a surprise. Over the past two years, Tehran and Riyadh have engaged in several rounds of talks, in an attempt to restore diplomatic relations. Both Iran and SA are interested in de-escalating some

of their confrontation. Saudi Arabia's main interest is to end Iranian support of Houthis in Yemen, and their direct attacks on Saudi oil facilities. Iran's interest centered on the desire to decrease Tehran's isolation in the region, and as a part of a broader policy, to reduce US influence in regional affairs.

We can assume that the traditional axis of the Sunni-Shia confrontation in the region will remain relevant, as well as the Israeli-Iranian one. Tehran's destabilizing role in the SEMED, along with its nuclear program, will remain a powerful factor for the further consolidation of the anti-Iran bloc. As for the relations between the Sunni camps, there may be some shifts towards normalization.

*Questions*
How the Arab spring influenced the balance of power in the SEMED?
What is "flexible alliance"?
What are current alliances in the SEMED and what actors they consist of?

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**LECTURE 4**
**PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL SECURITY AFTER THE ARAB SPRING.**
**CIVIL WARS IN LIBYA AND SYRIA**

### *The civil war in Libya*

Libyan uprising began in February 2011 to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi and was fought between forces loyal to the president and rebel groups that were seeking to oust his government. Gaddafi ruled Libya for 42 years between 1969 and 2011. Many Libyans strongly opposed Gaddafi's social and economic reforms. He was condemned by many as a dictator whose authoritarian administration systematically violated human rights and financed global terrorism in the region and abroad.

In March 2011 NATO led the coalition of foreign troops to implement UN SC Resolution 1973 in respond to the civil war. They launched a series of airstrikes targeting Gaddafi's forces. Gaddafi was killed in November 2011 and Tripoli came under the control of a foreign-backed groups. Libya later split into two warring rival governments (in Tripoli and in Tobruk) with their own militias, mercenaries, and foreign backers.

According to K. Robinson (2019) and A. Delalande A. (2018) the civil war in Libya includes the following actors:

1. The United Nations helped establish and formally endorsed Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA) in 2015 to unify rival administrations that came out of the country's 2014 elections. Based in the capital city of Tripoli, the GNA was led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj and controls parts of the country's west. The GNA's armed forces comprise the remains of Libya's official military as well as local militias. It receives significant military aid from Turkey, Italy, and Qatar.

2. Libya National Army. The Benghazi-based Libya National Army (LNA), a force of some twenty-five thousand fighters, is led by Khalifa Haftar, a former general who helped Muammar Qaddafi seize power in 1969. The LNA launched an assault on Tripoli in April 2019 and today controls large swaths of Libya's east and south. Haftar claimed military rule over eastern parts of the country in April 2020, though it has not materialized. The LNA's backers include Egypt, France, the UAE, and Russia.

3. The House of Representatives (HoR). Opposing the western-based GNA is the House of Representatives (HoR), a legislature created in 2014 to govern until a constitution could be written. It refuses to recognize the GNA because it was installed by the international community and allegedly supports Islamists. The HoR relocated to the eastern city of Tobruk when Islamist militias overran Tripoli.

4. Local Salafist Islamist extremists and terrorists, including but not limited to Ansar al-Sharia and the groups that coalesced into the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council in 2015.

5. International terrorist groups with Libyan components, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and later, ISIL. These included foreign fighters with ideologies and experiences derived from beyond Libya.

The 2020 cease-fire between the GNA and LNA established the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC), made up of officers of both Libyan political

powers, to work on the implementation of the cease-fire and other security issues. The JMC made progress, but it has struggled to achieve the withdrawal of foreign fighters. Most important, though, despite a lack of trust and a faltering cease-fire, levels of violence remained low following the 2020 truce, allowing for a reopening of political dialogue.

In spite of growing public concern about the government's legitimacy, the GNU continues to garner the support of the international community and has not seen any change in its mandate after its failure to organise elections in 2021. After the failure of elections, no real contingency plan was put in place to ensure that Libyans could go to polls as soon as possible. M. Dorda and O. Crowley (2022) concluded that Libya now faces a new legitimacy vacuum where dealmaking and competition between status quo actors has become the arbiter of the country's future.

From its start, the Libyan crisis has been shaped by external actors, so much so that foreign influences were crucial in fostering and channelling the revolt against Muammar Qaddafi's regime in 2011. Most of the regional and international actors involved deluded themselves into thinking they would be able to direct the revolution towards their respective preferred political outcomes.

The involvement of international powers and regional actors contributed to dividing the country and made it more difficult to undertake a credible process of national reconciliation. While France, the U.K., and the U.S. were all deeply engaged in the air war to oust Gaddafi, thereby functionally destroying his ability to contain the revolution, at the end of the conflict, these and other Western powers largely retreated and did not seek to exercise control over events in Libya. Instead, they offered a broad menu of assistance programs in every sphere (political, economic, and security), essentially all of which failed (Varvelli 2017).

By contrast, regional actors developed favoured clients, based on a mixture of ideological and geographic ties. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE on one side and Qatar and Turkey on the other helped fuel the conflict by covertly providing military support to their clients. Qatar supported Islamists with money and military aid through Sudan. Turkey engaged in relationships going back geographically to Ottoman times with friendly groups, primarily in Misrata and Tripoli. And from the summer of 2013 onwards, Egypt and the UAE, with support from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, worked with forces which previously had been associated with Gaddafi, ultimately becoming the political and security backers of General Hifter's Libyan National Army (LNA), operating from bases near Tobruk (Winer 2019).

The competition between regional forces played a substantial role in the ultimate splitting of the country into two governments in June 2014, neither of which controlled much territory outside their respective capitals of Tripoli in the west and Tobruk in the east. The international community's inability to sponsor a successful transition in Libya is raising distrust among all Libyan factions.

### The civil war in Syria
In March 2011, in the wake of the Arab spring protests in the SEMED, Syrian citizens went to the streets for peaceful protest. They were calling for

greater freedoms, the release of political prisoners, an end to the half-century-old state of emergency. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad responded with unprecedented brutality. Subsequently, the situation turned into a deadly civil war.

The roots of the uprising in Syria could be divided into 3 blocks.

1. The economic problems. High unemployment rate among the working population, low general standard of living and corruption of the government caused growing outrages among Syrians.

2. An authoritarian regime. From the beginning of the 70s of the last century, power in Syria was in the hands of the Assad clan.

3. Confessional diversity of Syrian society. The main contradictions were caused by the opposition of the Sunni majority of the population to the Alawite regime of the Assads.

A variety of actors are locked in a power struggle in Syria.

1. The Syrian government. Bashar al-Assad inherited his rule of Syria in 2000, taking over from his father Hafez al-Assad, who had been in power since 1971. He continued the political traditions of his father, remaining a supporter of authoritarian power and the police state.

**2. Free Syrian Army (FSA). It is a loose conglomeration of armed brigades formed in 2011 by defectors from the Syrian army and civilians backed by Turkey and several Gulf countries.**

**3. Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (former Jabhat al-Nusra). Jabhat al-Nusra was formed in Syria in 2011 as an al-Qaeda affiliate within the Islamist opposition to the al-Assad government.**

**4. Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a Shia armed group and a political force based in Lebanon and backed by Iran. It moved into Syria to support al-Assad's forces and currently controls no territory in Syria.**

**5. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This alliance of Kurdish and Arab militias was founded in 2015. Its makeup largely consists of YPG fighters.**

**6. ISIS. Predominantly known for the brutality of its foreign fighters, organised government systems, and strong social media presence, ISIS rose to power in the vacuum in Syria after 2012 as civil unrest grew. By 2014, it had captured significant land by force and declared the creation of a "caliphate".**

**7. Russia. Russia has strongly backed the Syrian government, particularly following a request from al-Assad to intervene militarily in 2015. Moscow is now deeply entrenched in Syria, with military bases under its control, and a government that owes its survival to Russia.**

8. The USA. Washington initially supported the Syrian opposition, with the aim of overthrowing al-Assad, but did not directly attack the Syrian government. Its main focus in Syria has been fighting ISIS. In October 2019 U.S. President D. Trump removed the roughly one thousand U.S. troops supporting Kurdish fighters on the Syria-Turkey border.

9. Turkey. Turkey supported the Syrian opposition and became a base for opposition figures. Ankara conducted a number of military operations against

Kurdish forces in Syria. The operations have resulted in Turkey controlling large parts of north-western Syria along the border.

10. Iran. Iran has been a long-time ally of al-Assad, and swung behind him as soon as the protests began. Since then, the Iranian military presence has grown in Syria, along with that of Iranian-trained fighters (Al Jazeera 2023).

The civil war in Syria can be chronologically divided into several stages.

The initial stage (2011 to 2013) of the civil war started with the confrontation between the al-Assad regime and the opposition - Free Syrian Army, representatives of the moderate secular opposition. Assad's objective was to preserve his own regime and to avoid Qaddafi's fate. During this period the first multi-party elections to the People's Council were held, and the first peace plan of the UN Secretary General "Six-point peace plan for Syria" was proposed.

The second stage (2013 to 2018) is characterized by a radical change in the character of the conflict. With the involvement of Islamist groups (ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra) in the conflict, the democratization of Syria as a goal of the Syrian opposition disappears from the general context. The deepening of Syria's civil war made both pro- and anti-regime forces dependent on external sponsors. As major powers have deepened their involvement, Syria has become a battlefield between regional and global actors. UN-backed attempts to mediate a conflict-ending political transition in Syria have been stymied by differences among veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council and other powers (Ford, 2019).

During the third stage (2018 - nowadays), the al-Assad regime solidified control over large parts of the country, leading some to argue that the civil war in Syria is effectively over. In 2020 a new round of negotiations took place in Geneva, which was aimed at drafting a new constitution of the country. The talks brought together representatives from the Syrian government, opposition groups, civil society organizations, as well as international observers and mediators. However, the talks faced significant challenges, including disagreements over the role of President Bashar al-Assad and the composition of a new government. Other initiatives include the Astana talks, which were initiated by Russia, Iran, and Turkey, and the Syrian Constitutional Committee, which was established by the UN in 2019 to draft a new constitution for Syria (Laub, 2023).

Twelve years after 2011, hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been killed and nearly thirteen million people - more than half the country's prewar population - have been displaced. As for today, the al-Assad regime has gained a military victory, and Syria was reintegrated of into the Arab League in 2023. Nevertheless the civil confrontation in the country is still far from the end. Al-Assad has retained his nominal power but he remains dependent on his Russian and Iranian partners.

*Questions*
What are roots of uprisings in Libya and Syria in 2011?
What are local actors in Syrian and Libyan civil wars?
What is the role of regional and global actors in these conflicts?

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# LECTURE 5
# NON-STATE ARMED ACTORS IN THE REGION

***Definition of non-state armed actor***

In the past decades, non-state actors in general and non-state armed actors (NSAA) more specifically have grown in status and importance. This trend is especially evident in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, where since the Arab spring a combination of state fragility, rising particularism, conflict and instability have contributed to eroding governments' capacity and effectiveness, and provided fertile ground for armed groups to operate. Non-state armed actors have assumed increasing significance in social and political life across the region.

NSAAs are generally defined according to two main criteria: first, they are seen as organizations operating outside the control of the state and challenging its "authority, power, and legitimacy". Second, they are characterized by their reliance on "violence and force" to achieve their objectives. These groups' goals can be political, economic or ideological and their structure tends to include at least a

minimal level of command and coordination. Non-state armed actors are extremely diverse, ranging from local, self-defence and community-based militias, to transnational criminal organizations and networks, to classic insurgent opposition groups (Valensi 2015).

The terms that are used to define these groups are controversial and reflect the beliefs of who is using them. For example, non-state military actors can be seen as "liberation movements", "freedom fighters" or "revolutionaries" by some and, at the same time, as "rebels" or "terrorists" by others. Generally, a state will label a non-state actor depending on the political issues involved – if they pose a threat to a government, normally they will be defined as terrorists. On the other hand, if they serve to weaken adversaries in the international or regional arena, these groups might be named as liberation movement.

### *The growing role of NSAA in the SEMED*

NSAA in the SEMED, especially after the Arab spring, has grown in number significantly. The emergence of non-state armed actors in recent years is correlated with the growing weakness of many states in the region. States with low levels of legitimacy are unable to maintain the loyalty of many within their populations. When such states resort to repression they typically provoke opposition. Similarly, when states exclude significant elements of their populations through neglect, lack of capacity or some other form of discrimination, they can create the conditions within which non-state armed actors emerge (Durac 2015).

Today along with traditional and well known non-state actors such as Hezbollah or Hamas, there are plenty of new ones, such as: Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, the Free Syria Army (FSA) and many others in Syria; an array of militias that emerged in Libya following the fall of Gaddafi; Kurdish peshmerga; Ansar Bayt Maqdis in the Sinai region of Egypt; al-Murabitoun in Maghreb; al-Qaida and affiliated groups; ISIL, etc.

These actors play significant, if not prominent, role in the ongoing regional conflicts – in Syria and Libya. They change borders, create "state in states" as well as zones of instability. NSAA can operate as separate, unaligned actors or become the proxies of more influential powers in the region.

NSAA are extremely diverse, ranging from local, community based (such as Hamas) to transnational organizations and networks (such as ISIL or Al-Qaida). They might be Islamic or secular. They vary in their level of military, political and social capabilities, as well as with respect to their territorial control and ability to govern. These groups have different organizational structures, strategies, objectives and ideologies while also operating in unique political, social and military environments.

NSAA in the SEMED have grown not only in number but also in complexity. When analysing such complex groups as Hamas, Hezbollah and ISIL, it is crucial to look beyond just their reliance on violence and to take into consideration the social, political and economic dimension of their activities.

Hamas started as a social movement that became an armed group in 1987. As political party HAMAS participated in 2005 Palestinian municipal elections

and in the 2006 legislative elections. In addition to its strong political identity, Hamas became directly involved in a number of social interventions, such as health care, education, poverty alleviation, and development. Since assuming control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, Hamas's involvement in the Palestinian political system shifted from participation to direct governance (Dentic 2019).

From an operational perspective, Hamas went from being a relatively unsophisticated violent faction perpetrating individual attacks against Israelis to being able of carrying out large-scale bombing attacks and rocket attacks into Israel. It resulted in a number of Israeli operation against HAMAS in 2010-s and the war in October 2023.

Hezbollah, initially established in Lebanon in 1982 as resistance to Israeli invasion, has also evolved to adopt a similar political, social and military character. The group gradually became directly invested in establishing a complex social services network and charity. While preserving its military structure and its status as "national resistance," Hezbollah also gradually became a mainstream political party and joined the executive cabinet in 2005.

In each of its identities, Hezbollah has undergone a significant transformation: a political transformation from a marginal political group into a party; a social transformation from a charity into a governance and social security apparatus; and a military transformation from a militia into a regional army and Lebanon's most sophisticated military force (Levi 2016).

Hezbollah is often cited as a new type of "quasi army", capable of using force in hybrid ways and combining classic use of guerrilla warfare with more conventional ones. According to M. Ataie (2023) Hezbollah's engagement in Syrian civil war constituted a watershed moment for the organization and transformed it into a regional player engaged in conflicts far beyond its traditional realm, often in collaboration with Iran. Like no other actor, Hezbollah, with its multiple parallel identities as a major Lebanese political party, a quasi-army or a regional proxy actor, illustrates the complexity of NSAA in the region.

Finally, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) represents another unique case. The IS can be identified as an anti-systemic, oppositional actor that not only fights all regional states but also denies the legitimacy of both regional and the global state-based order.

ISIL went much further than other groups by assuming control of parts of Syria, Iraq and Libya, proclaiming a new Caliphate and creating a kind of transnational entity. In the areas under the group's control, ISIL has sought to be the "sovereign power", focusing on holding a monopoly over the use of force and exercising control over the territory and population. The group also relied on intense social media branding, as well as on extreme brutality and offensive military doctrine. After having captured several oil fields, tens of artillery pieces and tanks in Iraq, the ISIL became the world's most powerful non-state militant group. Till 2017 it combined government building on controlled territories, conventional operations in the region and terrorist attacks all over the world (Rumman 2020).

### Re-conceptualizing NSAA in the region

When it comes to complex non-state armed groups like Hamas, Hezbollah or ISIL, it is evident that their social and political activities and involvement in governance are often not different from those performed by states.

NSAA in the SEMED have evolved to undertake political, social and governance functions. They control territory, provide alternative governance, services and collective goods, engage in diplomacy. They have increasingly adopted characteristics of states. According to B. Berti (2016), the evolution of armed groups across the region de facto blur the line between "state" and "non-state" actor and redefines concepts like statehood and sovereignty. In doing so, these groups de facto challenge the conceptual definition of "non-state armed actors" as previously defined. Rather these organizations should be understood today as hybrid or multi-layered entities - which do not only rely on violence, but are engaged in social, political and military activities.

NSAA should also not always be seeing in opposition to the state. Reality is far more complex and nuanced. Hybrid groups are not merely involved in conflicts against governmental authorities, but can also act in support of domestic governments, operate alongside them, or even be included in state institutions. Despite operating independently from the government, these actors can have their commanders in local, regional, or national authorities, and even join governments to shape their country's strategic decisions.

In fact, until today, there isn't a general international framework widely accepted of how to deal with this kind of groups. The experience of the last several decades suggests that non-state armed actors cannot be eliminated. Ad-hoc responses that target these groups are unlikely to have any long-term prospects for success because they cannot resolve the problems of weak state legitimacy or the absence of effective state institutions. NSAA adjust to new constraints, exploit opportunities, and reinvent them to meet new environments. In the situation of instability and state fragility in the current SEMED non-state armed actors are going to play prominent role in both war-making and post-conflict transitions in the region.

### Questions

What is non-state military actor?
What are main NSAA in the SEMED?
How the role of NSAA in the region evolved after the Arab spring?

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# LECTURE 6
## THE NEW DYNEMICS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The wave of normalization of relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours – the Abraham Accords (2020) between Israel and four Arab countries (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan) is indicator of significant change in the SEMED political and strategic dynamics which has occurred over the past decade (The Abraham Accords Declaration 2020).

The deal symbolizes a geopolitical shift in regional security, and a significant step in the gradual but deliberate long-term efforts of Israel to normalize relations with its Arab neighbours without having to compromise on the Palestinian issue.

The agreements were designed and mediated by the Trump administration. The deal was important segment of Trump's Middle Eastern strategy, aimed at the constructing informal anti-Iran alliance in the region, increasing the pressure on Tehran and strengthening U.S. ties with its key allies in the region.

The Abraham accords were caused by the fundamental changes in the SEMED political landscape launched by the Arab spring ("power vacuum"; civil wars in Syria and Libya; proliferation of non-state actors; the rise of Iran, Turkey

and Qatar as regional powers). In these circumstances, the countries of the region have shifted their focus from the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian problem to the more urgent issues. The main reason for normalization between Israel and moderate Arab regimes is mutual interest in containment of Iran, which develops its nuclear program, supports radical movements and is rapidly expanding its influence in the region, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Another reason is the struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood (including Hamas) and the influence of the countries that support them - Turkey and Qatar (Norlen, Sinai 2020).

The Abraham accords fully correspond to the national interests of Israel, which managed to win the recognition of four Arab countries without any serious concessions on its part. Prime Minister B. Netanyahu also used this diplomatic success to improve his shaky political position in the country, because the accords were positively perceived by Israeli society as well as his political opponents. The Palestinian problem and the idea of "two state solution" have been marginalized, which is also in Israel's interests.

The United Arab Emirates had a clear interest in strengthening its ties with the United States and obtaining access to advanced American weapons; establishing cooperation with Israel, including terrorism, regional insurgencies, and the Iranian threat; presenting the agreement with Israel as a diplomatic victory, intended to benefit the Palestinians, and the necessary price of stopping Israel's intention to impose its sovereignty on the West Bank (based on the Trump "Peace to prosperity" plan). Reactions to the move from Emirati citizens on social media, particularly shortly after the announcement of the agreement, were mainly positive.

Bahrain's interest was first and foremost to fortify its relations with the United States and bolster its security against the Iranian threat, as well as strengthen its economy by means of ties with Israel. The step taken by the King of Bahrain was in many ways more daring than that of the UAE, in view of Iranian factor and the Shiite majority of Bahrain. Responses to the agreement among the general Bahraini public – both Sunni and Shiite organizations and opinion leaders – were largely negative (Krasna 2021).

For Sudan, normalization with Israel was the price paid for Washington's decision to remove the country from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list after twenty-seven years, and an accompanying aid package of $1 billion from the World Bank. In the case of Morocco, normalization with Israel has also come as a result of strong American involvement: D. Trump signed the declaration on the recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the territory of the Western Sahara.

The Abraham accords did not meet a negative reaction from any member of the Arab league, with the exception of the Palestinians. President Mahmoud Abbas called the Abraham Accords "a stab in the back". The round of fighting that erupted between Israel and Hamas in May 2021 (Israeli operation "Guardian of the Walls"), became the first important test of the strength of the Abraham accords. The UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco criticized Israel for what they called an attack on Palestinian rights and the sanctity of al-Aqsa, reflecting an interest in displaying solidarity with the Palestinians (Chtatou 2022). Nevertheless, their comments were balanced, placing responsibility for the escalation on both Israel

and Hamas. Columnists in the Arab media blamed Hamas for the fighting and for the harm caused to the Gaza population, and even expressed some empathy for Israeli citizens

All of the agreements signed in 2020 (excepting Sudan) have brought tangible outcomes. The changes are reflected across five indicators: the exchange of ambassadors, follow-on agreements and related memorandums of understanding, direct flights, trade, and participation in joint military exercises.

On 27–28 March 2022 Israel hosted the foreign ministers of Bahrain, the UAE, Egypt and Morocco, as well as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in Israel's Negev desert. Aimed at enhancing cooperation between these countries, the summit gave birth to the Negev Forum, a framework of economic and diplomatic working groups that will largely define the new Arab-Israeli relations in the region. Six working groups have been established, dealing with: Clean Energy; Education and Coexistence; Food and Water Security; Health; Regional Security; and Tourism. The Working Groups are to meet regularly throughout the year to advance initiatives that encourage regional integration, cooperation, and development for the benefit of the peoples of the region (Guzansky, Feuer 2021).

*Questions*
What circumstances contributed to the signing of the Abraham Accords?
What is the role of Trump administration in these agreements?
What are the practical results of Israeli-Arab normalization?

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# LECTURE 7
## THE ROLE OF GLOBAL POWERS IN THE REGION:
## THE USA AND CHINA

### *The evolution of U.S. policy toward the SEMED*

The Southern and Eastern Mediterranean as a part of the wider Middle East remains a key region for the United States. US interests that inform policy toward the region are the following:

1. Restoring strong relations with European allies and helping Europe maintain or enhance its security, stability and prosperity.
2. Pushing back on rival great powers, whether that relates to their influence in Europe or their growing influence along the Mediterranean's eastern and southern shores.
3. Countering the threat of terrorism, which remains serious and pressing in the region.
4. Containing the nuclear and conventional threat from Iran both to the US and Israel, a threat that is present – at least in its conventional asymmetric form – on the shores of the Mediterranean through Iranian-backed groups in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.
5. Maintaining the free flow of maritime trade, which applies mainly to the key artery of the Suez Canal.
6. Supporting the security and prosperity of Israel.
7. Shaping policy in favour of democratization, human rights and a rules-based international order (Salem 2022).

Over the past decade, the SEMED has undergone profound geopolitical transformations as a result the uprisings of the early 2010s. This process occurs in parallel with the decreasing role of the United States in regional affairs.

Starting under U.S. President Barack Obama, the United States began to shirk its role, steadily disengaging from the region. Obama's approach, and his preference for diplomatic solutions, was shaped by his scepticism about US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US "led from behind" during the 2011 NATO intervention that removed Gaddafi from Libya, and opted not to take on a major role in stabilising the country after the war. Obama also completed the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in December 2011, and refused to involve the US deeply in Syria's civil war. In 2013, when the Assad regime used chemical weapons, Obama did not respond militarily, as he had previously promised. Following the emergence of ISIL in Syria and Iraq, he preferred to deploy fewer

troops to fight it within Syria, co-operating with the Syrian Kurdish YPG instead (Gause 2022).

Under the presidency of Donald Trump, the United States' exit from the region became more blatant. He has withdrawn from the nuclear deal with Iran (JCPOA), which was achieved by previous administration, and instead pursued what it called a "maximum pressure" campaign against Teheran. Trump forcefully attacked Obama's approach, particularly the JCPOA. He claimed that the deal was flawed, as limitations on nuclear enrichment were not permanent, and that it did not constrain Iran's ballistic missile programme or its support for terrorism (Gause 2022). This contributed to re-orientating US policy in the region firmly in favour of Israel and Saudi Arabia. Finally, in December 2018, Trump took the decision to withdraw US troops from Syria, stating that ISIL had been defeated.

Washington's recalibration of its engagement with the region since the Obama administration has fuelled the perception in regional governments that the United States is reducing its commitment, especially as a security provider. A sense of abandonment has permeated Arab countries that rely on the US security umbrella and feel more directly exposed to the threat posed by Iran. US inaction in the wars in Syria and Libya, paved the way for fierce geopolitical competition among the main regional powers states and created an opportunity for alternative global powers to strengthen their ties with countries in the region.

### The Biden administration and the SEMED

Biden openly positioned his foreign policy as antagonistic to D. Trump's policy. Focusing on the human rights, he introduced a tougher approach to authoritarian regimes, including Saudi Arabia, balanced his policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and renewed negotiations with Iran on the JCPOA (Mazzucco, Alexander 2022). Nevertheless he kept the system-forming element of Tramps' Middle East strategy, which is reliance on traditional American partners in the region - Israel and moderate Sunni regimes, which are united by opposition to the Iranian threat.

The SEMED and wider Middle East region was on the periphery of Biden's foreign policy interests during his first year in the office. However, the dramatic consequences of Russian aggression in Ukraine, which went far beyond the Europe's borders, have reaffirmed the importance of the region for American national interests. The stagnation of the JCPOA negotiations, the necessity to increase the oil production, as well as the threat of deepening military cooperation between Russia and Iran, have led to the reset of US policy in the region (Shapiro 2022). Biden administration has also shifted its focus from promotion of democracy to a more realistic and pragmatic approach.

The purpose of Biden's visit to the region in July 2022 was to strengthen US relations with American traditional partners in contrast to the growing influence of Russia and China. The president's visit began in Israel, where he signed the "Jerusalem Declaration" stating that the United States is committed to "building a robust regional architecture; to deepen the ties between Israel and all of its regional partners; to advance Israel's regional integration over time; and to expand the

circle of peace to include ever more Arab and Muslim States" (Jerusalem Declaration 2022). From Israel, the president flew directly to Saudi Arabia. In the president's meetings with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, the issue of greater regional integration and cooperation (particularly in countering Iran) was a consistent theme.

The visit offered no new policy, but confirmed that Washington is getting back to basics. It was an important step that proved the continuation of US commitments to its allies and the strength of American security guarantees.

### China's regional strategy

Relations with the countries of the SEMED and the wider Middle East region occupy a crucial place in Chinese foreign policy. Three factors determine the importance of the region for the PRC. First, Beijing is one of the world's largest oil importers, with the majority of Chinese imports coming from the countries of the region. Second, the region is one of the largest markets for Chinese goods. Third, the growing activity of terrorist and extremist groups here is an increasing concern for the PRC's leadership.

China's policy in the region is rooted in deep motives and interests, above all — **the geostrategic ones**. The SEMED as the part of the Middle East is an important transit point on the path between Asia and Europe and is the key to realizing the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This global strategy announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2013 envisages the creation of an extensive infrastructure network from China's western borders to the eastern and southern borders of the EU. The new transport corridors will help optimize supplies, reduce the cost of many Chinese goods, strengthen Chinese positions in European and Asian markets, as well as provide access to new ones, such as in Africa (Wang 2016).

China's moves are well-calculated and highly correlated with its general regional policy, which aims to develop long-term relationships with virtually all states. Unlike the US, Beijing has avoided taking sides in regional conflicts. Instead, it has sought to straddle divisions and develop links with all major regional powers, upgrading bilateral relations by forging "comprehensive strategic partnership" with Iran, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.

The above countries are long-standing antagonists in the system of regional relations, and they also have diametrically opposite views on challenges to regional security. One of the main reasons for the significant progress in relations between the PRC and the key states of the region is that in the previous period, China was able to significantly strengthen its position in the region by rapidly expanding trade and economic cooperation. The economic factor in relations between the PRC and the states of the region has acquired special significance and allows exerting political influence on the diplomatic preferences of the latter.

According to Jon B. Alterman (2019), the main feature of China's strategy is that it builds relations not with the region as a whole but with its individual countries, taking into account their national characteristics and priority areas of

cooperation. In turn, the Arab countries find China not only a reliable partner but also an alternative force in the SEMED. The PRC is seen as a relatively honest broker since it does not carry the same historical baggage as the United States or European countries, due to its very limited presence in the region in the past.

In addition to geostrategic considerations, **security issues** play an important role for China in the context of its regional policy. It is linked to its desire to be a more serious player in the global counterterrorism struggle, which is driven by its domestic agenda.

The separatism of Uighurs, a Muslim minority living in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in north-western China is a primary national security concern. Several radical groups are operating on the territory of XUAR, the most active of which is the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan. The group consists mainly of Chinese Uighurs and declares the need to separate Xinjiang from the PRC and to establish an independent Uighur theocratic (Sunni) state there. It fights the Chinese authorities in XUAR and carries out terrorist attacks in other regions of the PRC (Clarke, 2017).

The purpose of the Uighur radicals is not only to destabilize the situation in the western regions of China but also to deepen ties with terrorist organizations abroad, in particular in the SEMED. Chinese Uighurs travelled to Syria and joined several terrorist groups, including ISIL and al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra. Fighters returning from Syria are becoming a significant threat to China's domestic security, and those remaining in the SEMED are threatening Beijing's economic interests, jeopardizing the implementation of Belt and Road concept.

In 2017, ISIL issued its first direct threat against China, releasing a video in which Uighur fighters vow to return home and attack their country. China approved Security Council resolutions 2170 and 2178 to attack the IS. However, it is the only one among the permanent members of the UN Security Council that has not taken military action against the group. Wang Zhen (2016) explains that China is neither enough militarily strong, nor it has the political will and social support for a strike on ISIL forces.

Finally, Beijing also seeks to enhance its status on the world stage by position itself as **an independent, alternative player in the region.** For instance, preventing foreign intervention in the Syrian conflict has become a priority of China's regional policy, which directly affects its relations with the United States. In shaping this approach, Beijing primarily took the lessons of the 2011 Libyan crisis into account. Chinese officials sharply criticized the military actions in Libya, declaring China's opposition to the use of force in international relations and called for an immediate ceasefire. Equally important to Beijing's argument was that by opposing military interference in the internal affairs of individual countries, China also protects itself from the threat of interference in its internal affairs.

In implementing the principle mentioned above, Beijing, along with Moscow, has repeatedly used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block US proposals aimed at punishing the al-Assad's regime. Beijing has also shown itself to be a consistent supporter of dialogue between government forces and

opposition. Thus, the PRC has made it clear that it will not give any preferential support to any parties including the Syrian government, and Beijing would take a positive and open-minded attitude towards any political solutions so long as all Syrian parties can accept them. Watching the struggle of regional and global powers on the Syrian arena, China was trying to position itself as an impartial as well as the most responsible among world powers (Saltskog, Clarke 2019).

The Chinese are working on the formation of the image of a friendly and responsible power in the region quite successfully. Ensuring the stability of SEMED region, along with the expansion of its own role in regional affairs, will continue being an essential priority for the PRC.

### *Questions*
What are objectives of U.S. policy in the SEMED and the wider Middle East?

What is dynamics of U.S. involvement in region affairs during two last decades?

What are strategic interests of China in the SEMED?

What is the main feature of Chinese policy in the region?

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# LECTURE 8
## THE EU AND THE SEMED: THE ISSUES OF COOPERATION AND SECURITY

### *The EU policy toward the SEMED before and after the Arab spring*

The European Union traditionally regards the SEMED as an important sphere of influence due to historical ties and a wide range of political, economic, and security interests in the region. Taking into account the geographical proximity, Europe is very vulnerable in the face of the threats emanating from the region: illegal migration, the spread of Islamic extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and others. All these factors determine the EU's high interest in ensuring regional stability.

Until recently, the EU's cooperation with the SEMED countries was based on three major initiatives.

The first is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Barcelona Process. It was launched in 1995 with the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference in order to strengthen EU's relations with the countries of the regions: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. Libya has had observer status since 1999. The Barcelona Process is a unique and ambitious initiative, which represents a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

In Barcelona Declaration, the Euro-Mediterranean partners established the three main objectives of the Partnership:

1. Definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue.

2. Construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area.

3. Rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Barcelona Declaration 1995).

The second initiative is the European Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP was launched in 2004 to foster stability, security and prosperity in the EU's neighbouring regions, both in the South and in the East. In 2015, the High Representative and the European Commission adopted the ENP Review, which brought a change to the cooperation framework and proposed ways to build more effective partnerships in the neighbourhood. The reviewed ENP adds 3 joint priorities for cooperation: 1. economic development for stabilisation; 2. security; migration and mobility.

Differentiation is a guiding principle of the EU relations with its neighbourhood. This approach recognises the different aspirations of the partner countries towards their relations with the EU. The ENP builds on the commitment of the EU and its neighbours to work together on key priority areas. This partnership is based on shared values, the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and social cohesion (The European Neighbourhood Policy (2021).

The third initiative is the Union for the Mediterranean (2008). It is an intergovernmental Euro-Mediterranean organisation which brings together 27 European Union member states and 15 Mediterranean Partner countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monaco, Montenegro, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Turkey, Syria, and Libya as observant. The mission of the Union for the Mediterranean is to enhance regional cooperation, dialogue and the implementation of projects and initiatives with an emphasis on young people and women, in order to address the three strategic objectives of the region: stability, human development and integration (The Union for the Mediterranean 2023).

These initiatives implied the European Union's assistance in democratic transformations and economic reforms to achieve stability and predictability of the countries' development. In practice, it turned out that the European initiatives had positive results mainly in the field of political dialogue, but they did not lead to significant socio-economic or democratic transformations in the region, as the events in the Arab world in 2011 vividly testified.

The outbreak of the Arab spring was a surprise to the EU, as evidenced by serious failures of European diplomacy at the first stage of anti-government protests. With the start of mass protests in Tunisia, and the governments' attempts to suppress them, the EU took a very restrained and cautious position. It limited its reaction to urging the authorities not to use disproportionate force toward the protesters. This reaction corresponded neither to the traditional European rhetoric about the need for democratization, nor the real trends in social and political life in the region.

After realizing that the «stability course» was ineffective, the EU significantly diversified its foreign policy strategy, trying to adjust it to the processes unfolding in the Arab world. The new approach provided a positive assessment of the revolutionary socio-political transformations.

Trying to catch a wave of change that it missed in Tunisia and Egypt, Europe (especially France) switched to active action in Libya. However, the

protracted military operation against the backdrop of the civil war in this country led to significant casualties among the population, as well as political and economic collapse. It turned Libya into a permanent source of instability near the borders of Europe and seriously damaged the prestige of the EU in the region (Dempsey 2016).

### *EU's policy toward the regional crises: the case of Syria and ISIS*

When civil war broke out in Syria in mid-March 2011, the EU, relying on negative Libyan experience, abandoned the idea of military intervention. It chose the tactics of pressure through sanctions and the recognition of the loss of legitimacy by the al-Assad regime. In April 2011, the EU suspended its proposition regarding association agreement with Syria and adopted a series of sanctions. Since the early months of the conflict, the EU has expressed support for oppositional Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and provided humanitarian, economic, and diplomatic support.

Soon after, a contradiction within the EU arose. The issue in question was whether to supply arms to the Syrian opposition. France and Britain tried to convince other European states to deliver weapons to the opposition to end the stalemate in the civil war. However, the majority of the EU member states did not support this idea being afraid of increased militarization in Syria. Thus, the common approach of the European Union towards the arms embargo collapsed in May 2013, and the countries started to pursue independent policies on this issue.

The strategy "Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to the Syrian Crisis" was adopted in June 2013. It defined main interests and objectives of the European Union with respect to the conflict in Syria: supporting a political process that can bring final resolution; preventing a spill over of the conflict to neighbouring countries; addressing the humanitarian situation; assisting the affected populations; and eliminating the consequences of the conflict on the EU (Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to the Syrian Crisis 2013).

However, in practice, the political and diplomatic role of the EU in resolving the Syrian conflict was quite modest. The European Union supported Geneva peace process initiatives, including Geneva Communiqué, and other UN diplomatic initiatives. At the same time, it did not play an independent or leading role. It rather acted in cooperation with other major international players, such as the United Nations, the Arab League, the United States, or regional actors such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The rise of ISIL in June 2014 and Russian military involvement in Syrian conflict in September 2015 further complicated the political environment in the region and left even less room for the EU foreign policy manoeuvre.

The terrorist threat posed by the ISIL became one of the most serious European security issues. The group was responsible for dozens of terrorist acts in European countries. Moreover, a series of resonant attacks, including the March 2016 bombings in Brussels and the November 2015 attacks in Paris, were carried out by European citizens who had fought with ISIL. An estimated 5,000 EU citizens (mostly from Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have

traveled to Syria and Iraq to become ISIL and other radical groups fighters since 2011. Approximately 30% of European fighters returned home (Gaub 2015).

In such circumstances, the EU adopted a new fundamental document "Elements for an EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh Threat" in February 2015. It outlined the basic European strategy in countering the threat posed by ISIL and other terrorist groups to regional and international stability. It stressed the need for diplomatic engagement and long-term support for political reforms, socio-economic development, and ethno-sectarian reconciliation.

At the same time, the EU was not able to develop a unified approach to military participation in the fight against ISIL. Each EU member determined the level of its participation in the war against the organization in accordance with its national interests. As a result, five EU member states – France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands – participated in the coalition carrying out airstrikes against the group in Iraq, and only two of them – France and the United Kingdom – in Syria (Pawlak 2016).

### The EU role in region: limitations and prospects

Even though the European Union disposes of a variety of strategies as well as diplomatic, political, economic, and humanitarian tools, it has not been able to effectively contribute to the resolution of the conflicts in the SEMED. Paradoxically, the EU did not play an essential role in resolving conflicts that affected Europe more than any of the other international actors involved. Besides, its policy was reactive – the EU took most of the decisions regarding the conflict in Syria in response to specific events (for example, the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks in European countries).

Both European and international experts criticize the role of the EU in the Syrian crisis and characterize it as rhetorical, secondary, and even marginal (Pierini 2018; Turkmani, Haid 2016; Youngs 2018). According to Pierini (2018) the new EU foreign policy architecture (the formation of which coincided with the events of the Arab spring) is part of the crisis itself. Despite Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the hard work of High Representatives and European External Action Service staff, the reality is that the EU's foreign policy has increasingly been crafted at Heads of State and Government level, and often in a crisis mode. The EU's foreign policy mechanism does work, although its work consists of routine operations (statements, demarches, coordination at high-officials level, the local conversation between ambassadors), while individual states and leaders take the real policy initiatives, at best, after direct consultations.

While the United States is showing a declining interest in the SEMED issues, the importance of the region for European security is growing. The differences in US and European views on important regional security issues, such as the Iranian nuclear program, the Arab-Israeli conflict, etc, might require a more independent policy on the part of the EU.

The Arab spring brought some sort of democracy only to one country – Tunisia. The situation in other countries of the region demonstrates the opposite tendencies of increased authoritarianism and instability. The changing dynamics in

the SEMED and international relations, in general, will require a fundamental rethinking of European foreign policy and methods of its realization in case the EU wants to preserve its role as an influential global actor.

## *Questions*

1. What are three main EU initiative regarding the SEMED?
2. What was the European approach toward the events of the "Arab spring"?
3. How EU policy towards the conflict in Syria has evolved?
4. What are limitations of EU role in the region?

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**MIGRATION PROCESS IN THE MEDITERANEAN**

*(Compiler Yuliia Maistrenko)*

*E-book on didactics*

**ODESA**
**ONU**
**2024**

# INTRODUCTION

Subject study of the discipline: Migration process in the Mediterranean.

Prerequisites and post-requisites (Place of the discipline in the educational program): Prerequisites – Political geography, Foreign policy and diplomacy of the countries of Asia and Africa, Foreign policy of the countries of Western Europe.

Post-requisites – Regional politics and security in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.

The purpose of the course is to consider the peculiarities of the migration process in the Mediterranean.

The course objectives: studies of the theoretical approaches to the analysis of the migration process in the Mediterranean; the foundations of EU migration policy; the main problems related to migration in the Mediterranean.

Expected learning outcomes. By the end of the course the students will be able to: apply modern scientific approaches, methodologies and methods for researching problems of international relations and foreign policy; participate in professional discussions in the field of international relations, foreign policy, public communications and regional studies, respect opponents and their points of view, convey information, ideas, problems, solutions and own experience on professional problems to specialists and the general public;

# LECTURE 1
## THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MIGRATION PROBLEMS

**The Mediterranean includes** European states: Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Monaco, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Greece; Western Asia (Middle East): Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestine, Gaza Strip; Northern African countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.

**The term "migration" is derived from the Latin word "migratio".**

The sociological dictionary states that migration should be understood as "the mobility of people in a narrower or wider geographical space, which involves the geographical movement of individuals or groups of individuals". A similar interpretation is contained in the economic encyclopedia: "Population migration is the movement of people, ethnic groups, which involves the return or change of permanent residence." **Migration** is the movement of persons who voluntarily or forcibly leave their permanent place of residence as a result of political, economic, social or other reasons and carry out external movement to another country or internal movement within the borders of the country in order to ensure their own safety, satisfaction or preservation of material, cultural, personal needs.

*Periodization of the international migration*

It can be distinguished the 3 periods in the development of international migration:

1. **Period of mercantilism** (approximately from 1500 to 1800) – migrants went from European countries to America, Africa, Asia, Oceania. It is quite difficult to determine the exact number of international migrants in that period, but it can be argued that these flows were enough essential. At the same time, there is a dominance of Europeans in some parts of the world, who had a significant influence on economy and culture of nations.

2. **The industrial period** (the beginning of the 19 th century – approx 20s of the XX century) is characterized by the fact that the centers of emigration were mainly European countries, the majority of the population which left the British Isles, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Spain. Mass migration has played an important role in social, economic and demographic transformation of Europe and made significant impact on international migration. Mobility of the population facilitated by the liberal policy of the host countries regarding migrants, open borders, low tariffs.

3. **The period of post-industrial migration** (from the middle 1960s). It is connected with the transformation of migration in a global phenomenon, when the number and variety of countries, countries of origin and host countries has increased. The vector of migration flows has changed, and the dominant role has become belong to Third World countries. Since 1960s, emigration from Africa, Asia and Latin America has very increased. In 1970s, even long-term countries of emigration, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, began to receive immigrants from the Middle East and Africa.

Interest in explaining immigration control policy emerged in the middle of the 1970s. The pioneers in this area were, however, **John Higham** (1955) and **Maldwyn Allen Jones** (1960), who had conducted research into the anti-immigrant mood. Together with the rise in the number of immigrants – mainly in Western countries – as well as with the politicisation and securitisation of that matter, more and more researchers became involved in researching of immigration policy.

But theorists of international relations did not deal with immigration issues for a long time, because migration was considered low politics and therefore it was not examined by academics, who were concerned with high politics, i.e. questions of national security and foreign policy. Only together with the wave of international migration of the beginning of the 1990s, but mainly with the emergence of a new generation of academics, international migration gain some space within international relations. Originally, it started to be related to state security and sovereignty, and thus to questions that are at the centre of concern of realism and neorealism.

Only after the end of the Cold War, some neorealists began to accept the broader concept of security, which allowed the neorealist theory to be applied better to migration policy analysis. One of the first to link immigration and security was **Myron Weiner**. He pointed out how immigration can destabilise societies and regimes – mainly in less developed countries, but also in more developed democracies. According to him, the reason for such destabilisation can be the fear of foreigners. The fear is not a question of pure xenophobia. Weiner notes that

many people perceive links between migration and economic and cultural threats. **Ole Wæver,** one of the founders of the so-called Copenhagen School associated with questions of the securitisation of migration, points at societal security, which he defined as 'the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and customs**. Didier Bigo** stresses the argument of inassimilability, which means that immigrants threaten national homogeneity and national identity and in that way they have a negative effect on social and state security. Finally, **Anastassia Tsoukala** refers to three types of threats perceived by opponents of immigration. On the basis of those she identifies three principles around which anti-immigrant arguments are articulated. **The first one** is a socio-economic principle – the rise in unemployment, the development of the parallel economy, the crisis of the welfare state, and deterioration of the urban environment. **The second one** is a securitarian principle – security problems in a narrow sense, from petty to organised crime, from urban insecurity to terrorism. **The third one** is an identity principle – the threat to demographic balance and to the identity of the receiving societies. These examples reveal that immigration has become subject to securitisation. The 'security' approaches highlight the fact that states and societies have started to look at newcomers as if they were the carriers of threats and these threats are widely understood. The perspective has its roots in realism and even more in neorealism; however, as Meyers points out, many mainstream theorists of realism do not agree with such a broadening of the concept of security.

The liberal approach offers a more optimistic view to the world. According to him, economic interdependence and interaction, the spread of democratic principles can contribute to development cooperation and establishment of peaceful relations between states.

Like realists, liberals believe that the basis of the behavior of states lies in the protection of their interests. However, in their opinion, cooperation opens better prospects than confrontation, creating opportunities for the acquisition of benefits by various parties in the long term, as opposed to one-time personal victories.

The role of international organizations is strengthened. They are able to help states identify common interests, reconcile conflicts and reach agreements that would meet the interests of all parties. Although, migration policy issues remain within the competence of national governments, however, there are examples when migration is successfully regulated at the international level. States agree to this cooperation, because it corresponds to their interests, and they are willing to freely fulfill certain requirements, which are provided for by it, because an outsider position may deprive them of the benefits of international cooperation.

More comprehensive view of migration policy may serve the idea of E. Meyer, who thought that migration policy is the result of the interaction of various socio-economic factors and foreign policy, and also depends on the main ones characteristics of the migration flow and differs depending of it is labor migration, resettlement migration or seeking refuge. E. Meyer names five socio-economic and foreign policy factors: state of the economy, intensity and composition of

migration, wars, foreign policy priorities, the ratio of racist and liberal views in society.

**Michael Walzer** was one of the first contemporary political theorists to examine the issue of political membership in debates about distributive justice. Political membership is "conceivably the most important" social good because it has historically determined access to other fundamental goods. It can only be distributed by taking people in. For Walzer, it is obvious who should decide how to distribute the good of membership: "we who are already members do the choosing". To elaborate the nature of the political community and whether it has the right to control migration and membership, Walzer compares political communities with three associations: neighborhoods, clubs, and families.

The first analogy is with neighborhoods, which he defines as a random association of people living in close proximity. Because neighborhoods have no formal admissions policies, people are able to move into and out of neighborhoods for reasons of their own. Should countries be like neighborhoods, permitting people to move to whichever they want? **Walzer argues they should not.** Political communities have an obligation to provide for the security, welfare, and culture of their members. If they are not able to select among wouldbe members, "it is likely that neighborhoods will become little states" with "a thousand petty fortresses". In a world of open borders, neighborhoods might maintain some "cohesive culture" for a generation or two on a voluntary basis, but over time the cohesion would disappear. Walzer suggests the state's right to control immigration rests in part on the goal of preserving distinctive cultures.

This cultural imperative grounds Walzer's case for the state's right to control immigration, but he adds a qualification: The right to restrict entry does not entail a right to restrict exit. Controlling immigration is necessary to defend "the liberty and welfare, the politics and culture of a group of people committed to one another and to their common life," but controlling emigration involves coercing people who no longer wish to be members. Except in times of national emergency when everyone has a duty to work for the country's survival, citizens must be free to exit their country if they wish. The right of exit is one constraint on the state's right to control migration. This moral asymmetry between immigration and emigration suggests a second analogy. Countries are like clubs. Clubs have admissions committees and the right to control who can become a member, but they cannot prevent members from leaving. The club analogy, however, misses an important feature of the moral life of contemporary political communities.

This leads to the third and final analogy of families. Unlike members of a club, members of a political community often believe they are morally bound to open the doors of their country to a particular group of outsiders, those recognized as "national or ethnic 'relatives.'" In this regard, states are like families, "for it is a feature of families that their members are morally connected to people they have not chosen who live outside the household".

The implications of this "kinship principle" for immigration policy include giving priority to the relatives of citizens and taking in co-ethnics who are persecuted by other states. As Walzer puts it, "Greeks driven from Turkey and

Turks from Greece, after the wars and revolutions of the early twentieth century, had to be taken in by the states that bore their collective names. What else are such states for?" Taking stock of these analogies, Walzer underscores something that is unique about political communities: They possess jurisdiction over a particular territory. Unlike neighborhoods, clubs, and families, states have the right to control the physical location and movement of members and nonmembers in the territory. Yet, like clubs, they have the general right to set their own admissions policy, and like families, they have an obligation to take in those recognized as part of the "national family." For Walzer, the agent of collective self-determination, the "we" who controls admission into the territory and into political membership, is a culturally distinctive community. Walzer suggests one more constraint on the right of states to control migration: They are bound by the principle of mutual aid. Positive assistance must be provided to foreigners outside the territory if it is "urgently needed" and the risks or costs of giving it are relatively low. Wealthy countries can usually fulfill this duty by sending aid to poorer countries, but in the case of "persecuted and stateless" people, the duty can be met only by taking them in.

According to **David Miller**, the right of states to control immigration is grounded in the right of nations to be self-determining. Citizens are not merely co-participants in a scheme of social cooperation or subject to the same coercive legal regime; "they also relate to one another as fellow nationals, people who share a broadly similar set of cultural values and a sense of belonging to a particular place".

Members of the nation have an interest in the character and preservation of their national culture. Immigration generates racial and ethnic diversity, which affects the pace of change of the national culture. In his earlier work, Miller says that "immigration need not pose problems, provided only that the immigrants come to share in a common national identity, to which they may contribute their own distinctive ingredients". However, "immigration might pose a problem" in certain circumstances, for instance, "where the rate of immigration is so high that there is no time for a process of mutual adjustment to occur; consider recent immigration to California, where a large number of immigrants have arrived in a relatively short space of time. In such cases the education system and other such mechanisms of integration may be stretched beyond their capacity". In more recent work, Miller points to studies suggesting the racial and ethnic diversity generated by immigration may reduce social trust and trust in political institutions. These changes in turn may reduce public support for social welfare programs and the deliberative institutions of democracy. Nationalists conclude that if immigration does have this kind of impact, receiving states are justified in restricting immigration for the sake of protecting their national culture. Miller's nationalist argument rests on empirical claims that may not be accurate. If high levels of immigration do not have a negative impact on social trust, social welfare provision, or democratic participation, then it is not clear what reason is left for excluding migrants. It may be the goal of preserving a distinctive national identity. One troubling aspect of the nationalist view is that grounding immigration control in the

imperative of preserving national identity may open the door to racial and ethnic exclusions. Miller explicitly rejects racial exclusions: "To be told that they [immigrants] belong to the wrong race or sex (or have the wrong color) is insulting, given that these features do not connect to anything of real significance to the society they want to join.

Racial and xenophobic sentiments are not relics of the past; they are evident today in the rise of far-right parties in Europe and the white nationalists who helped usher Donald Trump into the White House. Liberal nationalists have sought to set racial and xenophobic elements outside of their concept of national culture, emphasizing the linguistic and cultural elements consistent with liberalism. Yet, the challenge for the liberal nationalist view remains what to do when a nation's commitment to racial and ethnic visions of national identity overtakes its commitment to liberal principles.

Many scholars reject **the conventional** view in favor **of open borders**. They begin from the basic liberal premise of the moral equality of all human beings and interpret liberal principles as requiring a policy of open borders. As Joseph Carens, the leading proponent of open borders, has argued, Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege - an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances. Like feudal birthright privilege, restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one thinks about it closely. Carens's analogy with feudalism is meant to highlight the unfairness implicit in being born a citizen of a wealthy country. Like being born into a wealthy family, citizenship acquired by being born in the territory of, or to parents who are citizens of, wealthy liberal democratic states is a matter of luck.

In his early work, **Joseph Carens** builds his case for open borders by drawing on utilitarianism, libertarianism, and liberal egalitarianism. Each of these theories shares the assumption of the equal moral worth of all human beings. If we take this premise seriously, we have no basis for distinguishing between citizens and aliens who seek to become citizens, whether the moral standard is maximizing utility, respecting the right to liberty, or ensuring equal basic liberties and some measure of material equality. Carens devotes greatest attention to applying Rawls's liberal egalitarian theory of justice to the issue of immigration. He revises the device of the original position such that parties adopt a global standpoint and select principles of justice that apply to everyone in the world, not just to fellow citizens. From this hypothetical global standpoint, not only would they not know what their social class background or life plans were, they would also not know which country they would be citizens of. As a result, they would choose to add freedom of international movement to the list of basic liberties that all individuals are entitled to. This right of free movement grounds a pro tanto duty on the part of liberal democratic states to open their borders.

More recently, scholars have developed additional arguments for open borders. They fall into two main categories. The first appeals to the liberal egalitarian ideals of moral equality and equality of opportunity. The basic claim is that respecting the moral equality of all human beings requires a commitment to global equality of opportunity.

According to Carens, equality of opportunity requires that "access to social positions should be determined by an individual's actual talents and capacities, not limited on the basis of arbitrary native characteristics (such as class, race, or sex)." Citizenship is also an arbitrary characteristic, so it follows that citizenship status is not an appropriate basis upon which to distribute access to rights and opportunities.

By restricting immigration, states deny equal opportunity to those who are entitled to it.

A second set of arguments for open borders rests on the value of freedom. There are several freedom-based arguments. The first contends freedom of movement is a fundamental human right in itself. People have an interest in immigration that is fundamental to their well-being, and this interest is said to be of sufficient weight to ground a duty on others to respect the right to immigrate.

Carens concludes that liberals should regard freedom of international movement as a basic human right, which grounds a duty on the part of states to open their borders. Another consistency argument is made with regard to exit and entry. The right to exit one's country is widely recognized as a human right.

**Phillip Cole** argues that the right to exit a country entails the right to enter another. There must be "symmetry" between exit and entry: "one cannot consistently assert that there is a fundamental human right to emigration but no such right to immigration." Cole argues that the liberal asymmetry position is "not merely ethically, but also conceptually, incoherent.

The philosophical argument provided by libertarians rests on freedom of contract and exchange. Libertarians regard the state as a voluntary association among consenting property owners. So long as migrants do not violate the security and property rights of others, the libertarian state should not prevent their migration. Proponents of open borders acknowledge some qualifications to their case. For example, Carens says if migrants pose a threat to national security, states are justified in excluding them. Another potential qualification would arise if "too many immigrants came within a short period," which might lead to a breakdown in public order in the receiving country and leave everyone worse off in terms of liberty and welfare. However, Carens is quick to add that the national security qualification is contingent and self-limiting: It only justifies the exclusion of specific migrants who can be shown to pose an actual threat. He also doubts that states would ever reach a circumstance in which the public order qualification would kick in. These weak qualifications do little to constrain the claim that borders should generally be open and people should generally be free to move if they wish.

The globalization thesis, associated above all with **Saskia Sassen**, holds that the logic of globalization (understood as increasingly integrated international capital and service markets) renders migration controls essentially untenable. There are three elements to the argument. First, important elements of immigration policy have shifted from states to supranational institutions, most importantly the EU but also the European Court of Human Rights and bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Second, consistent with the arguments of postnationalism, an emergent international human rights regime – channelled domestically through the

judiciary - reduces the capacity of nation-states to limit immigration and refugee movements (thus restricting sovereignty). Finally, there is a sort of unstable tension between the increasingly free movement of services, capital, and goods, on one hand, and the maintenance of limits on the movement of laborers, on the other.

**Multiculturalism** is the coexistence in a single political society of several distinct cultural groups willing and able to reproduce their specific identity; **Multiculturalism** is the state, processes, views, policies of a culturally heterogeneous society, focused on freedom of expression of cultural experience, recognition of cultural diversity; **Multiculturalism** is cultural, political, ideological, religious pluralism, recognition of the rights of minorities both at the social and state level.

**Migration and multiculturalism** – the latter defined generically as a strategy for 'managing ethnic diversity' – are closely related. Mass migrations raise issues of social and political 'management' of ethno-cultural relations, and this very 'management' becomes problematic when mass migrations intensify. Sudden surges of migration have regularly occurred in Europe and Australia throughout the last two centuries. The latest such wave started in the 1990s, triggering a destabilising backlash in Europe.

The recent intensification of mass migrations is an integral part of '**globalization**' – the increasing cross-border flows of information, internationally portable capital, globally 'tradeable' goods and services, values and norms, and, most importantly, ever more 'mobile' people. This last dimension of globalization – the increased mobility of people – has proven the most problematic and difficult to manage on the European continent. There are six interrelated reasons for these difficulties: the recent waves of mass migration have been sudden, powerful, and less controllable by the receiving states than past waves. In Europe, they involve not only 'intra-EU' migrations – which produce only moderate strain – but also much more socially problematic and politically traumatic 'extra-EU' movements of economic and political refugees (e.g. 'crisis migrations' from Africa and the Middle East), often from regions ravaged by conflicts and natural disasters; these waves involve, often for the first time, large numbers of people who are very different from the host populations, not just in their languages, cultures and identities, but also in their religious beliefs, outlooks, lifestyles and everyday practices. Absorption of such immigrants, especially Muslims from the destabilised regions of Africa, Asia and the Middle East, has proven more difficult than the absorption and integration of more 'similar' immigrants in the past; Europe's immigration regime bifurcates. The eastern neighborhood of the European Union (EU), which comprises a distinct group of former Soviet Union countries (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), is an area of competing influence between Russia, which hopes to retain and consolidate its regional hegemony, and the EU, which has forged cooperative relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, mainly on the basis of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. The competition also involves quite distinct strategies of management of mass migrations and immigrant integration, thus creating a competing migration system

within Europe; many 'external' (extra-European) immigrants have limited knowledge and experience of their European host societies, and therefore less 'integration capacity' than intra-European migrants. This is often exacerbated by the traumatic experiences of migration, thus producing a tendency for ethno-religious communalism, sometimes even defensive particularisms, which, in turn, provoke a hostile backlash from 'host' populations; mass immigration in the 1990s and 2000s has coincided with waves of terrorism and the national security scares which accompany them, especially those related to Islamist terrorism. They also coincide with 'backlash terrorism' (as illustrated by Breivik's mass murders in Norway). Consequently, 'others' – especially Muslim immigrants – are suspected of disloyalty, anti-western sentiments and, generally, of reluctance to integrate with their host societies. Radical declarations by religious zealots, themselves leaders of backlash movements, further increase such suspicions; the Great Recession, hitting the 'Mediterranean belt' of the EU, which also receives the largest number of 'non-EU' immigrants, exacerbates tensions. These immigrants face high unemployment and hostility from local workers forced to compete for scarce jobs.

Reactions to these new circumstances seem to have been similar throughout Europe: a backlash against mass immigration and 'tolerance of ethno-cultural diversity', the latter often identified with 'multiculturalism'.

In the EU's eastern regions, ethnic minorities have attracted the hostile attention of an increasingly vocal extreme right. In Western Europe, there has been a shift in leaders' and the public's attitudes away from tolerant 'multicultural acceptance of cultural diversity' towards suspicious 'assimilationism'. Some even diagnose a more radical shift towards 'post-multiculturalism' that salvages some liberal elements, such as civic nationalism, but sacrifices others, such as ethno-religious tolerance. However, these general statements, as almost all contributors have stressed, require some clarifications and qualifications. For a start, the European backlash seems to be directed mainly towards uncontrolled 'crisis migration', especially the inflow of 'economic refugees' from outside Europe. 'Illegals' are suspected of abusing the system and resisting integration. While the leading role in spreading these suspicions has been played by right-wing movements and parties, anti-immigrant attitudes have gradually percolated to mainstream political parties and leaders. In France, the anti-immigrant and pro-assimilationist National Front leads in opinion polls; in October 2013 over 24 percent of polled French voters intended to support it.

As recently as 2009, the National Front was still a marginal party attracting only 6 percent of the popular vote in European Parliament elections. The anti-immigrant Freedom Party in Holland proposes a pan-European alliance before the 2014 EU parliamentary elections aimed at restricting immigration and asserting cultural assimilation. In crisis ravaged Greece, the extremist, neo-Nazi New Dawn organises attacks on immigrants and threatens forced expulsion of refugees. The Eurosceptic Five Star Movement in Italy proposes drone surveillance of the Italian coast and strict control of the inflow of African refugees. The Bulgarian government is constructing a razor-wire wall on its border with Turkey to stem the

inflow of illegal immigrants; this is in response to a wave of refugees from war-torn Syria.

The backlash has resulted in tighter control of 'crisis migration' and further restrictions in assistance to refugees. The 'legitimate' 'labour market migrations' within the EU, by contrast, create less controversy; they are largely accepted as a part of the integration process. The accompanying policy shift may not be as comparatively illiberal as some critics suggest. This is partly because all European countries have always embraced assimilationist policies – less tolerant of cultural diversity than Australian multiculturalism – and partly because the radical backlash is kept under control by liberal elites. Also public attitudes, policies and elite strategies in Europe are diverging. The most crisis afflicted societies, like Greece, Italy, Spain and, increasingly, also France, have experienced the strongest political backlash, with anti-immigration and anti-immigrant parties gathering strength. The less affected societies, like Germany, Poland and most of the Scandinavian countries, control the backlash by distinguishing between legitimate (legal and intra-EU) and illegitimate immigrants, with the latter facing stronger controls and restrictions. Finally, the non-EU countries, like Russia, seem to be embracing quite distinct strategies of immigrant selection and adaptation.

Similarly, the backlash against 'multiculturalism' – often misconstrued as an uncritical cult of ethno-cultural diversity ('Multikulti') – takes different forms. It is illiberal mainly at the political fringe. The critics belonging to the political mainstream, however, remain liberal; they point to the social pathologies that often accompany poorly managed mass migrations. Their attitude towards ethnic diversity is more cautious, perhaps more circumspect and conditional, than the attitudes of the extremists. Thus very few observers realise that Angela Merkel's criticism was directed at 'Multikulti' and not 'multiculturalism'. 'Multikulti' – a superficial and uncritical celebration of cultural diversity, with little concern for social integration – is a caricature of multiculturalism as understood and practised in Australia. The problem is that the 'finer points' escape public (and media) attention, and that the public denunciations of 'Multikulti' by a powerful and popular EU leader have been widely interpreted as being directed at mainstream liberal strategies. This has caused 'collateral damage' to the reputation of integrative multiculturalism.

### Questions
What are the main approaches of representatives of the neorealist paradigm to the analysis of the migration process?

What are the main approaches of representatives of the neoliberal current to the analysis of the migration process?

What are the main approaches of representatives of the multiculturalism to the analysis of the migration process?

### Literature

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## LECTURE 2
## LEGAL AND NORMATIVE BASES OF REGULATION OF THE MIGRATION PROCESS

After the end of the Second World War, universal human rights were formulated in international law. The regulation of migration processes is connected with protection of human rights.

The international normative framework on international migration includes instruments pertaining to the human rights of migrants and the rights of migrant workers, and the protection of refugees as well as instruments designed to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking. These instruments have been ratified in varying degrees by huge number of states.

First of all, we should mention the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948**, developed by the UN as a model to which all nations should strive. For migration it is very important articles according to which every person has the right to free movement and choice of residence within the borders of his state, and can also leave any country, including one's own, and return to one's **country (Article 13**); everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries **(Article 14).** The right to family unity remains a controversial issue. The right is enshrined in international law; **Article 16 (3)** of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states clearly that: "the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by the society and the state". Splitting families apart deprives each member of the fundamental right to respect of his or her family life. Whether the principle of family unity requires a State to admit the non-national family members of someone residing legally on its territory is the point of contention. Many States do, in fact, permit the entry of spouses and minor children to join a lawfully resident immigrant, but many also place serious restrictions of the ability of families to enter.

The main principles of the Declaration were developed in two general conventions on human rights - **the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights** and **International Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights** (December 16, 1966). These documents protect all people, regardless of their citizenship and legal status including migrants.

The provisions on freedom of movement, the right to leave and return gained legal force. Covenant on civil and political rights prohibits inequality between citizens and foreigners with the exception of some political rights (voting rights, civil service). In accordance with **Article 13** of the Covenant, legal migrants have protection from illegal deportation. Provisions against slave and forced labor, unjustified arrests or detentions are very important for migrants. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights obliges states to create for all its inhabitants, regardless from their citizenship, proper working and living conditions, health care, implementation of cultural rights.

The standards of treatment with migrants are also contained in the series universal international legal agreements which do not directly relate to the migration sphere. This is, for example, **the UN Convention on the Prohibition of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965),** which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national or ethnic origin. **The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)** guarantees that every child who is in the territory under the jurisdiction of a state has the right for a name and a nationality, especially if the child is threatened statelessness. The Convention protects the child's right on the care of both parents (the norm that appears extremely important if one of the parents does not have legal status in the state), on access to education regardless of legal status, etc. **The Convention against All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)** is increasingly important due to the feminization of migration processes. **The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Dehumanizing Treatment (1984)** is also important for the migration field. It prohibits the deportation of a person to countries where he may be at risk of torture. A similar provision is included in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which has been interrupted to prohibit the return to a State where there is a "real risk", that the person will be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment.

The UN 1951 refugee Convention is widely recognized by the countries of the world. It is one of the documents most supported by the international community (ratified by 145 UN member countries). It provides for base standards treatment of refugees. The most important among them is the principle non-refoulement, the essence of which consists in the prohibition of expulsion or forced return of a foreigner to his own country because of the threat to his life or freedom. According to the Refugee Convention freedom of religion, the right to give religious education to children, the right to go to court, to receive primary education, state aid, etc must be guaranteed.

In matters of housing and employment, the treatment of refugees should be at least no less favorable than that of other foreigners. The Convention contains provisions on refugee documents, including the giving of a travel document for crossing state borders in the form of a passport, their naturalization etc. The rights of refugees are inseparable from their responsibilities towards the country, which includes the implementation of the legislation of this country.

These international legal acts and their main provisions formed the basis of agreements in the field of migration at the regional, including European region.

**The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms** was adopted in 1950 within the framework of the Council of Europe. It contains a number of important provisions for migrants. The convention does not contain direct instructions on the right to use asylum or enter the territory of a foreign state. At the same time, according to the conclusions of **the European Commission on Human Rights**, Article 3 of the Convention, which refers to the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, unequivocally confirms the inadmissibility of deporting a foreigner to the country where he will be exposed to the risk of such treatment. This approach has been used repeatedly by the European Court of Human Rights in cases of forced return. **Article 8 of the Convention**, which guarantees respect for personal and family life was also interpreted in the context of protection against deportation. It was applied mostly in relation to the second-generation immigrants or those who have lived in the host country for most of their lives and expulsion would lead to disruption of family relations, personal social and cultural ties.

**Protocol No. 4** is important for migrants. In particular, its **Article 2** guarantees to a person who is legally present in the territory of states, freedom of movement and choice of residence, as well as the right of everyone to leave the country, including their own. **Article 3** does not allow the expulsion of a citizen from the territory of his country and provides undisputed right of return. **Article 4** prohibits collective deportation of foreigners; it requires careful and objective study of any case on an individual basis.

Procedural guarantees relating to the expulsion of foreigners are specified in **Article 1 of Protocol No. 7**, which states that a foreigner, who legally leaves on the territory of the state, cannot be deported without decision made accordingly to the law. He should be given the opportunity to provide evidence against his expulsion, to demand a review of the case and something like that.

An important document for ensuring the rights of migrants is **the European Social Charter (revised in 1996)**. The preamble to it states that social rights must be guaranteed regardless of race, color of skin, sex, religion, political beliefs, national and social origin. In the annex to the Charter, as well as the Additional Protocol to it, migrants can enjoy these rights. The person must be a citizen of other signatory countries and legally leave or work on the territory of the respective country.

**The European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers** opened for signature in 1977. Its main principle is the equality of rights of own citizens and foreigners who are citizens of countries that have signed the Convention. This is the difference between European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, according to which fundamental human rights are guaranteed regardless of a person's citizenship.

The norms of the Convention relate to the main legal issues of the situation of migrant workers: the hiring procedure, the procedure for conducting a medical examination and professional test, issuing permits for entry, residence and employment, procedures of reunification of family, living and working conditions, remittance of earnings to the homeland funds, social insurance and medical

assistance, cases termination of the contract, dismissal and new employment, in preparation for returning to the homeland.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has adopted three legally-binding instruments that are relevant for the protection of migrant workers: **the Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949) (No. 97), the Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity** and **Treatment of Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) (No. 143)** as well as the 2011 **Convention concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (No. 189).** All three have been complemented by non-binding recommendations.

The 1949 Convention concerning Migration for Employment covers recruitment and working conditions' standards for migrant workers. It establishes the principle of equal treatment of migrant workers and nationals with regard to laws, regulations and administrative practices that concern living and working conditions, remuneration, social security, employment taxes and access to justice. The 1975 **Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers** was the first multilateral attempt to address irregular migration and to call for sanctions against traffickers of human beings. It emphasized that States are obliged to respect the basic human rights of all migrant workers, including irregular migrants. It also provided that lawfully present migrant workers and their families should not only be entitled to equal treatment but also to equality of opportunity, e.g. equal access to employment and occupation, trade union and cultural rights and individual and collective freedoms. The 2011 Convention concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, which entered into force in 2013, was the first multilateral instrument to establish global labour standards for domestic workers, guaranteeing them the same basic rights as other workers. The convention establishes that domestic workers, regardless of their migration status, have the same basic labour rights as those recognized for other workers: reasonable hours of work, a limit on payment in-kind, clear information on the terms and conditions of employment, as well as respect for fundamental principles and rights at work, including freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.

As of 1 December 2013, 49 ILO Member States out of 185 had ratified ILO Convention No. 97; 23 Member States had ratified Convention No. 143; and 10 Member States had ratified Convention No. 189.

The 1990 **International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and Members of Their Families** is the third and most comprehensive international treaty on migrant rights. It establishes international definitions for categories of migrant workers and formalizes the responsibility of States in upholding the rights of migrant workers and members of their families. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights monitors the implementation of the convention and works to further its ratification. For most migrant workers, national laws and procedures remain the principal support or barrier to the exercise of rights. These laws vary significantly, however, in the extent to which they protect the rights of migrant workers. A range of activities

will help migrant workers better protect their rights. These include 'know your rights' training programs for workers who migrate. The better-informed workers are prior to migrating, the better able they are to assert their rights. This is particularly the case for contract labourers who may have little idea of the wages or working conditions to which they are entitled. Similarly, workers migrating to join family members need to know and understand their rights, both in relationship to their or children (particularly regarding domestic violence) and in relationship to their immigration status. Access to language training courses in destination countries will also help migrant workers to learn of and assert their rights when employers or family members violate them. Often, highly restrictive and detrimental contracts signed by migrant workers are in a language they do not understand

Monitoring recruitment agencies and employers is essential to the protection of migrant workers. This is particularly the case when migrant workers are working in domestic labour or other activities that keep them out of public view.

Training for government officials, employers and others as to the rights of migrant workers and their obligations under international and national law will also help curb abuses.

When abuses occur, legal representation for migrant workers can help them fight against discrimination, sexual harassment, lost wages and other violations of their labour rights. Consular protection can extend to covering the costs of such representation.

At times, public interest or class action lawsuits may help ensure that an entire class of workers migrants obtain their rights. Nongovernmental organisations and trade unions play important roles in providing legal support in such cases. Associations of migrant workers can be useful rallying points for identifying problems and seeking legal redress.

Finally, programmes that provide shelter and social services to migrant workers who have experienced abuse are essential to protecting their rights. Migrant workers who decide to return home after escaping abusive conditions may also need assistance in repatriation and reintegration. Nongovernmental organizations, religious institutions and trade unions provide such assistance in a number of countries. Consular protection can play an important role in ensuring that migrant workers do not face abusive situations. Consular officers can monitor the security of migrant workers in potentially vulnerable positions, using their diplomatic positions to engage the host country in interceding in favor of the migrant worker. Too often, however, there are too few consular offices and officials to be able to carry out these activities.

The most developed of these frameworks applies to refugees as defined by the 1951 UN Convention – that is, persons who have a wellfounded fear of persecution – and persons who would be tortured if they were returned to their home countries.

International legal standards for the protection of forced migrants are in refugee, human rights and humanitarian law. There is a growing international consensus, however, about the rights of persons who have been displaced by

conflict and other situations that are likely to pose serious harm if return takes place.

The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees emerged in the early days of the Cold War particularly to resolve the situation of some hundreds of thousands of refugees who still remained displaced by World War II and fascist persecution. At its core, this treaty substitutes the protection of the international community (in the form of a host government) for that of an unable or unwilling sovereign. The treaty limits this stand-in protection to those who were unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their home countries because of a "well-founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group". The Convention had time limits (refugees displaced by 1951) and geographic restrictions (Europe) that were lifted in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

The core legal obligation of States pursuant to the Convention/Protocol is non-refoulement. It's meen to refrain from forcibly returning refugees to countries in which they would face persecution. States do not have the obligation to provide asylum or admit refugees for permanent settlement, and they may relocate refugees in safe third countries that are willing to accept them. The Convention has been interpreted to require States to undertake status determinations; however, for asylum applicants at their frontiers or inside their territories in order to determine if they have valid claims to refugee protection. In practice, this has often meant admission and asylum in the host country. The Convention also ensures that states cannot impose penalties on refugees if they enter or stay illegally, as long as the refugees "present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence" **(Article 31).**

The Convention also sets out the rights of refugees who have been admitted into the territory of another country. Certain fundamental human rights such as freedom of religion **(Article 4)** and access to courts **(Article 16)** are guaranteed to be at least those accorded to the citizens of the state hosting the refugee. Thus if legal assistance is provided to citizens, the same must be accorded to refugees **(Article 16(2))**. Elementary education is also accorded to refugees as it is to citizens **(Article 22(1))**. Refugees lawfully residing in a host country are guaranteed public relief in this way as well **(Article 23)**. In addition, the Convention cannot be applied in a discriminatory way regarding race, religion, and country of origin **(Article 3).** Many important rights accorded recognized refugees, however, do not need to match those of citizens. Rights as fundamental as the right of association **(Article 15)** and freedom of movement **(Article 26)** are accorded to refugees to the same degree that they are accorded to nationals of other countries. Rights regarding employment **(Article 17)**, property **(Article 13)**, public education beyond elementary school **(Article 22(2))**, and housing **(Article 21)** are also accorded to refugees in a manner no less favourable than those accorded to citizens of other countries. However, with regard to wage-earning employment, refugees are accorded national treatment after three years of residence in the host country **(Article 17(2)(a))**. Certain legal matters are left completely to the host state. States are encouraged to facilitate the naturalization of refugees, thought they are not

required to match any naturalization rights provided to other non-citizens (**Article 34).**

The Council of the European Communities adopted a Directive in 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons. The protection is granted in situations of mass influx if the Council, upon recommendation by the Commission and taking into account reception capacities of the Member States, so decides by a qualified majority. Temporary protection may last up to a maximum of three years and obliges Member States to grant beneficiaries a residence permit, employment authorization, access to suitable accommodation, social welfare and medical assistance, access to education for those under the age of 18, and family reunification. The Directive requires States to allow beneficiaries to lodge an asylum application, but allows States to suspend the examination of such applications until after the end of temporary protection. In addition to temporary protection in the event of mass forced migration, European states provide complementary or subsidiary protection to individuals who do not qualify for refugee status under the 1951 Convention but still need protection from return to their home countries. In 2000-2002, for example, European states granted protection complementary to Convention protection to an average of 70,000 applicants each year. About 57,000 individuals received asylum in those same states in each of those years. **European Union Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004** directs that subsidiary protection shall be accorded to any person who cannot return to the country of origin because of serious harm, which consists of (a) death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict"

While the norms and international legal frameworks are well accepted, serious problems of implementation continue. These legal frameworks must be seen in the context of growing confusion about the nexus between asylum and other forms of migration. No international treaty provides for a right to asylum - only a right to seek asylum. Determining who is a refugee, as compared to an economic migrant, can be an extremely difficult task, particularly when individuals migrate for a complex variety of reasons. For example, an individual may leave his or her home because of persecution or life end angering conflict, but he or she may choose a destination because of family connections or employment opportunities or, even, the decision may be made for the individual by a smuggler. States have adopted various policies to deter asylum seekers from reaching their territory or to shift the burden for making refugee status determinations to other States.

**Trafficking** is defined as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation".

**The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children** and **the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air**, both of which supplement **the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime**, went into force in December 2003 and January 2004, respectively. Within a few years of their adoption, the trafficking and smuggling protocols have garnished considerable support, with more than 100 signatories and 67 and 59 parties, respectively. The Trafficking Protocol requires States to adopt measures to criminalize trafficking (Article 5), to provide assistance and protection to victims of trafficking (Article 6), to provide repatriation assistance to victims of trafficking (Article 8), and to prevent and combat trafficking (Article 9). The Smuggling Protocol requires States to adopt measures to criminalize smuggling and to prevent smuggling (Article 7, 8, 11, 15), requires States to preserve and protect the rights of migrants who have been smuggled (Article 16) and requires States to facilitate the return of migrants (Article 18). These instruments require international cooperation in combating smuggling and trafficking, an issue that will be further discussed below. The adoption of separate protocols on trafficking and smuggling reflects the need to clearly distinguish these two activities. Whilst undocumented migrants willingly accept to pay and take risks to be transported across borders in search of better life prospects, trafficked persons are victims of criminal groups. Yet, the sometimes overlapping nature of trafficking in humans, labour migration into exploitative situations, and debt bondage to pay off smuggling fees calls for a careful use of these terms. Persons might volunteer to migrate but then find themselves subject to violence, coercion and exploitation after leaving their home communities. Trafficking is defined by such exploitation, coercion and abuse, not the original motivation for migration. For example, migrants may agree to pay smugglers to bring them across borders. If they are unable to pay all of the costs, the smugglers may "sell" the migrants to businesses that cover the fees in exchange for indentured labour. This debt bondage can amount to virtual slavery, particularly for women and children forced into sexually exploitive occupations. Such a person has been trafficked, even if she initially consented to the smuggling arrangement. Trafficking and smuggling must be addressed at three levels. First is the supply of trafficked and smuggled persons. Second is the demand side - those who ultimately use or benefit from the services provided by trafficked or smuggled persons. Third are the traffickers and smugglers themselves as well as the corrupt officials who enable them to operate with impunity.

The Trafficking Protocol focuses most concretely on the third element, particularly the prosecution of traffickers. Yet, the Protocol recognizes that there is need to balance crime prevention/prosecution with protection of the rights of the trafficked persons. The Protocol states a purpose of "protecting and assisting victims of trafficking, "with full respect for their human rights" (Article 2). State parties are to take steps to protect the physical safety, privacy and identity of victims, assist them in legal proceedings, and consider measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of survivors (Article 6). It also urges

States to consider adopting laws or regulations that permit victims to remain in the territory for a temporary or permanent basis (Article 7).

The Protocol recognizes that prosecution and protection of victims are mutually supportive goals. The testimony of trafficking survivors is generally invaluable to the prosecution of cases against traffickers. Trafficking is a difficult crime to investigate and highly dependent on the willingness of victims to cooperate with law enforcement. Such cooperation can be highly dangerous for the trafficked persons, however. They will be too afraid to testify unless there are effective ways to prevent retaliation against them or their families at home. The United Nations recommends that law enforcement officials work in partnership with non-governmental organizations to help ensure greater protection of the victims of traffickers. Law enforcement should also implement measures to "ensure that 'rescue' operations do not further harm the rights and dignity of trafficked persons. Such operations should only take place once appropriate and adequate procedures for responding to the needs of trafficked persons released in this way have been put in place"

Identification of trafficking victims is exceedingly difficult, requiring a multi-sector approach, rather than reliance on law enforcement. When trafficking victims come to the attention of authorities through raids on brothels and other places of employment, the victims are often afraid to reveal their situation. They may fear retaliation by the traffickers, who often have paid police for their cooperation, or they may fear that they will be imprisoned or deported. Social service agencies, hospitals and clinics, schools, Laws in some countries provide for temporary or permanent legal status to trafficking victims. Often the legislation requires cooperation with law enforcement agencies in the capture or prosecution of the traffickers. In some cases, family members still in the country of origin will be admitted to the country of destination if the traffickers are likely to retaliate against them. The United States Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, enacted in 2000, in addition to increasing criminal penalties for traffickers, provides immigration benefits to victims of severe trafficking who cooperate in the prosecution of traffickers, including a special visa and access to benefits granted to refugees. A number of European countries have similar provisions that grant residency status to victims who cooperate with law enforcement. Such countries as Germany and the Netherlands have official 'reflection periods' during which victims are given time to decide whether to cooperate in the prosecution of their traffickers. In 2004, the European Union adopted a Council Directive on short-term residence permits to those victims who cooperate with the authorities.

### *Questions*
What are the main positions of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers?

What are the main positions of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?

What are the main positions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

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# LECTURE 3
## MODERN MIGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: TYPES AND RESONS. EUROPEAN DIRECTION

Our world is made of states and individuals – who constantly come and go. It is also a world of borders that people cross for many reasons: to work, to visit their families, to escape violence and natural disasters, to study, or to return to their country. Migration is not just the act of crossing the border, but an important factor in the erosion of traditional boundaries between languages, cultures, ethnic groups and nation-states, affecting all those involved.

Most countries simultaneously "receive" and "give" the population, and also serve for transit, although, of course, with different intensity. Modern migration is characterized by a phenomenon known as the "migratory transition", i.e., the transformation of migrant **supplier** countries into **recipient** countries. It is enough to mention Ireland, Italy, and Spain. Under modern conditions, **the composition** of migrants is **changing.** In particular, the share of women among them is increasing. They make up 48.4% of migrants; dominate the structure of migrants in Europe, Latin and North America, and Australia. In Africa, they are 47.1%, and in Asia - 42.4%, which is due to the high demand for male labor in the oil-producing countries of Western Asia.

If half a century ago, women migrated mainly as part of families, now they leave for other countries independently. As a result, the needs for female labor force, mostly unskilled, are growing, but are being met to a lesser extent by the local population (women in developed countries are actively entering the labor market, but they claim the prestige of niches and higher-paid jobs).

Structural changes also affected the **educational characteristics** of the immigrants. Unskilled labor force, holders of working professions continue to dominate the migrant population. However, post-industrial societies (where intelligence becomes the main driver of development) giving significant

preferences to highly skilled migrants. As a result, over the past decades, among immigrants to the EU, the weight of persons with higher education has increased from 15 to 25%.

At the same time, in recent years, a permanent contingent of migrant specialists has been forming, who constantly move between countries. In relation to them, we can speak not about the outflow, but about the circulation of brains. As a result, a network of transnational social, business, and scientific ties is created, which enriches both the countries of origin and the countries of destination.

The reasons of the increasing of the international migration movements, as well as changes in their essential characteristics, are primarily the result of globalization processes. The removal of obstacles to free trade, the growth of political, economic, and social interdependence between states, which is manifested in the formation of transnational business and the international labor market, the internationalization of science, education, information, and the unprecedented, development of communications, were importance for the dynamics and volumes of population migrations. In the context of globalization, international migration acts both as courses and as a result of global changes. Social inequality is a powerful factor in migration not only at the national, but also at the global level. As a result of the unbalanced development of some countries and regions, interstate differences in earnings and living standards remain significant.

A significant factor in the intensification of migration is the demographic disbalance. Population reduction in the "global North" is accompanied by its aging. The population of Europe is currently the oldest. In 2015, the number of people older than 65 was 17.6%, and in 2050 it will reach 28%. At the same time, the number of children under 15 and young people is the lowest in Europe. It is supposed that, in 2050, the half of the inhabitants of the "old" continent will be over 50 years old, and near 30 percent of population will be over 65 years old. Due to an aging and reduction of population, the demand for foreign workers in developed countries is increasing, while the presence of huge number of young people in developing countries ensures their supply. Despite faster development than in the "global North", the creation of new jobs in developing countries does not keep up with the rate of replenishment of the working population: for every 10 people who reach working age, only 7 new jobs are created.

The intensification of migrations is facilitated by the rapid development of transport and communication. The formation of global communication networks, on the one hand, provides the inhabitants of all corners of the world with access to information about opportunities for employment and study abroad, obtaining visas and necessary permits, transport services, which greatly facilitates moving. On the other hand, mobile communication, satellite television, and the Internet create for the migrant the possibility of a virtual presence in his homeland at the time when he is physically abroad, reduce the psychological burden and undesirable social consequences of migration, and make it more accessible.

In recent years, such a push factor as **climate change** has played a major role in increasing the dynamics of migratory movements. According to many

researchers, the importance of ecological reasons for migration will only increase in the future. However, climate change and natural disasters caused by it are already leading to massive forced migrations. According to some estimates, in the period between 2008 and 2015, as a result of droughts, floods, desertification, devastating hurricanes, etc., 25 million people were forced to leave their previous places of residence annually. Most of them moved within their own countries, but there were also many who went abroad. Very often, the environmental situation causes migration in combination with other reasons. Thus, in many cases, poverty, which pushes people to search for better living conditions abroad, is consequence of environmental degradation. At the same time, poverty can intensify environmental problems as it forces people to deplete water, forest and land resources, leading to irreversible ecosystem changes.

**Political factors** are also important. Its intensification was facilitated by openness of the vast majority of states, the growth of demands for the provision of human rights, including the right for freedom of movement, and the activities of human rights protection organizations and other international organizations. The large-scale geopolitical transformations of the end of the 20th century, for example, the collapse of the USSR, socio-political reforms in the countries of the former Soviet bloc, and the opening of China to the outside world, took place. These events created opportunities for international movements for millions of people who were previously artificially kept by regimes within national borders.

The radical social transformations of the 1990s were sometimes accompanied by deep political and economic crises, inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts. Therefore, the migration potential was released in the form of forced migrations. Unfortunately, even in the new century, wars, armed conflicts, and foreign aggression still remain widespread factors of population displacement. The migration policy of both the countries of destination and the countries of origin also affects the intensity and composition of migration flows. A number of countries in the world that have significant human potential, but are poor in natural resources, remained behind in industrial development, have no export prospects, specialize in training and labor trade, stimulate emigration (for example, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Jordan). Even if emigration is not the goal of the government, in some cases, failure of economic policies, corruption, weak social guarantees, violations of civil liberties, etc., lead to emigration.

International relations and bilateral relations are very important for the development of migration processes, in particular those based on historical ties between former colonies and metropolises, as well as interstate agreements, for example, on free movement, choice of residence and employment within the European Union.

Migration can be both **internal** and **international**. Internal migration refers to the passage from one area (province, county, municipality) to another area within the territory of the same state. International migration is a territorial relocation of people between states.

External migration is often called international resettlement, i.e. leaving the borders of national territories for the purpose of accommodation or employment.

Such migrations are often divided into local, actually regional, intercontinental and intracontinental and planetary.

External migrations are types of migration that go beyond the territorial boundaries of certain social entities (states, their regions, individual societies or international communities). External migrations indicate a possible outflow of money, personnel, intellectual potential, property or finances. Taking them into account allows you to draw scientific conclusions about the effectiveness of state (national) policy in one or another social sphere, in one or another direction. External migration is a partial or final loss of material and human reserves, which, being used outside national territories, can create and usually form public goods and social wealth.

Migration is usually divided into two categories: voluntary migration and forced migration. Voluntary migration is based on the initiative and the free will of the person and is influenced by a combination of factors: economic, political and social: either in the migrants` country of origin (determinant factors or "push factors") or in the country of destination (attraction factors or "pull factors").

"Push-pull factors" are the reasons that push or attract people to a particular place. "Push" factors are the negative aspects of the country of origin, often decisive in people`s choice to emigrate and the "pull" factors are the positive aspects of a different country that encourages people to emigrate in search of a better life. Although the push-pull factors are apparently diametrically opposed, both are sides of the same coin, being equally important.

Although specific to forced migration, any other harmful factor can be considered a "push factor" or determinant / trigger factor, for examples poor quality of life, lack of jobs, excessive pollution, hunger, drought or natural disasters. Such conditions represent decisive reasons for voluntary migration, the population preferring to migrate in order to prevent financially unfavorable situations or even emotional and physical suffering.

On the other hand, the "pull factors" or attraction factors are present in the receiving states. The promise of religious or political freedom, career opportunities, quality of life and the environment are factors of attraction for immigrants.

We consider that, generally, the voluntary migrants are more likely to immigrate to more developed states due to the ethnic, religious and cultural tolerance, the perspective of the higher wages, the opportunities for better employment and, often, the desire to escape the internal social and political situation of their country of origin. These migrants are mostly coming from countries with low or medium incomes, where, paradoxically, the population, motivated by the perspective of emigration, has a greater interest for professional development.

The most common type of migration movement is family migration, i.e. the movement of a person to another country together with a migrant, for family creation, family reunification, or international adoption. Family migration is the most common form of migration and provides in different countries from a quarter to a half of the number of arrivals. In the European Union, the share of family

migrants is more than a 30%. Such type of migration is characterized by the predominance of women – more than 60%, a high proportion of children – up to 25% of migrants. Its feature is also long-term, usually permanent residence in the host country. In conditions of increased mobility of the population, the number of international marriages increases. In EU countries, at least 11% of marriages are concluded by couples where at least one of the spouse is a foreigner.

Family reunification is often a result of labor migration. For example, in Europe, after the restriction of labor migration due to the oil crisis of the 1970s, immigration was primarily based on family reunification of former guest workers. Thus, in 1999-2002, the share of family migration was more than 70% of immigrants to France, approximately 50% to Denmark, Norway and Sweden, about 45% to Switzerland, 40% to Austria and Portugal, and 34% to Great Britain. Similarly, in the US, the legalization of several million illegal migrants at once in the mid-1980s led to a sharp increase in immigration to the country due to the arrival of their families.

Family reunification, in turn, can cause further chain migration, when, having received a residence permit, a migrant gradually facilitates the immigration of his relatives (for example, a migrant receives a wife's entry permit, she eventually invites her parents, they, in turn, their other children, who arrive with their wives, they later bring their parents, etc.). Although the main driving force of family migration is a person's natural need for family life, the direction of migration is mostly chosen depending on the living conditions in one or another country, that is, it is economically determined.

**Labor migration** has always been and remains the most common type of economic migration and, at the same time, the most numerous global migration flows. 74% of all migrants are persons of working age from 20 to 64, which gives reason to estimate the volume of labor migration at 190 million people. Although the majority of migrants do not belong to the category **of migrant workers** according to the legislation of the host countries, nevertheless, having arrived through other channels (family reunification, study, seeking asylum, etc.), they replenish the ranks of the labor force. Labor migrants primarily move in the direction of countries that need labor and are able to pay for it properly. Therefore, they are most eager to reach developed countries. However, almost half of labor migrants move between developing countries. The centers of their attraction are the new industrial states of Southeast Asia, the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf.

**Labor migration** can take permanent and temporary forms: according to estimates, two out of five migrants are workers. The qualification and professional structure of the foreign workers is very different. On the one hand, migrant workers harvest crops, work as builders, babysitter, or cleaners, and on the other hand, they manage transnational corporations, provide examinations, and work as advisers, teachers, and scientists. An increasingly form of labor migration is the movement of workers within transnational corporations, where territorial mobility is used as one of the components of personnel management. If in 1970 there were 7,000 multinational companies in the world, and in the early 1990s - 37,000, then

as of 2004, their number had increased to 70,000. The number of foreign branches of these companies increased after 1990 from 170,000 to 690,000, and the number of employees – from 24 to 57 million.

Globalization of the sphere of science and education has caused the intensification of the so-called **intellectual and educational migration.** For example, the Bologna process is the main tool for integration in the field of education in Europe. It is designed to create a single space in which common approaches to the content and organization of education will operate, and documents about education will be recognized in whole Europe. Education abroad is an important chance to acquire advanced knowledge, learn languages, familiarize yourself with other cultures, and improve your chances in the globalized labor market. The formation of integrated educational spaces is not only taking place in Europe. In particular, in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia is actively working in this direction; its educational institutions have concluded hundreds of agreements with universities in China, Korea, Japan, and the USA.

For foreign students, studying in leading educational centers abroad provides an opportunity to acquire quality knowledge at the same time as learning foreign languages, getting to know the culture and traditions of different peoples, which significantly improves the position on the international labor market. For destination countries, the provision of educational services is a highly profitable business. For example, 67% of international students in the US finance their studies from external sources. It is estimated that the country's income from foreign students in 2017 amounted to almost 40 billion dollars.

The presence of international students provides educational institutions with a wider choice, and local students with multicultural contacts, which are important for later life and careers. Countries of origin, in the event of the return of a specialist who studied abroad, receive a specialist which they could not train at home.

**Involuntary migration** is formed by individuals who have been forced to leave their homes due to fear of persecution, inability to stay due to political or military conflicts, natural and man-made disasters, or have been forcibly expelled by governments or non-governmental forces. Their goal, actually, is not migration, but security, since their own state does not provide it.

Forced migrants are often called refugees, but not every forced migrant becomes a refugee upon arrival at the resettlement valve. Three types of forced migrants can be distinguished: asylum seekers – applicants for refugee status, i.e. citizens of other states or stateless persons who, being forced to move from their place of permanent residence, applied for refugee status in the country of immigration, but have not yet received it; persons with temporary refugee status - citizens of other states or stateless persons to whom the state authorities of the country of immigration have granted temporary protection and rights for a certain period, identical to the rights of refugees, and actual refugees – citizens of other states or stateless persons who were forced to migrate for reasons sufficiently compelling for the state authorities of the country of entry to provide them with the

necessary protection and the right to residence and employment for an unlimited period, which is what the refugee status entails.

Migrants with **irregular status or illegal migrants** due to reasons or nature of migration may belong to any of the above categories. A foreigner can enter the country illegally and from the very beginning fall into the category of illegal migrants. However, he can arrive legally and only over time lose his status: a tourist who stayed abroad and got a job there, a migrant worker who continues to work after the end of the contract, an asylum seeker who was refused refugee status, but is in no hurry to return home.

Illegal migrants are in the most vulnerable position, risking not only the violation of their labor rights, but also becoming victims of human traffickers. Women and children are in the most dangerous position. A significant part of illegal migrants use the services of customs brokers in order to get to the country of destination. People smuggling has turned into a widespread and extremely profitable business.

*Questions*
What are the main types of international migration?
What factors couse internation migration in Mediteranean?
What are the main porpuses of modern international migration?

*Literature*
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# LECTURE 4
## FORMATION OF THE COMMOM MIGRATION POLICY
## OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In order to guarantee safe conditions for individuals at the global or regional or global levels, it is necessary to ensure the successful cooperation of the countries of the European Union, which have an effective migration policy in order

to satisfy the interests of the international community, the societies receiving migrants and the immigrants themselves.

During the last century, Europe experienced four main stages of migration, which determined the migration policy of its countries:

1. The first stage was observed after the end of the Second World War and was characterized by the mass resettlement of people who suffered from the war to the countries of Western Europe. This resettlement was observed within the European continent and the main migrants were Europeans who resettled in territories less affected by hostilities.

2. The second wave of migration began in the 60s of the last century and was associated with the fact that economic growth in Europe, so it needs workers. At first, the migrants were workers from less developed European countries, but then the labor force from Turkey and North African countries began to be attracted.

3. During the third wave of migration (mid-70s – late 80s of the last century), the demand for low-skilled workers **decreased** due to the technological revolution that took place during this period. Migration waves occurred both from less developed European countries to more developed ones, and from the countries of East and North Africa.

4. The fourth wave of migration was associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and armed conflicts in Yugoslavia.

At first, migration issues were of little interest to the heads of European states: they were resolved during informal communication between the leadership and only in the early 90s of the 20th century they began to acquire formal features. If we talk about the regulatory support for the movement of people within Europe, then we can only talk about the regulation of labor movement processes. In particular, the Paris Agreement on the establishment of **the European Coal and Steel Community, adopted in 1952**, guaranteed freedom of movement of labor. The same was defined in the two Treaties of Rome, on the basis of which **the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) were formed (1957).** They talked about permanent and season employees, as well as people who were not employed. And **in 1976**, the relevant **Program** was approved, which excluded the possibility of discrimination by employers in relation to hired migrant workers, who could claim decent working conditions, a decent salary and the opportunity to move freely with their family members.

According to **the Single European Act** adopted in **1986**, changes were made to the **Rome Agreements,** and not only economically active persons were able to move freely. However, those wishing to change their place of work had to prove their economic capacity and obtain permission from local authorities. Immigrants received much greater employment opportunities, but this mostly applied to citizens of European countries than to third-country nationals, who, in turn, were mostly subject to national rather than pan-European legislation. Accordingly, migrants from Asian countries had much less opportunities compared to Europeans. An important step towards the development of a common migration policy by European countries was the signing of **the Maastricht Agreement** on

the establishment of the European Union, which regulated fundamentally new approaches to the residence and employment of European citizens. This document stated that persons who are citizens of European countries that are part of the European Community are automatically its citizens, according to which they get the opportunity and the right to freely live and move around the territory of the European Union. With regard to external migrants, the Agreement stated that immigration policy should be formed taking into account the interests of all member states of the union, therefore employment of foreigners, **conditions for their border crossing, movement and residence on the territory of European states should be decided on an intergovernmental basis**. Migration issues were not aimed at expanding the rights of migrants. On the contrary, the policy regarding immigrants from third countries was aimed at protecting European citizens from external migrants. Therefore, the regulatory framework of the European Union did not contribute to the expansion of the powers of migrants, but had a law-enforcement nature, designed primarily to guarantee the rights of Europeans. However, the Maastricht Agreement noted that governments can take the actions they deem necessary to prevent smuggling and crime, as well as to control immigration flows from Third World countries.

Thus, a significant step in the formation of a single European migration space was the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement in 1995 agreements, initially for seven EU countries (Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, France), a little later - for Denmark, Sweden and Finland. In 1996, Norway and Iceland, which were not members of the EU, concluded special agreements regarding their participation in the agreements. In 1997, Italy joined the Schengen Agreements, Austria and Greece. Most of the Central European countries that have acquired EU membership in 2004 joined the Schengen zone in 2007. In 2009, Switzerland, which is not a member of the European Union, joined the agreement. The accession procedures of Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia are being completed.

In order to prevent the undesirable consequences of the abolition of border control, the Convention provided for measures to combat uncontrolled migration, arms and drug trafficking, and smuggling. It introduced a constant exchange of information and cooperation between different law enforcement and judicial institutions, in particular, the creation of the Schengen information system, where data on all persons who, under one or another circumstances, attracted the attention of the law enforcement agencies of the participating countries had to be entered.

The Schengen agreements also provided for the harmonization of visa policy. Visa's single model was introduced and developed common criteria for issuing visas, a list of countries and citizens has been compiled who must have visas to enter the Schengen area.

Originally, the Schengen Agreement also contained a section devoted to the issue of asylum. However, later, in connection with the signing in 1990 Dublin Convention (entered into force in 1997), it was removed. The EU countries agreed that the consideration of asylum seekers' applications should take over the country

that allowed them to enter, i.e. issued a visa, or the first one country of entry in case of illegal entry.

A turning point in the process of harmonizing the policy of European states in the field of migration was the signing **Amsterdam Agreement in 1997** (entered into force in 1999), where a **separate section is devoted to freedom of movement, asylum and immigration.** It is integrated into EU law by a special protocol to the Agreement Schengen agreements. Radically new was that the Amsterdam Agreement contained a provision that enabled the EU to adopt binding legislation in the field of migration for its member states.

In October 1999, at the summit of Tampere (Finland) EU heads of state agreed **on implementation Amsterdam Agreement**, in particular in the field of immigration and asylum. It was a special program was approved, which outlined final and short-term, five-year goals for the creation of a common system of migration regulation in the EU. According to the then chairman of the European Commission Romano Prodi, after the creation of a single market, the introduction of a common currency and the creation of the Schengen area, the harmonization of migration politics marked a new stage in the unification of Europe.

In 2000, the European Commission issued a document that became the first in the field of common immigration policy of the European Union. It was about the formation of a policy on the basis of which it was necessary to exercise control over the attraction of economic migrants and which was to be implemented within the framework of the European Union's common policy on asylum and migration. The document provided for the development of a special legal framework designed to regulate the movement of labor, in particular, skilled labor, within the European community and control its shortage. It also stated that thanks to immigration, it is possible to solve many problematic issues, in particular, improve the social protection of the population and optimize the labor market of a particular country. The message defined the main provisions regarding such a policy, the tools and methods of its implementation, as well as the subjects responsible for its implementation (trade unions, employers, heads of governments and other participants in civil society relations). It was also noted in the message that the member states of the European Union should establish active cooperation with those states from which the flows of migrants are coming, as well as take measures to prevent illegal migration. The understanding of the indisputable fact that it is impossible to regulate migration processes and overcome illegal migration alone, determined the formation of a new foreign policy vector of EU migration policy.

After the **implementation** of the program adopted **in Tampere in 2004,** already after the enlargement of the EU, the following program was approved in The Hague actions until 2010. It formulates tasks: to create a single European asylum system; develop legal migration and combat illegal employment; ensure integration citizens of third countries; to develop the foreign policy vector of migration policy; to improve the management of migratory flows. In addition to the development of joint legislation, the Hague program was focused on deepening the solidarity of the EU countries in the solution migration issues, provided for the operation of a number of financial programs of mutual assistance.

Five-year programs are a political document, that is, they do not belong to EU legislation and, therefore, are not binding. At the same time, they outline the main directions of the common migration policy, the means of achieving the stated goals, first of all, the development and adoption of relevant legislation.

Taking into account the shortage of labor force, primarily qualified, caused by the reduction in the number of working-age population. It was proposed the policy of controlled attraction of economic migrants as a component of common EU policies in the field of migration and asylum, development of joint legislation on this issue. Creating a legal alternative for those who want to get to Europe, will not only contribute to the reduction of illegal migration, but also pressure on the refugee protection system, increase its effectiveness.

Immigration policy should be accompanied by effective integration programs, which are a guarantee of using the positive results of the arrival of foreign workers, as well as measures against racism and discrimination, promotion of the ideas of cultural diversity through the education system and through mass information. The EU's common policy on attracting economic immigrants should also include cooperation with countries origin and active actions to prevent illegal migration.

In order to implement the developed strategy, the European Commission proposed a special mechanism for convergence of migration policies member countries. Common goals and guiding principles were defined in four areas: management of migration flows, acceptance economic migrants, partnership with third countries and integration citizens of third countries, as well as proposed tools for their achievement, in particular, the development of national plans, adoption joint legislative decisions, involvement of European institutions, use of opportunities of civil society and others.

These mechanisms have been successfully applied in other areas of integration European countries were supposed to be effective in this case as well.

In December 2005, after long multilateral consultations the European Commission approved **the Political Plan on Legal Immigration**, the adoption of which marked the confirmation of the change in the EU's immigration policy from the previously quite restrictive to a more pragmatic and open now, which was explained by demographics recession, the need for qualified workers to build the knowledge economy, as well as cultural enrichment and additional sources entrepreneurship and innovation. Its goal is to use the potential of migration for the development of Europe, including through the fullest possible integration those foreigners who are already on its territory, as well as regulated attraction of new contingents of foreign workers.

At the same time, **the main principles of the common policy of the EU** regarding migrants were formulated, as well as the strategic directions of its future development were determined. In particular, these principles provided for the following:

**The first principle** determined that the European Union is interested in forming a set of procedures and rules, transparent and understandable for application, which are designed to ensure the existence of legal immigration on its

territory. In other words, citizens of third countries should receive the information they need in order to understand their possibilities regarding the legitimization of entry and stay in European countries, the use of rights and freedoms on an equal basis with European citizens, as well as the implementation of movements on the basis of the visa policy in Europe in educational and professional purposes.

**The second principle** outlined the thesis that economic immigration should meet the needs of the labor market of European countries, determine the appropriate quality level of workers and their sufficient number. At the same time, the rights of migrants at the market had to be respected.

The **third principle** is the integration of immigrants into European society. An important point is that this process had to take place on a bilateral basis, that is, both the immigrants themselves and the country of their stay had to participate in it.

The essence of **the fourth principle** of the common migration policy of the EU includes solidarity, which was based on the equal responsibility of the member states of the European Union, an objective assessment of national migration policies and mutual trust regarding the development of effective migration measures. This should also include the cooperation of EU countries with third countries in the field of preventing illegal migration and developing labor mobility. Such cooperation was aimed at interaction with potential participants of the European Union, as well as with the countries from which the largest number of migrants came (African and Asian countries).

**The fifth** is integrated border protection and adequate visa policy. Prevention of illegal migration is very important. The European Commission **emphasizes** that mass legalization of illegal migrants is not an effective means of migration management and should be stopped. At the same time, the focus should be on the fight against the organizers of illegal movements, protection and support of victims of trafficking people, as well as providing illegal migrants with fundamental human rights, in particular, access to emergency medical care assistance, education of children. Measures to prevent illegal migration also include the return of illegals to their homeland, the development of cooperation in this matter both between member countries and and countries of origin of migrants.

Also **in 2008, at the Brussels summit**, **the Pact on Immigration and Asylum was adopted**, in which the main agreements of politicians regarding the regulation of migration processes on the territory of the European Union were recorded. The basis of this document was the slogan "prosperity, solidarity, security", which determined the further directions of development of EU migration policy.

The Pact defined migration as a process through which it was possible to ensure the economic prosperity of the countries of the European Union. However, this is realistic only under the condition of effective management of migration processes on the territory of Europe and taking into account the possibilities of European states to receive migrants, based on the needs of the labor market, the situation in the field of education, health care, housing, etc.

The main directions of migration policy indicated in this document: 1) ensuring integration processes in the migration sphere and taking into account the opportunities, needs and priorities of every country in the process of organizing legal immigration; 2) facilitating the return of illegal migrants to their homeland and preventing the illegal movement of persons; 3) strengthening control in the territories bordering the countries of origin of migrants; 4) development of the asylum system in Europe; 5) ensuring synergistic ties in the field of migration in order to improve interaction with countries that are donors of migrating persons.

The joint migration policy of European countries was determined by the tenets of the Message on Migration, which was presented by the European Commission in 2011. It determined that new social challenges, in particular, revolutionary events in the countries of the eastern and southern Mediterranean, became the reason for the activation of a new wave of migration to the territory of Europe. Taking this into account, there was an urgent need for the countries of the European Union to deepen cooperation in the field of common migration policy and to solve the following problems: to prevent a massive illegal influx of economic migrants; to provide asylum to persons who need it.

The Schengen agreements, that is, the cancellation of control over internal borders of the EU and its transfer to the external border, were incorporated into EU legislation with the adoption of the Amsterdam Agreement (1997). Today the zone is free movement in Europe, which was joined not only by the member states of the European Union, but also by a number of other states, covers almost the entire continent. Under these conditions, the interests of internal security demand from the EU countries a significant strengthening of the external border, solidarity efforts with his protection**. In 2004, the European Agency for Operational Management was founded cooperation on the external border** (FRONTEX), the main functions of which are the coordination of joint actions on the external front borders; personnel training; risk analysis and forecasting of the migration situation; resource allocation and assistance to member countries facing massive the arrival of illegal migrants. The procedure of actions of the rapid border patrol groups has been developed response teams (Rapid Border Intervention Teams – RABITs), which can be deployed upon request of any member state faced with a massive influx of illegal migrants (2007), established joint patrols in the Mediterranean Sea, through which it passes the most intensive channel of illegal transfer of migrants to Europe.

In April 2012, the European Council approved the Response Strategy EU on migration pressure, which defines a number of strategic priorities of the European Union in this area. Among them: strengthening of cooperation with countries of origin and transit regarding migration management; improvement of external border management; preventing illegal migration through Turkish-Greek border; prevention of abuse of legal migration channels; ensuring compliance with the law

on freedom of movement while preventing abuse by citizens of third countries; improvement of the system of regulation of migration movements, including the return of migrants home.

As part of the implementation of the first priority, i.e. cooperation with third countries, it is planned to improve their own capacity to regulate mixed migration flows (that is, those that consist partly of refugees and partly of economic migrants). For this purpose, EU planned to supply the countries of first asylum all necessary instruments  for providing protection to refugees in accordance with international standards, prevent such further movement of refugees; enforce and continue conclusion of readmission agreements; deepen partnership in the field of mobility with third parties countries; to develop a dialogue with the countries of the Eastern Partnership in the context of challenges, caused by migration flows from the Southern Mediterranean, moving through the Western Balkans.

In Europe, there was demand for both low- and high-skilled labor. Migration relations with the neighboring countries of the European Union were multifaceted, as evidenced by the development of the phenomenon of migration during four main stages. Thus, in the cooperation of the EU countries with the Mediterranean states, it is distinguished the following stages:

1 stage, which lasted during 1960–1995; it was characterized by the implementation of the global Mediterranean policy;

2 stage, which lasted during 1995-2005; an important event of this period was the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership;

3 stage, which lasted during 2004-2008; this stage was characterized by the implementation of the Unified Neighborhood Policy;

4 stage, which began in 2008 and continues to the present time; this phase was marked by the restart of the Barcelona Process: the Union for the Mediterranean.

Features of **the first stage** were the creation of trade, cultural-social, investment-innovation and financial relations, as well as the formation of the foundations of an effective migration policy aimed at attracting qualified labor to the territory of Europe. During this period, European countries are developing rapidly, establishing socio-economic relations and demonstrating progressive transformations after the Second World War. This led to the fact that at the end of the last century, Europe turned into an independent center of world politics, which established its own strategic lines of behavior with neighboring regions, in particular, with the countries of the Mediterranean.

Thus, in the first half of the 90s of the 20th century, a qualitatively new phase of relations between the EU and the countries of North Africa began, due to the rapid development of Europe and its understanding of the need to revive cooperation with neighboring states. The signing of **the Barcelona Declaration** in 1995 characterized the second stage of relations between the EU and the countries of the Mediterranean Partnership. The third stage of the European Union's cooperation with the Mediterranean countries, which began in 2004, was characterized by the declaration by the European Union of its intentions to implement the Single Neighborhood Policy in order to ensure the realization of Europe's interests in increasing the number of Eastern countries with which the leadership of European states sought to interact.

*Questions*
What are the main principles of the common migration policy of the EU?
What are the main principles of the Pact on Immigration and Asylum?
What are the main principles of the program adopted in Tampere in 2004?

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# LECTURE 5
## THE MIGRATION PROCESS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

The concept of security has changed and includes a wider range of problems: environmental pollution, depletion of natural resources, rapid growth of population, proliferation of nuclear weapons, drug addiction, organized crime, international terrorism, violations of human rights, unemployment, poverty, mass migration movements.

In the broadest sense, **security** is defined as the state of the absence of threats to the existence of a certain unit (person) and the realization of its interests, and in the presence of such threats, effective protection against them. Researchers distinguish three main levels of security: personal, national, international (global).

**The concept of national security** is related to the protection **of the state's national interests** in various areas and the possibility of its development**. B. G. Buzan,** professor of political science at the London School of Economics and Political Science, **identified five types of security:** military, social, political, economic and environmental. Along with **the traditionally** most researched types of **security, such as military, economic, political, informational, ecological, other types of security** are also distinguished, which are important in view of the connection between **security issues and international migration**, namely: **demographic, ethno-cultural security, security of the ethno-national community.**

**Irregular migration** is also an important reality in the Mediterranean as the sea serves as one of the key gateways for the "unrecorded" immigrants seeking to flow into the EU. The issue has started to be addressed with increasing urgency, especially by the EU states bordering the Mediterranean after the 1990s.

**"Personal security" of a person** is a stable state of reliable protection of a person's vital, legal and private interests, rights and freedoms, his ideals, values from illegal encroachments, threats of harmful influences of any kind and development of human potential and maintenance of effective stimulation of the individual's activity. At the same time, two main points are emphasized. The first is related to the protection of a person's interests from threats, and the second - to the provision of conditions and guarantees for its development.

Khalid Koser argues that Understanding migration as a national security issue has consequences for the kind of policies that are used to counter the threat. It is used to justify "greater surveillance, detention, deportation and more restrictive policies". This in turn has an impact on the human security of migrants (by encouraging them to use more dangerous routes and to turn to migrant smugglers and human traffickers, and by restricting their opportunities to reach safe countries), and on the public perception of immigration (by encouraging anti-immigrant tendencies). This is certainly true of the Mediterranean region. It is for this reason that many authors conclude that human-security threats to irregular migrants by outweigh the national security threats that they may create.

Human security aims to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. The thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean were attacking the most vital core of human security: life itself. From a human-rights perspective this failure is leading to a breach of the most fundamental of human rights: the right for life.

The EU's response to the situation in the Mediterranean points to an unresolved tension between approaches stressing national security and those that focuses on human security. While official rhetoric takes note of the humanitarian considerations of saving lives and guaranteeing the human rights of irregular migrants, and the need to address the root causes of increased migration (conflicts, human-rights abuses, poverty, and socio-economic factors such as unemployment in the countries of origin), the response focuses largely on measures intended to curtail irregular migration by means of migration management and border management. The EU's immediate response to the tragedies of April 2015 (among the worst in terms of loss of lives in the Mediterranean) is indicative of the focus on state security-based approaches. However, targeting smugglers is only targeting a symptom rather than a cause. The root cause of the migration, as has been outlined above, is human insecurity related to conflict, persecution, and poverty. The destruction of smugglers' capacities, assets, and networks does nothing to address to human insecurity. As already mentioned, the dangerous sea crossings are the part themselves of the "Fortress Europe". Highly bureaucratic visa procedure for the Schengen area makes authorized travel into the European Union impossible for people escaping conflict, persecution, or poverty.

In fact, human tragedy is one of the basic features of migration across the Mediterranean. The number of deaths by drowning and freezing can only be approximately estimated. It is guessed that at least 10.000 persons died while crossing over the Mediterranean to arrive at Europe's southern coasts over the last decade. Therefore, the question of irregular migration should be considered broader in the sense that it involves the "issue of human welfare". However, this humanitarian aspect is often neglected as immigration is presented and perceived as a threat to stability and welfare of European societies rather than realizing the "humanitarian challenge" with regard to the migration flows in the Mediterranean. This imbalanced securitised approach does not only aggravate the situation, but also creates situation in which stricter migration controls causing an increase in irregular migration, which in turn generate the need for more controls. And the humanitarian aspect of the issue is lost in the shadow of this circle.

Migration can also be perceived as threat to the social and economic structure of countries of destination, for instance, immigration can cause the rising of unemployment. Here again, **the sense** that migration poses a threat can prevail even when economists argue that migration is a positive force linked to the flows of goods and money, and that European demographics actually indicate that Europe would benefit from an influx of migrants. Migration also benefits developing countries through remittances. Furthermore, "destination countries benefit from the cheaper and often indispensable services provided by these migrant workers. In the future, demographic balances imply подразумевает a growing need for and supply of international migration, especially of the lower-skilled people".

Another challenge coused by irregular migration is the perception by people in transit states and, in particular, destination states that the situation is out of control. Control of movement across borders is of course one of the basic functions of a state. Thus it can be argued that "states use migration control measures to demonstrate their sovereign control over territory." States determine who can enter, reside, and work in their territories, and the means they use to do so include migration management and border management policie.

The most studied is the impact of international migration on various types of national security. There are three directions of such dependence. 1) Conflicts with the use of force – how international migration contributes to the emergence or support of internal and international conflicts, organized crime and international terrorism; Diaspora formations contributing to military, political, and legal instability are considered a security threat. 2) "Balance of forces" - how international migration affects the economic, military, diplomatic power of states; migrants are considered as resources for achieving certain goals in the economic sphere, diplomatic relations and as participants in military operations under the flag of the country of immigration. 3) State power and autonomy – the state's ability to effectively control its borders and maintain national identity; migrants are considered as objects of migration policy, which involves the promotion or restriction of immigration and the selective selection of immigrants, as well as a threat to the traditional national identity of the state. In today's world, with the

growth of cultural, along with social, adaptation factors of immigrants, the question of uniquely defined national identity is one of the most important in the interdependence of security and international migration. The national identity of most countries is rooted in history, culture, ethnicity, and race. By forming cultural enclaves in a relatively ethnically homogeneous country, immigrants pose a threat to the unity of national identity.

The relatively new concept of **"demographic security"** as one of the types of national security means the protection of the gene pool of the people from various negative influences and the creation of favorable conditions for its existence, development and self-realization. The need to introduce this new concept into scientific circulation is caused by a deep demographic crisis that has affected many countries of the world on different continents. Deterioration of population health, increase in mortality, drop in birth rate and life expectancy **are threats** to the gene pool of peoples, leads to a decrease in population growth, "aging of the nation", etc.

**The security of the ethno-national community** can be defined as the protection of the vital interests and values of the ethno-national community, in particular, its statehood, status, language, culture, way of life, economic and ecological niches customs, etc., from internal and external threats. This refers to both ethnocide and deportation of ethno-national communities, liquidation of their statehood, as well as discrimination, forced assimilation, artificial obstacles to the realization of their rights.

Historically, the concept of **international security** has been equated with the use of force between nations, with a particular focus on great power warfare. **International security** is a state of international relations that excludes the violation of peace and the emergence появление of a real threat to the development of humanity, under which peoples can sovereignly, without interference and pressure from outside, determine the ways and forms of their socio-political development.

**International security** is considered as a state of political, economic and other relations between states, which excludes the threat of aggression by one state (or group of states) against another state (or group of states) and ensures their peaceful coexistence on the principles of equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, respect to national independence and self-determination of peoples, as well as free development. In other words, international security acts as a favorable external environment for the development of states.

The main method of ensuring security is the prevention of conflict relations through the introduction of international restrictions (barriers) on certain types of activities. It is quite common to believe that the most important thing to ensure international security is the creation of a system of **collective security** on a universal and regional basis, which is a system of joint actions of all states of the world or a certain geographical region to prevent and eliminate threats to peace and suppress acts of aggression.

P. Andreas, American scientist, introduces such a term as **"clandestine transnational actor"** (CTA). It is a non-state actor that acts crossing the borders

of national states, violating state laws and norms international law and seeks to avoid legal prosecution. Such clandestine transnational actors include, in particular, groups and individuals who cross borders for the purpose of terrorist attacks, human trafficking, drug trafficking, smuggling, as well as illegal migrants and refugees. It cannot be argued that **"clandestine transnational actors"** is a completely new phenomenon. They have existed since the borders of states have existed, however, in recent decades, under the influence of globalization processes, the forms of their organization have changed; methods and speed of border crossing; laws and legal norms that they violate; means of countering their activities. Speaking about clandestine transnational actor activities, for a long time they were studied mostly by criminologists and specialists in criminal law and were not recognized as subjects/objects of international politics and security. However, mass migrations cause interpersonal conflicts between native and arrived populations, internal instability of the state of arrival, sometimes tensions in its relations with the state of origin, and couse a **threat to international security.**

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda also played a major role in securitization of immigration. When terrorists, who carried out the attacks, were labelled as "immigrants", the public focused on the nationalities of terrorists more than the attack itself. Especially, the use of "foreigner" and "terrorist" words together and one after the other by the American authorities paved the way for the securitization process. Thus, security measures implemented in many procedures, ranging from the increase in the evaluation criteria of immigration applications to the USA to the tightening of the control practices for people coming to the country for touristic purposes, have been carried out.

Real or imagined links to terrorism, organized crime, and health threats are at the core of the perception of irregular migration as a security threat. The "war on terrorism" and other transnational threats have been linked to migration, especially irregular migration. Such threats have generally been found to be exaggerated in the public perceptions in countries of destination. However, the matter of such links is a complex one, serves a serious and well-founded debate aimed at countering public fears.

### Questions
What are the modern approaches to the definition of the term "security"?
What threat is coused by illegal migration in the Mediterranean?
What threat to the national security of the Mediterranean countries is coused by migration process?

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# LECTURE 6
## THE MEDITERRANEAN AS A ROUTE FOR MIGRANTS TO THE EU

Migration routes are continuously changing and evolving. Routes are highly responsive to conditions changes' in countries of origin, transit, and destination, and evidence will always lag behind the current.

The great majority of the migrants are fleeing from armed conflict, civil strife, and grave human-rights abuse. Within this context, it is important to **highlight** the role **of international law**, which seeks to protect migrants and refugees as persons who require special protection due to their vulnerability as a result of their being outside the jurisdiction of the state of their nationality. International law thus provides **dual protection for migrants and refugees**: general protection under human rights treaties applicable to all persons and specific protection applicable to particular categories of persons (in this case migrants and refugees).

One need to stress that, according to the EASO (European Union Asylum Support Office), nationals coming from these countries of origin who manage to make it to EU member states are almost invariably granted protection. The key problem lies in the fact that these individuals, who are entitled to receive protection, are often unable to enter Europe legally and thus face great peril in accessing the protection they need and the rights that accompany it.

As well as people who are eligible for refugee status under international law because they are fleeing **persecution and warfare**, the second category of individuals who are migrating across the Mediterranean are those who are often referred to as **"economic migrants"**. Alongside Syria, Afghanistan, and Eritrea, significant numbers of migrants crossing the Mediterranean also originate in countries such as Mali, Nigeria, Gambia, and Senegal. These are all countries with low human development index ratings. People who leave these countries do so, in the main, because they are looking for employment, better healthcare for themselves and their families, and better education and prospects for their children.

The migrants mainly used the sea route.

Approximately 97% of migrants arrived to Europe via the Mediterranean routes. In general, migration routes can be conditionally divided into three corridors:

**Western Mediterranean Corridor** – through Algeria and Morocco – to Spain;

**Central Mediterranean Corridor** – from Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, Libya – to Italy;

**Eastern Mediterranean Corridor** – from Turkey to Greece

The first corridor was used by a small number of refugees; the second is much more popular among refugees, although it is much more dangerous due to the high risk of dying in the sea. Using the Central-Mediterranean corridor, refugees expect to get to such prosperous countries as Germany and Sweden, moving through Austrian territories.

**The Western Mediterranean** route includes the sea passage from North Africa to Spain and the land route to the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, which are located in Morocco. It is not clear which cities or places are used by irregular migrants to embark and consequently debark in reaching Europe. In 2003, sub-Saharan Africans made up approximately one-quarter of migrants detected after crossing the Strait of Gibraltar compared to less than **two percent** in the late 1990s. The route from Morocco to Spain has become less **frequently used** by irregular migrants relative to the route from Libya.

Most Moroccans move to Europe through existing regular migration pathways. Similarly, regular migration to Morocco from West and Central Africa is facilitated by bilateral agreements that allow nationals of Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Niger and Senegal to enter the country without a visa. Nationals of Guinea, Mali and Republic of Congo have the possibility to apply for an electronic visa.

People from West and Central Africa who cannot comply with regulations for regular travel may attempt to reach Morocco irregularly. Smugglers often facilitate these irregular crossings of the border between Algeria and Morocco, as well as irregular border crossings earlier on in their journeys. Those West and Central Africans who intend to continue the journey to reach Europe usually travel to the Northern coast of Morocco and attempt to cross irregularly into Spain – many with the assistance of a smuggler – at the different land and sea border crossing points, along with Moroccans and Algerians.

The Western Mediterranean route was used by over 56,000 people in 2018. This was the peak year for this route; the numbers then decreased to 23,900 in 2019; and to 16,300 in 2021 as of end October.

People on the move who use smugglers or facilitators to reach Morocco by land mostly originate from francophone countries in West and Central Africa, as well as from Algeria. People moving irregularly from West and Central Africa to Morocco do so to seek safety from conflict, persecution, harmful practices (e.g. FGM, forced marriage) and other issues, and in search of better economic opportunities. Many people from West and Central Africa who arrive irregularly aim to find a job, and regularize their stay whenever possible. In some cases, if

people have tried and failed to enter Spain, they may reconsider Morocco for long-term residence.

Some people from West and Central Africa go transit through Morocco with the intention of reaching Europe, while others decide to travel onwards to Europe only after spending some time in the country.

The first route passes through Mali and is largely used by francophone West and Central Africans. Until 2013, the border between Mali and Algeria was open and Malians were allowed to enter Algeria without a visa.

The deterioration of the security situation in Northern Mali and refusals of entry at the Malian-Algerian borders have exacerbated people's dependence on migrant smugglers in order to enter Algeria

On arrival in Bamako or Gao, Mali, West and Central Africans get in touch with smugglers and facilitators providing transportation and accommodation services across Northern Mali. Many smugglers and facilitators transport their clients as far as the southern towns and cities of Algeria (such as Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Timiaouine, Tin Zaoutine or Tamanrasset). Others drop them off before reaching these urban centres, at the sand berm constructed in 2013 along parts of the border between Mali and Algeria, often by night. Passengers then cross the berm by foot, hoping to find the next transporter on the other side, without being intercepted by Algerian border guards.

The second route connects Northwest Niger to Southern Algeria. It is relatively more commonly used by Nigerians and Cameroonians, compared to the Malian route, as it is the closest point of entry for people departing from Nigeria or Cameroon. In this case, most people arriving from Kano in Northern Nigeria have already used smugglers and/or facilitators, who bring them directly to Southern Algeria, or connect them with a local actor working on this route.

In order to travel to Spain from Morocco, North, West and Central Africans often organize sea crossings independently, either across the Gibraltar Strait or Alboran Sea (Western Mediterranean Sea), along the Moroccan shores to Ceuta and Melilla, or along the Northwest African route to the Canary Islands, Spain. People use smugglers or facilitators when the crossing requires higher organizational capacity, such as for longer sea journeys or highly patrolled maritime areas.

In order to travel to Spain from Morocco, North, West and Central Africans often organize sea crossings independently, either across the Gibraltar Strait or Alboran Sea (Western Mediterranean Sea), along the Moroccan shores to Ceuta and Melilla, or along the Northwest African route to the Canary Islands, Spain. People use smugglers or facilitators when the crossing requires higher organizational capacity, such as for longer sea journeys or highly patrolled maritime areas. In Nador, Morocco, a small proportion of refugees and migrants use smuggling services in order to cross the sea to Melilla or mainland Spain. Between 2015 and 2019, a gradually increasing number of people attempted the crossing at the land and sea borders between Morocco and Ceuta and Melilla. The numbers decreased again in 2020-2021, largely due to the closing of the border crossing points (6,216 people arrived irregularly in 2019; 1,769 in 2020).

Since 1999, stricter patrolling of the Strait of Gibraltar corresponded to diversification in the routes migrants followed to reach the EU. Several migrants chose to migrate to Libya rather than to Morocco because they found it too difficult to reach Spain. Others applied for permanent residence permits in Morocco, which consequently gave them access to tourist visas to travel to Turkey. Once in Turkey, several migrants then continued to Greece.

Crossing the desert from West Africa into Algeria is dangerous. People get lost while crossing the sand berms on foot, and others fall from overloaded pick-ups.

During the first half of 2021, an estimated 40 people died while attempting the land crossing from Morocco to Ceuta and Melilla. These are much higher figures compared to the one person reported in 2020, and the seven people identified in 2019. Among those who died in 2021, five people were identified as Moroccans who lost their lives trying to swim to Ceuta. In the first half of 2021, 47 people died on the sea route between Northern Morocco and the Spanish mainland.

Morocco acceded to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in 2002 and to its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish on Trafficking in Persons in 2011. The Kingdom has neither signed nor ratified the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. A number of bilateral agreements with Spain and France since 2012 shape the framework of counter-smuggling cooperation. Morocco has acceded to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol. Moroccan migration law (Law 02-03 of 2003) criminalizes irregular entry and smuggling of migrants. The law sets out severe sanctions for offenders, and protection against deportation for some categories of smuggled migrants, such as pregnant women, children, refugees and asylum applicants. The President of the Public Ministry (King's General Prosecutor) has the responsibility for ensuring that these guarantees are upheld and that smuggled migrants rights are protected, in terms of access to justice, healthcare, and diplomatic services. In 2014, Morocco adopted the National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum, which led to the proposal of three new laws. The law on human trafficking has since been adopted, while the draft laws on migration and asylum are still under discussion.

In 2019, the Moroccan authorities investigated more than 60 migrant smuggling groups and uncovered 3,000 fraudulent documents. In the same year, around 27,000 people with irregular immigration status were arrested, representing between 10 and 30 per cent of the Moroccan prison population in 2018. In 2020, 3,196 people were prosecuted for smuggling of migrants in Morocco, and 307 for trafficking in persons.

Much longer and more dangerous is the **Central Mediterranean sea** route, which runs from **North Africa to Italy**. This is the most frequently used route to reach the EU. The increase of irregular migration to Europe by sea started in the 1990s after Spain and Italy introduced stricter visa regimes. Libya became the main source of migrant boats heading to Europe. While Libya has traditionally been a destination country for migrants from other Arab and African countries, irregular migration from Libya to Europe is a relatively recent phenomenon. When

irregular migration through the Central Mediterranean Route gathered momentum at the end of the 1990s, containing irregular migration became a bargaining chip for the Libyan state in its diplomatic association with Europe, as it faced international embargos and sanctions at the time. Even after the embargo was lifted, Colonel Kaddafi used the threat of mass movements of migrants to Europe as a scare tactic to strengthen his bargaining position.

Migrants departing from **Tunisia and Libya** are most commonly arriving in **Malta** or **Italy**. Until 2005, Malta was a significant point of arrival and departure for irregular migrants wanting to cross the border into the EU. In the late 1990s and up to the start of the 2000s, before Malta joined the EU, the island had been a **hub** for **North Africans and even Asian migrants (mainly from China).** Migrants arrived by plane and soon after were transported in small boats to southern Sicily by local smugglers. Many of the irregular migrants caught and imprisoned in Malta had no intention of going and no wish to stay. They were rather looking for ways to travel on to Italy and other EU member states. In 2008 the position of Malta as a transit point has been cited as steadily declining, as it is very difficult for migrants to depart from the island to other destinations.

The safest and easiest route is considered to be **the Eastern Mediterranean** corridor, which can be crossed by sea and land routes. It is used by Iraqis and Syrians fleeing armed conflicts in their homeland. Most of those arriving via Greece go overland through the countries of the Western Balkans to Sweden and Germany. Their route runs through Hungary or Austria, Serbia or Croatia and Macedonia, by passing Romania and Bulgaria.

The Eastern Mediterranean route refers to entry into Greece, Bulgaria, or Cyprus from Turkey. Since 2008 this route has become a progressively more important entry point to the EU.

As a result of the intensified patrols along the Greek coast, irregular migrants made more use of land than sea borders beginning in 2009. The number of detections of migrants in the Evros river area increased during the first five months of 2011, from 6,287 detections in the same period in 2010 to 8,738 detections, which represented a 40 percent increase. The number of detections further increased when Greece built a fence on its border with Turkey at the end of 2012, which cut off the Evros river route. Efforts to enhance controls on the Turkish-Greek land border in 2012 led to an increase in migrants departing from the Turkish coast to Greek islands, and the number of migrant crossing the border into Bulgaria also increased. The substantial drop (by 95 percent) in irregular migrants crossing the border into Greece through the Evros Ri ver was offset by an increase in the number of migrants travelling by boat via the narrow straits that divide Turkey from several of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Another important development was the introduction of visa liberty by the Turkish government towards many African countries, which created the possibility for African migrants to legally enter Turkey by plane before crossing into the EU as irregular migrants via Greece and Bulgaria.

Since then the number of irregular arrivals using this route has been greatly reduced thanks to cooperation between the EU and Turkey. The implementation of

the **EU-Turkey statement of March 2016** has played a key role in reducing irregular arrivals through Turkey.

In March 2016, EU and Turkish leaders agreed to tackle irregular migration in light of the massive number of migrants travelling through Turkey. **The statement sets** out the following two principles: all new irregular migrants arriving on the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey if they do not **apply for asylum** or if their **claim is rejected** for every **Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek island**s, another **Syrian will be resettled** in the EU.

These are extraordinary measures to **end human suffering** and **restore public order.** They are implemented in full accordance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion.

Turkey committed to take tougher measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration from Turkey to the EU from opening up. The EU remains committed to the implementation of the statement and continues to support Syrian refugees through the facility for refugees in Turkey.

In 2019 arrivals via the Eastern Mediterranean route were 90% lower than in 2015**,** and a further decline was observed in 2020. The agreement with Turkey also helped to reduce the number of lives lost at sea and tackle migrant smugglers. According to the International Organisation for Migration**, 71** lives were lost at sea in 2019, compared to **806** in 2015.

In February and March 2020, the EU experienced increased pressure at the land border with Turkey. To respond to this situation, €700 million was made available to support Greece. In addition, Frontex deployed operational staff and assets through rapid border interventions and the EU civil protection mechanism was activated to mobilise all necessary equipment.

Refugees in Turkey are receiving aid from the EU to improve their living conditions. The EU facility for refugees in Turkey, which manages a total of €6 billion, provides a joint coordination mechanism which aims to ensure that the needs of refugees and host communities in Turkey are addressed in a comprehensive manner.

The EU facility for refugees is a coordination mechanism ensuring that EU assistance is delivered to refugees in Turkey.

The European Commission created the facility on 24 November 2015 following member states' call for more funding to support refugees in Turkey. On 29 November 2015, the European Council committed a first tranche of €3 billion to the facility: €1 billion from the EU budget, €2 billion contributed by member states

In March 2018, the Commission proposed that the facility's funding be extended by an additional **€3 billion** given that the initial budget had been used in its entirety. In June 2018, EU member states agreed on how to finance an additional €3 billion to support Syrian refugees in Turkey: €2 billion from the EU budget, €1 billion financed by member states according to their share of the EU's gross national income.

The first tranche serves to fund projects running until mid-2021. The second tranche serves to fund projects which will run until **mid-2025**. The main focus

areas are humanitarian assistance, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support.

Refugees in Turkey have seen their living conditions improve thanks to projects funded by the facility: 685 000 refugee children supported to attend school; close to 12 million primary healthcare consultations delivered; over 3.5 million vaccinations provided to refugee infants and pregnant women; 1.7 million refugees receive support for basic daily needs.

***Questions***

What are the main routs in Mediteranean for illegal migration?

What are the main problems at the Eastern Mediterranean migration route?

What are the main problems at the Western Mediterranean migration route?

What are the main problems at the Central Mediterranean migration route?

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# LECTURE 7
## MIGRATION POLICY OF ITALY, SPAIN AND GREECE

Mediterranean migration suffers from many problems. The Mediterranean Sea covers a huge region, and the difficulties faced by Italy, Greece, and Spain are very different.

Italy was affected by the Dublin Rule more than others because of an extremely long maritime coast. From 2014 to 2016, there were around 160,000 arrivals each year. In 2018, the number was down to 23,000, and in 2019, around 11,500 migrants arrived. According to the Dublin Rule Italy is responsible for registration, for asylum procedures, and, if necessary, for repatriation because it is the state of first arrival. Immigration policy in Italy as in other European countries has been politicized.

Attitudes to both EU and non-EU immigrants have consistently become more positive since the 'migration crisis'. By June 2019 more Italians held a positive view of migration/free movement by EU citizens than a negative one, while the net negativity towards non-EU immigrants was significantly diminished. In both of these senses, Italian trends have been the same as pan-EU trends, albeit with a lower constant on both measures.

Between 2014 and 2019 the percentage of Italians stating that immigration is one of the two most important issues affecting their country increased, from around 5 per cent to 40 per cent in May 2017.

The 'migration crisis', in the Italian popular mindset, has lasted longer than elsewhere in Europe.

**In 2008, the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation** was signed between the Government of Italy and the Government of Libya. In general, the document provided for investments in the amount of 5 billion dollars for 20 years. In exchange, Libya had to resume cooperation with Italy in the fight against organized terrorism crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. In order to combat illegal immigration, patrolling by Italians of Libyan borders was foreseen.

For **Italy**, the immigration crisis on the southern borders has begun to be in 2011, but it reached its peak in October 2013, because of civil war in Libya. So the government could not control the transit of immigrants through its territory and comply obligations stipulated by the agreement with Italy.

Italy assumed a distinct role in the central Mediterranean from 2013 on when the country launched a unilateral, humanitarian military operation, Mare Nostrum, after the drowning of many migrants near Lampedusa. 18th of October, 2013 was the first day of operation of the sea mission "Mare Nostrum". The tragedy near Lampedusa attracted the attention of the world public. The head of the European Commission, **Jose Manuel Barroso**, and the Commissioner for the Interior, **Cecilia Malmström**, came to the island and visited the center where the 155 people from the first boat who managed to survive were accommodated.

Operation "Mare Nostrum" lasted from October 13, 2013 to October 31, 2014. Compared to all other measures carried out in the Mediterranean, it aimed to strengthen control over immigration flows, as well as to prevent human trafficking.

But above all, the operation had a humanitarian goal of protecting the lives of immigrants. During the operation from October 13, 2013 to October 31, 2014, 421 missions were carried out, as a result of which more than 100,000 immigrants were rescued. But however, more than 3,000 other immigrants died at sea trying to cross the Mediterranean during this same period. In addition, 728 traffickers were arrested.

Triangulating the EU's, Italy's and Libya's interactions in fact demonstrates that constraints are placed on migration diplomatic strategies not only by states' domestic constituencies but also by 'external' pressures, in this specific case those exerted simultaneously by the diplomatic game being played between Italy and the EU on migration.

In May 2015, the EU's former High Representative for **Foreign and Security Affairs Federica Mogherini** had informed the UN Security Council of

the situation in the Mediterranean and the intention to set up a CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) naval operation with UN backing. The operation, approved by the European Council on the18[th] of May 2015, was conceived to prevent more people from dying at sea, a human tragedy connected directly on smuggling activities across the central Mediterranean. Actions to prevent deaths at sea by cutting off smuggling activities had to go in the direction of strengthening the EU's presence at sea, specifically to disrupt the business model of smugglers in the southern part of the central Mediterranean.

In November 2015 was the Valletta Summit, there was established a 'European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and to address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa'. The main aim of this fund has been to foster resilience, economic opportunities, security and development to address the causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration. The Fund thus entailed a financial commitment by the EU, complementing traditional development instruments, for the Sahel region, Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa (Libya included). At the Joint Summit on Migration held in Valetta EU and African leaders issued a political declaration recognising the priority of jointly managing migration. The declaration prioritized the need to protect migrants – both at sea and in the desert – from abuse, exploitation and death. Supporting resilience and self-reliance, boosting socio-economic development, improving asylum perspectives, combating irregular immigration, human smuggling and trafficking and building capacity on border management and the return and reintegration of irregular immigrants were key points. In order to achieve some of these objectives, the EU emergency Trust Fund was cast as a vital instrument.

The emphasis put on the exploitation and deaths of migrants was evident, as was the need to confront these problems through a capacity-building approach aimed at reducing the outflow of irregular immigrants. This would have proved particularly relevant in the case of Libya, but the political situation there prevented any discussion from moving forward. For this reason, the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2259 (2015) welcoming the signing of a Libyan Political Agreement and recognising the GNA as the sole legitimate government of Libya was crucial. Particularly relevant was the UN invitation to Member States to urgently respond to requests for assistance from the Libyan government. The resolution also invited Member States to share information with the new government on smuggling and trafficking activities in Libyan territorial waters and along Libya's coasts and to help it assist migrants rescued at sea.

The approach of addressing migrant deaths by dealing with the smuggling networks was thus well established by the end of 2015. That was particularly so because of a clear association between Libya's instability and the smuggling phenomenon, and, consequently with deaths at sea and in the desert. However, aside from EU humanitarian aid disbursed after 2014 to address the consequences of the conflict and efforts to extend some programmes of the Trust Fund supporting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), throughout 2016 no measures for

stricter cooperation with Libya were concretely advanced (European Commission, 2016). Libya's fragmented political situation and its security problems were well documented by the EU, which defined border security and migration management as being 'in complete disarray and in dire need of institutional and legal reform'. Further concern was expressed about migrants' detention conditions and the existence of many informal centres, given that the UNHCR could not access these sites. Libya's traditional place at the crossroads of the old trans-Saharan trade and smuggling routes was referred to, against a backdrop of gangs and armed groups operating at liberty, trading in migrants, weapons, drugs and engaging in other illicit activities thanks to the absence of effective police and border control.

Some signs indicating a strong commitment by the EU were indeed present, such as the extension of EUNAVFOR MED's mission to include capacity-building tasks and the training of the Libyan coast guard, and the launch of a high-level dialogue with Libya's government, led by the High Representative at the beginning of 2016. Also, in August 2016, the Council extended the duration of the EUBAM Libya mission and enlarged its potential tasks (pending a request from Libya). Nevertheless, the acknowledgement that single Member States, Italy foremost, were better positioned to build more thorough cooperation with Libya was reiterated.

It was only at the beginning of 2017 that efforts to cooperate with Libya achieved concrete results thanks to the Italian role. This initiative consolidated the existing narrative on smuggling, backed by financial support from the EU (but not always of single Member States).

It was Italy back in the 1990s that restarted dialogue with an internationally isolated Libya and its decisive leadership was also crucial in restarting closer cooperation in 2017. Mainly thanks to the new Minister of the Interior, Marco Minniti, new initiatives were proposed. However, European support was vital in advancing the strategy Minniti had in mind. This was a comprehensive 'method' based on stabilization, political reconciliation and the opening of economic opportunities for the local population to weaken and impair the networks of organized crime and, hence, reduce arrivals in the EU. Also, according to Minniti, work had to be done to improve the human rights of migrants and asylum seekers present in Libya.

Against this backdrop, 2017 can rightly be called 'the year of the central Mediterranean', for the number of initiatives undertaken concerning the region. On the 14th of January 2017, Italy approved the implementation of a mission aimed at training the Libyan coastguard by the Guardia di Finanza (Italy's financial crimes police) and maintaining naval assets donated before the civil war. The mission was not new but had been suspended for security reasons – indeed, it implemented an agreement signed between the two countries in 2007, on the joint patrolling of Libyan territorial waters backed up by a later protocol in 2009. The mission could now be cast as a legitimate effort not only to prevent irregular immigration (its original objective) but also to contribute to stabilizing the country.

For its part, the EU started a new phase in relations with Libya. On the 25th of January 2017 (in coordination with Italy), it delivered a document wholly

dedicated to the central Mediterranean. The document clearly put Libya at centre stage. It made clear that smugglers and traffickers were the greatest beneficiaries of the instability looming large in the country and the country's weak capacity in territorial and border control. It underlined that those criminal networks were further contributing to the country's instability merely by existing and by endangering migrants' rights. Promoting the stabilization of the country would thus significantly curtail smugglers' room for manoeuvre and avoid migrants' deaths at sea, while clearly reducing inflows into Europe. An additional point was to insist on strengthening Libya's control capacities: given an increased presence at sea (also of search and rescue activities) close to Libyan waters, smugglers had changed strategy, loading migrants in completely unsafe vessels, and counting on those vessels being rescued close to or in Libyan waters. Hence, training the coastguard would increase the possibility of saving migrants in Libyan waters but also of intercepting smugglers before they could attempt dangerous enterprises. While the EU would contribute to such capacity-building with all the efforts at its disposal (EUNAVFOR MED Sophia and EUBAM Libya), it was clearly stated that Member States had a significant role to play.

Alongside the emphasis on capacity-building in both northern and southern Libya, the document recognized the need for a comprehensive strategy for the country, aimed at improving human rights conditions, socio-economic development, and actively engaging Libyan municipalities to increase ownership throughout the process. These efforts were intended as an attempt to diminish the causes of irregular emigration and thus the profit-making opportunities for smugglers. Coordination between Italy and the EU was facilitated by the 2nd of February 2017 issue of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Libya and Italy. The MOU was followed by a set of initiatives taken over the next months. Meanwhile, in full support of both the central Mediterranean strategy and the MOU, the European Council's Malta Declaration was announced just a day after the Italian initiative. According to Minister Minniti, stabilizing Libya and fighting smugglers were two faces of the same coin. According to Minister Minniti, stabilizing Libya and fighting smugglers were two faces of the same coin. The training of the Libyan coastguard and the restitution on behalf of Italy of 10 patrol vessels by mid-May 2017 would contribute to help the Libyan coastguard and would advance the objective of intercepting boats in Libyan territorial waters and bringing them back to Libyan ports. The idea of a comprehensive strategy aimed at tackling smugglers, however, had to devote attention to Libya's northern coasts as much as to the southern border, in full cooperation with neighbouring actors. On the 31st of March 2017, Minister Minniti played guarantor (thanks to a major diplomatic effort) to a peace agreement among three tribes of the southwestern region of Fezzan: the Tuareg, the Suleyman and the Tebu. Pacification was considered fundamental for addressing smuggling activities and for countering the threat represented by terrorism. It was also cast as crucial for expanding development opportunities as an alternative to criminal activities. Simultaneously, the patrolling of Libya's southern border contributed to the effort of reducing irregular inflows into Europe.

At the European level, efforts were made to support Italy's initiatives. Through a programme funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, €90 million was dedicated to addressing the socio-economic situation of migrants and refugees in Libya (where their irregular status is criminalized) but also that of the local host communities, thus 'strengthening resilience of local governance structures'. Another objective was to train local authorities on migration-control-related tasks, thereby safeguarding a rights-based approach to migration. Projects by the Italian energy company, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), were financed in this direction.Footnote5 On 4 May 2017, the Commission delivered a document on 'a renewed impetus of the Africa–EU partnership' recognising the centrality of shared partnership in facing up to common challenges. Shared partnership, ownership and self-reliance were said to be key to adopting a 'resilience approach to migration'.

Sentral problem of immigration to Spain is human security. Ceuta and Melilla are two Spanish enclaves in the Moroccan territory. Both enclaves become European cities in 1986, when Spain joined the European Community. A decade after, Melilla and Ceuta became autonomous cities. The entrance of Spain and, consequently, of Ceuta and Melilla, had important consequences on the borders between Spain and Morocco and the possibility to cross them.

The first border to be constructed was the one in Ceuta, built in 1993 with a length of 8.3 Km. However, the fence was too easy to climb, so, a few years later in 1995, the construction of a strengthened fence began. The project finished in 2000 with a total cost of 48 million euros, with the EU funding 75% of the total cost. The construction of the fence in Melilla started with a total length of 10.5 Km. In 1998, the fence in Melilla was strengthened too.

The first remarkable change on the equilibrium around the borders took place at the beginning of the 1990s. From 15th May 1991 onward, the citizens of Morocco need a visa to enter Spain. This was due to the fact that the European Union obtained more competence in matter of migration policies, which used to belong to the Member States, and that Spain signed the Schengen Agreement.

When the news of this change started to spread in the proximity of the border, a lot of people tried to cross the fences fearing they would not manage to do it anymore. The EU and its members wanted to build a security belt against undocumented migration. For this reason, the EU encouraged the member states – Spain included – to develope their border controls.

During the conference of Barcelona in 1995, a partnership based on security, economy and finance, society and culture was established. Another episode which had important consequences was the one happened in 2005, when a massive number of migrants tried to cross the border. This led to a military intervention which caused the death of four migrants and forty-five injured. The violence of this event can be read as a turning point in the migration policies because the EU understood that illegal migration was something to be controlled and not something to be ignored. From 2005 to 2008, the Spanish government put in practice the so-called "Africa Plan" to control migration influxes. Because of the

europeanization of the migration policies, the EU gave funds to Spain in order to strengthen the fences and the border control.

All migrants found by Spanish rescue services in waters of the Strait of Gibraltar or the westernmost section of the Mediterranean Sea have been automatically taken to Spanish ports, even if the rescue took place nearer the Moroccan coastline.

The measure is part of the Spanish executive's attempts to reduce migratory pressure at a time when irregular immigration has become an electoral issue as Spaniards head for local, regional, national and European elections. The new guidelines are meant to go into effect immediately, although their future will depend on the outcome of the snap general election called for April 28.

On the 24th of June 2022, Moroccan and Spanish security forces used unlawful force and committed acts which may amount to torture and other ill-treatment to violently stop people trying to cross at the border.

Security forces used batons, tear gas, rubber bullets and beat and kicked people in an enclosed area from which people could not easily leave, even after they were under police control and could not move. Both the Moroccan and Spanish authorities failed to provide prompt and adequate medical assistance to the injured, while dozens were left unattended in the full glare of the sun for at least eight hours.

To date, Morocco and Spain have failed to even release information to loved ones about the dead and missing or to acknowledge any wrongdoing. The authorities have failed to adequately investigate these actions which constitute crimes under international law and human rights violations or to investigate racism and discrimination at the border.

Whilst this was the deadliest, it was not an isolated case. People face an ongoing risk of serious violations of their human rights at this border. The lack of safe routes and Europe's harmful fortification policies at any cost has lethal results.

**2023 –** The 12th bilateral **summit** since 1993 when Spain and Morocco began implementing the treaty of friendship that includes an annual bilateral meeting, the last of which was held in 2015.

One of the "hot problems" between Madrid and Rabat is the issue of migration flows on the Spanish-Moroccan border. At a summit in Rabat, the two countries signed as many as 20 agreements to boost trade and investment, including credit lines of up to $873 million for Spanish firms in Morocco.

Another deal touched on how to manage migration between the neighboring countries, such as the opening of a customs office on the border crossings at Spain's North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla – which Rabat doesn't recognize as European territories. Such frontiers are often sites of tragedy for Africans who occasionally storm the fences in hopes of continuing on to Europe.

### Questions

What are the main directions of Italian migration policy in the Mediterranean?

What are the main directions of Spanish migration policy in the Mediterranean?

What are the main directions of Greece migration policy in the Mediterranean?

What are the main directions of Turkish migration policy in the Mediterranean?

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# LECTURE 8
## MEDITERRANEAN COUNTIRE OF EMIGRATION:
## MAIN CHARACTERISTICS

Over the second half of the 20th century, Morocco has evolved into one of the world's leading emigration countries, with the global Moroccan diaspora estimated at around 4 million. Moroccans form one of the largest and most dispersed migrant communities in Europe. Morocco's current population is about 33 million; more than 3 million people of Moroccan currently live in Western and

Southern Europe. Recently, a smaller but growing number of Moroccan migrants have settled in Canada and the United States.

Over the past decade, changing migration patterns have set the stage for potentially far-reaching changes to the economy, demographics, and legal system of this North African country. Although Morocco remains primarily a country of emigration, it is also becoming a destination for migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa and, to some extent, from crisis-hit European countries. The growing presence of immigrants confronts Moroccan society with an entirely new set of social and legal issues typical for immigration countries, which do not yet resonate with Morocco's self-image as an emigration country.

While Moroccan migration remained relatively untouched by the Arab Spring upheaval, migration has been one of the most defining and thorny issues in relations between Morocco and the European Union. While the latter has attempted to engage Morocco in efforts to reduce irregular emigration and transit migration, Morocco has an interest in facilitating mobility for its own citizens.

French colonization of neighboring Algeria in 1830 heralded the beginning of a period of economic and political restructuring, which created new migration patterns from Morocco. This led to increasing seasonal and circular labor migration to Algeria for work on farms owned by French colons (settlers) and to the expanding Algerian coastal cities. In the late 1930s, the number of Moroccan migrants to Algeria was estimated at about 85,000 per year.

In 1912, the Franco-Spanish colonial "protectorate" over Morocco was formally established. While France gained control over the heartland of Morocco, the Spanish protectorate was limited to the southwestern Sahara and the northern Rif's mountain zone. Road construction, other infrastructure projects, and the rapid growth of cities along the Atlantic coast boosted rural-to-urban migration within Morocco.

The colonial era (1912-56) also marked the beginning of migration to France. During World War I and II an urgent lack of manpower in France led to the active recruitment of tens of thousands of Moroccan men for factories, mines, and the French army – 40,000 for the French army during the First World War and 126,000 during the Second World War. Most of these migrants returned to Morocco after both wars ended. Although 40,000 Moroccans from the northern Rif's area found employment in Spanish Dictator Francisco Franco's army during the Spanish civil war in Spanish Morocco, labor migration from Morocco to Spain remained limited. Until the 1960s, Spain itself remained a source of labor migrants to northern Europe and even to Algeria. When France stopped recruiting Algerian workers during the Algerian war of independence (1954-62), recruitment and migration of factory and mine workers from Morocco was boosted. Between 1949 and 1962, the Moroccan population in France increased from about 20,000 to 53,000. Much of this migration took place via Algeria, which remained a French colony until 1962. Moroccan laborers often followed their *colon* employers, who massively departed to France after Algerian independence.

Yet post-colonial migration was only modest compared with the 1962-72 decade, when strong economic growth in Western Europe resulted in high demand

for low-skilled labor. This would dramatically expand the magnitude and geographical scope of Moroccan emigration. Between 1965 and 1972, the estimated number of registered Moroccans living in the main European destination countries increased tenfold, from 30,000 to 300,000, further increasing to 700,000 in 1982, 1.6 million in 1998, and 3.1 million in 2012.

In a context of growing demand for workers in Western Europe, labor recruitment agreements with the former West Germany (1963), France (1963), Belgium (1964), and the Netherlands (1969) led to a diversification of Moroccan emigration beyond France.

Moroccan Jews followed a distinct pattern, emigrating in massive numbers to France, Israel, and Canada (Québec) after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the Six Day War of 1967. Morocco's Jewish population dwindled from an approximate 250,000 to the current number of about 5,000.

Although Moroccan and receiving-country governments insisted that this migration was temporary, many migrants did not return and ended up settling in Europe. Paradoxically, increasing settlement was stimulated by increasing immigration restrictions.

The 1973 oil crisis heralded a period of economic stagnation and industrial restructuring, resulting in rising unemployment and a lower demand for low-skilled laborers in Western Europe, and labor migration slowed considerably in the years that followed. With many destination countries closing their borders to new labor immigrants and introducing visa requirements for Moroccan visitors, circular migration was no longer an option. Rather than reducing migration, this pushed more and more former "guestworkers" into permanent settlement.

In the same period, the economic situation in Morocco deteriorated and, following two failed coups d'état in 1971 and 1972, the country entered a period of political instability and repression. In a context of increasing immigration restrictions, this situation made many labor migrants decide to stay on the safe side of the Mediterranean and reunify their families.

Helped by the liberal family reunification policies that European destination countries adopted, Moroccan migration shifted during the 1970s and 1980s from primarily circular and labor based to more permanent and family based. It was family migration that mainly explains the fourfold increase in the number of people of Moroccans living in West Europe, from 291,000 in 1972 at the eve of the oil crisis to nearly 1.2 million in 1992.

Family reunification took two forms: "Primary" family reunification consisted of Moroccan women and children joining the predominantly male migrant workers. "Secondary" family reunification happened when the children of Moroccan migrants in Europe married people living in origin regions. While primary family reunification was largely completed by the end of the 1980s, during the 1990s secondary family reunification became an important channel for continued migration from Morocco. By 1998, the number of people of Moroccan descent in the main European destination countries had risen to 1.6 million.

Return migration has remained relatively limited compared to other immigrant groups in Europe. Analysis of available migration data from Northern

and Western European destination countries suggests that about one-quarter of Moroccans who migrated between 1981 and 2009 returned to Morocco, although that proportion fluctuates with the business cycle in Europe. This low tendency towards return coincides with a high tendency towards naturalization. From 1992 to 2001, about 430,000 Moroccans living in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway were granted the nationality of an EU Member State.

While family reunification largely explains the continuation of migration to traditional destination countries in Northern and Western Europe, from the mid-1980s Spain and Italy emerged as new destination for Moroccan migrants mainly as a consequence of rapidly rising demand for (often irregular) migrant labor in agriculture, construction, and other low-skilled services. Initially, Moroccan migration to Southern Europe had a predominantly circular character as Moroccans could travel freely back and forth.

Migration restrictions and border controls would interrupt this circular migration. After Italy and Spain introduced visa requirements in 1990 and 1991 respectively, more and more Moroccans migrated illegally across the Strait of Gibraltar, overstayed their visas, and were pushed into permanent settlement. Despite the introduction and expansion of border restrictions, irregular migration continued primarily because of ongoing labor demand in Southern Europe.

On several occasions since the late 1980s, Italian and Spanish governments granted legal status to large numbers of Moroccans and other migrants through successive regularization campaigns. In this way, hundreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants were able to gain legal status and, subsequently, reunify their families in Southern Europe.

These factors explain that, in spite of increasing restrictions, the combined Moroccan population officially residing in Spain and Italy increased from about 20,000 in 1980 to an estimated 1.2 million in 2010. While in the past most Moroccan labor migrants were men, an increasing proportion of independent labor migrants to Southern Europe are women who work as domestic workers, nannies, cleaners, or in agriculture and small industries.

Since the 1970s, a relatively small number of Moroccans have migrated to Libya (approximately 120,000) and the oil-rich Gulf countries (several tens of thousands) to work on temporary contracts. More recently, the United States and the French-speaking Canadian province of Québec have attracted increasing numbers of generally highly educated Moroccans.

The Moroccan migrant population in Europe has increased almost sevenfold, from 300,000 in 1972, on the eve of the recruitment freeze, to at least 2.5 million in 2010. This estimate excludes unauthorized Moroccan migrants, who might run in the several hundreds of thousands.

France is still home to the largest legally residing population of people of Moroccan descent (more than 1.1 million) in 2010, followed by Spain (766,000), Italy (486,000), the Netherlands (362,000), Belgium (297,000), and Germany (126,000). Smaller communities live in the Canadian province of Québec (53,000), the United States (33,000), the United Kingdom (26,000), and Scandinavian countries.

Since the mid-1990s Morocco has evolved into a destination country for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. Although this immigration is still very modest compared to the large-scale nature of Moroccan emigration, this is a significant shift from the past.

An increasing number of migrants from West Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other African countries travel to Morocco on visas to pursue studies and embark upon professional careers. West African and, more recently, some Filipina women migrate to Morocco as domestic servants and nannies for wealthier Moroccan households, and there is also a modest, but growing presence of Chinese traders in Moroccan cities. In addition, an increasing number of Europeans have settled in Morocco as workers, entrepreneurs, or retirees. The number of European labor immigrants, particularly from Spain, has increased since the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008.

While the number of students and workers from African countries such as Senegal and Mali (who enjoy visa-free travel to Morocco) has been increasing, the African immigrant population in Morocco also includes asylum seekers and refugees fleeing conflict and oppression in their origin countries. Some African migrants use Morocco as a staging ground before attempting to enter Europe. These migrants often enter Morocco from Algeria, at the border east of Oujda, after crossing the Saharan overland from Niger. Once in Morocco, they sometimes attempt to enter one of two permanently inhabited Spanish port cities located on the north coast of Africa, Ceuta and Melilla, which share borders with Morocco. Because Spain has few repatriation agreements with sub-Saharan countries and because of identification problems, many migrants who manage to enter are eventually released.

An increasing number of migrants failing or not venturing to enter Europe prefer to settle in Morocco as a second-best option rather than return to their more unstable and substantially poorer origin countries. Tens of thousands have settled in cities like Casablanca, Rabat, and Fes on a semi-permanent basis, where they find jobs in the informal service sector, domestic service, petty trade, and construction. The increasing presence of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa has also increased religious diversity and has, to a certain extent, revitalized Christian life in some cities of this predominantly Muslim country.

The Arab Spring had little effect on Moroccan migration, mainly because relatively few Moroccans live in the countries where violent conflict broke out, and also because Morocco is geographically far away from these countries.

While both African and European immigrants in Morocco often lack legal status, migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa are the regular target of violent racist attacks and discrimination in Morocco. Over the past years, police round-ups have frequently occurred in immigrant neighborhoods in big cities and in improvised ad hoc camps close to Ceuta and Melilla. Some migrants have been randomly deported via the Algerian border without checking their right to protection, which is a violation of the principle of nonrefoulement.

In November 2012, the cover of a Moroccan weekly (Maroc Hebdo) represented **sub-Saharan migrants as "the Black Danger"** suggesting that they

increase drug trafficking, prostitution, and pose a human and security problem. Moroccan politicians have also alleged that sub-Saharan migration increases unemployment.

In reaction to scapegoating and institutionalized racism, a vibrant civil-society sector has emerged in Morocco, consisting of human-rights organizations and associations of Moroccan emigrants abroad, as well as sub-Saharan migrants, religious organizations, lawyers, and local migrant-support groups such as ABCDS and GADEM. These groups play a vital role in giving practical assistance and advocating for migrants' and refugees' access to residency rights and public services.

A significant minority of immigrants in Morocco have migrated for reasons that fall under the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Until recently, the Moroccan government assumed that virtually all sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco were "economic migrants" on their way to Europe. However, in 2007, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) signed an accord de siège with the Moroccan government, resulting in some limited improvements in the situation of refugees and asylum seekers.

Since then, those holding UNHCR registration cards have less frequently been subject to harassment and deportation. Their access to public health care and education has in some instances improved as well, although many problems persist and the Moroccan government generally refuses to issue resident permits to refugees and asylum seekers. As of mid-2013, the UNHCR office in Morocco had registered 874 refugees and 3,706 asylum seekers.

Since the 1960s, the Moroccan government has encouraged emigration on political and economic grounds. It stimulated labor recruitment from relatively marginal Berber-speaking areas of the southwestern Sous valley, the oases of southeastern Morocco, and the northern Rif Mountains, a region notorious for its rebellious attitude to central authority. In particular, remittances were expected to reduce poverty, unemployment, and discontent, and thus function as a political safety valve.

Until the 1990s, the Moroccan government attempted to maintain tight control of Moroccans living in Europe by actively discouraging their integration into receiving societies, including naturalization - to the dismay of some EU governments adopting policies to the contrary. The Moroccan government sent Moroccan teachers and imams abroad and provided education to migrants' children in the Arabic language to remind them of their roots and to prevent integration and assimilation, which was also perceived as endangering vital remittance transfers.

Through Moroccan embassies, consulates, mosques, and state-created organizations for migrants, such as the "Amicales," Moroccan migrants were also actively discouraged from establishing independent organizations and joining trade unions or political parties.

In this way, the Moroccan government wanted to prevent migrants from organizing themselves politically and, as such, from forming an opposition force from abroad. During the 1970s and 1980s, it was not unusual for political troublemakers who lived in Europe to be harassed while visiting family and friends

in Morocco. However, there was a growing consciousness that Morocco's policies alienated the migrant population from state institutions rather than binding them closer to their origin country.

The Moroccan state therefore changed course in the early 1990s. Active repression was largely replaced by the courting of the expanding Moroccan diaspora. Along with the dismantling of the control apparatus in Europe, this translated to a more positive attitude towards naturalization and dual citizenship. Also factoring into Moroccan authorities' change in attitude was an ominous stagnation in remittances, at around $2 billion per year during the 1990s, which generated the fear of a future decline.

These changes were in line with a certain liberalization of Moroccan society during this time period. Increasing civil liberties meant more freedom among migrants to establish organizations such as Berber, hometown, and aid associations.

A ministry for Moroccans residing abroad was created in 1990. In the same year, the Moroccan government established the Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l'étranger, which aims to foster links between migrants and Morocco. This foundation aims to help migrants in various ways, both in Europe and during their summer holidays in Morocco, and seeks to inform and guide migrants on investment opportunities. In 2007, King Mohammed VI established the Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME). This is an advisory council consisting of emigrants, which aims to advise the Moroccan government how to best defend the interests of Moroccan emigrants and how to enhance the development potential of migration. The migrant members of this consultative council are appointed by the king.

Morocco has been relatively successful in channelling remittances through official channels such as banks and money transfer companies. Since the 1990s, it has become easier, cheaper, and more attractive for Moroccans to remit money because of a government-encouraged expansion of Moroccan bank branches in Europe, the lifting of restrictions on foreign exchange, fiscal measures that favor migrants and devaluations that increase the value of foreign currency.

At first glance, these policies seem to have reversed the stagnation in remittances. Since 2000, there has been a spectacular increase in official remittances, which stood at $6.9 billion in 2012. However, an even more important factor explaining the surge in remittances has been the rise in migration to Spain, Italy, and other new destinations. The global economic crisis caused only a relatively minor decrease in remittances in 2009, after which they increased again and stabilized.

Remittances are a crucial and relatively stable source of foreign exchange and have become vital in sustaining Morocco's balance of payments. In 2012, official remittances represented about 7 percent of the gross national product (GNP). Over the 2000s, remittances have been roughly six times the amount of official development aid paid to Morocco on average, and three times the value of direct foreign investments, which are also much more unstable.

The real amount of remittances is estimated to be higher because money is also sent through informal channels or in the form of goods taken to Morocco. Despite the level of remittances, relatively few Moroccans abroad seem inclined to start businesses in Morocco. The Moroccan government, therefore, has tried to attract migrants' investments by offering fiscal incentives, reducing corruption, and removing bureaucratic obstacles to investment, such as easing administrative procedures for obtaining business permits.

However, there is little evidence that these initiatives have been very successful, as issues of corruption and a general lack of trust in government institutions, including the judiciary, continue to put off potential investors. Some argue that the "migration culture" and dependency on remittances provokes passive attitudes, lessens the entrepreneurial spirit, and undermines the pressure for genuine political and economic reform.

In 2003, Morocco passed a new law regulating the entry and residence of foreigners. The law included heavy sanctions against irregular immigration and human smuggling but largely ignored migrants' rights. According to critics, in passing the new law Morocco bowed to pressure from the European Union, which wishes Morocco to play the role of Europe's "policeman" in North Africa.

Morocco's increasingly independent policy course became evident in the major immigration policy reform that was announced in 2013 under influence of growing criticism by national and international NGOs on the escalation of violence against migrants. In August 2013, together with other associations, the GADEM association compiled a highly critical report that detailed significant abuse of migrants, embarrassing the Moroccan government on the international stage. In September 2013, the National Council of Human Rights (CNDH) released an official report that criticized Morocco's migration policy for being too security-oriented and ignoring migrant rights. The report included a number of policy recommendations, including the right to asylum and the regularization of unauthorized migrants from Africa and Europe. The report was quickly endorsed by the royal Cabinet, setting in motion a potentially far-reaching immigration reform.

With the official endorsement of King Mohammed VI, things have moved quickly. For instance, Morocco has reopened its Bureau de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (Protection Office for Refugees and the Stateless), given migrants' children access to public education, and announced an "exceptional" regularization to be executed in 2014. While it remains to be seen how these policies will be implemented, they seem a significant break with the past. They can also be seen as an assertion of independence and refusal to obey the wishes of the European Union. The reforms may also be beneficial in strengthening Morocco's strategic relations with sub-Saharan countries and improving its leverage and credibility in negotiations with the European Union, for instance on readmission.

Although the Moroccan government is formally complying with the European Union's fight against irregular immigration, serious doubts remain about the credibility and effectiveness of these policies. There is a reluctance to massively readmit and expel sub-Saharan unauthorized migrants, particularly

because this may harm strategic political relations with sub-Saharan countries. This partly explains why nationals from Senegal, an important regional ally, enjoy visa-free travel to Morocco.

In the eyes of the Moroccan government, the European Union's intention to create a "common Euro-Mediterranean space" is perceived as lacking credibility for a number of reasons. First, Europeans have almost unrestricted access to Morocco although Moroccans face restrictive policies. Second, protectionist policies still prevent Morocco from freely exporting agricultural products to the European Union, while many authorized Moroccan migrant workers help harvest produce in EU countries.

From the Moroccan perspective, migration constitutes a vital development resource that alleviates poverty and unemployment, increases political stability, and generates remittances. In the context of the Arab Spring and increasing domestic pressure for reform, emigration is believed to have an important stabilizing function.

High youth unemployment, low wages, and limited domestic opportunities suggest that Morocco's emigration potential will remain high in the coming one to two decades. In addition, increasing education and media exposure have increased aspirations, and for many young low-skilled and, increasingly, high-skilled Moroccans, migration continues to represent a promising path to success.

The economic crisis in Spain and other in European destination countries has led to a slowdown in emigration and increasing returns and even some limited immigration from Europe. The key question is whether this is a temporary response to a decline in labor demand, or whether this heralds a more structural migration transition characterized by a long-term decline in emigration. The extent to which Moroccan emigration will pick up again vitally depends on whether and how fast European destination countries will recover from the current economic crisis.

However, it is unlikely that Moroccan emigration will cease. Even if countries like France, Italy, and Spain continue to face economic hardship, some demand for Moroccan migrant labor in the agricultural, construction, and service sectors, as well as domestic work, is likely to persist. Furthermore, as has happened in the past, limited opportunities in the established destination countries may also lead to the emergence of new Moroccan migration destinations in and beyond Europe.

However, in the medium to long term, emigration might decrease following the substantial decline of Moroccans attaining working age in the coming decades, although this obviously depends on future economic growth and political stability. Under conditions of future growth and stability, Morocco may evolve into a "migration transition" country, characterized by the coexistence of declining emigration and increasingly immigration. This process may already have been set in motion with increasing immigration from sub-Saharan countries and elsewhere.

Although Moroccan policymakers and the media have stressed the temporary, transitory character of sub-Saharan immigration, an increasing proportion of these migrants are becoming long-term or permanent settlers. Their

presence confronts Moroccan society with an entirely new set of social and legal issues typical for immigration countries - issues that do not yet resonate with Morocco's self-image as an emigration country. The recently announced new immigration policy reform, which includes provisions for regularization of unauthorized migrants, may signal that Moroccan society is gradually coming to terms with these new migration realities.

Algerian immigration has been more significant for France than most other immigrations. By and large uninterrupted since the beginning of the twentieth century, it continues to be seen as an example of "problematic" immigration and in practice it gives rise to some specific difficulties. The results of the 2008 Trajectoires et Origines inquiry conducted by the National Institute for Demographic Studies (Institut national d'études démographiques, or INED) point up a higher than average rate of unemployment, a lower rate of home ownership, and stronger perceptions of discrimination than in other communities. More broadly, the singular relationship between the French state and people of Algerian descent has been demonstrated by their particular involvement in certain events over the last thirty years (for example the urban riots of the 1970s, the March for Equality and Against Racism in 1983, 4 the pitch invasion at the 2001 FranceAlgeria football match, and rallies in the 2000s to campaign for acknowledgement of the police massacre of protesters on October 17, 1961). The colonial history of this migration is often evoked to explain its particular status in contemporary French society.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, many studies have addressed French immigration policy both during and after the colonial period and have validated the Algerians' unique place in this history. A rule of exception originated with the Évian Accords, which theoretically gave Algerians the same rights as the French (apart from political rights) and delivered a system that favored them in terms of access to French territory, to the labor market and to French citizenship. However, Alexis Spire has been able to show that these derogation arrangements also perpetuated practices "issuing from the colonial experience," some of which were discriminatory (deportations for example). Thanks to studies that have appeared in the last thirty years, the social history of this migration is well known as regards both the colonial era and the Algerian War of Independence. All these studies have been strongly influenced by the sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad's seminal article on the "three ages of Algerian emigration," originally published in 1977, which modeled the evolution of this migration process. Building on colonial sociology, Sayad identified a first age dominated by temporary immigration (noria), consisting of married men, before a movement towards workerization, leading to the second age and a phase of increasing stability. The third age, developing out of the second, was marked by the formation of a "mini colony," caught up in the "illusion of a temporary migration": the migrants themselves lived under the impression that they would return, and this was perpetuated by both the French and Algerian authorities. This age also saw families becoming established, in a gradual transformation from immigration for work to an immigration of settlement. However, this third phase, which roughly corresponds to the decade between 1960

and 1970, is not explored in depth in Sayad's article, partly because at that time there were few available sources describing Algerian immigration post-independence and partly because he did not interview many women.

*Questions*
What are the main features of Algerian migration policy?
What are the main features of Morrocan migration policy?
What are the main features of Egyptian migration policy?

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